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ABSTRACT
The Metamorphosis of Jewish identities in Nineteenth-Century Russia, 1801-1894
James R. Weiss

During the period between the ascension of Tsar Alexander I and Tsar Nicholas
II, the Jews of Russia and Russian officials were engaged in a curious partnership. Both
parties were concerned with determining the precise definition of Jewishness and how
this would change during the course of the nineteenth century. Russian officials, in the
main, wanted to refashion the Jews of Russia into Russophiles imbued with Russian
mores and education but, on no account, were these "new Jews" to be considered true
Russians since God had made them a distinct group from their Slavic neighbors. Being
compelled to be a part of the Russian milieu and yet kept apart from Russian society, the
best that a Jew of Russia could accomplish was to become a Russian with a Jewish
accent. From the Jewish perspective, specifically the intelligentsia and certain native and
foreign philanthropists, the Russian Jewish identity needed to be reformed in order to
maintain its viability but not at the price of complete assimilation. Towards that end, a
number of educational initiatives were presented to the Russian government and even
approved, giving the appearance of a partnership, though their respective ends were
hardly identical.
Understanding the underlying motivations of each side is imperative. Aside from
Russian xenophobia in all of its manifestations, Russian officials simply did not know
what to do with approximately 800,000 Ashkenazic Jews after the Polish partition of
1795. Being unknowns, Tsar Alexander (1801-1825) attempted to make them familiar to
the official Russian mind via the imposition of Russian education. With this exposure, the
Jews would then become Russians of a sort which meant that they were no longer to be
feared and could be utilized for Imperial benefit. In brief, this was the rationale of
Russian officialdom.
For their part, the Jews of Russia did not accept these policies passively.
Beginning in the mid-1830's and continuing until the end of the century, the Jews of
Russia, along with foreign allies, promoted their own reforms, some of which met with
favor from St. Petersburg. In the end, between wranglings and détente, the Jews of
Russia prevailed by creating a number of identities which bore various degrees of
Jewishness and yet allowed them to engage in the intellectual, social, and political
milieus beyond the bounds of their community.
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GLOSSARY OF PRINCIPAL TERMS
Bet Din: House of Judgment. In a Jewish community, this court of religious law, with
Russian government sanction, was presided over by the local rabbi to ensure the spiritual
welfare of its residents.
Behola: Fright. This was a reference to Jewish communal reactions following
amendments to the 1827 Recruitment Ukase which threatened to diminish the Jewish
ethos in Russia. It was particularly virulent during the 1830's.
Gaon: Titular spiritual leader of Eastern European Jewry who resided in Vilna.
Get: A divorce document procured from a Bet Din.
Kettuba: Literally, a writing, a wedding contract.
Halakhah: Jewish religious law, some of which is in Torah but largely in Talmud.
Haskalah: Enlightenment. This intellectual movement was imported to Russia from the
German lands and was a consequential influence upon Russian Jewish intellectual
development from the late 1830's until the middle of the 1870's.
Heder: Jewish primary school which all Jewish boys had to attend beginning at age three.
The teacher, the malamid, was responsible for instructing his charges in the rudiments of
Torah in order to enable them to lead moral lives and, for his brighter pupils, the requisite
knowledge to pursue more advanced learning in the bet ha-midrash (house of study) and
yeshiva.
Herem: Ban of excommunication from the Jewish faith. Usually the prerogative of the
Gaon or high-ranking rabbinical authorities attached to the Bet Dinim of the larger
Jewish intellectual centers.
Kadosh Hashem: Holiness of God. It is also the last pious act of a Jew facing death.
Melamed: Teacher in the heder.
Odessa School: Originating from a circle of Jewish intellectuals circa 1819-20, this was
one of the models for a modern Jewish curriculum which promised to liberate Russia's
Jews from their officially-perceived parochialism and transform them into "modern" and
useful citizens of the Empire.
Moses Mendelssohn and the Mendelssohnians: Gifted eighteenth-century German
scholar who attempted to make Orthodox Judaism dynamic by acquainting its precepts
with German rational philosophy. Though he did not intend to bring about the complete
assimilation of German Jewry to German customs, a circumstance against which he
inveighed with particular vehemence, some of those who ostensibly carried on his work
v

after his death succumbed. Having some knowledge of this, Sergei Uvarov, Nicholas I's
Minister for National Enlightenment, opined that if the Jews of Russia were exposed to
the German language and philosophy, their alienation from their traditions would only be
a matter of time.
Phylacteries: The two boxes containing the commandments to "bind the words of G-d
upon your hand, let them be a symbol before your eyes."
Rosh Hodesh: Head of the Month in the Hebrew calendar. In the Orthodox tradition, this
event is marked by special observances.
Tallis: Prayer shawl worn by mature Jewish males during prayer observances. A shorter
tallis katan (short tallis) is worn under the shirts of more observant Jews when outside of
the synagogue.
Torah: The five Mosaic scrolls.
Yeshiva: Academy. Jewish educational institution devoted to educating the more
scholarly members of the community in Talmud and advanced Halakhikh concepts.
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INTRODUCTION
Hasidism's triumph over the Vilna Rabbinate by securing a majority in the city's
kahal and the office of Gaon in 1798 initiated a new chapter in Jewish history. At issue
was the Jewish community's sense of being divided into numerous and antipodal factions
and the desire to regain its imagined communal cohesion, a task which held no promise
of facility. Where were they to begin? To many, communal restoration lay in the
establishment of a single, all-encompassing identity which would define for all time who
was a Jew and what was Jewishness.1 Superficially, the matter seemed plain enough yet
the ensuing quest occupied most of the nineteenth century and led to the formation of a
multiplicity of identities. This fragmentation ironically served to preserve Russian Jewry,
and the analysis of these identity transformations in nineteenth-century Russia (18011894) from an intellectual perspective is the principal concern of this work. As the Jews
of Russia struggled to define and maintain their cultural and intellectual distinctiveness
within a fairly hostile environment, the Russians themselves were occupied with defining
Russianness. The ensuing clashes between the government and its Jewish population
resulted in legislative action for most of the period and violence towards the end. Even
so, these actions served as the engine of identity formation for the Jews of Russia.
Official “reform measures” aimed at the Jews inspired Jewish intellectual and social
initiative, and it was this balance of initiative and accommodation which allowed the
Jews of Russia to remain intact by refashioning themselves into several Jewish entities,
distinct from one another and yet still Jewish.2

1

Martin Buber, On Judaism (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 24.
This description is akin to what Simon Dubnow termed “Diaspora nationalism” in his work Letters on Old
and New Jewry (1897). Since losing their state in 70 C.E., the Jews, in Dubnow’s estimation, still retained
1
2

2
At the core of this history was the unusual development of a blind partnership
which was quite significant in governing the course of this metamorphosis. Russian
authorities had little understanding of the Jews and, for their part, the Jews tended to view
Russians, and the government in particular, as unpredictable.3

While seemingly

unpromising, Russian officials and Jewish communal leaders and intellectuals were,
nevertheless, able to meet one another in the field of Jewish education. Seldom pacific, it
was often the scene of pitched battles not only between themselves but also, from time to
time, among themselves. Amidst numerous assertions, threats, retractions, modifications,
and accommodations, however, there emerged a rough symbiosis grounded in a mutual
spirit of give and take. In brief, the struggle for Jewish identity in Russia essentially
comes down to two general endeavors which were not necessarily in opposition. First of
all, Jewish communal leaders and intellectuals were concerned with preserving the
Jewish ethos among themselves and their coreligionists through the acquisition of
Jewishness, an umbrella term covering all subjects germane to Judaism.

Secondly,

Russian authorities sought to create an educated Jewish workforce capable, official
restrictions notwithstanding, of employment in useful endeavors.4 Throughout this

their Jewish national distinctiveness while adapting themselves to life within other nations. Sophie
Dubnow-Erlich, The Life and Work of S.M. Dubnow: Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish History
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 1.
3
Linda J. Ivanits, Russian Folk Beliefs (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), p. 90, 137. The usual images of
Jews in the Russian imagination according to Ivanits were of sorcerers who cast spells upon their Christian
neighbors or as adversaries of Christianity from its origins. A popular story which circulated for some time
before the nineteenth century was of Mary telling Jesus of a dream she had where the Jews had bound him
hand and foot and brought him before Pilate for judgement. On the Jewish side, the pogroms were
testament to the tenuous nature of their coexistence. The first major riot on Russian soil took place in
Odessa in 1821 with others occurring episodically thoughout the century. Usually, the slighted rumor was
enough to spark these disturbances. This will be discussed in more detail later on in this work.
4
John Klier, Russia Gathers her Jews: The Origins of the Jewish Question in Russia, 1772-1825 (DeKalb:
Northern Illinois University Press, 1986), p. 183. Not all reforms were ill-intentioned. Klier maintains
that, for the most part, Russian officials were attempting to fashion Jews into what they perceived to be
worthy citizens.
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ninety-three year symbiotic contest, neither side was completely satisfied with the results,
especially the Jews.

Emigration to Palestine and United States testified to this

disenchantment but just as significant was Russian Jewish communal viability whose
identity was, by 1894, secured through heterogeneity.
The ends of this metamorphosis may be clear but not the means by which they
were realized.

Perhaps one of the more challenging aspects of this subject is to

appreciate the relevant issues and emotional currents which were often obscured by
rhetoric and chancery language. Simple enough to state, it can be a daunting pursuit. By
way of a starting point, it is necessary to begin with the obvious. Russians and Jews lived
in mutual ignorance of one another, and this ignorance was not one arising exclusively
from cultural and theological considerations. The fact that a Jew was not a Russian and
vice versa was reason enough to excite mutual fear and distrust, and as facile as this
statement may appear, it was a truism which was often obscured in the flurry of activity
surrounding Jewish education and reform. Where this blindness was most evident was in
the endeavors of foreign Jewish philanthropists. Baron Maurice de Hirsch, for example,
was a wealthy French Jew who submitted to Alexander III a detailed proposal for Jewish
education for which he had set aside a considerable sum and directions for how the funds
were to be used. The Tsar approved his design only to find fault with it several months
later.

In his letter to Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Procurator of the Holy Synod, he

expressed his dismay at having crafted his project within the framework of Russian law
only to have it disallowed shortly after it had received the Tsar's approbation.5 On the
other side, Russian authorities had to contend with a prominent non-Russian group in

5

YIVO Archives 318/22/6. A letter from Baron de Hirsch to Konstantin Pobedonostsev. 16 May 1889.
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their midst whose beliefs and ways were alien to them.6 Foreseeing no other alternative,
the authorities, beginning with Tsar Alexander I and his ministers, embarked upon
various programs which sought to make the Jews a part of Russian society and yet apart
from it. This contradiction of purpose was considered feasible if Jewish youths were
given a broad-based and cosmopolitan education with a diminution of Jewish religious
instruction.7
By their very title, the Jews could not escape being identified with Judaism, but
though it served as their principal identity, it disguised certain aspects of the community’s
character which would emerge in the course of the century. Specifically, the struggle
between Rabbinical and Hasidic Judaism did not end in 1798. Acknowledging their
defeat but never conceding the field, the Vilna Rabbinate and its adherents engaged in a
partisan campaign to discredit the Hasidim. From time to time, articles would appear in
Jewish journals, such as Russkii evrei, condemning Jewish “religious fanaticism” as
being injurious to intellectual and social progress.8 More often than not, the Hasidim
stood accused of harboring and propagating this sentiment in addition to publishing
6

Of course, this was not always so. During the time of the Khazars and immediately thereafter, Russians
thought of Jews as being clever merchants and bearers of culture. Even the Judaising heresy which
involved some of the higher Kievan Christian clergy was not checked by religious authorities until 1487.
Unitl the early sixteenth century, Judaizers were influential at court and then, through a series of
ecclesiastical decrees, adherents were either executed, imprisoned for life, or compelled to return fully to
the Orthodox Church. A more distant memory in the Russian mind would have been Khazaria’s hostility
towards Byzantium which would have been interpeted as Jewish animosity towards Christianity. See Louis
Greenberg, The Jews of Russia: The Struggle for Emancipation vol. 1. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1944), pp. 3-6, and L. N. Gumilev, Ot rusi do rossii (St. Petersburg: Yuna, 1992), p. 42.
7
Dmitry Elyashevich, Pravitel’stvennaia politika i evreiskaia pechat v Rossii, 1797-1917: ocherki istorii
tsenzury (St. Petersburg: Mosty Kul’tury, 1999), pp. 63, 82. Anxiety over inadequate surveillance of the
western frontier, coupled with the inevitable smuggling in those regions, prompted Russian officals to
impose a ban on the importation of all foreign Jewish books in 1763. Some books, such as the Rosh
Hodesh Siddur, banned in Amsterdam on 22 January 1798 and in Russia shortly thereafter, were clearly
religious in nature whereas Bobe Maises (Grandmother’s Stories), was proscribed because some of the
stories were about landlords being murdered by their impoverished tenants.
8
“V vedenie evreiskago zakonucheniia v kievskikh gimnaziiakh.” Russkii evrei, 18 February 1881. no. 8.
p. 283.
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leaflets in Russian and Yiddish to swell their ranks. Jewish publishing overall was a
contentious issue particularly in the 1830’s when Tsar Nicholas, vowing to improve the
quality of Jewish literature, ordered the closing of all Jewish presses in Russia in 1836.9
Engendered in this action and those of his immediate predecessor was the suspicion of
Jewish sedition, a stigma which was never shed entirely.10 Regardless of any threats to
the state potential or imagined, when Jewish intellectuals and social progressives would
bring these charges to the attention to the government, the latter was disconcerted.
Obviously not wanting to admit that it did not know who or what to believe, it was
simply easier to impose some sort of temporary censure upon a group of Jews and be
done with it.11
Confusion was not the exclusive province of Russian officials. Caught up in the
maelstrom as well were intellectuals such as Lev Nevakhovich who perceived all official
efforts to improve the Jewish condition as attempts to diminish Jewish consciousness
which would lead, invariably, to its eradication.12 To ardent traditionalists, any change
from what they perceived to be Jewish meant immediate assimilation. As the nineteenth
century progressed, however, Jewish partisans of intellectual modernity initiated their
own improvement schemes from within the Jewish community as a means of maintaining
Jewish consciousness and the identities to which it gave birth. In the promotion of some
projects, such as the establishment of Jewish schools on the Odessa model, collaboration
9

Elyashevich, Pravitel’stvennaia politika i evreiskaia pechat, p. 125.
Ibid., pp. 66-7.
11
John Klier, Russia Gathers her Jews: The Origins of the Jewish Question in Russia, 1772-1825 (DeKalb:
Northern Illinois University Press, 1986), p. 183. Klier mentions that when confronted with the
complexities of Jewish issues, Russian officials merely blamed every consequence on the Jews just to rid
themselves of unpleasant situations with which they met.
10
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with Russian officials was necessary. What was also imperative was to play upon official
prejudices for Jewish advantage. A clear example of this was the introduction of German
into the curriculum of the modern Jewish schools. German was the language of science
and philosophy which Jewish educators saw as a means of broadening the intellectual
horizons of their students whereas Nicholas I and Sergei Uvarov, his Minister for
National Enlightenment, saw it as a guarantee of Jewish estrangement from Jewishness.
This and other issues will be discussed more fully in the body of this work, but it should
be noted here that the latter consequence did not come to pass and, in truth, aided in the
formation of Jewish identities in Russia.
Despite the trials, tribulations, and overall turbulence in Russia at this time, the
question in need of an answer is how could all of these distinct Jewish identities still lay
claims to Jewishness. In examining this particular historical process, it is a formidable
obstacle. Defining the Jews as a distinct “nation” is difficult given the varied shades it
took on during the century. David Weinberg is correct in his assertion that Jews in the
Russian milieu, owing to their splintered national identity, religious divisions, and lack of
territorial concentration, made it impossible for the Russian government to establish a
consistent definition of Jew.13 Contemporary Jewish efforts to create a definable identity
are equally frustrating. One of the fundamental problems associated with this issue of
identity and identity formation is the complicated interaction between “Russian” as a
national category and the Russian Empire as a multinational state. Such terms as “state,”
“nation”, even “tribe,” according to Ted Weeks, are adequate for describing specific
12

John Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855-1881 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), p. 73. Nevakhovich was an early representative of the Berlin Haskalah and not opposed to Jewish
reform in general, only Alexander I's proposals.
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relationships in certain circumstances, but there is no single definition which will hold
true in all instances. Furthermore, “state” and “nation,” especially in nineteenth-century
Russia, have to be considered separately.14

These difficulties, compounded by the

intellectual, social and political changes sweeping through the Empire in the mid to late
nineteenth century, however, do not put problems of Jewish identity formation out of
scholarly reach. If anything, there is plenty of work to be had.
In his now classic work, Benedict Anderson affirmed that “nationality,” owing to
the values individual scholars have assigned to it, is difficult to define and analyze.15 He
did, however, pose a solution which, he admitted freely, has its limitations but at least
sufficed in the broader spectrum.

Anderson’s definition of “nation” is that of an

“imagined political community” which is inherently limited and sovereign.

Such a

definition holds true for the Jews of Russia who imagined themselves as a community,
bound together by a common culture, language,16 and background, not to mention a
“shared memory” of experiences. Sovereignty, meaning a degree of political and cultural
autonomy, certainly existed among Russian Jews, though it varied throughout the
nineteenth century.
More recently, Ernest Gellner has amended and extended Anderson’s argument.
Common experiences and communal memory forge a shared culture, according to
Gellner. The very impetus for nationalism in a community, he contends, is brought about
by the educational and bureaucratic institutions of another, ostensibly, more powerful one
13

David Weinberg, Between Tradition and Modernity: Haim Zhitlowski, Simon Dubnow, Ahad Ha-Am
and the Shaping of Modern Jewish Identity (London: Holmes & Meier, 1996), p. 37.
14
Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the
Western Frontier 1863-1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), p. 4.
15
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(London: Verso Press, 1983), p. 3.
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which surrounds it.17 Communal memory is vital but, as Gellner concedes in citing
Ernest Renan, if a nation is to emerge, a shared amnesia must be also present for its
continued viability.18 By this statement, Gellner is referring to a community’s ability to
rejuvenate itself over time by discarding seemingly outmoded practices for more modern
and improved ones. The parallel with the nineteenth-century Russian Jewish community
is evident. Some segments of the Russian Jewish community exchanged time-worn
notions of the world and cultural practices for more cosmopolitan ones. Still, there is one
other dimension to this evolutionary process which warrants examination. This same
amnesia inspired offended traditionalists to reconstitute the lost Jewish world that existed
before the Khmelnytsky Risings (1648-56) and, therefore, reclaim identity. Well before
the nineteenth century, but particularly acute during that period, the interplay of memory
and amnesia was crucial in Jewish identity formation.
Literature on the Jews of Russia and Russian Jewry is extensive, and while this
facilitates research in the field, it also presents challenges. Since Russian society was the
larger of the two, historians tend to concentrate more upon its trials and tribulations than
those experienced by Jews. Even when the Jews are the subject under study, their “side”
of the Jewish Question and related issues is often given minimal to moderate attention
and, more often than not, viewed through Russian eyes.

Limited access to Jewish

archival material in Russia, lost or destroyed documentation, and a host of other
difficulties were acknowledged limitations on historical investigation. Since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, a number of these frustrations have been removed while some

16

Yiddish
Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. viii.
18
Gellner, Culture, Identity, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987 ), p. 6.
17
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stubbornly persist. Even this work was not spared, though every attempt has been made
to present a balanced account of those Russian, Jewish, and other (especially Polish)
forces which influenced the formation of Jewish identities in nineteenth-century Russia.
Resurrection of the historical Jewish voice, where Jews are permitted to express
themselves intellectually, socially, and politically, is crucial.

This endeavor is now

possible given the greater freedom accorded scholars in Russian archives. All the more
encouraging, native Russian scholars, some of whom are Jews, have discovered materials
in archives which were either barred to Western scholars or simply unknown to them.
Whatever the reasons, these scholars are publishing articles and books in the field which
can only augment the extant literature.
Optimism is indeed warranted, though it should be recognized that scholarship on
Russian Jewry tends to fall into two categories: Russocentric Jewish history and
Judeocentric Russian history. Neither can claim superiority over the other and, in certain
respects, their contributions have been substantial. Moreover, some authors belong to
both categories, depending on the particular work. Even so, to analyze them properly, it
is best to separate them into their respective groupings beginning with the larger
Russocentric group.

It should come as no surprise that nineteenth-century Russian

sources on Jewish affairs are more plentiful and easily accessible than contemporaneous
Jewish ones. Despite being an outspoken advocate of a Jewish historical ressurrection,19
even Simon Dubnow had to labor under just such a limitation in composing his three-

19

Dubnow-Erlich, The Life and Work of S.M. Dubnow, pp. 4-5. Weinberg, Between Tradition and
Modernity, pp. 145-7.
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volume work, The History of the Jews of Russia and Poland (1915).20 Though dated in
certain areas, it is still a valuable source for any work in the field. Certainly well
researched for its time, Dubnow’s reliance upon Russian materials, however, tends to
portray the Jews as being recipients of their fate rather than being proactive in shaping it.
A far more recent and extreme representative of the Russocentric historiography,
however, is Heinz Dietrich-Lowe’s The Tsars and the Jews: Reform, Reaction, and AntiSemitism in Imperial Russia 1772-1917 (1993), which is concerned primarily with the
Jewish “image” that the political right manufactured and manipulated to achieve its
ends.21 In light of his purpose, the author states openly that he has no interest in who the
Jews “were,” merely what they were perceived to be.
The same could be said of much of the more specialized literature. Michael
Stanislawski’s Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in
Russia 1825-1855 (1983) is concerned with presenting an objective account of the
legislative causes which transformed Jewish society during Nicholas I’s reign.22 Though
he is meticulous in his examination of causes and effects, the Jews in Stanislawski’s
study are objects of official ministrations rather than actors in their own right. Coming a
little closer to the Jewish side but still rooted in Russian sources is John Klier’s Imperial
Russia’s Jewish Question 1855-1881 (1995). Unlike Deitrich-Lowe, Klier does touch
upon Jewish identity formation but again, it is mainly from the Russian perspective.
Having consulted no less than 200 journals, newspapers, and periodicals relating to
20

Simon Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland from the Earliest Times until the Present
(Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1915).
21
Heinz Deitrich-Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews: Reform, Reaction and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia
1772-1917 (Geneva: Harwood Press, 1993).
22
Michael Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia
1825-1855 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1983), p. xii.
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Russian public opinion about the Jews during the reign of Tsar Alexander II, Klier is still
dealing with the Jewish “image” rather than the Jews for what they were. In light of his
purpose, this was the most viable role Klier could accord them since his primary concern
focused on what particular Russian parties meant when they spoke of the Jewish
Question and how each proposed to resolve it.
In his earlier work, Russia Gathers her Jews: The Origins of the Jewish Question
in Russia 1772-1825 (1986), Klier declared at the outset that this work would concentrate
on Russia’s acquisition and administration of its Jewish population. Here, the Jews are
used to illustrate Russian bureaucratic attitudes towards a sizable non-Russian population
which had to be incorporated into the Empire as a political necessity.

Again, the

consequences arising from Russian-Jewish contact are seen as Russian problems rather
than Jewish ones, even though the Jews are at the core of the matter.
The same can be said of Hans Rogger’s Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics
in Imperial Russia (1986) which addresses the question of why Jews were treated as
second-class citizens in the period 1881-1917.23

In his estimation, the Jews were

convenient pawns in the delicate and often treacherous game of Imperial politics. Though
concerned primarily with the Jews, Rogger, nevertheless, attempts to avoid scholarly
near-sightedness by placing the Jewish plight within the context of those suffered by the
Baltic Germans, Poles, Finns, and other non-Russian nationalities. Despite the cursory
treatment given these other groups, Rogger points out that the Jews of Russia have to be
examined within a broader spectrum in order to present as complete an historical account
of Russian official attitudes as possible.

12
Michael Aronson’s Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish
Pogroms in Russia (1990), has a narrower focus than some of the previously mentioned
works but it serves a vital purpose with regard to the Jewish condition in relation to
official policy.24

Given his minute investigation and assessment of the Odessa and

Kishinev pogroms, the author provides a compelling case against any involvement on the
part of the Imperial government. Aronson’s conclusions stand in stark contrast to those
stated in Edward Judge’s work. Judge’s Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom
(1992)25 considers the 1882 pogrom within the context of world opinion and is reluctant
to give up the notion of official involvement entirely. Eventually conceding that local
anxieties may have been the impetus, he then claims that pogroms, not necessarily the
Jews, were a prominent and influential force in Russian politics during the 1880’s.
According to Judge, the Jews served both as a means to achieve various political ends as
well as the recipients of the socio-political fallout.
For some time now, the Judeocentric side of Russian Jewish history has been
given considerable attention, especially in the publication of biographies and biographical
sketches. Michael Stanislawski’s For Whom Do I Toil? Judah Leib Gordon and the
Crisis of Russian Jewry (1988) offered a fresh perspective on Jewish educational
initiatives from the mid-nineteenth century onward.26 Though centered on Gordon’s
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activities, the author also placed him within the larger scope of Jewish and Russian social
and intellectual transformations which would come to fruition by the end of the century.
Though possessing an even narrower focus but undoubtedly a substantial work is
Sophie Dubnow-Erlich’s The Life and Work of S.M. Dubnow: Diaspora Nationalism and
Jewish History (1991).27 Taken from a voluminous and heretofore unpublished work,
Dubnow’s daughter emphasized her father’s self-appointed role of “the missionary of
history” to the Jewish people. She also recounted his influence and criticisms of the
various Jewish cultural, intellectual, and political movements, many of which he believed
would bring about the death of Russian Jewry. Of particular import was his opposition to
Ahad Ha-Am and the Palestinophile movement of the 1880’s which, in Dubnow’s
estimation, was a misrepresentation of the highest order to Russia’s desperate Jewish
population.28
By devoting his research to Dubnow and two other Jewish intellectuals who
bridged the gap between religious Orthodoxy and secular nationalism, David Weinberg
has made a profound contribution to Judeocentric Russian history. His work, Between
Tradition and Modernity (1996), recounted the major contributions of Haim Zhitlowski,
Dubnow, and Ahad Ha-Am (Asher Guinsberg) who, in Weinberg’s opinion, shaped the
modern Jewish identity.29 Though their respective biographies are presented as three
distinct chapters, the author established a “roundtable” within the work which allowed for
dispute and dialogue among the three participants.
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Clearly, the Jewish voice and initiative are present in these works. This is no less
true of Steven Zipperstein’s The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History 1794-1881 (1985).
This particular Jewish community’s unusual rise to prominence, the author contended,
was a consequence of internal transformation.30

Jewish actions and initiative were

clearly the dominant theme of this work. With the passing of rabbinism in Odessa, many
Jewish intellectuals who had been waiting in the wings put into practice their various
skills and knowledge which they had acquired beyond the heder curriculum.31 This same
emphasis on Jewish initiative in identity formation was present in some collaborative
works as well. In Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History (1992),
Alexander Orbach’s “The Development of the Russian Jewish Community 1881-1903”
provided some interesting revelations. Though 94% of the Empire’s Jews still resided in
the Pale as late as 1897, certain categories had been allowed to leave it. Few took
advantage of this liberality and those who did, left behind the world of the shtetl and
prayer house to transform the synagogue into a political crucible from which, they hoped,
an original and singular Jewish national identity would spring.32 Orbach’s analysis ties in
neatly with Klier’s “Russian Jewry on the Eve of the Pogroms” in which the author
argued that the 1881 pogroms inspired Russian Zionism’s determination to establish a
“new” Jewish identity divorced from the Russian experience. The pogroms could very
well have forged a Zionist identity, but care should be taken in extending it to Russian
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Jewry as a whole since Jewish identity had assumed several forms by the early to mid1880’s.
By the 1880’s, “modernity” had come to mean, for some, citizenship in a civil
society which allowed for political participation. In Assimilation and Community: The
Jews in Nineteenth Century Europe (1992), Eli Lederhendler contended that Russian
Jewry did not obtain this prize fully until February 1917.33 In his article, “Modernity
Without Emancipation or Assimilation? The Case of Russian Jewry,” the author
maintained that as the Jewish polis came into its own, political modernity was its sole
concern. This is in keeping with David Vital’s Origins of Zionism (1975)34, but in many
respects, both Vital and Lederhendler parochialized the issues by limiting Russian Jewry
identity formation to political goals exclusively. Both authors accorded Jewish culture
and religion an inferior status in the modern era almost to the point of ignoring them.
Viewed from the narrow basis of Jewish socialist literature from the mid-1860’s to the
1880’s, their respective portrayals of the Jewish identity appear skewed and monolithic.
Not to be discounted is the fairly recent work of Russian and Russian Jewish
scholars which have made some notable contributions in the past seven years. For
example, Novaia evreiskaia biblioteka (1992), is an anthology with an academic
orientation.35 Its contributors are specialists in Jewish history, anthropology, sociology,
as well as in other fields of Jewish studies, who have published their work for a broad
audience in an effort to restore Jewish knowledge which had been suppressed during the
Soviet period. Appealing to the Russian Jewish public and popular interest, works such
33
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as Yevreiskii mir (1992),36 the Russian translation and compendium of Rabbi Joseph
Telushkin’s Jewish Literacy, and Ruth Samuel’s Po tropam evreiskoi istorii (1993),37
have been published for the benefit of those who have had either no knowledge of Jews
and Judaism or a superficial one.
A balanced account of the Jewish metamorphosis is a key concern of this work.
Even so, it was imperative to begin with official Russian records, principally, the law
statutes and state papers comprising the Polnoe sobraniia zakonov rossiiskoi imperii
(series I & II). Both Series I (1649 to December 1825) and Series II (1825/6 to March
1917) have been cited throughout this work and, consequently, all dates are given Old
Style. Admittedly, this source has its limitations, nevertheless it does provide a coherent
chronology of the Russian official disposition towards the Jews and the proscriptions
under which Jewish reformers had to labor in order to realize their projects either in
whole or part.38
In terms of organization, the first chapter will address those conditions and
circumstances which brought about the physical and intellectual scattering of the Jewish
community and attempts to reconstitute an imagined original whole. Subsequently,
Jewish and Russian encounters and relationships will be examined, concluding with the
ascension of Tsar Alexander I. Chapter II will overlap somewhat with the preceding
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chapter in its examination of the consequences of the Polish partitions, the challenges to
Jewish identity, and the Jewish Question.

Both Paul I (1796-1801) and Alexander I

(1801-1825) attempted to address Jewish issues by various means, not all of them
accepted in silence. Beginning with Lev Nevachovich’s essay, “Lament of the Daughters
of Judah,” and continuing throughout this work, voiced Jewish apprehensions,
accommodations, and innovations will be introduced to balance the all but eclipsing
Russian dicta.39 Chapter III will take up the Jewish metamorphosis during Nicholas I's
(1825-1855) reign. Though official attempts to accelerate changes in Jewish demeanor
through the imposition of Russian mores via compulsory military service and educational
institutions were certainly prominent, they had to share company with equally notable
Jewish initiatives. This thirty-year period saw the emergence of the blind partnership
between the government the Jews but also frustrations within the Jewish community itself
over identity and education, some of which were settled immediately while others
lingered on for decades.
Chapter IV's principal theme is reconstruction.

Most immediate was the

challenge before Alexander II to rebuild both government and state in the aftermath of
the Crimean War. For the Jews, the Garden of Eden had not be realized but, at the very
least, the temper of Alexander II's reign allowed them to breathe freer than they had ever
been permitted in Russian history. During these twenty-six years, Jewish self-awareness
and intellectual development allowed the community to examine who and what they
were. One boon in particular was the relative relaxation of the censorship laws in April
1862 and the rise of the boulevard press three years later. From these developments, the
39
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Jews were not excluded. Journals such as Evreiskaia biblioteka (Jewish Library), for
example, one of a number of Jewish journals, reflected this growing intellectual
awareness and expression among the Jews. For a brief period prior to January 1863 and
the Polish Insurrection, the Jews of Russia were permitted more than they had ever been
in determining their own cultural and intellectual evolution. Knowledge, specifically
secular learning in a variety of fields, was prized since it led to opportunities to express
Jewish talents in gainful and meaningful employment.
Russian authorities and society were taken aback by Jewish initiatives. After
suppression of the Polish Rising (1863-64), the problem for Russians became the Jewish
strength of purpose, a clear commitment for defining who they were and what they
proposed to become. Contending with the difficulties associated with serf emancipation
(1861), Poland, and the Odessa pogrom (1871), such assertiveness was ominous.
Ukrainian nationalism inspired the government to take a harder line which, invariably,
affected the Jews. From the mid to late 1870's, Jewish admission and advancement in
several fields became much more restrictive, and Jewish education itself was coming
under fire in terms of its supposed efficacy and the chimera of respectability in the eyes
of Russian officials.
Chapter V concerns the culminating phase of the nineteenth-century Jewish
metamorphosis during the reign of Tsar Alexander III (1881-1894). Certainly no friend
of the Jews, he nevertheless had to play the role of “philosemite” on occasion in order to
curry favor, especially monetary investments, from Jews such as Baron de Rothschild and
Baron Maurice de Hirsch. With Russia struggling to transform itself into a modern state,

which will amplify the Jewish voice.
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the Jews of Russia resumed an active role determining their individual and collective
fates with the assistance of domestic and foreign philanthropy. Voskhod (Rising), a
journal which ran from 1881 to 1899 and episodically thereafter, provided an open forum
for Russian Jewish opinions as did Russkii evrei. Intellectual investigation, debate, and
ongoing infighting over various issues promoted the Jewish community’s diversification,
though this proved a strength rather than a weakness. Disparities of education, wealth,
and social orientation made an all-encompassing definition of Jew impossible. Simon
Dubnow, the first comprehensive historian of Russian Jewry, saw in this divisiveness the
community’s complete dissolution, as did Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Procurator of the
Holy Synod. This did not come to pass. Lacking a monolithic national identity actually
allowed the Jews of Russia to become socialists, communists, Zionists, secularists, and
Bundists, or remain Orthodox or Hasidic, and still lay claim to Jewish identities as they
suited their particular dispositions. By the time of Nicholas II's ascension in 1894,
concerns over Jewish identities shifted to the political arena where, it was believed, Jews
could safeguard their gains by obtaining a viable political voice.

CHAPTER 1: THE ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN JEWISH QUESTION
Introduction:
The year 1798 was the ignition point for the Jewish metamorphosis on Russian
soil, yet it was only one of two.

Preceding it by 150 years was the first of the

Khmelnytsky risings which inspired the popular Jewish quest to reconstitute what had
been imagined as a whole Jewish community and identity.1 For 384 years (1264-1648
Poland and Lithuania had served the Jews as refuges from both Crusaders and the
Inquisition, a condition which had allowed them to flourish as a community in a variety
of ways. Aside from their engagement in a number of activities, what made Polish and
Lithuanian Jews unique was their devotion to learning. The Vilna Gaon2 and rabbinate
were renowned throughout the European Jewish community, and many flocked to the
lively intellectual centers of Vilna, Lublin, and other cities known for their rabbinical
academies.

Despite episodic proscriptions and expulsions, the Jews enjoyed a

considerable degree of collective prosperity and autonomy though, by no means, had
Eden been transplanted.
Growing animosity towards the Jews on the part of Polish noblemen after 1539
did not alarm most Jews, especially merchants and estate managers whose economic
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interests had brought them into close contact with the Polish szlachta.3 If there had been
some value attached to their association with the Crown and nobility, it was lost during
Khmelnytsky’s seven-year rebellion against the Polish monarchy. In the diaries and
official correspondence between Khmelnytsky, Polish King Jan Casimir, and Tsar Alexis,
Khmelnytsky’s erstwhile Russian “protector," the Jews were virtually invisible.4
Regardless, the Jews found themselves dispersed and divested of the institutions which
had given them their sense of communal stability, wholeness, and identity. In order to
restore what had been lost, they relied on their own resources and efforts to rebuild
Judaism from the rubble and amidst the uncertainties of daily life. It was a daunting task.
Physical dislocation coupled with a dire spiritual need for rejuvenation left the
Eastern European Jewish community desperate for any hope of communal or religious
reconstitution, messianic or otherwise. Such vulnerability invited the ministrations of
individuals such as Sabbatai Zevi and Jacob Frank who appealed to those for whom the
Vilna Rabbinate was geographically and spiritually remote.5 Being among the people
rather than placing themselves at a distance from them gave them a decided advantage
over their spiritual leaders who had no inclination to venture forth and instruct those
whom they considered their spiritual subjects.

Emphasizing their estrangement, the

Rabbinate failed to offer feasible alternatives to what Zevi and Frank were preaching.
Impotence was disguised by a hail of missals threatening to place under herem (ban of
3
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excommunication) communities and individuals who followed these men and their
respective movements, though how the Gaon proposed to enforce this decree was left
unsaid. Frustration mounted on both sides. The community wanted guidance and an
education from a dispassionate leadership which assumed that its directives would be
implemented without question owing to its position in the Jewish world.

By the

eighteenth century, it was apparent that Judaism had to be brought to the people, and the
vehicle responsible for bringing this about was the Hasidic movement.
At least in the mind of its founder, Israel ben Eliazer, the Baal Shem Tov (Master
of the Holy Name), or Besht as he came to be known, Hasidism was a sincere attempt to
bring the complexities of Torah, Talmud and Kaballah down to the level of ordinary
Jews.6 Once imbued with a general knowledge of Jewish beliefs and rituals, the Besht
opined, the Jewish majority could participate actively in Jewish life. Though Eliazer was
not a rabbi, his two successors, Dov Baer and Schneur Zalman were, and they were
responsible for the spread of Hasidism throughout the spiritual realm Vilna claimed for
itself. Acting out of self recrimination for failing to educate the Jews themselves, the
Rabbinate, under the leadership of Elijah ben Solomon, Vilna’s most noteworthy Gaon,
embarked upon a campaign against the Hasidim which ended with Vilna falling under
Hasidic control. The diminution of the Rabbinate, however, was not the only dramatic
change with which the Jews had to contend.
At the time of the first Polish partition in 1772, Empress Catherine II either had
no knowledge of the Hasidic-Rabbinate debate or it was of no importance to her. The
new territory she had acquired needed to be assessed, put in order, and utilized for the
5
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benefit of the Russian Empire. Unlike Elizabeth I (1740-63), Catherine the Great did not
fear the Jews nor did she have any marked philo- or anti-Semitic leanings. Concerned
more with how to utilize Jewish talents, Catherine, in the course of her reign admitted
Jews to the Empire so that they could be of service. The Pale of Jewish Settlement
established in 1795 was a deferral of what would become Russia’s Jewish Question.
Dying the next year, it became Paul I's concern and, five years later, Alexander I's.

The Polish Legacy

In 889, German persecutions prompted the first mass influx of Jewish refugees
into Poland which were followed by several more by 894. Removed from their perils and
anxious for respite, the Jews thought Poland to be a true haven.7 Social conditions there
were so amenable that Hebrew linguists rendered Poland into two Hebrew phonemes,
“Pol” and “lin,” meaning “stay overnight” or “here God rested.”8

Whatever the

interpretation, the crystallization of the Polish monarchy coupled with the growth of
towns and villages attracted many Jewish tradesmen, merchants and artisans who served
themselves as well as the Polish elite through holding a virtual monopoly on the luxury
goods trade.9 Polish noblemen made ready use of Jews as tax collectors, estate managers,
and in a variety of administrative capacities which, over time, made them the mainspring
of commercial life in the small private towns of the southeast. Although all of this
6
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compared favorably to the conditions they had known in the German lands, even the
“new Canaan” was not entirely free of nasty turns. Working on behalf of the Polish
nobility was often hazardous. Prior to 1264 and especially after 1539 Jews in the employ
of one lord could and often did suffer injury, hindrance, and even death at the hands of
another lord’s retainers in order to satisfy a parochial grievance between the two
magnates. With the transfer of Jewish patronage from the Crown to the nobility, the
dangers increase and pretenses to Jewish protection were gradually dropped.
Jewish welfare had been a Crown concern for nearly three hundred years.
Identified in some sources as King Boleslaw the Wise, in others, “the Pious,” what was
not in dispute was his enactment of the 1264 Statute of Kalisz and its definition of PolishJewish affairs.10 In addressing the imperfect nature of this relationship, this piece of
legislation set forth precise instructions as to how both parties were to interact socially,
theologically, and commercially. Christians accusing Jews of wrongdoing would now be
heard only if the accuser could bring forth two Christians and two Jews whose characters
were beyond repute to testify to the charge. In addition, the Christian plaintiff had to
swear on the cross while the Jewish defendant had to attest to his innocence on the Ten
Commandments.11

Should anyone be found to swear falsely, the penalty was

excommunication for the Christian and lifetime exile from the Jewish community for the
other. These penalties would serve as guarantees, thought the King, against superfluous
and manufactured suits.
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Primary to the Statute’s aims was a commercial relationship which had become
strained owing to Jewish and Polish competition in a number of areas. Jews were often
charged higher tolls, a form of discrimination redressed by the statute. Associated with
this was one other practice which Boleslaw found most abhorrent, that being the demand
for special duties from Jews on the part of some customs officials when transporting
corpses of their coreligionists from one town to another in order to inter them. Both
actions were now treated as criminal offenses and their perpetrators deemed thieves. In
addition, Jews were now permitted to hold hereditary estates into which they had come
via foreclosure. The King also decreed that Jews were considered “treasures” (i.e.
valuable assets), and with that status, were not obliged to participate in military
campaigns or contribute to such endeavors.12 In general, the Statute can be interpreted as
a perceptive countermove to noble exploitation; however, even Boleslaw, whose position
was more secure than his successors, realized that every lacuna would be manipulated to
Jewish disadvantage and all that he could hope for was that his successors would honor
this mandate.
The most important aspect of the Kalisz Statute was its draconian treatment of the
Blood Libel. In the clearest language, article 39 stated that Pope Innocent had declared
such acts fantastic since they violated Jewish law. Papal authority on this matter was
beyond question but should anyone insist upon pressing this charge, it had to be
prosecuted on the testimony of three Jews and four Christians, all of whom had to be
property holders and of irreproachable character. If the matter progressed to trial, it
would be held in a synagogue and judged by the palatine of that region and by a Jewish
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judge.

Death and complete property divestment would be the outcome of these

proceedings either for the defendant if found guilty or for the plaintiff if caught in a
deception.13

No law could eradicate or cowl popular superstition completely since

rumors of such activities persisted within the Polish Kingdom and later Commonwealth.
Even so, this provision prevented actual trials from occurring and the Statute’s overall
integrity in safeguarding Jewish liberties lasted 275 years.
Jewish liberties in Western Europe had also existed de jure, but the Statue of
Kalisz was unique because it encouraged Jewish communal vitality.14 Altruism may
have been an impulse in the King’s reasoning, though practicality was the governing
force, particularly in commercial affairs. Boleslaw knew the value of his assets and
realized that if the Kingdom were to benefit fully from these astute and industrious
people, they had to possess a sense of stability and have opportunities to express their
talents. Towards those ends, Boleslaw authorized their engagements in moneylending and
estate management.15 Many Jews prospered from this relatively free market and from the
successive confirmation of commercial privileges and political autonomy under Casimir
the Great (1364), Casimir IV (1453) and Stanislaw August (1765).16
Secure in their status, Jews were also accorded liberties and freedom from
molestation which allowed Jewish life and culture to flourish, eventually making the
Kingdom of Poland and then Poland-Lithuania (1385) the center of Eastern European
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Jewry.17 Encumbered with fewer proscriptions than in the West, Polish Jews suffered
fewer privations since they were under the King’s personal protection. All of this would
change, however, in 1539 when the monarchy was compelled to relinquish considerable
authority to the nobility, including its patronage of the Jews.18

When this transition

occurred, the Jews expressed little concern since their contracts and patents were binding
and defensible under Crown law; moreover, they had had to plead their cases often over
the years. It mattered little initially if justice came from the King or the local nobleman
since the Jewish relationship with the “jurisdiction of the castle,” as local administration
had come to be termed, was already centuries old and the nobles, in theory, were bound
by the same legal strictures. By 1648, this would be tested to the limit.
Jews were both prized and cursed in noble eyes. Many noblemen, especially
middling ones, envied Jewish commercial success and domination in some parts of the
Commonwealth, a sentiment made more acute by the belief that Boleslaw and his
successors had favored Jews through the establishment of special conditions which
allowed them to compete unfairly with their Polish rivals.19 The time had come for
restitution. In 1539-40 there circulated throughout the Commonwealth a “conversion
libel” which accused the Jews of deceiving innocent Christians into converting to
Judaism by arguing that Christ was a Jew.20 This would not be the last instance of
suspected “Judaizing.” Although the whole affair was discovered to be a farce by mid-
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1540, the damage had been done.

Strict proscriptions were imposed upon Jewish-

Christian contacts which polarized both groups psychologically as well as spiritually.
Some noblemen forced Jews to accept baptism and conversion to Catholicism out of a
spirit of “divine revenge,” a practice which met with tangible resistance and would
continue well into the next century. In retrospect, these episodes of coercion, harassment
and intimidation were merely antecedents to Bogdan Khmelnytsky’s pogroms which laid
bare Jewish vulnerability in Poland.21
Prior to 1648, most Jews regarded their life in the Commonwealth as one of give
and take. For all of their liberties, they were expelled from Lithuania in 1495 on an
unspecified pretext only to be repatriated in 1503, though they remained barred from
certain cities. More legislation aimed at the Jews would follow. The Second Lithuanian
Statute (also known as the Volhynian Statute) condemned Jews to death by burning for
circumcising and converting their slaves to Judaism as well as for compelling Christian
women to act as wet nurses to Jewish infants. The Third Lithuanian Statute (1588)
merely recapitulated its immediate predecessor with some minor additions.22

As

extracommunal hostility increased, however, Jewish cultural and spiritual activities in
and around Vilna became more vigorous. Several Hebrew and Yiddish presses and
libraries were established as well as a famous yeshiva (rabbinical academy) whose Gaon
would eventually determine Jewish orthodoxy in Belarus and Russia as well as in Poland
and Lithuania. From painful historical experience, however, the Jews had learned that
fortune was temporary and that the Evil Eye would not miss an opportunity to bring low
21

Rabbi Nathan ben Moses, Yeven Metzulah (Abyss of Despair): The Seventeenth Century Chronicles
depicting Jewish Life in Russia during the Chmielnicki Massacres 1648-9, translated by Abraham J.
Mesch (1649; reprint, New York: Bloch Publishing, 1950), pp. 37-41.

29
the haughty. Even in the best of times the boundary between paradise and perdition was
a fine one.
Boleslaw could not exert his will from the grave. Trailing after the Jews like an
unwanted camp follower, the Blood Libel still made its rounds among Christians who
remained convinced that Jews required the blood of unbaptized Christian children as a
leavening agent for matzos and blood offerings to “their God.”23 Any time of the year
was ripe for Libel rumors, though Easter was most susceptible owing to its proximity to
Passover. In 1534, a riot ensued after the commission of a ritual murder in Plock which
was later discovered to be a hoax. Five years later, another one surfaced; on this occasion
the hapless Jews were executed, since not even the King’s authority could prevent
vigilante “justice” and the nobles were reluctant to intercede.
Viewed as theological pariahs, Jews were also singled out for having the unique
and unenviable position of being the only stewards, functionaries and petty entrepreneurs
(i.e. innkeepers, craftsmen, etc.) to enjoy greater proximity to the peasant population than
either King or nobleman. Valued when needed, Jews were also easy targets of popular
recrimination for real and alleged malfeasance.24 Polish magnates, the real perpetrators
of such burdens as higher rents, price increases on basic staples, and demands for longer
working weeks, were usually absent, but the Jewish agents of their estates were almost
always local. That a number of Jews were also tax farmers did little to endear them to
larger rural population. As noble demands for more revenue grew, so too did the tax
22
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farmers’ portion, leading many villagers to believe that these Jewish ”lackeys,” and not
the “unseen” King and nobles, were extorting money, a misconception which made rural
Jewish livelihoods precarious. Jewish incomes were as meager and, at times, episodic as
that of any Polish peasant. Gratuities earned from tax farming, a temporary commission,
augmented Jewish incomes, but this was little appreciated by their affected Christian
neighbors who often lived proximate to them.

Now firmly under castle (noble)

jurisdiction, Jews had to apply to their noble employers for protection, the very stratum of
Polish society least sympathetic to them. Their collective fate in pre-partition Poland was
fast approaching its nadir. Even the mere suspicion of illicit trading or petty extortion
could ignite a riot or, at the very least, an official expulsion edict, a measure which would
find favor with Russian officials in the not too distant future.25
Matters came to a head in early 1648 when King Wladyislaw IV summoned
Cossack leaders, including Bogdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Sich, to
Warsaw in order to plan a joint Polish-Cossack expedition against the Turks. All were in
accord with this project save the Sejm which refused to finance the campaign. Not
wishing to press the nobles, Wladyslaw abandoned his plans not knowing what he was
about to unleash.26 Khmelnytsky believed himself aggrieved. In his address to the
Cossack hetmen, the King had promised to maintain ancient Cossack traditions, but this
pledge seemed contingent upon the now-moribund expedition and could be disavowed by
the Sejm at will. Whatever his thoughts may have been, the Zaporozhian Hetman wanted
24
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to “express” his displeasure with the monarch’s change of mind in person, an opportunity
which escaped him with Wladyslaw’s death in May 1648. Since he had not had the
opportunity to establish a rapport with Jan Casimir, though he had actually favored him
initially, Khmelnytsky found himself in open rebellion against the King with the odds in
Cossack disfavor.27
In Jewish history, this rebellion would bring to an end the wholeness of the
imagined Jewish community. Whether Khmelnytsky was an active anti-Semite or not
cannot be answered with absolute certainty despite the substantial number of Jewish
deaths attributed to his men.28

Given the series of rebellions which followed

Khmelnytsky’s revolt in 1648, the number of Cossacks involved, and the breakdown of
law and order, Jews falling victim to those seeking sanguinary restitution for grievances,
real and imagined, would have been a natural consequence. On 28 July 1655, for
instance, the Jews of Vilna were attacked by both marauding Cossacks and Muscovite
soldiers, resulting in considerable loss of life among the defenseless inhabitants.29 As for
the Zaporozhian Hetman’s personal sentiments, judging from his correspondence, the
Jews never figured in his plans.
According to Nathan ben Moses, a Jewish witness and survivor, the revolt began
on 25 May 1648, when the Jewish governor of Czehiryn, Zachariah Sobilenski, claimed
that Choronzhy, a nobleman, had not paid his land taxes in full. Immediately, charges of
“Jewish churl,” “extortionist,” and a host of other expletives flew about, confirming a
resolution on the part of Choronzhy and his henchmen to pay back the Jews with interest
26
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for all of the years of alleged fiscal abuse.30 Supposedly, this episode intensified the
rebellion against King Jan Casimir with considerable Ukrainian noble and peasant
support though, in all probability, it was one of many such events. What followed
regardless was a massacre beyond compare to any previous violent outbreak in Eastern
Europe. Jews in the villages and private towns had no effective defenses. Some were put
to the sword while others were captured, sold into slavery, or simply slaughtered in their
sleep.31 This pogrom raged until June, with Khmelnytsky’s forces defeating the Poles on
many fields and the Jews suffering the brunt of these victories. Taking advantage of the
turmoil in Nemerov, for instance, Hetman Ganya called upon the Jews to convert to
Catholicism. Responding to this demand with all speed, Rabbi Jechiel ben Eliezer led the
entire community of 6,000 in Kadosh Hashem (the prayer sanctifying God’s name) who
were then martyred on 10 June.32 Not long afterwards, Hetman Krivonoss of Tulczyn
made the same demand of the 15,000 Jews there and met with the same result.33 Those
who survived the 1648-9 massacres remembered them as “gzerot takh ve tat” (times of
evil). In the traditional grace after meals on 20 Sivan (June 15), the phrase “lo nikem”
(let us not be disgraced) was replaced with “velo nikoshel” (let us not stumble),
“stumble” being a euphemism for conversion to Christianity.34
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The calculations involved in these compulsory and humiliating “conversion-ordeath” mandates reveal a deeper angst which had been coalescing for some time
previously, though the extant sources give no specific reasons for the hetmen’s actions.35
As for Khmelnytsky, fortune was already turning against him. Smarting over his rout at
the Battle of Beresteczko (29-30 June 1651), and frustrated completely with Poland’s
monarchical weakness, Khmelnytsky, on 22 March 1652, petitioned Tsar Alexis for
personal and corporate citizenship.36 Four times within the corpus of his petition, he
protested his faith as well as that of his company in the Russian Orthodox Church as well
as their willingness to serve Muscovy. With the aid of prolific rhetorical flourishes,
Khmelnytsky transformed himself from a Cossack hetman into a Christian knight leading
a body of men, ready to defend the Church. He admitted openly to destroying several
Polish towns and laying waste to countless versts, being as expansive in his narrative as
Jan Casimir would be in his a year later and equally silent about the Jews. This lacuna
mattered little since Alexis had his own affairs to settle with the Commonwealth, and yet
it is telling in terms how visible the Jews were to the Cossack insurgents not to mention
their sentiments towards them.
Khmelnytsky’s letter possessed a sense of urgency, much like the petition of a
desperate supplicant to an indifferent authority figure, though he had nothing to fear
regarding Alexis’ acceptance of his service. Polish-Muscovite relations had been strained
since the early seventeenth century owing to long-standing territorial disputes,
35
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particularly over Smolensk.

Nearing the brink of inevitable conflict with the

Commonwealth, the Tsar needed to strengthen his forces and granting protection to these
skilled horsemen whose ranks would enhance Muscovite cavalry was a rare boon.37 For
Khmelnytsky’s part, Muscovy provided both sanctuary and the promise of safeguarding
Cossack liberties which, after all, were his foremost concerns.
King Jan Casimir did not seem to be troubled with the Jews either. Desiring a
measure of restitution for Cossack excesses, Casimir appealed to Tsar Alexis in 1653 for
the extradition of Khmelnytsky and his host for their crimes. Citing a germane provision
in the 1637 constitution, the King affirmed his right to make this request and the Tsar’s
obligation to consider it. 38 Khmelnytsky was branded a brigand and murderer, and the
petition proceeded to enumerate a protracted and detailed account of his depredations
which surprisingly, owing to its deliberate meticulousness, made no mention of the Jews.

Cast Adrift and in Search of a Compass: Sabbateanism and Frankism

When the storms subsided in 1656, communal cohesion and social stability had
vanished. To whom could the Jews could turn for protection and guidance? Previous
guarantees of Jewish protection by the Polish crown had now been whittled away to
meaningless affirmations. Amidst the ruins of their villages, lives, and institutions, the
Jews of Poland, Ukraine and southern Russia eventually found their supposed salvation
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in the arrival of Shabbetai Zevi in 1665.39 Claiming to be the long-awaited Messiah, Zevi
promised an immediate respite from Christian hostility and the establishment of God’s
kingdom on earth in return for Jewish communal allegiance to him. Skeptics declared
him a charlatan and shunned his company, contending that if the Messianic Age had
dawned, a profusion of auguries would now be evident and not just the proclamation of
one man.40 The Rabbinate assailed him with deprecating missals but did nothing else to
dissuade the Jewish masses from following him. Emboldened by this lack of effective
resistance, Zevi then increased his opponents’ opprobrium for him when he asserted that
Bogdan Khmelnytsky was to be praised and remembered since his actions made 1648 the
year of Jewish redemption, which had initiated the Messianic Age.41 Such messianic
fantasies were seductive to those starved for hope amidst despair. The ignorant, semiliterate, and destitute who, seeing themselves assailed from all sides with few allies and
fewer prospects for a peaceful existence, joined the Sabbatean movement.
Zevi’s following grew throughout Eastern Europe and into the Ottoman Empire
where, in 1666, the Ottoman Sultan summoned him into his presence. Sabbatean
influence had reached the Sultan’s realm and there was a danger that some of his Muslim
subjects would join its ranks which would compromise the Sultan’s spiritual and secular
authority. Unwittingly, where the Rabbinate had failed, the Sultan prevailed. Exploiting
Zevi’s conceit, the Sultan allowed him to place himself into an untenable position which
ended when the would-be Messiah elected conversion to Islam rather than death for
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misrepresentation.42 Active propagation of Sabbateanism would be terminated for a time,
though the desperation which had driven so many to join him would linger. Its influence
was so powerful that a number of his more ardent neophytes followed his example and
converted to Islam, believing that their apostasy would affect the restoration of Palestine
to Jewish patrimony.43 As for the majority, disillusioned and embarrassed by this false
prophet and his equally incredulous Torah, 44 some converted to Christianity or shunned
religious observances altogether, much to the consternation of both Western and Eastern
European rabbinical authorities.
Contemporary with Zevi’s movement was Vilna’s election as Eastern Europe’s
premier center for Jewish learning and arbiter in Jewish affairs. Zevi’s messianic claims
soon put the Rabbinate’s arbitration skills to the test. In addition to offending Jewish
conservatives, his actions incensed Christians who, in 1665, rioted in Pinsk, Lublin and
Vilna, compelling Jewish authorities to seek government protection and denounce the
Sabbateans as heretics.45

This inglorious episode deepened the Rabbinate’s enmity

towards Zevi and, more importantly, called into question their authority and power
regarding the Jews over which they claimed spiritual hegemony. Fuming was the extent
of its exertions. Despite its concerns and with the integrity of Eastern Europe’s Jewish
community in the balance, Vilna never dispatched regular educational missions or
delegations to the villages and settlements to offer spiritual solace or instruction. On
42
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those occasions when the Rabbinate did decide to take an active hand, however, it
succeeded in worsening its already-waning prestige. Embarrassed and incensed over
Zevi's activities even in defeat, the Rabbinate punished the Sabbateans by denying them
readmission to Judaism, a decision which eventually produced another disconcerting
episode in the evolution of Jewish identities in Eastern Europe.
Sabbateanism created a gulf between Vilna and the larger Jewish community
which would widen with each passing year. More than the welfare of its theological
subjects, Vilna's priority was the maintenance of its own credibility and authority. Its
attitude of protective paternalism actually masked an unattractive truth. Despite his
individual reputation as well as the respect attributed to his office, the Vilna Gaon, the
principle spiritual leader of the Eastern European Jewish community, was denied the
liberty of independent action. His acumen and ethical fortitude meant little when he had
to rely upon the Vilna Kahal (Jewish governing body) for his maintenance and tenure in
office, a position which could be terminated at will should he act contrary to the wishes
of that body.46 If that had come to pass, there was no recourse open to him since the
Kahal also held the reins of the Vilna Rabbinate. What authority the Gaon had was
vested in missals to local rabbis and in their willingness and ability to carry out his will.
Painfully aware of their true “power,” both the Gaon and the Vilna Rabbinate attempted
to use rabbis and Jewish community leaders to impose doctrinal rigidity upon their
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respective congregations inasmuch as that was possible.47 Shtetlach were spread over a
vast area which meant that effective communication was a rarity, but there was a larger
issue at hand. Rigidity over a generations-old narrow body of knowledge associated with
Jewishness certainly played a role in later identity formation.48 Depending upon the
fortunes of individual villages and towns, how Jews came to know who and what they
were and what God expected them to do would shape their individual and collective
intellectual development.
Knowledge was a jealously-guarded preserve which Vilna shared with an elected
few. If the Rabbinate had been more accessible, instructive, and supportive, Zevi would
not have had much of an opportunity, but despite the aversion of what could have been a
significant disaster, the leadership held fast to its old courses. This attitude of neglect
favored Jacob Liebovitz, a.k.a. Frank, ninety-one years later.

Initially, he and his

followers resurrected an altered form of Sabbateanism and renewed the battle with the
Rabbinate.49

Like Zevi, Frank claimed initially that he was the second person of the

Trinity, the Messiah, only to abandon this claim in favor of declaring himself and his
company “Zoharists at war with the Talmud.”50 Among disaffected Jews in search of a
way to discover true Judaism, he soon acquired a following. To the Rabbinate’s initial
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relief, Frank, unlike Zevi, was not advocating a competing theology which would
challenge Orthodox Jewish doctrines or alterations in ritual practices and, furthermore,
the movement lacked overall cohesion. It was not, however, harmless. Frankism was
quite effective in heightening tensions in several Jewish communities by stirring up
questions and speculation surrounding the legitimacy of Rabbinical authority. Desiring
negotiation over confrontation in order to assuage Gaon Elijah’s concerns, Frank and his
followers answered a summons to appear before Poland’s principal rabbinical court.
They had no idea that their mission was doomed before it began. Taking its instructions
from the Gaon who had already judged the Frankist before hearing them out, the Brody
Bet Din excommunicated them in 1756.51 This act of bad faith would cause Vilna
considerable concern.
The Frankists refused to accept the verdict. Since the Rabbinate had not granted
them a fair hearing, they sought another theological forum more inclined to do so. Soon
thereafter, they appealed to Bishop Dembrowski of Kameniec-Podolski to consider their
claims that the Talmud was an anti-Christian work, a charge which the Bishop weighed
carefully and prosecuted cautiously. After some deliberation, the Bishop called together
Poland’s renowned rabbinical sages to debate this charge in the summer of 1757. Taken
unawares and lacking the requisite forensic skills and refinement which their experienced
Western coreligionists had elevated to an art form, the Rabbinate made a poor showing
and many copies of the Talmud were subsequently burned. Not everyone saw finality in
this act. Dissatisfied with the results and believing that the matter required further
discussion, Canon Mikolski called for another disputation in Lvov in 1760 at which many
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of the leading rabbinical luminaries of the century were in attendance, including Israel
ben Eliazer, the Baal Shem Tov. On this occasion, the Rabbinate was prepared and
argued its case deftly as did opposing Polish Catholic theologians. The result was a
stalemate. Both sides had demonstrated considerable knowledge and sophistication in
presenting their respective positions and the Canon lawyers in attendance were unable to
determine whether Jews were indeed heretics or enemies of Christianity.52

This

conundrum was the core of the Frankist case and the insurmountable obstacle which
prevented both ecclesiastical and civil authorities from taking punitive action. Persuasive
theological arguments aside, the Polish Catholic Church lacked the authority to rule on
such issues which contributed to the deadlock and subsequent dismissal of the Frankist
suit. Episodic in Western European history, such inquisitions relating to the Jews were
rare in the East and, in either event, Frank did not benefit.53 The impasse could not be
bridged and given the perishable nature of his cause, all he and his followers could expect
was alienation from both Jewish and Christian communities. No Imam was present to
welcome Frank to the delights of the Koran, but Poland was not at a loss for Catholic
clergy willing to accept converts.54 In July 1759, Frank and a number of his remaining
retinue converted to Catholicism with the King of Poland acting as their sponsor.55
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Thanks to Frank’s compromising apostasy, Eastern European Rabbinical Judaism
won back a portion of its reputation if only by default. Only a few dissidents had been
lost through Frank’s defection, yet there was little cause for complacency. Frank and his
followers would pass into obscurity but not so his aspersions regarding the Talmudic
basis of Gaonic and Rabbinical authority. On that score, he had a case which was one of
the reasons why the Brody Bet Din excommunicated the Frankists in all haste. By
declaring the Frankists apikursim (heretics) and then imposing a herem (ban of
excommunication), Elijah ben Solomon sought to silence them by discrediting their
movement in the eyes of Polish and, more broadly, Eastern European Jewry. According
to prevailing wisdom, no self-conscious Jew would accord credibility, much less listen to,
the accusations of a “non-Jew.” This would have been a reasonable calculation if the
Gaon had had the backing of the Jewish majority. Being an astute scholar whose learning
spanned both Judaica and secular subjects, it could not have escaped Elijah that the
Frankists threatened the precarious foundation upon which his position rested. For all of
the vigorous defenses of the Gaonate’s Talmudic veracity, few could verify it. Physical
access to the relevant volumes was the privilege of a select circle as well as Hebrew
comprehension, but this gave Vilna little security.56 Time would bring change with
predictable certainty but would Vilna be able to adapt?

Breaching the Eyruv: The Shtetl on the Eve of Change
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Too preoccupied with his position and continued good relations with the Vilna
kahal, the Gaon left the task of Jewish education and, consequently, identity to the
innumerable shtetlach which were scattered throughout Poland and Lithuania, not to
mention those in Ukraine and Russia. Just as there were disparities among shtetl Jews in
wealth and circumstance, each Jewish village and settlement differed in its perception of
the defining elements of Judaism. Not everyone knew Hebrew but most could converse
in Yiddish and, depending upon location, Polish.

At the synagogue, everyone

worshipped, though only the most scholarly and wealthy were given the choicest seating
by the eastern wall, the most holy part of the building since it was in the direction of
Jerusalem. On Friday night, everyone celebrated the Sabbath, some with meat while
others with only challah. Regardless of social status, all males were circumcised eight
days after birth, all were entitled to a huppah (wedding canopy), and, at death, a talis
divested of its fringes would be worn by all deceased males and buried with them. Even
these commonalities had their disparities, but still there was a sense of Jewishness among
the populace, understood in the most simple and immediate terms.
Those who wished to advance in these communities required either substantial
financial means or a demonstration of scholastic aptitude. Affluence was concentrated
and mobility restricted save by marriage which was governed strictly by an individual’s
yikhes (family background).57 For young men who had any ambition, early scholastic
success carried with it the promise of study at a renowned yeshiva (rabbinical academy)
under the desired patronage of a wealthy Jew who might be persuaded to wed his
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beneficiary to his daughter.58 As for daughters, there was little available to them. The
nineteenth century would see women joining men in search of greater opportunities but,
in the eighteenth, Jewish custom and circumstance regarded women as financial liabilities
to be transferred to the first eligible male via kettuba (wedding contract).59
A man of exceptional financial means could be respected given his social and
commercial conduct, but scholars were revered. For a “genius” of Torah and Talmud, the
yeshivas of Warsaw, Lublin, Vilna, and Berlin were open to talented young men who,
under the tutelage of a learned master, could aspire to fame and riches, not to mention the
privilege of lending his sagacity to the integrity and promotion of Rabbinical Judaism.
Less than two percent of the male Jewish population could take advantage of such
opportunities.60 Most had to content themselves with heder (religious primary school)
where, as young boys, they were taught elementary Hebrew and then immersed in the
Book of Leviticus with all of its codes and complex judicial arguments.61 A young Jew
was expected to know the laws at an early age in order to lead a moral and ethical life.
Instruction began at the age of three under the shtetl melamed (heder teacher) whose sole
purpose was to impart Jewish literacy (learning Hebrew was considered important but
merely a means to an end) to his charges, some of whom might surpass him some day.62
Despite his vital services in educating the young, most melamedim were considered
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either failed or lazy scholars and were paid meagerly. This image was a product of folk
wisdom which, in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, was accepted as
fact.63 Religious notions among shtetl dwellers also had a similar genesis.
In such circumstances, secular knowledge received minimal attention. Vilna was
aware of the problem, and sent scholars on occasion to shtetlach and settlements in an
effort to correct a variety of errors.64

It came as no surprise that these missions failed

more often than not since the would-be teacher and his students spoke different
languages. Though more evident in the nineteenth century, already by the mid-eighteenth
there was a scholarly stigma attached to Yiddish.65 In all four dialects, it was the lingua
franca of Ashkenazic Jewry and yet it was one of the more divisive elements between the
Vilna intelligentsia and the rest of the Jewish population, though both were conversant in
it.66 For generations, yeshivah luminaries had impressed upon their students that Yiddish
was a profane jargon fit for tradesmen and artisans while Hebrew was a learned language
sanctioned by God himself, though never to be used in vulgar communication. For
secular conversation, Polish, Lithuanian, German and Russian were considered sufficient
media by Jewish authorities, though many shtetl Jews enjoyed only limited facility in
these languages.
Inaccessibility was a source of power over those furthest away from Vilna’s aura.
The Jewish majority, it was imagined, viewed Vilna as the “ivory tower” of authority and
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would continue to obey its mandates until the end of time. Few of them realized that any
Jewish identity had to be grounded in the very knowledge which was denied those most
in need of it. Given their own meager resources, “non-scholastic” Jews resorted to a
variety of beliefs and half-forgotten concepts learned long ago. Interspersed with Jewish,
Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish folklore, and perhaps a kernel of Jewish theology, custom,
and ritual, it was all the knowledge most possessed. Under such circumstances, it was a
natural reaction for some Jews to be suspicious and, in some instances, hostile towards
anyone, Jew or Russian, who tried to either discredit their beliefs or ply them with new
information which might challenge cherished notions.

The Unintentional Challenge: The Hasidic Movement:

Never retiring from their quest for communal reconstitution and the education
which would give it vitality, it was only natural that the Hasidic movement would emerge
among the Jews. Although Hasidism’s challenge to Vilna antedated the Polish partitions,
its true denouement occurred under Russian rule in an unexpected manner.

The

movement's subsequent victory over the Vilna Rabbinate in 1798 and subsequent
domination of the kahal and Gaonate ended their persecution at the hands of the latter.
Initially, Hasidic leaders merely wanted a dialogue with the Rabbinate to explain their
goals and mission.

This was denied them repeatedly.

Through a combination of

frustration, obduracy, and persistence on both sides, disputes graduated to conflicts which
resulted in the Rabbinate losing the Vilna Gaonate and kahal majority.
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At its core, Hasidism was committed to promoting Jewish literacy among those
who could not obtain this education by other means. It was with an eye towards forging
Jewish communal integrity and identity, not to mention unlocking the mysteries of Torah
and the universe, that Israel ben Eliazer, the Baal Shem Tov created the cosmology and
Torah of Hasidism.67 Of the many problems East European Jews confronted in the
eighteenth century, the one which barred them from “higher wisdom” was Hebrew. For
Torah and Talmud scholars, this was certainly not a problem, but the vast majority of
Jews did not have the luxury of time to devote to learn Hebrew fluently. Without a
lingua franca comprehensible to a quasi-literate population, Judaism was in danger of
losing its vitality. In order to resolve this challenge, ben Eliazer reflected upon his own
approach to God, that is, through sensing God’s shekhina (terrestrial spirit) while
engaged in fervent prayer rather than through meditating upon sterile pages.68 Only in
this state, the Besht (acronym of Baal Shem Tov) opined, could one possess true
kavannah (intention) during prayer and be admitted to the Gates of Wisdom and to God’s
throne.69 Embracing his audience in the truest sense of the word, the Baal Shem Tov and
his learned followers adopted storytelling, a familiar village pastime, as a medium for
conveying Hasidism’s peculiar interpretations, tenets, and addenda to Orthodox
Judaism.70 Often created off the cuff, and combining the mundane with the esoteric,
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Hasidic tales served as successful didactic tools in bringing all aspects of Judaica to those
who could not obtain this knowledge otherwise.71
Not intending to contest Vilna’s authority, the Baal Shem Tov merely perceived
the traditional educational institutions and practices as being far too narrow in scope.
Those who possessed an acumen and disposition towards Torah and Talmud study should
be encouraged, according to the Besht, but everyone had different aptitudes and
intellectual needs.72

Sensitivity towards the less well-endowed members of the

community was the key to Hasidic success. By combining selections from Kabbalistic
literature and Jewish folklore presented in an instructive theological setting, the Hasidim
gave shop clerks, cattle dealers, liquor agents, estate managers, and innkeepers, the
opportunity to understand their faith and enjoy a closer communion with it.73 Though
born in Ukraine and an extensive traveler, the Besht is not known to have made his way
to Belorussia and Lithuania. Even so, he was known in those regions and Hasidic cells
existed there during his lifetime.74

Rabbi Dov Baer of Mezhirech, his immediate

successor, expanded this organization in order to cull the eager, restless and frustrated
Jewish masses into a version of Judaism which was all-embracing and accessible to
them.75
Often referred to as the Great Maggid (preacher), Rabbi Dov Baer succeeded the
Besht upon his death in 1760. During his twelve-year tenure, he promoted his
predecessor’s teachings further afield to more of the shtetlach and settlements of Ukraine
71
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and Belorussia and made significant innovations to Hasidic theology which brought him
into conflict with Gaon Elijah.76 Friction began in 1765 when the Gaon, claiming to have
read a Hasidic tract and finding its deficiencies heretical, issued a ban on all such
publications. Respecting the office as well as the erudition of its holder and desiring to
avoid a pitched battle, Dov Baer, in 1771, sought an audience with Elijah to explain that
Hasidism was an augmentation of and not in competition with Orthodox Judaism. Dov
Baer had hoped to prove to the Gaon that his anxieties over doctrinal and ritual
innovations were unfounded. To these expressed intentions, Elijah responded by burning
all Hasidic works obtainable in Vilna’s town square and expelling the resident Hasidim.77
Despite Rabbinical disapproval, the movement grew. Eastern European (soon to
be Russian) Jews first encountered the Hasidim in force during the tenures of Dov Baer
(1760-1772) and his successor, Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi (1772-1813). In the
immediate confusion following the Besht’s death, Dov Baer moved the center of the
movement to Mezhirech in Volhynia which allowed him to exert considerable influence
upon Lithuanian and Belorussian Jewry.78 Concerned with maintaining the movement’s
vigor, the Maggid adopted the Lurianic Kabbalah and took the honorific title of tsaddik
(righteous man), which the Besht had bestowed rarely and only upon a select few of his
followers, and made it an active institution within Hasidism.79 This last innovation did
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much in propagating Hasidism and winning converts though, eventually, tsaddikim
would almost bring down the movement.
While not eschewing scholarly activity, Hasidism did not possess an intellectual
orientation. Both in fashioning Hasidism’s general philosophy and in creating tsaddikim,
Dov Baer was concerned more with winning over converts through psychological
manipulation than in promoting learned discourse. Most of those seeking an audience
with the Maggid took a seat at his dining table in the company of his followers.
Unbeknownst to the visiting pilgrim, he was to be duped. The friendly and inquisitive
townsfolk he met as he made his way to the Rav’s house were actually Hasidim in
disguise. Long before the stranger sat down, Dov Baer had been informed about his
history, desires, and concerns. During the course of the meal, Dov Baer would seek him
out and astound all in attendance with his keen insight into the stranger’s life.80 In a time
and place where magic and supernatural powers were accorded unqualified credence, few
suspected duplicity.

Usually surprised and often at a loss to account for such

perspicacity, the visitor saw Dov Baer as a “righteous man,” a great seer whom only God
could have favored. Joining his company was seen as the next logical step. Solomon
Maimon, writing in his memoirs about his own victimization at the Seer’s table,
commented that a more astute intellect could see plainly that this well of knowledge had
a false bottom. Hindsight being what it is, this was certainly true, but given the general
demeanor of those who sought out Dov Baer, such critical keeness was exceptional and
the Maggid knew it.
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Dov Baer had an innate understanding of those who came to him. Coming
primarily from proximate provinces and regions with similar customs and mores with
which he himself was familiar, the Maggid could sympathize with those who sought his
council and religious guidance. Being a rabbi, he could not claim ignorance of musar
(ethics) which his recruiting techniques challenged.

On this score, Dov Baer took

advantage of the “gray areas” of Jewish spiritual ethics which assessed the ethical
qualities of the means in light of their ends. Reasoning that his particular goal was to
rebuild and maintain a tangible Jewish community in Poland, Lithuanian, and Belorussia,
he would then have accomplished the mitzvah of kadosh ha-Shem (honoring God’s
holiness), the most holy act a Jew could perform. The Maggid had no cause for
hesitation or regret.81
Dov Baer was well-versed in casuistry, a talent he could not impart to those of his
followers whom he appointed tsaddikim. During the Besht’s leadership, those who were
accorded this title were merely objects of emulation with no vested authority aside from
their influence-by-example.

Believing them to be an under-utilized resource in

promoting Jewish education, Dov Baer appointed them as teachers and spiritual guides.
One clear advantage that they had was mobility, especially given the Maggid’s own
physical limitations.

Even if he had been free of infirmities, it would have been

impossible for the Maggid to visit every settlement, and a group of individuals familiar
with a variety of local circumstances promised more effective organization of the Hasidic
movement.82
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Initially, this quasi-missionary design swelled Hasidic ranks, but continued
expansion corrupted Dov Baer’s intentions.

Assuming that all tsaddikim receiving

identical instruction under his auspices would maintain doctrinal uniformity, the Maggid
had failed to account for his students’ particular dispositions and their abilities to adapt to
circumstance. As time and physical distance separated him from them, innovations were
inevitable. Coupled with that consequence, each shtetl, town and urban enclave had its
particular customs, dispositions, rituals and peculiarities which would require his original
followers to accommodate their respective torahs (religious guidance) to the needs of
their local congregations.83 Such divergence and differentiation increased exponentially
as the next generation of tsaddikim were ordained into the movement.
The Besht knew that educating the Jewish masses had to be done methodically.
Innovations had to be presented and assimilated gradually or else conflicts would erupt.
As the tsaddik’s role in Hasidic practice was redefined, differences in rituals and beliefs
among some Hasidic groups led to rivalries and even violence when competing tsaddikim
and their respective retinues were too proximate for comfort.84 Egos notwithstanding,
this unfortunate development illustrated one of the chief obstacles to progressive Jewish
education. Unconsciously mimicking Vilna's behavior, these righteous teachers became
jealous of their narrow preserves of knowledge and power, thinking that they alone held
the key to understanding true Jewishness. Not that this behavior would have been
welcome in the best of times but, as fate would have it, these divisions were
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contemporaneous with the first Polish partition of 1772.85 Russian domination would not
halt this fragmentation either then or during the two succeeding partitions.

Not

surprisingly, Elijah and the Rabbinate became increasingly desperate to maintain Jewish
cohesion in the crumbling remnants of the Polish state.
Despite the disparities, Hasidic propagation continued which meant that Vilna
knew no peace. Had the Rabbinate met its match? For all of his erudition and wisdom,
Gaon Elijah could not and would not comprehend Hasidism. Not unmindful of their
desire to become a part of the Jewish community and their theology and philosophy
accorded canonical authority, the Gaon could not imagine an accommodation for the
Hasidim within Orthodox Judaism. In addition, his own ego bristled when he perceived
that these heretics were slowly winning the allegiance of Jews that he had always
regarded as his own.86 Like his predecessors, he resorted to the oft-tried and seldom
successful recourse of Gaonic missals. Sagacious at one moment and emotional at the
next, Elijah’s sentiments towards his adversaries were as mysterious as his refusal to
meet and confront the Hasidim in a public forum. One possible explanation may have
been the Gaon’s reliance upon secondhand information about the Hasidim which ranged
from the mundane to the bizarre. Bound to the vicinity of his office as Dov Baer had
been to his dining table, Elijah could only perceive the Hasidim at a distance and at their
imagined worst. Dov Baer died in 1760 in Anapoli in Ukraine having failed to present
his case, but neither the Hasidic movement nor Rabbinical hostility towards it followed
him to the grave. Much like what would come to pass later on under Russian suzerainty,
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neither side really understood the other. It this instance, the Rabbinate had no firm idea
who and what the Hasidim were. All that the Gaon really knew was that this group had
appropriated the title Hasidim, meaning "the pious ones," implying that those who did not
belong to the movement were not. Furthermore, they worshipped in shtiblim (little
prayer houses) and some among them were called “tsaddik” whose claims to this title
rested upon the credulity of their followers rather than spiritual edification and scholarly
erudition.87 Eyewitness accounts had attested that they turned somersaults during prayer
and engaged in unrestrained davvening (bowing) reminiscent of sexual intercourse.
Bizarre and fantastic were reports that Belorussian and Ukrainian Hasids danced naked
with the Torah scrolls and were seen swinging from the ner tamid (eternal light) above
the Torah ark. Upon this foundation of spurious intelligence Elijah created and launched
his campaign to discredit them. Theological politics fostered in him an acute acrimony
which the all-powerful Vilna Kahal reinforced and Elijah applied to purpose. The time
was fast approaching when either Hasidism would have be brought to its knees and
discredited or Elijah would have to relinquish the office of Gaon.

Enter the Russians

The Polish partitions brought Jews and Russians closer together, and though they
may not have understood one another, they were hardly strangers. The earliest known
Jewish community in present-day Ukraine was established in 1388-89 and had enjoyed
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commercial relations with Russian merchants and markets.88

By the mid-fifteenth

century, with the further development of commerce in Moscow and its environs, Jews
were more prominent and tolerated episodically, though never really trusted. Russian
chroniclers and officials made note of Jewish commercial activities and, on rare occasion,
their settlements near the Polish frontier. Though not ignored in official papers, they
were seldom accorded more than marginal importance.
Peter the Great, the founder of the Russian Empire, did not trouble himself with
the Jews. Engaged completely in building his capital city and the Imperial state, the
Tsar’s energies were taken up entirely by other matters. At no time during his reign did
Jews confront him nor did they pose an obstacle to his aspirations. They were simply not
“seen” and, owing to their far-flung demographic distribution, the often-quoted antiJewish statement attributed to Peter is all the more improbable.89 Nowhere in his 1702
Manifesto did the Tsar ban Jews from the Empire because “they are known cheats,”90
although there is documented evidence of the Emperor’s promotion of a Jewish
commercial enterprise in 1717 which will be discussed later in detail.
Commerce and xenophobia underscored the Russian-Jewish relationship from the
outset. Jews and Greeks in Odessa conducted a thriving trade which spanned from the
coast of Asia Minor north to Moscow and, competition aside, there was no evident
animosity between the two until the early nineteenth century. The Russian perception of
Jews was different. Ivan IV’s seizure of Polotsk in 1563 and subsequent order that all
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Jews residing within the vicinity be baptized in the nearest river or drowned in the same
was an unprecedented mandate which the Jews found incomprehensible.91

To their

minds, they had done nothing to merit such treatment. Even accounting for the Tsar’s
determination to make Russia the true seat of Christianity did not explain why such a
harsh imposition was levied upon these non-combatants. The answer was, perhaps, more
mundane. Swearing that no disbeliever would find quarter in his domains, Ivan IV,
nevertheless, would have appreciated the immediate practicality and necessity of
removing displaced Jews from Polotsk’s environs to prevent them from becoming camp
followers who could potentially impede his forces’ movements.92
This same draconian practicality certainly motivated Tsar Alexis Mikhalovich in
1658 when he conquered Vilna and repatriated the resident Jews to the city’s outer
walls.93 Claiming that he was “excoriating infidels from the body of Christianity,” it was
clear that Jewish removal was a military consideration and not a religious one. Vilna was
situated ideally for launching an offensive against Poland and required a large Russian
garrison. Since the Jews were non-combatants, they were a potential encumbrance to
Russian troop movements and, in Alexis’s mind, had to be removed.
Muscovy’s war with Poland (1654-1667) brought the Jews into view, though still
peripherally. The first official reference to them in the PSZ was in a state paper dated 7
March 1655 which reported that Jewish and Lithuanian prisoners were being moved from
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Kaluga to Nizhni Novgorod.94 Bogdan Kamnin and his associates were ordered to escort
a group of 92 war captives, no distinction made between civilian hostages and
combatants, to the latter destination to be sold to Greek slave merchants with the
anticipation of realizing substantial revenues. Without delay, the company was to set out
for Nizhni Novgorod with the first spring thaw, although four were to be freed prior to
embarkation once ransom money had been secured in their behalf. Selling war captives
was a centuries-old practice, but the inclusion of Jews in the company was unusual.
Polish and Russian laws and customs had exempted them from both military service and
enserfment. Under the circumstances, Jews were considered foreign nationals as were
their Lithuanian co-captives, accorded a political identity rather than an ethnic or
religious one, and no further discrimination was made between the two groups.
Jewish and Lithuanian slaves were a commodity, valued only for their labor.
Jewish merchants, by contrast, posed a potential threat. On 12 September 1676, an
official protest on behalf of the Moscow merchants was submitted to the government in
response to a report from customs officials that Jews were disguising themselves and
their goods in order to sell their wares in Moscow.95 Central to their grievance and a
perennial dilemma was Muscovy’s lengthy western border which lent itself to smuggling
and bootlegging, especially in proximity to Smolensk, an important commercial center
recently reconquered from Poland.

Quartered in the Big Customs House, Russian

officials registered both traders and goods and exacted the appropriate duties before
allowing them to proceed to the interior. Though it is plausible that illicit goods were
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making their way to the Moscow markets, the Jews did not hold an exclusive monopoly
on smuggling.

Poles, Lithuanians and Germans crossed these same frontiers for

commercial purposes and in greater numbers. Jews, however, by their distinct dress and
demeanor, were more easily recognizable foreigners. This report and its successors
attributed Jewish smuggling to a lack of vigilance along the border owing to too few
border guards and officials to cover all crossing points. Bribe-taking was suspected and
was mentioned specifically in future legislation along with severe punishments for
corruption. As to who informed the authorities about these matters, Muscovite merchants
may have been prompted to do so owing to imagined or actual commercial competition
from itinerant traders, many of whom were Jews.
Muscovite Russia came to an end with the ascension of Peter the Great (17011725) whose single purpose was to fashion a modern Empire worthy of European
prestige.96 Before executing this endeavor, however, the Tsar had to quell accusations
that he was the Antichrist by establishing the Preobrazhenskii Prikaz which was
empowered to discover and try cases of word and deed against the Emperor.97 Marring
this inauspicious inauguration further were the Swedes who would occupy most of
Peter’s attention until their defeat at Poltava which rendered them far less of a threat to
Imperial security than they had been previously. Afterwards, afforded a rare opportunity
to breathe easy, Peter devoted his energies to fashioning his Empire from his new capital
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at St. Petersburg, an ongoing occupation in which the Jews were accorded marginal
official notice.98
Despite the discrepancy over the exclusion of foreign Jews from entering the
Empire, there is no argument that Peter I’s Manifesto of 16 April 1702 welcomed all
foreigners to Russia with the promise of religious liberty.99 Making plain his situation,
the Tsar proclaimed that his Empire needed specialists of all backgrounds, especially
those conversant with commercial affairs which had developed little over the centuries
and remained weak owing to the Great Northern War (1700-21). In an effort to allay all
reservations, those who responded to Peter’s invitation were guaranteed security under
the laws of their respective lands and freedom of Christian worship. The importation of
foreign clergy to serve those needs, however, was not permitted because, as Peter
explained in the corpus of the statute, the dissemination of foreign doctrines among his
subjects would undermine ancient customs and traditions.100 No reference to Jews, either
directly or indirectly, appeared in this address. Moreover, this omission was certainly not
an indication of Peter’s disposition towards the Jews or that he considered them
inconsequential to Russia.
Ilya Matve’ev, son of a Jew, was granted a license to establish factories in and
around Moscow for the manufacture and sale of silk, damask, and brocade in 1717. The
98
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particulars of how this man and his brothers secured this lucrative patent are not known,
though there is no mistaking the Imperial favor afforded this operation.101 Empress Anne
renewed it with much enthusiasm in 1737, expressing her astonishment at the growth of
their business and sustained success over a twenty-year period. Beginning with one
factory in Moscow the Matve’evs had expanded their operations manifold in and around
Moscow and their wares remained without rival.102 Court Jews such as Lipman, the
jewel merchant and Golitsyn favorite in Anne’s reign, could be found interspersed among
official and bureaucratic circles and accorded various privileges in return for gratifying
personal or governmental needs. This was precisely the niche the Matve’evs occupied
during the latter years of the Great Northern War and in the decade following its
conclusion.103 They would have their successors in the next century.
Assisting Peter’s plans greatly was the Treaty of Nystadt (1721) which afforded
the Empire sufficient land and security as well as a basis for future expansion, a
bittersweet moment since Russia had won the war only to face impending fiscal disaster.
Russia’s trade relations had been disrupted by the war and its silver reserves diminished,
the latter condition aggravated further by a silver depression in Western Europe that
would last well into the 1740’s.104 Considering that silver was still a stable and valuable
specie, Peter and his successors placed strict controls on its traffic and all but banned its
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exportation. Gold was even more dear, and unauthorized traffic in it incurred severe
penalties.105 Plainly, Russia needed enterprises which could aggrandize its specie
reserves, and the Matve’evs were one of a number of manufacturers who had the full
support of the government to affect this.106
Jewish acumen in commercial affairs was known in Russia and needed despite
the formidable obstacle of Orthodox Christian prejudice. Rarely was there little to fear
from Jewish-Christian contact. In Odessa, for instance, Jews and Greeks lived within
proximity to one another and carried on a thriving fishing and mercantile contest with
little acrimony.107 Elsewhere, Jews were employed as tax farmers, liquor agents, customs
officers, and in various other occupations with one crucial stipulation.

The Polish

monarchy had accorded Jews various autonomous rights, and though these were altered
and diminished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Jewish community still
remained a recognizable legal entity in terms of its culture and religious practices. In
Russia, however, such cultural and intellectual distinctiveness inspired uneasiness in the
government which would manifest itself in official edicts. Throughout the nineteenth
century, some decrees pledging the preservation of certain cultural and religious practices
were then annulled and then restored in return for supposed Jewish concessions to official
104

Jan Blanchard, Russia’s Age of Silver: Precious Metal Production and Economic Growth in the
Eighteenth Century (London: Routledge Press, 1989), p. 51.
105
Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great, p. 146. The crisis, by 1723, had become acute. Fearing
that foreign merchants would flood the Russian economy, Peter placed tight controls on all currencies
imported into Russia.
106
Ibid., p. 147. Even this was of small comfort. Russia's commercial fleet was not as large as its
European competitors but Peter refused to rely upon foreign transports for Russian goods. Furthermore, the
Emperor communicated his fears to his ambassador to Spain that the French, Dutch, and Italians would
deliberately sell their goods below what Russian merchants could afford and, therefore, shut Russian goods
out of the markets in which they needed to enter.
107
For a detailed history of Greek-Jewish commercial relationships in Odessa, see Steven Zipperstein, The
Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History 1794-1881 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985). See also John

61
policies. All Jews had to contend with the shifting soil of Russian life, but a portion of
the Jewish population had the added burden of dealing with consequences arising from
the economic demands of the monarchy and nobility in Russia which bore heaviest upon
the peasantry.
One case is worth noting. On 14 March 1727, two Jewish tax farmers and customs
collectors in Smolensk, Borcha (Baruch) and Leybov (Lev), along with their associates,
were ordered expelled from the city and the Empire and all collected revenues returned to
the appropriate parties save the Jews.108 Despite the order’s severity, no specific charges
were rendered nor was an official investigation mandated to either substantiate or
discount the grounds for their removal. Compounding the problem was two hundred
miles of bad road which separated Smolensk from Moscow where the Currency Board
would have had to decide this seemingly trivial matter, but this case stood out owing to
its relevance to broader issues. At the time of this expulsion edict, the Imperial Senate
was demanding, on pain of substantial fines, that all subjects surrender their old currency
for new at the ratio 1:11. Noting this devaluation and desiring to collect their legitimate
portion as stipulated in their farming and customs licenses, these Jews and their assistants
sought exactions which the local inhabitants perceived as personal extortion. As to
whether Baruch and Lev acted out of greed is beyond determination, but it should be
understood that they and others who held such licenses did not derive their income solely
from this activity. Most likely, these Jews had business concerns either in Smolensk or
within its immediate environs which had tapered off owing to economic uncertainties and
Klier, “The Pogrom Paradigm in Russian History,” in Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian
History, eds. John Klier and Shlomo Lambroza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 15-17.
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thus made their tax and customs collections more important than they would have been
under normal conditions.109
Circumstance is a key factor in determining identity formation. While it is true
that the image a particular group has of itself is certainly consequential, its external
appearance is equally important. The incident involving the two tax collectors was one of
many which left an impression upon the minds of some Russians that Jews were
rapacious. In those difficult years of the late 1720's, those who had to bear most of the
tax burden only saw the Jews as their adversaries. That Jews themselves had to pay those
taxes if not more in some instances did not enter into their reasoning and particularly not
within government circles in light of what transpired a month later. Empress Catherine I
and the High Secret Council, on 26 April 1727, ordered all Jews expelled from the
Empire and demanded that they leave behind all of their gold and silver money.110
Targeted specifically were Jewish settlements in Ukraine and Jewish inhabitants of cities
in western Russia. All of them were ordered to settle beyond the border and forbidden to
return to the Empire, save under special leave and conduct. Fast upon this order (April
29) was a renewed demand for exchanging old money for new in order to facilitate reminting. Reluctance and desperate pleas by the affected Jews led to dire threats which
were wielded imperfectly and promoted noncompliance as well as official frustration.
Empress Anne’s disposition towards the Jews during the 1730’s was unusual. On
the one hand, she was pleased in the summer of 1737 with the Matve’ev brothers and
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decreed that their children could inherit the industry and continue to produce silk and
damask with the skilled craftsmanship of their fathers. It was also on this occasion that
she took the liberty to elaborate upon her praises by claiming that Jewish industry had
benefited greatly from Peter’s laws as evidenced by the success of this enterprise.111 This
self-congratulatory favor was one of the very few she bestowed upon the Jews. Shortly
thereafter, a report reached the Holy Synod that a Jew, Baruch Leibov, was Judaizing
among Her Majesty’s subjects. Usually such a charge came from malcontents, but this
particular case evidently had merit since the accused admitted to converting to Judaism
with Leibov’s encouragement and assistance. Unfortunately, the particulars of the case
were not noted. It is uncertain whether the convert admitted to this crime freely or
whether his testimony was coerced. Whatever transpired, a Jew who converted a Russian
Orthodox Christian to Judaism committed a capital offense. Leibov was executed in St.
Petersburg on 15 July 1738.112

Many questions were left unanswered, and the

motivations of both the convert and the converter remained unknown. Judaizing, real and
imagined, was a rare occurance in the Empire which had recently been revitalized via
Poland and Western Europe along with the Blood Libel. Cases of Judaizing would crop
up again though, of the two, the Blood Libel would enjoy far greater frequency and have
a more profound impact upon fashioning the Jewish image in popular Russian
imaginations.
Jews residing in Russia were vulnerable in almost every aspect of living, and this
condition was most acute in commercial affairs. Outside the cities and larger towns, inns
110
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and taverns were staples of village and small town life usually under Jewish management.
A general meeting place to discuss local affairs, these establishments could also become
dens of iniquity for highwaymen and bootleggers, especially if they were within
proximity to the western frontier. In an effort to curb criminal activity, Empress Anne
decreed, on 18 August 1739, that Jews were prohibited from operating such
establishments and that their rent money was to be returned to them prior to their
departure from Ukraine.113 Permanent Jewish exclusion from the western provinces,
however, would have exacerbated the Empire’s already-strained economic condition
which prompted the government to include a provision for legitimate commercial
intercourse, provided that Jewish merchants register with customs officials and pay the
requisite duties. Not wishing to compromise its public stance, the government labeled
Jews as potential spies ripe for adversarial employment.

Border guards were to

investigate them thoroughly before allowing them to cross the frontier and prevent their
resettlement. At this time, the Russo-Turkish War (1736-39) was nearing its end and
given the ongoing communication between the Jewish communities of both states, the
Imperial War College may have assumed that such contacts would prove inimical to the
Empire.114 Whatever the reason, implementation was delayed until the conclusion of
hostilities.
With the passing of Anne and the ascension of Empress Elizabeth I in 1740,
official vigilance and suspicion of the Jews did not abate. Acting on reports from so112
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called credible informants, the Military General Chancery, in the interests of the Little
Russian Chancery, submitted a report to the Senate calling for the expulsion of the Jews
from Ukraine.115 Anticipating a substantial delay, the Chancery further declared that it
would prohibit outright any new Jewish settlement within its environs and would
scrutinize every lease agreement pertaining to taverns, inns, and coach houses lest Jews
enter into such arrangements to circumvent the ban on direct proprietorship. It was also
stipulated that all Jewish property had to be registered; those refusing to do so would be
declared “troublesome Jews” and have their real estate confiscated and turned over to
monasteries. Both chanceries sought to dispose of “houses of ill repute,” by which was
meant those taverns and inns which catered to smugglers.116 Breaking the surface of a
sea of contradictions and obfuscations, the report concluded by classifying Jews as being
“good” or “bothersome.” The former were accorded business and estate security, while
the latter were to be expelled immediately, including three men of that category who
taught their children Jewish letters.
Pared down to the essentials, this report presented an interesting addendum to the
Russian image of Jews. Commencing in a xenophobic vein, it then made distinctions
between “good” and “bad” Jews and went so far as to give the former some property
rights. This may not have been a simcha (joyous occasion) for the Jews but in the
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Russian milieu it represented a small precedent for securing legal status. As for ridding
the Empire of “bad Jews,” it and its successors were complete failures.117
Two years later, Empress Elizabeth I decided to make a partial concession to her
resilient Jewish subjects. Reiterating the pro forma expulsion order, the Empress then
gave leave to those Jews who would accept the Greek rite of the Christian faith.118
Considering that Jews had been living in these areas illegally since 1727, the Empress
opined, this was a benevolent offering. Having made this statement, blunt expression
then took precedent over diplomacy. Insisting that her actions past and present were
expressions of maternal ministrations, she proceeded to accuse resident Jews of being
“despisers of Christ and Christians” from whom her Orthodox subjects must be protected.
Any contact between the two had to be forbidden since it could only come to a bad end
and, therefore, Elizabeth ordered the immediate resettlement of “those who do not share
our ways” beyond the borders. Border guards were once again ordered to divest these
Jews of their gold and silver. As had been true of its predecessors, this latest edict would
prove unsatisfactory.
On 16 December 1743, the Imperial Senate published an order which reiterated
the expulsion mandate and attached to it a report and assessment from the Little Russian
Chancery which contained ambiguous concerns relating to Jewish settlement in the
Empire.119 Riga, a vital commercial port, had a sizable Jewish population which the
Empress ordered removed within six weeks, a provision which supposedly extended to
117
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further Jewish residence in Russia. However, the report from Ukraine claimed that,
although 142 Jews had been sent across the Polish border, most Jews coming into the
Empire had no intention of settling but merely to attend markets and fairs to buy and sell
goods. Smuggling was still considered a problem in the region yet the Jews reportedly
paid duties and registered their wares at the customs houses. In response to this favorable
depiction, Elizabeth relented somewhat by permitting Jews to enter the Empire only for
commercial affairs if they had no outstanding debts to Russian merchants beyond their
means to pay.120 The author of the Chancery paper, in other words, understood the
Empress’ position in protecting Russian commerce and the integrity of its borders, but
reasoned that limiting the number and species of contracts and promissory notes between
Jewish and Russian merchants would place undue hardships upon Imperial finances.
Foreign merchants, many of whom were Polish and Latvian Jews, made substantial
annual investments in Russia which, unless some liberality were demonstrated, could be
diverted elsewhere to the Empire’s detriment. Unlike Alexander III nearly a century and
a half later, this prospect did not move Elizabeth. Having received this information and
assessing it, the Empress declared simply: “From the enemies of Christ, I desire neither
interest nor gain.”121
The following year, Elizabeth issued yet another expulsion edict which banned
Jews from entering Russia even on business, this owing to a new concern which had been
brought to her attention.122 In her estimation, the Empress now declared Jews to be in
open competition with the Orthodox Church for winning converts. Once more the charge
119
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of Judaizing was levied but, since no specific case was mentioned, it was an odd
indictment.

Apparently, both the Empress and the College of Spiritual Affairs and

Foreign Creeds were ignorant of the internecine struggle between the Orthodox
Rabbinate and the Hasidim over the very essence of Judaism. Neither the occasion nor
the desire for extracommunal proselytizing ever presented itself, not to mention that it
would have been an unappealing notion.123 Judaizing was merely one of Elizabeth’s
fantastic fears. Whether real or imagined, Elizabeth could not be dissuaded from her
conviction that Jews were adversaries in all realms touching Christian concerns and that
their removal from Russia was imperative.124

The Jews under Catherine the Great

Elizabeth’s statutory crusading against the Jews ended with her death in 1763,
though the judicial exclusions and restrictions affecting them remained. Having accrued
some formidable political debts following Peter III’s deposition and determined to
complete Peter the Great’s plan for the Empire, Catherine II had to balance her actions,
desires, and decisions with prudence and pragmatism.125

In a climate replete with

usurpation plots and pretenders, the former Princess Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst knew that
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she had to choose her allies carefully and arrived at a simple calculus applicable to both
private and public affairs.126 Individuals as well as groups were either assets or liabilities.
Entrance to the favored category, such as that accorded the Orlov brothers, required a
demonstration of personal loyalty and benefit to the state. In 1762, the Empress needed a
legion of friends to defend her against further political intrigues and to help her
modernize the Russian state. Towards those ends, on 4 December, she issued an open
invitation to all foreigners, excluding Jews, to come to Russia as well as a guarantee that
Russian nationals who had fled abroad could return without fear.127 Ten days later, she
issued a second decree welcoming the return to Russia of Orthodox schismatics (Old
Believers), pledging that the torture and oppression that had driven them from their
homes would not be revived.128 Such prudence accrued substantial dividends, affording
Catherine various beneficiaries who, in time, would outweigh her political opposition.
However, Jews remained superficially barred from the Empire and did not figure in
Catherine’s pre-Partition plans.
Stability on all fronts was Catherine’s chief concern and necessity in the early to
mid-1760’s which might have prompted official Jewish exclusion at that time. As had
been true during Elizabeth’s tenure, most Jews resided in the Baltic provinces, Poland,
Ukraine and Belorussia where they posed no problem per se. Opening the Empire to
them might have resulted in a mass exodus which would have brought them into direct
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contact with the Russian peasantry with unpredictable results.129 Such an encounter
might require military intervention, and Catherine depended upon the army’s support in
the critical opening years of her reign. Should soldiers be compelled to fire upon the very
people from which they themselves were drawn, Catherine’s political survival might have
been imperiled. The Pugachev Rebellion was her test by fire and it was more than
sufficient to test the Empress’ mettle.130
The other consideration was that Catherine II valued people based upon what they
had to offer her and the Empire. In her employ, she had Bartolomeo Rastrelli, a gifted
sculptor and architect, Etienne Falconet, the sculptor of the Bronze Horsemen, and a host
of Scottish engineers, French men of letters and German scientists.131 Imbued with the
perceptions of Jews prevailing in Western Europe, Catherine initially thought that they
had little to offer. She was not alone. Voltaire, whose opinions the Empress solicited
and valued, referred to the Jews as a petty nation whose laws were those of gain which
made them the very tissue of human criminality.132 The Empress’ impressions of Jews
thus came to her secondhand and their absence in her diary and letters before 1772
indicates that she had very little direct exposure to Jewish affairs. It is curious, however,
that the Baal Shem Tov, the Hasidic movement and even the contest over Vilna never
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entered her official or private correspondence, which indicates that either these
developments were too marginal for her or that, until 1795, they were too distant to
concern St. Petersburg.133
Whatever the Empress’ disposition was towards Jews, their immediate
consideration was deferred. The modernization of the Empire was a more pressing affair.
Peter the Great had accomplished much in laying the Empire’s foundation by means of
his building projects, the importation of scholars and experts, and conquest. The Empress
wished to cap these achievements by ratifying her Imperial Law Code. The Bolshoi
Nakaz, The Grand Instruction, which the Empress formulated in 1764 and presented to
the Legislative Commission the next year was an attempt to rationalize the relationship
between the state and those it governed. This comprehensive codification of laws never
came to pass and the Empress, who had so hoped to make it her lasting legacy, had to
consider it a failure.

Nevertheless, its intentions must be considered beyond the

immediate political moment. The Grand Instruction concerned the general nature of just
laws in which Catherine stated that nothing should be forbidden save that which is
prejudicial to individuals or the community in general.134

Following from such a

premise, it was mandated that punishments were not to proceed from the arbitrary will of
the official local. Good laws are those that maintain a just condition, and, above all, that
good conduct is secured through educating one’s children in the fear of God, the Ten
Commandments, and the traditions of the Orthodox Church.135
133
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consideration.136 Even Chapter 13, which dealt exclusively with commercial affairs, was
silent. Save for taxation purposes, Jews were relatively invisible to official eyes prior to
1772.137
With the first Polish partition, however, the Russians had to take a hard and
sustained look. The first proclamation which Count Chernyshchev, Governor General of
White Russia, had posted in all important locations, concerned the Jews but only in its
last few articles.138 Granting them the same guarantees as Christians, Jews residing in the
annexed provinces were promised freedom of religious exercise and security of their
property which Russian troops would enforce with the strictest military discipline. In
explicit terms, Jews were not to suffer abridgment of or exclusion from previous and
future social benefits.

In commercial affairs, for example, Jewish and Christian

merchants were required to apply for and obtain official permission to trade on or near
the border in addition to registering their wares at the customs houses. In a similar vein,
prior to leaving their homes and conducting their affairs, everyone had to remain where
they were and register by person for census and taxation purposes. Here is where most of
these formerly Polish Jews discovered their worth and status under Russian appraisal.
First, everyone had to register as individuals, beginning with the Christian population,
then followed by resident foreigners, with Jews being entered lastly. If some Jews
anticipated a change in demeanor when Russian authorities began to classify the urban
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population, they were disappointed when the ranking was arranged as follows: (1)
Merchants (2) Manufacturers (3) Workers (i.e. day laborers) (4) Jews.139 Russian
officials had recognized a Jewish corporate identity, though their overall status was far
from ideal or even on a par with lower-class Christians, whether Orthodox or Roman
Catholic. Even so, this categorization was done expeditiously so that this new acquisition
could be assessed and then used to Imperial benefit.140
It was this same interest in public order which impelled Catherine, through
Chernyshchev, to insist that Jews accept Christian laws and be included in the universal
taxation scheme.141 Of particular concern was Jewish residence.142 Catherine realized
that a Jewish presence in the western border regions could potentially be problematic, but
then too the Empire stood to benefit from their commercial acumen. To surmount this
impasse, the Empress introduced a moderate degree of flexibility into her edicts on
Jewish residency restrictions.
Imperial relaxation regarding Jewish settlement did not carry over into the realm
of taxation. For example, the average merchant, peasant, and artisan in Belorussia was
required to pay seven grivnas (70 kopecks) in annual taxes whereas resident Jews had to
establish residence, register with the appropriate kahal, and pay one ruble.143 If the
Jewish registrant was a merchant, the obligation increased to one ruble and twenty
kopecks on goods and excises dating from 1 January 1773. Failure to pay for any reason
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would result in expulsion.

Mindful that Chernyshchev and his staff had several

obligations to meet, Catherine commissioned the Pskov and Mogilev provincial
governors to establish a network of inspectors in certain key cities and surrounding areas
who would register and verify the number and occupation of Jews for taxation purposes.
Both governors and their subordinate inspectors were to oversee the kahals and observe
that they collected the appropriate assessments. Imperial social control of the Jews relied
upon the kahals since it was from these bodies alone that Jewish inhabitants could obtain
property leases and passports, the latter having to meet with Provincial Chancery
approval as well. Bureaucratic integration, which aimed at ensuring Jewish communal
compliance with the Empire’s Christian laws, took a further step when Imperial
authorities ordered kahal and local authorities to surrender records pertinent to cases
involving bootlegging and related offenses.144
Though heavy-handed outwardly, the Empress knew that the potential value of
Jewish traders in Russia could not be discounted. Granted, Jewish commerce was almost
always viewed in disparaging terms, yet Catherine followed a practical course of action
in dealing with it.145

Only too mindful of parochial superstitions and xenophobia,

Catherine established the Pale of Jewish Settlement in 1795, not only in order to contain
Jewish residence but also with an eye towards “organizing” Jews into their own estate, a
move which could only benefit the Empire.146 Before Catherine could put her plans into
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action, however, she died and her good intentions were subverted. Russian xenophobia
and theological chauvinism were two forces which Catherine the Great could neither
conquer nor ignore in her reform designs, especially in regard to Jewish affairs.147
Prominent in the state papers were regulations designed to limit “pernicious Jewish
influences” upon the simple peasant populations and “unfair” competition with the
Orthodox Church. 148
Fear was not an Orthodox Christian monopoly. The Jews themselves feared the
worst with the first Polish partition, though Catherine’s declaration of 16 August 1772
assured the Jews of “the retention and maintenance of all of their freedoms.” Even so,
this provision was neither a precedent for subsequent legislation nor the fruition of earlier
decisions.149 Empresses Anne (1730-40) and Elizabeth (1741-62), her two immediate
predecessors, merely ordered the Jews to settle beyond the border and limited their entry
into the Empire, but Catherine’s circumstances required a more diplomatic hand.
Ordering the immediate expulsion of 200,000 Ashkenazim from the Empire would have
been folly and not in keeping with Catherine’s character.150 Though the Russian party
was in control of Polish affairs by October 1767, the formation of the Confederation of
Bar on 29 February 1768 initiated a four-year civil war which required Russian
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intervention.151 This, coupled with war with Turkey (1768-74), occupied her attention
and demanded Imperial resources on such a scale that it was imperative to conclude the
first Polish partition with all due expedition. Jewish fears over displacement, property
divestment and legal proscriptions could very well have touched off disturbances unless
the Empress adopted a policy which would allay their anxieties. Of the Jews in general, if
succeeding legislation and reports reflected her true disposition, Catherine considered
them resident foreigners, regardless of their tenure on Russian soil, who could be either
constructive or inimical to the Empire.152 Judging from what she understood to be true at
this particular juncture (1772), Catherine did not believe that the stereotypically Jewish
occupation of small trading could be utilized by the state. Therefore, the Jews were
considered to be of little use initially.153 Time and circumstance indeed made some
external alterations to the Empress’s disposition.
In 1772, the newly-acquired Russian Jews had to be kept in some sort of order
and take a loyalty oath to their new ruler.154 Readjustment neither promised nor proved
to be easy. Imperial authorities had to assume various duties and reach a modicum of
accommodation with all parties, including those former Polish Jews whom they
particularly acknowledged as masters in fiscal affairs. It was widely believed in court
151
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circles that Jewish merchants were more clever than Christians, exposed to more markets,
and capable of accumulating more substantial gains. Deficits were omnipresent in the
state treasury and comprised a continual impediment to Catherine’s domestic and foreign
projects, which made finding a lasting solution to the financial crisis all the more
pressing. Acting out of a combination of judicial utilitarianism and cultural prejudice, the
government assessed Jews at a higher rate and to a greater extent than their Christian
counterparts in order to increase revenues.155 It was hoped that such measures would be
the only ones required to make the Jews an asset to Russian society. Absent from this
calculation, however, was the Empress’ acknowledgment of Jews as Russian subjects in
return for their compliance.
Conditional upon their submission to Christian laws, Jews were offered a vague
assurance that stricter legislation would be held in abeyance. What was left unstated was
the extent to which the Jews were expected to accept what were deemed Christian
principles. “Acceptance” had a wide range of meaning and it was unclear whether the
Empress indeed meant acknowledgment or outright assumption. By way of an answer,
Catherine emphasized that Russia was a Christian state in which Christian morals and
ethics held sway, but unlike Empress Elizabeth, this was not meant to encourage Jewish
apostasy.156 At the core of Catherine’s Jewish policies was her attempt to bring the Jews
under control of the throne. The Empress did not imagine that the Jews would abandon
their religion, culture, and traditions to become Russians, which would be as absurd as it
Touching upon the execution of Trials and Punishments in Legal Cases in Accordance with the Laws and
Customs of those Places.
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was impossible. Mandating that Jews accept Christian laws as engendered in state
policies and invested in autocratic authority was a way of securing their legal
obedience.157 In effect what she sought to create was an administrative category which
could be entered into the tax, census, and other official rolls without special stipulations.
Such legal status did not accord its holders the rights of Russian Christians and resident
foreigners, relax their residency restrictions in any appreciable way, or abrogate
employment proscriptions.

Instead, such status reinforced distinctions between her

subjects.
In general, Catherine’s Jewish policies were not unlike her other initiatives in that
they were promulgated in a spirit of pragmatism. The so-called Jewish problem on the
western border might very well have been a problem initially, but Catherine was not so
rigid in her thinking as to discount 'improvement.” By the late 1770’s and early 1780’s,
the Empress had become convinced that Jews were adept businessmen and that their
talents could prove profitable for the Empire. It was ordered that Jews, along with
Christians, establish institutions which would facilitate the assessment of human and
natural resources in the annexed provinces. Though this was a reasonable endeavor, it
was delayed because of Russia’s participation in the Second Turkish War (1787-92).158
After the second Polish partition (1793), Jewish life in Russia became strained.
Imperial authorities imposed additional restrictions and obligations upon Jewish
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merchants which were to last three years and followed by their expulsion from Russia.159
Christian commercial interests, believing themselves undercut by Jewish competition,
petitioned the Governor of Belorussia who then informed the State Treasury of this issue
which was then laid before the Empress and Senate.160 Old and in declining health,
Catherine the Great merely wanted peace throughout the Empire and especially in the
vulnerable and potentially volatile western border lands.

By forbidding permanent

settlement and barring Jews from conducting their affairs only to reverse herself,
Catherine did more to confuse matters than to arrive at a definitive policy. Fears arising
from the French Revolution probably led to the Empress’s diminution of Jewish market
exposure. Providing clearly defined parameters in this new edict, Jewish merchants were
restricted to the provinces of Minsk, Isyaslov, Bratslav, Polots, Moghilev, Kiev,
Chernigov, North Novgorod, Yekaterinoslav, and a few outlying regions. Confinement
to these smaller and middling markets would result in inevitable loss of revenue which
was balanced by the imposition of a double tax effective on 1 July 1795. In appearance,
this was the most formidable challenge Catherine had tendered to the Jews to date but not
even this would confine or diminish the Jewish presence in Russia. Like the Pale of
Settlement, enforcement of the Jewish decrees never met with much success owing to the
state’s inadequate means of implementing its own laws.
Two months prior to the imposition of the new tax, the Minsk Governor reported
that the Jews had utilized the resources at hand and were plying their affairs with great
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success.161 With greater delight, he added that the Jews had become more sedentary and
communal, content to execute their business among their own kind, producing,
manufacturing, and propagating themselves within their communities rather than
wandering about to the detriment of the larger population. As if these assurances were
not enough to pacify the Empress, the Governor announced that the kahals in the district
cities had been given authority, with strict guidelines, to judge religious matters falling
within the purview of religious law and liturgy. Jewish communities were finally coming
together in an organized fashion and order was assured. It was at this time, however, that
the Hasidism-Rabbinism debate was in its final stage and if the Minsk Governor General
did not know of it at this juncture he would be apprised of it soon enough.162 For the time
being, granting the kahals partial autonomy in deciding theological matters seemed a
quiet but important “concession” on the part of the Imperial administration in an
important aspect of Jewish life. Although stipulations reinforcing their role as revenue
factors kept kahal elders under the Imperial aegis, their possession of authority in
religious and cultural matters encouraged the Jewish leaders to assume that they could
weather any internal storm with Imperial backing.

Conclusion

Dostoevsky's ridiculous man and the Jews who found themselves under Russian
rule at the end of the eighteenth century shared a similar plight. First, there was an
161
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imagined and perfect community which was subsequently shattered. Among the Jews,
there were some who sought to reconstitute what had been lost and like Dostoevsky's
protagonists, found that the realization of their design would meet with numerous
obstacles.

Frustrating and seemingly futile at times, hope and historical amnesia

provided the animation behind that endeavor. While the struggle to restore Jewishness
was largely internal and esoteric, the Jewish community was certainly not immune to
external social and political developments. In the aftermath (1656-1798), the Jewish
community first had to regain its collective self assurance and then proceed to the task at
hand.
While the Jews were adjusting to their new circumstances, so too was the world
around them. Political relations between Poles and Russian were never easy, and
beginning with the first Polish partition, new challenges awaited the Jews. Though never
a paradise for the Jews, at least Polish officials had had centuries of experience with Jews
residing their kingdom and, later, commonwealth.

In contrast, the Russians, and

specifically government officials, had only dim historical recollections of the Khazars
and, more immediate though still fairly distant, the association of Jews with the founding
of Kiev. Historical amnesia and episodic contacts with Jews prior to 1772 did not
promise a welcome reception and even less so the emergence of positive Jewish images
in the immediate future. Even recent history was of little help. Peter the Great paid little
attention to them save for those few whose trades could bring scarce specie into the
Empire.
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human trait of fearing most what she understood least. For Catherine II, however,
emotionalism had to be discarded in favor of discrete, sagacious, and pragmatic action.
Well acquainted with the stock Jewish stereotypes of her age, which Voltaire
augmented with great relish, the Empress nevertheless realized the economic benefits
Jews could bring to the Empire. Carrying on a tortuous balancing act between Russian
xenophobic sentiments and worldly fiscal pragmatism, Catherine admitted some Jews
surreptitiously while publicly calling for their restricted admission. Like those employed
to affect the Empire's European transformation, the Jews had their place in Catherine’s
schemes to establish a mercantile estate.

As fate would have it, neither Russia’s

refashioning nor a Jewish estate came to pass in the Empress’s lifetime, yet the
transformation of both Russia and its Jews was gathering momentum and their respective
courses would cross one another frequently.

CHAPTER II: A NEW ELEMENT TO CONSIDER IN JEWISH REFORMATION
1796-1825

Introduction:
Insofar as their historical contacts with one another were concerned, Russians and
Jews were not new to one another. What had changed by the end of the eighteenth
century, however, was their mutual proximity. Catherine's Polish partitions and Paul's
annexation of Courland meant that Jews could no longer be sent beyond the borders or be
kept at arm's length. Tsar Paul I wanted order which was the fundamental reason behind
his official settling of the Rabbinical-Hasidic contest.

Alexander I, his immediate

successor who ruled for twenty-four years, saw the Jews as a potential asset to the Empire
in need only of a modern education. Beginning with his initiatives, Russian authorities
took an unprecedented direct hand in formulating and directing Jewish education, and
this was the new element in the Jewish quest for identity.

How Matters Stood: 1796-1801

With Catherine's passing, Tsar Paul I ascended the throne.

Though well-

educated in the art of statecraft under Nikita Panin’s tutilage, Paul, neverthelss, could
neither improve upon nor rid himself of the one defect which kept him at a distance from
his mother; he was Peter III’s son.

It had a retarding influence upon his political

education. More than a bad marriage, Peter had been for Catherine a political hurdle
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which she had to surmount for her very political and physical life.1 When she assumed
the Imperial scepter, she reversed many of Peter III’s decrees in a determined effort to
eradicate all vestiges of his reign save for Paul. His removal would have imperiled
Catherine’s political legitimacy yet his proximity was distasteful to her. In light of that
consequence, Paul was placed in Panin’s care, kept out of sight, and given virtually no
opportunity to practice the art of government. For his part, Panin attempted to give the
Grand Duke the best education possible under the circumstances yet, owing to the uneven
quality of his instruction and his mother’s rejection of him, he grew up to be an obstinate
and suspicious man.2 When Paul made his initial forays into Imperial policymaking in
1774, Catherine rebuffed him contemptuously. Not surprisingly, Paul’s thoughts may
have been ill-formed, his logic incomplete, and his written expressions clumsy, yet no
one had bothered to instruct him in the proper language of Imperial administration.3
Suffering for a crime he did not commit, it was little wonder that Paul gave his
vengeance full vent upon Catherine's death. Assuming the throne at age forty-seven, Paul
followed his mother's example by altering and reversing many of his predecessor’s
policies and removing some of her more favored ministers. As much as he would have
liked, Paul could not indulge in this sport at length owing to various pressing matters of
state. It was early in his reign when both the Vilna Hasidim and Rabbinate appealed to
1
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him in 1798 to settle the question of legitimate Jewish orthodoxy.4 This matter, coupled
with the annexation of Courland the following year, made the Jews prominent in Russian
considerations, though Paul probably would not have given the Jews any consideration
had it not been for I.G. Friezel's claim that the root of Jewish "evil" lay in their language,
clothing and customs.5

It was Friezel's assessment and the attitudes of the Poles and

Polanized Lithuanians towards the Jews had a profound influence upon the development
of Russia's Jewish policies.6 Though quite significant later on, the creation of a lasting
Jewish policy was deferred until Alexander's reign. Paul's concerns were largely directed
elsewhere.

The Climax and Resolution of the Hasidism-Rabbinism Struggle

One issue which refused official neglect was the Hasidism-Rabbinate imbroglio
which was coming to a head. Russian authorities, and Paul I in particular, had been
invited to decide the ultimate outcome of the contest between the Rabbinate and
Hasidism being played out in Vilna.

Central to this affair were Gaon Elijah ben

Solomon, Rabbi Shneur Zalman, and Elijah’s able lieutenants, Rabbis Avigdor ben
Hayyim and Hirsch ben David.7

By the mid-1790’s, Hasidism showed no signs of

waning and the Rabbinate’s prestige was in a precarious state. Worse was yet to come.
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Despite two formal excommunication bans, repeated public burnings of Hasidic works,
and orchestrated ostracism within the community, the Hasidim had reached the doorstep
of the Vilna Kahal and the Gaonate itself. Even by the late 1790’s, the Rabbinate
misunderstood and misinterpreted the goals of its opponent, errors in judgement which
would prove fatal. Adding to the confusion and frustration was uncertainty over St.
Petersburg’s Jewish policies and Russian receptiveness to official Jewish suggestions.
Until 1799, nothing was certain, and the situation was sufficient to try even the hardiest
Jewish souls. Tsaddakhic rivalries were marring Hasidism’s principal claim that it was
affecting the restoration of the world.8 Catherine II’s territorial aggrandizement, Vilna’s
intransigence, and Dov Baer’s ill-conceived institution had all proven too much for Rabbi
Schneur Zalman of Liadi who, as Dov Baer’s successor, sought to bring about reform and
reconciliation as best he could.9 Facing obstacles from all sides, perhaps the most dire
was that the tsaddikim had become unmanageable.10 Long ago they had overstepped
their authority as teachers, the only capacity intended for them. Styling themselves as
great prophets, many tsaddikim demanded absolute allegiance from their disciples and of
others residing within proximity to them.11 This behavior was completely alien to the
traditional structure of Jewish life. Most abhorrent, some had taken up wonderworking
for various purposes which bordered upon occult practices forbidden explicitly in Torah.
8
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This particular breach Schneur Zalman could not abide.12 There were some acts for
which there was no redemption. Perhaps the Gaon had been correct in insisting that no
one under age 40 be permitted to read Kabbalistic literature or study its mechanics and
then only after mastering Torah, Talmud and Gemarah.13 Clearly Hasidism’s educational
mission had been compromised and sadly by the very tenets which had supported it for
many years. The Hasidim had been encouraged to explore and approach God through
various forms of prayer and rituals, but this had been done without established
guidelines.14 Equally detrimental had been the integration of mysticism into Hasidic
theology and philosophy. Religious enthusiasm without scholarship had given way to
chaos.15 In a desperate gamble to rescue both the movement and the Jewish community,
Zalman established Habad Hasidism, a sect of mainstream Hasidism which embraced the
Baal Shem Tov’s teachings while discounting sensory and emotional experiences in favor
of rational intellectual self-examination, scholarship and toleration.16
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Zalman’s reforms would lead to the defection of a significant number of yeshiva
students, Judaism’s elite and Rabbinism’s only hope.17

If common Jews believed

themselves estranged from Vilna, scholars engaged in traditional study with its staid
formalism and parochial veracity viewed their education as esoteric and antiquated when
compared with the simple vitality and contemporary logic of Habad Hasidism.18
Intentionally, Zalman ensured that there was little innovation in Hasidic theology and
philosophy which was not in agreement with Orthodox Judaism. Even so, one crucial
departure from tradition with which he imbued his movement was its consideration of
contemporary conditions and the application of Jewish enlightenment which would serve
secular interests while preserving Judaism’s spiritual integrity.

For too long, the

cloistered atmosphere of the yeshivah had emasculated the Jewish intellect by preventing
its full expression within the context of modern circumstance.

Indeed, the Rabbi

practiced what he preached and would have liked to have expanded his new sect, but first
he had to obtain official sanction as a legitimate part of Judaism which could come only
from the man who had no sympathy for his cause.
Zalman was not alone in feeling the strain of this protracted struggle. Tired and at
the end of all conceivable options, Elijah ben Solomon, by 1793, was ready to give up the
fight. Even the so-called Sages of Shklov, his most ardent supporters, could offer him
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little comfort.19 Noting his master’s weakening ardor and physical constitution, Rabbi
Hayyim ben Avigdor, Chief Rabbi of Pinsk, approached the Gaon with a proposition. In
due course, he persuaded Elijah to issue an official order to burn the latest Hasidic
publication, Zavaat ha-Ribash (Testament of the Besht) on the steps of Vilna’s Great
Synagogue as a demonstration of the Gaon’s unflagging commitment to afford Hasidism
neither quarter nor respite while he still lived.20 The order was executed the following
year. Believing that this latest assault would disable his adversaries for some time, the
Gaon imagined a perpetual sabbatical from the fray, but that was not to be. The Hasidim
wasted little time in exploiting an opportunity to strike back. Two years later in May
1796, rumors reached Vilna that a young man claiming to be the son of Gaon Elijah and
an attendant were touring throughout the German lands to inform the resident Jewish
communities that Elijah had reconsidered his opposition to the Hasids and actually
sympathized with them.21 To this libel, the Gaon responded by dispatching a long letter
to those communities which had hosted the impostor and his aid, particularly those in
Lithuania and Belorussia, denouncing this latest Hasidic calumny and pledging a renewed
campaign against them. Investing teeth to his commitment in October 1796, shortly after
Yom Kippur, the Gaon sent a circular letter to all Jewish communities in the Russian
Empire ordering the expulsion of Hasidim from their midst. Russian officials had given
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similar orders earlier in the century regarding Jews in general, which had proven to be as
ineffective as the Gaon’s.22
The conflict now reached its apex. After the publication of Elijah’s October
mandate, Rabbi Zalman was urged to debate him and prove beyond all doubt that
Hasidism still adhered to the fundamental doctrines of Orthodox Judaism. Owing to the
failure of his earlier petition, the Rabbi declined this suggestion, electing instead to
commit his attestations to a letter which he hoped the Gaon would see. Fate decreed
otherwise. On 9 October 1797, during the holiday of Sukkot, Elijah died without ever
seeing the manuscript. Vilna’s Hasids, learning of the Gaon’s demise, rejoiced openly
while others mourned, prompting immediate Rabbinical revenge.
Convinced that the Russian Tsar would uphold its authority, the Rabbinate
appealed to Paul I to arbitrate and settle this long-standing affair. Shortly before his
death, Elijah ben Solomon, in his parting protestation, accused Rabbi Schneur Zalman
and his adherents of heresy and demanded justice, certain that the Tsar would carry out
Vilna’s sentence. Seeing more clearly than the dying Gaon that the debate’s composite
esoteria could be easily misconstrued by one unschooled in Jewish theological polemics,
Elijah’s closest associates, using the collective pseudonym of Hirsch ben David, notified
the St. Petersburg that Rabbi Zalman was sending money to Turkey for clandestine, antiState activities. To ensure that official action would be taken, another letter was sent to
Tsar Paul I himself, charging that Hasidism challenged Christian social morality and
posed a threat to public peace.23 Rabbi Zalman was arrested forthwith and incarcerated
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for several months until he came to trial and was released for lack of evidence.24
Embarrassed by this compromising episode, the governor of White Russia signed an
order on 15 December 1798 protecting Zalman and his company from any further legal
action. Fortune now favored the Hasidim and they took full advantage of it by accusing
the Vilna Kahal of misrepresenting its annual income and only giving half of what was
due to St. Petersburg. Once more, acting upon an unsubstantiated charge, the Imperial
police arrested the entire Kahal. What followed was a Hasidic coup d’etat. Elijah’s
death and the Kahal’s incarceration left Vilna and the Jewish community without a
governing body. Owing to the speed of Russian jurisprudence, several months would
elapse until the former kahal members could return. The community needed a governing
body to meet its present needs and to comply with Russian regulations. Elections were
held at once and the Hasids gained an eight-seat majority and the office of Gaon.25
Seeking legitimacy, the Hasidim greatly diminished the centuries-old power of the
Rabbinate, and though that body would linger, never again would it enjoy the potency it
once possessed. In its blind zeal to build a fence around Judaism and restore its faith in
God free of "myths," the Rabbinate had failed.26
The Hasidic conquest of Vilna ended an overt conflict which had lasted three
generations, though much remained to be settled. Eastern European Jewry was in need of
order and Schneur Zalman’s creation and promotion of the Habad movement was merely
one response to it. Russian authorities apprehended that need as well, though their
thoughts of order and reform went in an entirely different direction. The consequences
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arising from these differing visions were not immediate, but it should be pointed out that
the capture of the intellectual capital of Russian Jewry by the Hasids was a tainted if not
pyrrhic victory.

Russian authorities did not relinquish the ingress to Jewish affairs

afforded them.27 In Paul’s last two years, the Jews were compelled to do little more than
keep house by maintaining the kahals and compiling census and tax rolls. No further
attempt was made to influence Jewish life and culture at the time. A wide breach,
however, had been made which Paul’s successors would exploit throughout the next
century.
Vilna opened the door but it was really in 1799, with the assumption of the Duchy
of Courland and its sizable Jewish population, that Russian officials took a hard look at
Jewish affairs. Far from high drama, the first order of business the Russian had with the
Jews was to organize and assess them for the purposes of census and taxation.28 The
fundamental problem was to keep them in their original places of residence. Despite
repeated orders and entreaties to remain where they were at the time of Russian
annexation, many Courland Jews continued to wander from town to town as was their
accustomed habit. Complicating matters further, Jews coming into Courland from other
places as well made an accurate assessment impossible.

Demonstrating partial

cooperation, Jewish merchants and tradesmen registered in their categories and specified
their vocations when required, but often they failed to indicate a permanent residence or
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commercial locale.29 As an alternative means to collect revenue, the Senate requested
that at least Jewish recruitment money, payable in lieu of active military service, be
collected and returned to the Treasury. Expedition was wanting and months would elapse
before even a partial remedy could be found.

One advantage granted Russian

administrators, however, was that the kahals were still extant and functioning which was
really all that was needed for Imperial authority to establish a foothold.
Each city in Courland was to have a kahal subservient to an “Oberkahal” which
would coordinate activities between them. As had been true in the territories annexed
from Poland, each city kahal was to register the Jews within its environs and ensure that
master craftsmen were registered in their respective guilds. Residence was open to
everyone, though proof of gainful employment was required of those residing in the
cities. Upon completion of the census, Jews were allowed to move to other locations
within Courland provided that they applied to the Imperial Senate to do so. For a time,
these regulations pacified the inhabitants but Russian officials were still perplexed as to
why, in comparison to Polish Jews, Courland Jews were so disorganized.
Language, more than any other factor, was a problem in dealing with the
Courland Jews since many did not understand what the Russians wanted of them.30 The
standard procedure which had been used during the three Polish partitions required
officials to post public declarations of rights and responsibilities in Russian. Conversant
in Yiddish, Lithuanian, Lettish, and German, many of these Jews did not comprehend
Russian to any appreciable degree and Russian officials did not translate their instructions
29
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into the local vernaculars. Prior to 1799, Polish Jews were the only ones with whom
Russian authorities had dealt with any frequency. From that experience there developed
a notion that Jewish communities were all the same, the fallacy of which they were slow
to recognize.

Courland Jews were more mobile because their social cohesion and

communal institutions were not as strong as those of their coreligionists in the western
borderlands. They were an island unto themselves, incomprehensible to their conquerors
who mistook their behavior for stubbornness.

Jewish Publishing on the Eve of Alexander I's Ascendance:

To understand the undercurrent of official Russian attitudes towards the Coruland
Jews, one must consider the Russian term "nemets." In general parlance, it means
"German" and, depending upon context, can serve a synonym for "foreigner" and, by
semantic extension, "mute."31 Anyone not conversant in Russian was considered to be
so, however, this linguistic chauvinism, though narrow, did not blind Imperial officials to
one crucial aspect of the Jewish community which came under its suzerainty. Though
somewhat scattered, the Jews had a viable publishing industry and a collection of
intellectual salons whose influences emanated primarily from Germany.32 If ever there
was a single aspect of the Jewish ethos which frustrated and buoyed the Russian
government, it was the arrival on Russian soil of the ostensibly Germanically-influenced
30
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Jewish education. There was little doubt that members of these salons forged strong
bonds with German society but, to the consternation of some Jewish intellectuals, this
communion affected conversions to Christianity in some cases.33 A careful examination
of the respective policies of Alexander I and Nicholas I reveal that this latter consequence
did not escape their notice. More immediate, however, was the question of how the
government could effectively control the traffic in Jewish books and ideas across the
Empire's long and ill-defended border. Paul's overwhelming fear of being assassinated
precluded the formulation of any concrete design, and even his successors would find
most of their efforts wanting for a lasting solution.
From 1772 to 1797, Russian officials did not see the necessity for censorship
regulations regarding Jewish books.34 With the establishment of the Riga Censorship
Committee in 1798, the government intervened in what had been a fairly prosperous
commercial endeavor. Immediately, problems surfaced. Jewish booksellers complained
that, given the time needed to approve a certain book, their profits were severely
curtailed.35 To expedite matters, the government then employed Jews conversant in
Yiddish and Hebrew to read over suspected texts and pass judgment on them, only to
replace them with Jewish converts to Christianity in belief that they would be more
reliable.36 Throughout the nineteenth century, official illiteracy in Yiddish and Hebrew
regarding all aspects of Jewish publication and education would be an omnipresent
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concern and the fundamental reason behind the mandate that Jewish publications appear
in Russian. This imposition in no way diminished the Jewish identity since, as had been
true of German literacy, it actually expanded communal and intellectual horizons. Even
so, some Jews opined that they could only express themselves fully as Jews at night out
of the light of the assimilationist sun.37 After all, assimilation had few guarantees.
Moses Mendelssohn, the founder of Haskalah and a Germanicized Jews, was not spared
the assaults of a drunken antisemite on a Berlin street or the taunts of Immanual Kant's
students when he visited the philosopher's lecture hall.38 Many of the lessons of Jewish
adaptation which would enjoy full realization decades later originated in this four-year
period prior to Alexander's assumption of the throne.

The Jews and Other Non-Russian Nationalities

After Courland’s annexation, did Russian authorities suffer from a heightened
sense of xenophobia brought about by Jewish proximity to Russian population centers?
Both Chechens and Georgians, for instance, were made part of the Empire and lived in
the remote Transcaucuses region.39 Cultural differences notwithstanding, the only other
factor was that the Chechens lived near northeastern slopes of the Caucus Mountains
whereas the Georgians lived to the southwest and yet this difference in location did not
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preclude Russian interference.40 In comparison with other “inorodtsy” (a foreign body or
national minority) however, the Russian perception and treatment of the Jews was
unique.41 Imperial authorities judged such groups as the Bashkir, Kalmuks, Samoyeds,
Tatars, Kirghiz, and Uzbeks as inorodtsy, backward when measured by Russian
standards.42 Being non-Russian was a consideration, but since these people were far
removed from Russian population centers and were quite self-sufficient, Imperial
authorities interfered little with their internal affairs.43 One outstanding example of this
laissez-faire demeanor was the government’s attitude towards the Bukhara emirate under
the Manghit dynasty.44 Owing to their commercial access to China and the Far East
which brought into the Empire considerable revenue, Catherine the Great ensured that
Muslim domains were seldom disturbed. The Empress even went so far as to sanction
the creation of a Muslim consistory at Orenburg which was later moved to Ufa. While the
Orthodox Church sent missions into these areas to convert some communities to
Christianity, there was no urgent necessity, theologically, intellectually, or politically for
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their modernization via Russification.45 Already drawn into the Imperial sphere they
were serving the Empire satisfactorily as they were. True, Peter the Great had used the
educational function of the Russian Orthodox Church in his attempts to win over
Muslims to Orthodoxy by dispatching a number of priests to act as both teachers and
missionaries.46 Meeting with considerable resistance early on was to be expected, but the
chief obstacle between Russian teacher and Muslim or pagan student was that they did
not speak the same language. Learning from this shortcoming, the Church ensured that
its missionaries became fluent in inorodtsy languages. From this change in tactics,
usually the first generation became literate in Russian and arithmetic while eschewing
Orthodox baptism and religious instruction. In this matter the Holy Synod insisted that
conversion was not be forced upon the unwilling. There would be time enough for the
next generation to commit themselves.47 Orchestrated as a long-term process, succeeding
generations whose education consisted of reading, writing, and instruction in the laws of
the Christian God brought them ever closer to Russian bearings. Those accepting
Orthodox baptism were told that they had been freed from pagan and Islamic ignorance
and given five kopecks as a christening gift. Should they intermarry with Russians, their
progeny would become Russian, otherwise they remained inorodtsy invested with a
Russian state orientation while retaining some of the old customs.48
Russification via Orthodoxy had been most successful as well as self-perpetuating
with the Kalmuks. Once they had become Christianized, the Kalmuks sent missionaries
45
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to the Bashkir. Owing to their skilled horsemanship, the Russians enlisted both groups in
the Imperial cavalry where they served with distinction.

It should be pointed out,

however, that none of these inorodtsy groups capitulated easily, yet the Church
persevered and continued to educate and supply monetary gifts to the impoverished
nomads who settled subsequently, farmed the land, took instruction and accepted
baptism, all of which eventually undermined their resistance.49 Despite claims of saving
heathen souls for Christ, by converting these people to Russian Orthodoxy, the tsars not
only possessed these people in body but in soul as well.
The Jews, however, presented different challenges. Situated on the Empire’s
western border where their commercial acumen potentially threatened their less-adept
Russian competitors, Jewish life there was destined to be difficult.50 In addition, deeplyentrenched superstitious and religious beliefs among their Russian neighbors made the
Jews known to them, and these were augmented by anti-Semitic remarks, stories, and
Western European publications.51

Images arising from these sources imparted an

external identity to the Jews which was virtually impossible to cast off.

Mutual

parochialism afforded little opportunity or desire for either Russians or Jews to get to
know one another intimately. Perceiving Jews as adversaries, the Russian Orthodox
Church and government realized in the aftermath of the Polish partitions and the
annexation of Courland that their dealing with the Jews would be much more complex
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than that with the Muslim and Siberian groups.52 Possessing an intellectual tradition well
inured to internal edification while contending with external adversity, Jewish
capitulation would require an exceptional degree of sophistication.
Having met with Rabbi Zalman during his incarceration, Tsar Paul had been
impressed by his erudition and plans for educating the Jewish masses since it promised to
bring about their pacification. Pleased with this potential for restoring order, the Tsar
was soon disillusioned when he and his officials discovered that the Hasidic victory did
not bring with it firm guarantees against future disturbances. What could be expected in
the future could only be imagined in the darkest terms.53 By 1800, the government was
convinced that the Jews under their authority were generally backward and in need of
reform.54

A Jewish Community in Turmoil

From all appearances, Jewish communal integrity was in a precarious state in the
period 1799-1803. Rabbi Schneur Zalman, the victor of Vilna, now had to stave off
divisions within his own ranks. Habad Hasidism, the rational branch of the mainstream
movement dedicated to restoring genuine philosophical and intellectual enlightenment to
the Jews of Russia, was being torn apart by the same emotionalism which almost
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destroyed its parent.55

Rabbinical factions, refusing to concede defeat and spoiling for

confrontation, were an omnipresent problem.

More serious, however, were the

internecine contests between tsaddikim which had infiltrated the movement and were
exerting an inimical influence despite Zalman’s abhorrence of them. Proximity to the
parent Hasidic movement, which Zalman opined had deviated from its original creeds,
coupled with insufficient distinctions between it and his group, threatened to destroy
Zalman’s attempts at a “pure” Hasidic revival before it had reached maturity. The Rabbi
had to marshal all of his intellectual skills to save it. With his understanding of human
nature, Zalman appealed to his followers’ vanity and shame by espousing the superiority
of critical discernment over emotionalism which had preserved Habad and its mission to
fortify the entire Jewish community to meet all challenges.56 A quick resolution was
imperative, especially because, as events would bear out, Jews seldom were left in peace
for any extended period of Alexander’s reign.
Habad and mainstream Hasids were too preoccupied with each other and the
Orthodox Rabbinate to notice another rival which would in time challenge their
competing claims to authority over Russia’s Jews.

Joshua Tseitlin (1742-1821), a

wealthy estate owner in Uste, Mogilev province, provided Haskalah its ingress to Russia.
Rabbis and students alike flocked to his estate to study and discuss the potential for
Jewish reform along the lines of Moses Mendelssohn and, ironically, Elijah ben
Solomon, the deceased Gaon of Vilna.57

Combining modern scholarship with deep

rabbinic learning and piety, Tseitlin urged Jews to accept Russian acculturation as a
55
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means of fortifying their Jewishness and making it more viable in the contemporary
milieu. His efforts did not go unnoticed. Befriended by Grigori Potemkin, Catherine II
accorded Tseitlin the title of “court advisor” and his name was entered into the ranks of
the Russian aristocracy. For Tseitlin, this recognition was beyond that which any Jew
could imagine. Nonetheless, like most official honors given to Jews in Russia, it brought
only temporary benefits to the individual recipient without any lasting improvement in
the status of the larger Jewish community.

Alexander I’s Inheritance: An Overview

Tsar Paul 's assassination in March 1801 left open the settlement of Russia's
Jewish affairs. Catherine and Paul's irredentist acquisitions made sending Jews beyond
Russia's borders impossible and little in the way of alternatives to deal with them. Tsar
Alexander I (1801-1825) decided to embrace them with a bipartisan reform design.
Education was the cornerstone and in the first phase, 1801-12, official efforts were made
to introduce Jews to vocational training, specifically in the fields of agriculture, small
business, and artisanal trades. Later on, Jews who showed a scientific aptitude were
encouraged to seek training as medical personnel. On occasion, though vaguely, the
government offered some benefits to Jews who converted to Christianity.

A mere

administrative device to bring the Jews further under state control, it would assume
institutional importance after 1815.
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During the Napoleonic Wars, Alexander experienced a personal religious
transformation which influenced his post-Napoleonic Jewish policies profoundly. The
second phase of official Jewish reformation (1812-25) took on the character of a
millennial crusade. In 1817, Alexander and the Holy Synod entered into a joint venture
which became known as The Society for Israelite Christians. Outwardly, it had the
trappings of a missionary quest to bring the Jews to Christianity and utilize rural Jewish
talents for the Empire in a beneficial yet benign fashion.58 Agriculture was the sole
vocation of the Soceity's communes, and by placing its members in remote settlements, it
was thought that Jewish Christian farmers would gratify the Tsar's desire for conversion
and the government's with regard to economic development. For those Jews who elected
to become members, the only benefit they derived was to have their names entered into
the Christian tax rolls. Haphazard implementation and general ineptitude caused many
Jews to become wary of the Society and instead of softening the “stiff-necked” Jewish
demeanor, Alexander’s zeal prepared the ground for future Jewish wariness towards the
reforms of his successor, Nicholas I.

Attempts at Jewish Reformation in the Face of Napoleon

Alexander’s early Jewish reforms were influenced by I.G. Frizel and Count
Gavrill Derzhavin, his Minister of Justice.59 Though out of office by the time Alexander
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came to the throne, Frizel's report to the government, submitted during the last year of
Paul's reign, set the tone for reform. From his account, the Jews were not only lazy but in
a state of perpetual chaos.60

As proof of the latter, he spent considerable time

elaborating upon what he perceived to be the nonhierarchical Jewish clergy whose
espousal of contradictory teachings was absurd.61 Just as inimical as their theology, the
former Vilna governor contended, were the kahals and their unwholesome activities.
Well in advance of Jacob Brafmann, Frizel decried the bondage of fear and ignorance
with which the average Jew was attached to this institution. As if this was not enough,
the Jewish language and their customs kept them apart from their Christian neighbors,
and Frizal chafed at what he saw as the "charmed circle" which kept the Jews in a world
of their own.62
Sharing these concerns was Count Gavriil Romanovich Derzhavin, Frizel's
contemporary and colleague, who was also a court poet, jurist, and had been a favorite of
Catherine II's. Though a key figure of Committee for the Organization of Jewish Life
and, at times, the scourge of Nota Notkin and Judah Lev Nevakhovich, Derzhavin was
more of a literary figure who shared Karamzin's concerns about the purity and efficacy of
the Russian language.63 Even so, Alexander took his opinions on Jewish affairs with
considerable gravity. Like Frizel, he considered the kahals to be corrupt and suggested
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that all of them be abolished in favor of a government-appointed "Protector of the
Jews."64

Furthermore, he insisted that Jewish children above age twelve should be

educated in Russian state schools, traditional dress should be abolished, and that strict
censorship should be imposed on all Hebrew books and that foreign Jewish books be
banned altogether.65
Despite the spirit in which they were composed, almost all of the Alexander's
reforms were presented as gestures of goodwill. Apparently oblivious to the Committee's
domination by Russian officials and the compulsory nature of the 1804 edict, the
government took for granted Jewish volunteerism.66 Whether the issue was increased
taxation or occupational proscriptions, the Tsar’s edicts were usually composed in
language expressing the autocrat’s care and concern for his Jewish subjects. It was not
Alexander’s intention to eradicate the Jewish presence or destroy their identity.
Regulation of the Jewish population, particularly the rural communities, was at the heart
of his program. Somehow the scattered shtetlach of the western border regions has to be
brought under effective administration. Both Alexander and his successor, Nicholas I,
would address this issue with varying degrees of success. Urban Jews did not escape
attention but, being more settled, were more manageable from an administrative
perspective.

The Jewish Statute of 1804
64
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With Alexander I, the Russian government took an increasingly active hand in
Jewish affairs. Until 1804, Russian efforts had amounted to little more than demographic
reorganization and almost always for fiscal considerations.

For example, in Minsk

province the Governor ordered Jewish removal to the towns in 1795 only to unsettle them
from the province’s larger villages in 1801. This was eventually halted by the Imperial
Senate the following year for fear that these forced migrations would impair revenue
collection.67 In that same vein, the Finance Ministry issued a directive that all merchants,
guildmasters and Jews residing in the Minsk province pay 500 rubles in assignants or 360
in silver for each recruit.68 Now with the threat of Napoleonic France, more decisive
measures had to be implemented. De La Harpe’s assurances that Napoleon had no
intention of infringing upon Russian interests bore no credibility with Alexander who
realized that it would only be a matter of time before the two of them would meet on the
battlefield.69 Napoleon’s perspicacity and shrewdness had propelled him to the heights
he now enjoyed. By turning his opponents’ weaknesses to his advantage, the Emperor
was able to triumph, and Alexander endeavored not to become one of his hapless victims.
It was imperative, therefore, to bolster the ranks of the Imperial army and maintain a
guarded westward vigilance, which included a vigorous attempt to husband the Jews and
their resources.
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Alexander’s knowledge of the Jews prior to the promulgation of the 1802 statute
(the antecedent to the 1804 edict)70 was minimal which accounted for his assessment of
them as rank provincials living lives of endemic poverty, dishonesty, and ignorance as a
consequence of their communal educational institutions.71

Of the three, Alexander

considered this last privation particularly inimical since it had denied Jews numerous
social benefits, chief of which were legal residence and broader employment within the
Empire. Their plight, in Alexander’s mind, was the result of a profound disability but one
which was surmountable and could be remedied immediately through exposure to a
broader and cosmopolitan curriculum. Often referred to as the Jewish Statute, the 1804
declaration/edict was the first studied attempt to define the Jews politically and draw
them into the Russian milieu by expressing official intentions of meeting the educational
and employment needs of urban and rural Jewish communities. The autocracy made it
clear within the statute’s fifty-six paragraphs that the Jews and their children were
guaranteed an education on a level commensurate with that of Russian nationals, but not
contrary to or inconsistent with their religious beliefs.72 It was also made plain that
Imperial authorities needed doctors, surgeons and scientists; Jews who had sufficient
aptitudes for mathematics, medicine, physics as other allied fields were encouraged to
train for these professions.

On the one hand, the 1804 statute heightened Jewish

expectations of improved status both individually and collectively.73 For its part, the
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Empire expected to gain a viable resource, an educated “class” indebted to the Emperor
and his ministers. The price for this largess was fluency in either Russian, Polish or
German and the adoption of modern dress patterned after one of the three.74
Superficially, the edict appeared to mandate minimal concessions with no noticeable
departure from Jewish traditions, but some were skeptical. Those who had more liberty
to examine this posted legislation in totum, however, discovered that its graduated
stringency and full consequences portended ill for the Jewish existence in Russia.
What was unique about this particular piece of legislation was that it was
fashioned by the Committee for the Organization of Jewish Life which had three Jewish
members. Established in 1802, Judah Lev Nevakhovich, along with Grigorii Perrets and
Nota Notkin, were solicited to become members of this body in an advisory capacity.75
Though certain aspects of the Statute of 1804 reflected their influence, especially in the
opening paragraphs, the Russian members clearly determined its character.

Led by

Derzhavin, the restrictions placed upon Jewish commercial activity in the later sections of
the Statute all but eclipsed the promised benefits. This consequence of competing
interests between Russian officialdom and the Jews would be the hallmark of
Alexander’s Jewish policies and, eventually, lead to their ultimate failure. From the
government's point of view, however, potential Jewish manufacturers, farmers,
craftsmen, and traders in later sections of the Statute were being offered the best
arrangement for promoting Jewish advancement and autocratic control over the
74
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community. Alexander may have sympathized with some of the concerns voiced by the
Committee’s Jewish members, but Derzhavin and Victor Kochubei (Minister of Internal
Affairs) carried more weight. After all, they were Russian and high-ranking government
officials. What arose from this Committee and the statute it produced was a precarious
balancing act between proposed Jewish modernization and Russian political
conservatism. More precisely, what had been laid bare was the contradiction of making
the Jews part of the Russian milieu and yet apart from it, an attitude which Alexander's
successors would perpetuate.
In terms of it language and organization, the Statute of 1804 was straightforward
and more lenient than Derzhavin and Frizel's proposals.76 After outlining professional
obligations and benefits, its authors next addressed non-professionals who were divided
into four groups: merchants, farmers, manufacturers and mechanics (craftsmen), and
small merchants. Without exception, all were compelled henceforth to conduct their
affairs in the prescribed languages (i.e. German, Russian, Polish) and don the appropriate
modern dress. Time for adjustment was noted and granted but, as of 1 January 1807, all
bills of exchange had to be in the approved vernaculars, along with ledgers, logs, and
account books no later than 1 January 1808.77 The wording became more strident and the
tone demanding, but these alterations, at least from the Russian perspective, amounted to
pedestrian procedures which had been part of Jewish-Christian commercial relations for
centuries. Following these mandates was an expression of the statute’s fundamental
purpose. Predicting that there would be some who desired their own farmsteads and
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factories, the State Treasury was authorized to offer loans for such endeavors interest-free
for ten years after which repayment would be required at a rate to be determined upon the
expiration of that term. The hand of official assistance towards alleviating the Pale’s
myriad economic ills had been extended.
Not discounting his grandmother’s wisdom for instituting the Pale while
simultaneously promising expanded settlements, Alexander was quick to stipulate a
number of proscribed districts and regions before enumerating those amenable to the
anticipated exodus. Although the viability of the land for agricultural or industrial use
was questionable, this lacuna was glossed over with assurances to those persons wishing
to travel as far as Astrakhan and the Kazak lands that their re-settlement would not be
coerced.78 Upon establishing themselves, all State obligations for the new settlers would
be waived for ten years, save land taxes and customs duties. At the conclusion of the tenyear period, these Jewish colonists would assume the obligations of Russian nationals
and be accorded the same educational opportunities as their Russian Orthodox neighbors
in addition to a perpetual exemption from the double tax.
Education on a par with Russian Orthodox subjects was desirable if it could be
accomplished but, that aside, no other shared privileges were mentioned. This same
omission was evident in the offers tendered to manufacturers and industrial workers
willing to resettle. Pertinent articles were replete with unspecified promises that Jews
would manage these operations themselves and that Jewish workers would enjoy wages
commensurate with those of Russian employees.

Potential factory owners were

encouraged to purchase land for their proposed operations but, should current prices
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prove prohibitive, factories and equipment could be established on manorial lands
provided that there was a legally-binding contact between the factory heads and
concerned nobles.79

To prevent this arrangement from leading to abuses, it was

mandated that nobles were clearly forbidden from meddling in the operations and
commercial affairs of these enterprises which, under the provisions of the statute, enjoyed
both unlimited market exposure and exemption from standard Jewish excises.

By

according enterprising Jews this protection, it was surmised, their acceptance of further
reformation would be secured and their resistance minimized. Already under this project,
the Jews who took advantage of it were tied securely to the Imperial treasury since few
possessed the requisite start-up capital.80
Some Jews had reservations and, upon closer scrutiny, realized the true “price”
being demanded for their future “prosperity.” Despite assurances in the Statute’s first
articles that Jewish education and culture were protected, subsequent demands for
fluency in Polish, German or Russian, adopting contemporary dress, and the mandatory
assumption of recognizable Russian surnames seemed to undercut these guarantees of
ethnic integrity.81 In 1804, Alexander was concerned only with reforming the Jews and
making them an asset to the Empire, ignorant of the notion among some Jews that the
acceptance of anything outside of their traditions was antecedent to spiritual death.
Forever blind, Alexander never understood the Jewish position despite the presence and
advice of the Jewish members of the Committee. Preoccupied with his own conceptions
79
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of Jewish reform, he was incapable of viewing the Jewish Question from another
vantage.
The Committee’s conservative influence was pronounced in the Statute’s middle
paragraphs which dealt with restriction on Jewish enterprises. Care had to be taken that
such a diminution of employment and market share ensured that most Jews would be
reliant upon Treasury loans but not to the extent of promoting the possibility of default
which would destroy the very prospect of economic development. Through a delicate
balance of fiscal constraints and concessions, the Finance Ministry had to institute these
measures with minimal fanfare which was not an easy task.

Proceeding by degrees,

Jewish-run taverns, coaching houses and inns had to obtain new leases demonstrating that
they had adopted Russian partners no later than 1 January 1808 and that such businesses
had to operate away from main roads. As had been true in Poland, not all Jews had
stationary concessions. Wine, brandy and spirit merchants were itinerant traders and
usually the most prosperous which would explain why the finance minister ruled that all
contracts to sell wine in villages and towns would become null and void within ten years
and ineligible for renewal.82

No official reason was given regarding this proscription

though one was inferred from examining antecedent and successive articles. Commerce
in alcohol was a lucrative endeavor since it exposed merchants to numerous markets and
brought them into contact with other merchants, tradesmen and clients who could
aggrandize their customer base.

Such sojourns, however, made it difficult for the

government to oversee Jewish entrepreneurial endeavors. This inability to determine
few Jews suspected that these initial changes were to be the antecedents to a gradual erosion of the Jewish
identity in Russia.
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whether Jewish wine merchants’ actual revenue from these transactions agreed with the
figures entered in their respective ledgers when presented annually to the district excise
officers seemed to justify their exclusion from the trade. Ending elicit traffic and false
fiscal disclosures meant the imposition of a general exclusion of the Jews from the wine
and spirits trade which included the sale and distribution of kosher wines. Since there
was no hope of securing an exemption, celebrating the sabbath and festivals became all
the more difficult since this decree all but compelled Jews to consume non-kosher wines
or those of questionable purity.83
Beer and vodka peddling was to remain unchanged since it tended to keep the
Jews in place and provided more commercial competition.84 Pliers of malted and potato
spirits were omnipresent, manufacture and sales were local, profits modest but taxable,
and official scrutiny more keen. Depending upon the size of the town or city and market
demand, competition among these license holders was ardent and acrimonious, arising
from an overburdened market which was made all the more onerous through the
introduction of stringent passport regulations which limited the movements of itinerant
Jewish liquor peddlers. In short, the 1804 statute was, primarily, an attempt to reorganize
Jewish society along viable and exploitable economic lines.85
Noteworthy about this particular law in light of its legislative antecedents and
successors was the qualification of “demonstrations of good behavior.” In effect, the
82
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government held individual and communal Jewish l’goti (privileges) hostage, a condition
made even more onerous since this “carrot and stick” stipulation was cloaked in vagaries
rather than defined guidelines. Kept off balance, the community was laid bare to official
manipulations of its attitudes, sentiments, and perceptions, all of which amounted to a
delaying tactic until a permanent accommodation could be established. Alexander, for
his part, could not fix a definite “Jewish image” in his mind which would serve as a
template for their future alteration. Then again, he was becoming increasingly occupied
with the threat posed by Napoleonic France.86 The question of how the Empire could
derive maximum benefit from Jewish industry, secure Jewish loyalty and goodwill, and
still relegate them to marginal citizenship remained unanswered.87
From the Jewish perspective, the 1804 Statute was both unique and conformed to
previous legislation. Having contended with Russian edicts since 1772, two issues must
have stood out in the minds of astute Jewish merchants. The significance and long-term
consequences of tightening economic proscriptions which came with the government’s
eager offer of treasury loans would not have been lost on them. In addition, they and
other members of the community could not challenge the statute through legal recourse,
let alone seek a hearing on the matter, as their ancestors once could in Poland. Still,
Jewish reaction to it was ambiguous. Jewish religious institutions and practices had been
safeguarded in the first two paragraphs of the statute’s body which afforded some hope of
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an accommodation.88 Rabbis and kahal candidates were still chosen from among and by
their respective communities, although they were now subject to pro forma Imperial
approval and limited to three-year official tenures. For his part, Alexander I’s initial foray
into Jewish affairs was conducted with guarded restraint, though whether this action was
a consequence of uncertainty in dealing with Jewish affairs or a conscious effort to
introduce reforms gradually is not known for certain.
Instead of paving the way for Jewish emancipation, the 1804 Statute was viewed
by some as a challenge to Jewish existence.89 Judah Lev Nevakhovich, Jewish poet and
an proponent of modern Jewish education, dared to publish “Lament of the Daughters of
Judah” in 1804 as a response to Alexander I’s proposed reformation of the Jewish
community.90 To him, the matter was plain. Astonished at the thought of sweeping away
Jewish culture and life itself, Nevakhovich, a man who considered Russia his beloved
country and whose “tribe” shared that sentiment, wondered what the Jews had done to
merit such “trampling underfoot.”91

He had taken Russia to his breast as a cherished

daughter and now he and his coreligionists were compelled to abandon all that they held
dear as recompense. In the eighteenth century, Russia had been a haven for Jews (in his
opinion), now certain Christians condemned Jews as enemies (i.e. Christ killers, defamers
of Christianity) without proof and were believed by others. Worse still, Nevakhovich
claimed that the abolition of Yiddish and imposed limitations on Hebrew would censor
the Jewish intellect in exchange for a stipulated “modern” Russian education which
88
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promised literacy but no improvement in fundamental rights. Jews were people of the
book and Hebrew literacy a mainstay of Jewish erudition. To suggest otherwise, as had
the autocracy, was contemptible in Nevakhovich’s eyes. Concluding his appeal, the
author asked simply that the Jews be spared government attention, any of which he found
undesirable. Satisfied that he had voiced his sentiments and those of his coreligionists,
his parting request to the Tsar was that the Jews be allowed to live in peace in the manner
to which they were accustomed.92
Nevakhovich believed himself betrayed by the Tsar and members of the
Committee for the Organization of Jewish Life, especially by Derzhavin, though this was
hardly surprising.93 Joining him in that sentiment were his associates Nota Notkin and
Grigorii Perrets.94 Seldom complementary towards the Jews, Derzhavin, nevertheless,
had invited these three noteworthy, “modern” Jews to assist the Committee. Initially, this
Jewish troika (three) had devised a comprehensive program of Jewish reforms which,
save for a few minor ones, were completely disregarded. Notkin returned to his business
affairs.95 As for Nevakhovich and Perrets, surmising that they had reached the end of
their political lives and were too “European” in outlook to return to the Jews of Russia,
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both converted to Lutheranism.96

From that point, nothing more was heard of

Nevakhovich, but Grisha Perrets, the tutor of Mendel Lefin who laid the foundation for
the Odessa School, would reappear on the political stage.

Placing the Jews under Closer Scrutiny

Bringing the Jews into line was becoming a perennial problem. Rural Jewish
migrations made administrative oversight difficult and directives to local officials to keep
Jews in their place failed to achieve the desired results. Passport regulations were also of
little use, owing to the paucity of soldiers and officials to enforce them. Most Jews in
Russia lived in towns which made their governance relatively manageable. By 1810,
however, rural Jews were migrating en masse into New Russia and the Litovsk province
carved from Prussia’s Polish territories as a result of the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), creating
significant problems for both the Finance Minister and the Minster of Internal Affairs.97
New lands on the western frontier were ripe for cultivation but there were few
farmers in those regions.98 Agricultural colonists, regardless of religion or nationality,
were initially solicited to move into and settle these areas with the Imperial treasury
promising generous financial backing. However, owing to the influx of impoverished
rural Jews, this project soon was in peril of bankruptcy since fiscal demands exceeded
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allotted resources.99 In a joint report to the Senate, the ministers of Finance and Internal
Affairs warned that Jewish families, which at present numbered in excess of 600 (3,640+
souls), were already resident in these areas with the promise of 300 more (1800+ souls) in
transit. Only ill could be expected from such consequences since they were of the
poorest lot, dirty, and suffered from high mortality. Should anyone suspect that these
figures were fantastic, the Finance Minister pointed out that as of April, 1810, the
government had paid out 145,680 rubles in establishment and maintenance costs to
Jewish farmers. At the current rate of five kopecks per soul (individual) per day, the
annual outlay for 1810 alone would come to 219,000 rubles. Colonization under the
current circumstances was deemed vital, but the Treasury viewed Jews more as a debt
pool than as an asset-aggrandizing factor. No one could or wished to dispute these
findings and the project was terminated for a time.
By 1811-12, the government had a clearer idea of what to do with the Jews. A
Senate decree of 20 April 1811, little more than a paragraph in length, freed Jews from
paying the recruitment bounty in return for converting to Orthodox Christianity.100 For a
nation on the brink of war and requiring substantial revenue to equip its forces, this fiscal
reprieve ostensibly reflected a new official attitude. Visions of delivering Christian
Europe to the Messiah were still a few years distant, although on the eve of Napoleon’s
invasion a change was coming over the Tsar.
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Christianity as more than just a religious creed.101 To him, it was the repository of true
knowledge which would free those who embraced it from ignorance and usher in
beneficial modernity and guarantee Jewish loyalty to the throne.102 This last point was
crucial. As for the relationship between Alexander’s early messianic impulses and the
promised liberation of Jewish converts from the recruitment bounty, the wisdom was
quite simple. Rural Jews, it was thought, would gladly accept Christianity in return for
relief from one of the state’s fiscal exactions. Even if it failed in the long term to accrue a
substantial number of converts, this latest offer would inevitably find some “takers.”
With consistent official pressure and the inevitable attrition, ostensibly Judaism could be
rendered a cultural and ethnic accent.103 At this time, before Napoleon's occupation of
Moscow which would transform Alexander into the "Tsar-Liberator of Europe," Russian
Jewish Christians were seen as those who could be trusted implicitly by Russian
officialdom. As had been true of the Jewish Christian censors, these potential Jewish
Christian farmers would be placed more firmly within the compass of the Tsar's power.

In Anticipation of Jewish Spiritual Reformation

Prior to leaving for the front in December, 1812, Alexander I issued a decree
establishing the St. Petersburg Bible Society under the direction of Pastor John Patterson,
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a member of the British and Foreign Bible Society.104

Assisting Patterson in this

endeavor was fellow Society member, Reverand Robert Pinkerton.105 Nowhere within
the corpus of this document were the Jews mentioned directly, though they would be the
unknowing objects of an ambitious millennial project which this organization inspired
five years later. For some time, the Tsar claimed, illiteracy and poverty had kept the
Gospel from those most in need of it for which there was no immediate remedy. When
Patterson petitioned him for permission to establish a branch of his Society in St.
Petersburg and hearing him plead his case, Alexander was impressed and perceived that
this design would resolve his problem. Patterson’s organization possessed substantial
monetary resources and a record of success in distributing the Holy Bible as far as India.
This helped secure official Russian approval, but what made this proposal all the more
attractive was Patterson’s assurances that certain members of the Society were conversant
in and could translate these works into Kalmuk, Tatar and other Central Asian
languages.106

Curiously, it was Alexander’s original desire to save these eastern

communities from the Mohammadeans, who were mentioned directly and took
precedence over all other competing considerations, including the Jews.

Patterson

assured Alexander that his Society would assist the St. Petersburg Bible Society
financially and establish a publishing operation with the intent of forming a distinct
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Russian Bible Society which would cater to Imperial needs. Thus began an evolutionary
process which yielded such an institution in 1813.
From a Russian historical perspective, the Russian Bible Society was a unique
undertaking. It was an assembly of many Christian rites and creeds which included
Lithuanian Catholics, Franciscans, and several Protestant denominations, all committed
to proselytizing among the Empire’s non-Christian and semi-Christian population. This
was also the first officially-sanctioned theological group which, though under Prince
Golitsyn’s advisement was, at this time, not under the complete domination of the Holy
Synod nor its membership entirely Russian Orthodox.107 The Russian Bible Society,
above all, was a reflection of Alexander’s conception of an all-encompassing, indivisible
Christian community promoting spiritual and intellectual enlightenment to usher in the
Millennium. Germinating during the liberation of Russia in 1812, it become incorporated
into the Tsar’s growing belief that he was an instrument of Divine Providence, a
sentiment confirmed through his reading of the Book of Daniel and his identification with
Daniel’s trials.108

By 1815, Alexander had become convinced that he was the

“benevolent deliverer” of Europe and God was urging him to prepare the ground for the
Messiah’s return, a mission which would eventually include the Jews and shape Imperial
foreign and domestic policies until the Tsar’s death in 1825.109

Napoleon and the Jews
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During his invasion of Russia, Napoleon had thought that he had an opportunity
to exploit a Russian “weakness” to French advantage. By promising the Jews of Vilna
and their coreligionists throughout Russia a homeland in Palestine, he revealed something
of himself. Napoleon thought of the Jews as a nation rather than a religion, and knowing
their desire to settle their own state, he pledged Palestine.110 Securing Vilna as a supply
depot for the Russian campaign, of course, was his principle objective and, towards that
end, he made another grandiose promise. The reconstitution of the Great Sanhedrin
invested with unrestricted legal authority in determining religious laws and ritual
orthodoxy among European Jews was offered in return for Jewish cooperation.
Napoleon, however, overestimated the strength of his appeal. True, some Jews took him
at his word, but centuries of cynicism had tempered Jewish receptivity toward the
promised gifts from kings, emperors and princes, most of which had never
materialized.111
Caution in this instance served them well.

Napoleon had no intention of

liberating the Jews from oppression.112 As a soldier, he knew how to assess and exploit
resources; as a politician, he could enlist the hopes and desires of potential supporters.
War, in his opinion, was the apex of political contest. In France, he had embarked upon a
scheme of gradual Jewish integration into French society in the belief that they would
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come to identify with it rather than their so-called alien creed.113

Exposing his true

sentiments in 1808 with the promulgation of the Infamous Decree, he placed onerous
restrictions upon Jewish loans and occupations, and forbade settlement in northeastern
France, a measure which found favor with France’s foremost mathematician and
physicist, Francois Fourier.

Also in that same year, he had declared that Jewish

commerce was the source of all evil. Whether Vilna’s Jews knew of these particulars or
not cannot be ascertained, but their natural skepticism kept most of them from making
commitments to Napoleon.
Alexander could not gauge Jewish loyalty initially, and even accounting for their
general refusal of Napoleon’s pledges, the soundings from St. Petersburg were disturbing.
On the eve of the invasion, the anti-French proclamations of the Catholic Church in
Russia contained anti-Semitic references which were more than matched by the OberProcurator of the Holy Synod. Caught up in the spirit of the moment, each claimed that
should Napoleon triumph, Muslims and Jews would be unopposed in rising up and
destroying the Christian Church and civilization. Alexander himself, however, remained
more level-headed.

The nation was on a war footing, in the Tsar’s opinion, and

everyone’s talents, including the Jews, had to be pooled.114
Within the Jewish community the lines had already been drawn. Rabbi Schneur
Zalman and his Habad Hasidim had pledged their support for the Tsar, reasoning that
should Napoleon prove victorious, Jews might become emancipated and less
impoverished but that French hegemony would result in assimilation into Russian society
and the loss of Jewish identity altogether. Horrified by that prospect, Zalman opined that
113
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it was far better to pray for the realization of the other eventuality. Though the Jews
could expect continued poverty and little relief from the Russian autocracy, at least they
could cleave to the traditions and beliefs for which they had labored so long and hard to
retain.115 Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Rymanov and the Maggid of Kosnice, however,
had come to a different conclusion. Napoleon’s guarantees of a Jewish homeland in
Palestine and full citizenship in Europe were too much for them to dismiss. Both held
fast to their conviction that the French Emperor’s word would be honored. To justify
their stance, they pointed out that after creating the Duchy of Frankfort in 1811,
Napoleon had granted full citizenship to the five hundred resident Jewish families
there.116 For them, this was proof enough of Napoleon’s sincerity.
Such enticements offered to desperate people were difficult to discount, yet the
majority of the Jews of Russia supported the autocracy, as evidenced by the distribution
of Yiddish pamphlets urging all Jews to pray for the Tsar’s immediate victory.117
Russian forces re-entered Vilna in mid-April, 1812, with the Jewish kahal and other
members of the community greeting them with bread and salt.118 Alexander took the
opportunity to commend Jewish loyalty and industry with regard to his troops,
particularly the saddlers and dry goods merchants who kept them well supplied.119
Though favorable, this appraisal was tempered by the Tsar’s conviction that the rural
shtetl environment was not conducive to healthful lives and was in dire need of
modernization. Observing these same scenes but coming away with a markedly different
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view, his younger brother Nicholas opined that the “zhids” were dirty, cowardly leeches
who bled dry the peasantry. Military service was the only remedy, especially naval from
which desertion would be much more difficult than in a land-based army.120
Endemic Jewish backwardness, real or imagined, was not the difficulty Russian
authorities encountered when dealing with Jews. Shortly before Napoleon’s advance, the
Jews of Shklave in Lithuania complained bitterly to Russian officials in Vilna about their
Rabbi and community leaders who had been extorting money from them for their own
enrichment while impoverishing the rest of the settlement’s population.121 The complaint
was legitimate but Russian law provided no redress. Transgressions against the state and
associated punishments were detailed in the Empire’s laws in general, yet very few edicts
were devoted to civil violations. Compounding the problem was the state of Jewish legal
status in Russian society which was nebulous. The kahals were supposed to address
matters pertinent to Jewish communal concerns which Russian authorities deemed either
too esoteric or inconsequential to warrant their attention. Had Shklave’s rabbi and
communal elders cheated the government, justice would have been swift, but their
malfeasance affected only their fellow Jews. Nothing could be done. The pro forma
instructions which the government issued to local rabbis and community leaders were
ambiguous and Russian officials seldom oversaw their subsequent execution. Corruption
was an inevitable consequence of episodic government on the communal level. Despite
the number and extent of Alexander I’s reforms, law, order and justice on the local level
improved little.
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The Society of Israelite Christians

From 1812 until the Congress of Vienna, preoccupation with the affairs of war
and peace gave Alexander I little time to think about the Jews.122 It was only when Lewis
Way, the founder of the British and Foreign Bible Society, brought up the question of
Jewish social and political equality with Christians at one of the closing sessions of the
Congress of Vienna that the Tsar took a renewed interest in their welfare. Listening to
Way’s rational assertions and adapting them to his own mien, Alexander contemplated
the social and spiritual benefits which could be derived from such a consequence. What
came out of this discourse were the guiding tenets of the Society for Israelite Christians.
For Alexander, this became the answer to his Jewish Question. Such an organization, to
Alexander’s mind, could indeed channel Jewish talents and resources, specifically in
agriculture, which would benefit the Empire.123 Alexander’s conceptions were not so
fanciful as they appeared at first glance. Some rural Jewish affairs did assume a desired
official order shortly after the Society’s establishment, though only for a limited time.
Disillusionment among Society members resulting from unrealized promises, social and
economic realities, and general misfeasance all conspired to render the project all but
moribund by the early 1820’s.
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Though it appeared to be a novel invention, the Society for Israelite Christians
was really composed of much of the same time-worn thinking and devices which had
determined state policies towards the Jews since 1772. Monetary exemptions, loans, and
promises of expanded educational opportunities had not brought in sufficient Christian
converts and now hopes were invested in this project.124 The Tsar saw no reason why
success could not be achieved. Russia’s own reform was progressing slowly, but this in
no way indicated a failure, and the same, to Alexander’s reasoning, was applicable to
Jewish affairs.
He knew that he had to tread cautiously. The Society’s eventual formation,
organization, and direction evolved in two steps. Noting that forced conversions never
secured loyal adherence, Alexander, along with the Procurator of the Holy Synod,
officers of the Russian Bible Society (formerly the St. Petersburg Bible Society), and
several learned ecclesiastics established the Committee for the Conversion of the Jews to
Christianity.125 Prince A. N. Golitsyn, the Minister of Education and Spiritual Concerns,
was appointed head of this body, and its adherents targeted rural Jews and apprised them
of Christianity‘s spiritual benefits.126 Their present circumstances, the Jews were told,
were a consequence of their “old” faith. Furthermore, Jewish social isolation and tax
burdens arose from their rejection of Russian society, not the other way around. As a
Christian people, Russians were benevolent and welcoming; Jewish relief was at hand if
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only they would join the Russian mainstream. Arguing along these lines, Committee
agents were able to bring in a sufficient number of converts to establish some short-lived
Society communes. Once these settlements were in place, the second stage unfolded.
Newly-baptized Jewish-Christians, as the statute deemed them, were to be
organized into agricultural colonies for which lands had been reserved in the northern and
southern provinces on the Empire’s western border.127 The decree accorded community
members the privileges of brewing beer and distilling vodka and other grain products, as
well as building and administering their own communal institutions with little
interference from the government.128 Stating the matter bluntly, traditional Jewish life
was described as a burdensome condition. By joining the Pastor’s (i.e. Jesus’) flock,
relief would be forthcoming.

Those availing themselves of the opportunity would

constitute a special class of citizens, yet this status and other key issues were simply
declared without further elaboration.129 Many who had joined the Society were soon
confused and frustrated with the government’s incomplete conception of how its
members fit into the Russian milieu if at all.
The Statute was posted publicly throughout the concerned communities, and those
who had liberty to read it completely must have wondered about the implications and
consequences of this envisioned special class. Neither Russian nor wholly Jewish, it
could only have meant that members had merely exchanged one restricted and nebulous
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status for another.

Equally troublesome was the profusion of terms such as

“guardianship,” “protection,” “patronage,” and “security.”

It was not clear what

specifically was being promised to these Jewish Christians save that those who became
members of the Society’s communes would enjoy the same benefits of Russian Orthodox
Christian farmers. Still to be resolved in a meaningful manner were the specific liberties
accorded Jewish Christians and how they compared with those of their Orthodox
Christian brethren. It was understood that Jews converting to Christianity were released
from discriminatory Jewish taxes and given the tax status of Christian peasants but little
else beyond that. Society members were left to wonder if they had any real protection of
person and property under the laws.130 As a pacifying measure, the statute’s authors
emphasized the promotion and protection of Jewish agriculture and industry, though no
stipulations were given as to the portion of the Imperial market which would be open to
them nor what they could buy, sell or trade.
If the statute’s lacunae left its intended audience guessing, the logical conclusion
of what it portended did not. Members were urged at length to bring their immediate and
extended families into the Society’s cells so that future generations would benefit from
the automatic assumption of membership without alteration of privileges.131

In the

strongest terms, however, relations with non-aligned Jews were forbidden. The Interior
and Finance ministers considered these former friends and associates potential wreckers
and cautioned members to report any potential wreckers from within or outside the
Society to the head of their respective communities.
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In the end, conversion to Christianity and Society membership had resulted in a
double exile from both Russian and Jewish societies. Ensconced in remote communes
with few resources, Society communities constituted an inaccessible socio-economic
archipelago with no appreciable improvement in any facet of their members’ lives. After
1820-21, the Society no longer appeared in official reports nor were any further statutes
promulgated for its maintenance.

From all indications, it had become a moribund

institution.
When stripped of its theological facade, what the Society created, in effect, was a
quasi-fluid Pale. Neither Alexander nor his ministers were ignorant of the fact that
Catherine’s Jewish fringe suffered from a paucity of resources and shtetlach scattered
throughout. By allowing a limited number of Jews to settle in small remote communities
under tight control, Jewish acculturation, at the very least, would have an opportunity to
take root. As for banning contact between Society members and practicing Jews, the true
reason behind the proscription was more mundane than any fears of the latter’s supposed
corrupting influence. Often in their dealings with Jewish Christians and Jews, revenue
officials became easily confused as a consequence of continued economic relationships.
Inefficient and incomplete registration of Jewish Christians made it impossible to
distinguish between these Jews and others even on the communal and district levels, and
the state bureaucracy itself was still going through the growing pains of Alexander’s
earlier administrative reforms. Separation of Jewish Christians from Jews made social
control of both easier, at least in theory. Bureaucratic practice, however, was another
matter.

131
Unforeseen Consequences Arising from Jewish Spiritual Reformation

During the Society for Israelite Christians’ existence, other problems relating to
Jewish identity would emerge. By its very name, Christian theology was the Society’s
fundamental pillar, but it was treated in such a manner as to cause further obfuscation for
the Imperial administration. All Christian creeds were admitted to the Society’s cells and
judged equally valid, and their adherents were free to build schools, churches and engage
in all God-ordained affairs.132

This ecumenical sentiment did not curb contradictory

action, however, as evidenced by Alexander’s expulsion of the Jesuits from St.
Petersburg in 1812 because they were converting Orthodox Christians to Catholicism. In
an 1823 decree, on the other hand, the Tsar was disposed to consider the Roman Catholic
Church Orthodoxy’s sister church.133 Even in the early months of its existence, the St.
Petersburg Bible Society and its immediate affiliates had Lithuanian Catholics as
members who, along with their Orthodox associates, proselytized among the Jews
without prejudice.
Relations between the Bible Society and the Holy Synod had been a precarious
one, guaranteeing that the former’s tenure in Russia would be limited. On the eve of the
1820’s, ill-will between Prince Golitsyn and Patriarch Photius was wearing down
Christian solidarity and imperiling Alexander’s grand plan.134 Trying to head off a full-
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blown confrontation with the Holy Synod which would dash all “Jewish-alluring”
projects present and future, Alexander brokered a “truce” which afforded him time to
perfect his vision of a Christian brotherhood.135 Any sect which professed Christian
teachings, in the Tsar’s estimation, had merit as far as the Society of Israelite Christians
was concerned.

More than mere Christian theology, this open-creed invitation was

directed primarily at foreign Jews, specifically Western Europeans who had accepted
Christianity and wanted to join the Society. This was not a complete fantasy. A few
Eastern European rabbis and Jewish intellectuals had studied in German yeshivas and
Western universities.

The West, for some Russian Jews, was the repository of

knowledge, particularly Jewish knowledge, scarce commodities in their own
communities.136 Knowing this, the Tsar sought to exploit this inferiority complex among
Russian Jews for Imperial gain. Granting these Western Jewish scholars freedom of
movement to and from the Empire as well as property rights, in addition to those
accorded to native Society members, Alexander also played upon an established
sentiment among Western Jews that their Eastern coreligionists were backward and in
need of instruction.137
Prone to flights of fancy, Alexander could also exercise considerable shrewdness.
His timing for this particular reform project could not have been better. In the late 1810’s
and early 1820’s, some German Jewish intellectuals were subjecting Jewish traditions
135
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and theology to scientific scrutiny in an effort to determine whether Judaism could be
made compatible with modern circumstance or should be discarded altogether. Such
luminaries as Heinrich Heine and Felix Mendelssohn, ostensibly enlightened Western
Jewish-Christians, certainly had their followers, and it was precisely these individuals
whom the Tsar hoped would invite the Jews of Russia to join them.138 As for the Society
of Israelite Christians and its mission, it did enjoy some success in the smaller southern
and southwestern communities but it was a failure overall in realizing the Christianization
of the Jews of Russia. It was dissolved formally in 1825.
Aside from the Society, there were other religious affairs involving Jews which
occupied the Autocrat. Beginning in the late fall of 1822, the Jews unwittingly turned the
tables on Alexander by using his own statutory vagueness against him. It originated with
the case of Stanislav Fromgold, a saddler from St. Petersburg province, who had recently
renounced Judaism and converted to Roman Catholicism but was still being taxed as a
Jew.139 Accomplishing little with the district authorities, he appealed to the Holy Synod
for redress, and it was before this body that the particulars were brought to the fore. First,
Synod officials accused Fromgold of violating the law of 13 August 1820 which forbade
converted Jews from associating with their former Jewish friends.140 Furthermore, a
simple conversion to Christianity in and of itself, he was informed, did not signify a
change in status. Demonstrable proof of his religious sincerity had to be forthcoming
137
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before any action could be taken.

Subsequently, Synod officials admitted that

Fromgold’s plight was shared by others owing to bureaucratic delays which had kept
legitimate names from being entered into the official Christian registers. Under the
circumstances, Christian Jews could easily be mistaken for Jews. Shifting responsibility
further, Prince Golitsyn declared that such incidents could be avoided in the future if
converts would submit proof of their conversion in writing which would then be subject
to review and, upon official confirmation, their taxes adjusted accordingly.
Jews, Jewish taxes, and legislative misfeasance would follow Alexander to the
grave. In late 1823, an unprecedented event occurred in the Bialystok region which no
one in the Imperial administration could have predicted. That Jews there were converting
to Roman Catholicism was known and tolerated, but that they were applying to become
novices in the Franciscan Order with some actually becoming Friars was most unusual.141
Initially, many of these Jewish converts belonged to a voluntary prayer group associated
with a Franciscan monastery from which some later applied to become novices. Irked
and puzzled, the government questioned the legitimacy of these novitiates under Canon
Law, a query which was duly answered and not to their liking. Jurist Ferrara, representing
the position of the Catholic Bishop responsible for the Bialystok region, claimed that the
rule of Benedict XIV assumed the sincerity of all novices to the order without
examination, though candidates were cautioned that it was an arduous three-year
novitiate which many would not complete. If the government was hoping for a canonical
loophole, it could not be found.
140
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From the Jewish perspective, taking monastic vows was an alien notion if
considered solely on theological grounds. In light of the overall Jewish situation in the
period 1817-23, especially in rural environs, joining the Franciscan order was tantamount
to affecting social emancipation. To remain a practicing Jew with its attendant legal and
fiscal burdens guaranteed most a life of perpetual poverty. Out of desperation, should
some join the Society for Israelite Christians, there were still no assurances that a Jewish
Christian’s quality of life would improve. Like those who converted to Christianity but
did not join the Society, they would assume the obligations of Russian Christians but be
denied almost all of the benefits. By becoming a Friar, the severance with Judaism was
complete but so too was direct Imperial influence. Exempt from all taxes and obligations
and having all material needs met on a regular basis, some Jewish friars must have felt
that monastic life was a far better fate than the prospect of permanent poverty, the
prospect of starvation, and bureaucratic intervention. The other side of this phenomenon
was that it was the most potent self-sacrificing form of resistance to Imperial authority.
Depending upon how well informed they may have been, a few of these friars
may have known that if the government pursued them into the monastery, they would do
so on contestable ground. With reactionary sentiments running high, the Tsar found
himself trying to settle ecclesiastical accounts throughout his Empire, and a confrontation
with the Catholic Episcopate and the Vatican would have been too much to bear. By
means of conciliation and negotiation, it was resolved that should Jewish Christian
novices leave the monasteries, the heads of these communities would notify the district
authorities at once so that their names could be re-entered into the Christian tax rolls. If
141
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this departure proved to be a case of apostasy, the apostate was duly re-entered into the
Jewish rolls.142 Another concession the government was able to gain from the Roman
Church was a ceiling on the number of novices accepted into the order which, for a time,
satisfied both sides, though Imperial administrators had to admit privately that they had
been outmaneuvered.143

The Spectre of Constitutionalism and its Consequences

Discord and discontent were not confined to theological issues. Jewish political
activism, though minute, was in evidence.

In 1819, Grigorii Perrets re-entered the

political fray. Like many Russian intellectuals of the post-Napoleonic period, he saw
constitutionalism as the only means to bring about Russian liberation and, by extension,
Jewish liberation as well. Though now a practicing Lutheran, Perrets still identified with
the Jews of Russia. It was in the period 1819-21 that Perrets established the Society of
Perrets, a group of “pure constitutionalists,” committed to affecting reforms which would
bring Russian government into line with Western liberalism. Though envisioning the
work of his group in broad secular terms, Perrets, nevertheless used “heruth,” Hebrew for
“liberty,” as his group’s watchword and buttressed his arguments for constitutionalism
with citations from the Old Testament.144 For all of his efforts, however, he could only
draw ten people, and though the group disbanded in 1821, Perrets’s influence on the
their Exclusion from the Poll Tax Assessment.
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Decembrists, though slight, was sufficient to have him arrested in 1826 and sent into
exile. From this experience, Grigorii (Grisha) Perrets earned two distinctions; he was the
only “Jewish” Decembrist the Russian government recognized and, unwittingly, the
“founding father” of the secular-oriented Jewish intelligentsia in Russia. Unknowingly,
Perrets introduced yet another element to the composite mosaic of the Jewish identity in
Russia.

Conclusion

Jewish affairs did not suffer from want of attention or activity in the period 17961825. Paul I and Governor Freizel took an active hand in settlement of the HasidicRabbinical contest in Vilna if only by accident of circumstance. Ill at ease for most of his
life and even more so as Tsar, Paul merely wanted peace, taxes, and an accurate census of
Courland’s Jewish population. None of the three were realized completely, particularly
peace, though the continuing struggle between the Hasidim and their rabbinical
opponents would remain behind the scenes throughout this period. This internalization,
however, did not preclude government intervention.
Alexander believed that he had no choice but to shape Jewish affairs. For the first
time in Russian history, a concerted attempt was made to rein in the Jews for the purpose
of serving the Empire. To his mind, education was the indisputable agent to affect the
transformation of the Jews into modern and beneficial citizens. Alexander's reign fell
into two distinct parts, 1801-1812 and 1812-1825.
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In the first part, there was the
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establishment of the Committee for the Organization of Jewish Life in 1802 to initiate
and guide the Jewish intellectual metamorphosis. Distinguishing between urban and rural
Jewish communities and recognizing their distinct needs, desires, and aspirations,
Alexander and his ministers adopted a policy of superficial invitation. By this, the
government made it appear that those Jews who followed the mandates of the 1804
statute would derive much in return for modest compliance. The potential for social
advancement was emphasized at length, a small price for the Empire to pay considering
Russia’s urgent need for skilled professionals and scientists.

While not an urgent

mandate at this time (1804), Napoleon’s eastern advance could only have meant that a
French presence on the Imperial frontier was inevitable and the marshaling of resources
imperative. For Jews residing in the countryside, the prospect of being one’s own master
by owing a homestead or factory held some ephemeral allure while serving the covert
purpose of bringing the Jews further into the Russian fold without altering their status.
On the eve of Napoleon's invasion, the government tried two experiments in
hopes of bringing the Jews more securely into the Imperial fold. The 1811 offer of
recruitment bounty relief in exchange for Christian conversion was clearly exploitative of
their economic situation which disguised official concerns regarding their loyalty.
Similarly, the Russian Bible Society was conceived in order to bring all of Russia’s nonChristian populations to Christianity. Once this had been realized, the Empire would be
theologically homogenous and concerns over loyalty would dissipate since everyone
would be bound body and soul to the Tsar. Granted, there was no mention of the Jews
initially but, using the eastern tribes to test the Society’s effectiveness in proselytizing, a
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potentially invaluable tool had been acquired for attempting the conversion of the Jews
later on.
From 1817 to 1825, with the help of Madame de Krudener and Reverend H.L.
Empaytaz, Alexander’s own spiritual visions served as the impetus for bringing all of
Europe as well as the Jews to Christ.145 The Society for Israelite Christians was a true
expression of how sincere and to what extent the Tsar and Holy Synod were willing to
emancipate the Jews from the evils of their perceived provincialism. Newly-created
Jewish Christians were thought to be suitable in Imperial needs. Little was to be feared
from them since the government dictated all aspects of their education and residence
under the thinly-veiled guise of Christian liberation. Superficially, the matter seemed
clear to the government, and yet practice would prove otherwise.
Perhaps it is too facile to claim that both Jews and Russian officials were too
comfortable with their illusions of one another to reach a mutual understanding.
Certainly, the educational institutions for such investigations did not exist nor did the
overall atmosphere in Russia encourage this communion.146

Instead, their mutual

blindness which had developed during Alexander's reign would not diminish with his
successor had an unexpected benefit. In defiance of all reason, that one commonality
served as the engine behind the Jewish metamorphosis in succeeding decades.
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CHAPTER III: BATTLES WITHOUT DISTINCT VICTORS: THE JEWISH
METAMORPHOSIS, 1825-1855
Introduction

In their dealings with the Jews, Russian officials seemed to have every
conceivable advantage.

They established the reform committees, promulgated and

imposed the laws, controlled the ministries, and had undisputed authority over the
military and police. What did the Jews have as a counter to the overwhelming tide of
compulsory Russification with a Jewish accent within the next thirty years (1825-55)?
Nicholas I was an austere man who could never forget a wrong nor forgive a
transgression no matter how slight.1 Furthermore, he considered the very reason for
human existence was for the purpose of service because, in his estimation, everyone
served.2 This rigidity permeated all his policies foreign and domestic, especially those
regarding the Jews, and yet there was some elasticity.3 Certainly he had no sympathy
with the Decembrists and exhibited an ardent distrust and acrimony towards both
Slavophiles and Westernizers even though he did recognize, if only in a narrow vein, that
Russia had to change with the times. Jews aside, the Russians themselves were in need
of reform and yet, given the established official notions of law and order within an
autocratic frame, Nicholas and his ministers were forever wary. How far was too far?
Ironically, that same question plagued Jewish conservatives in terms of how
modern the community should become and still retain its Jewish identity. Identity itself
was becoming a plurality during this period which proved to be a source of constant
1
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frustration. From the 1830's onward, these tensions would spill over into the larger arena
of Jewish-Russian affairs and, at times, assume the demeanor of pitched battles. Strength
seemed to favor the Russians and yet the results of these confrontations were generally
matters of give and take. Such an attitude, however, did not preclude the government
from attempting to implement its designs clandestinely. Prior to the Crimean War,
Nicholas I instituted his final Jewish reform. The Rabbinical Pedagogical Institutes of
Vilna and Zhitomir were established in 1848 to train Crown Rabbis for congregations and
Jewish teachers for the government Jewish schools. There was no mistaking official
intentions when it was expressed clearly that Crown (i.e. Official) Rabbis would be the
only acceptable Jewish clergy within ten years’ time. In an effort to accelerate the
official Jewish metamorphosis, it was decreed in 1855 that the duties of Rabbi and
teacher would be merged “so that there would be no distinction between the two.”4
Despite their respective efforts, at the time of Nicholas' death neither side was completely
satisfied with what had come to pass nor could one really claim victory over the other.
The Crimean War was a loss but Jewish affairs had come to a stalemate.

Tsar Nicholas I: A Warrior Ready for Combat

Before the stalemate came the battle, and being a career military man, Nicholas
embraced it with the confidence of a seasoned commander. He was a man of simple
political tastes who demanded the fulfillment of only one requirement; his subjects had to
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submit to his notions of law and order.5 Though largely self-assured, the last years of his
brother's rule had made him fearful and hardened against anyone who might oppose his
wishes. Reactionary by nature, Nicholas could not abide the liberal upswell in Europe
following the Napoleonic wars. The circumstances which brought about the draconian
Carlsbad Decrees in Germany (July 1819) and the Six Acts in England (December 1819)
inspired fears among the Tsar and his conservative ministers that liberal and
revolutionary ideas might very well infect Russia in the near future. Already, his late
brother had taken preventative measures which Nicholas confirmed and augmented.
Determined to eradicate the contagion or, at the very least, localize it, the government
viewed the universities of Kazan and St. Petersburg with suspicion. Convinced that
certain professors at Kazan were disseminating liberal ideas, Mikhail Magnitsky of the
Russian Bible Society petitioned the government for a full investigation in March 1819.
Believing that Magnitsky’s concerns were genuine, the Tsar sent him to the University of
Kazan on 8 June 1819 as its new rector, and he proceeded to purge the faculty of
“radicals.”6 In 1822, under the ministrations of Dmitri Runich, the University of St.
Petersburg saw the dismissal of certain professors who expressed “mild sympathies” for
constitutionalism and atheism, though no clear definitions or criteria for these charges
were ever established. Suspicion alone was sufficient for dismissal and the repressive
climate continued to spread. At the University of Dorpat, Russian students who had
studied abroad were denied admission in July 1822 for fear that they would “propagate
the customs of disobedience” among the “untainted” student body. Following up on this
5
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proscription, in February 1823 the government declared certain German universities off
limits to Russian students owing to their cultivation of “antireligious and immoral
ideas.”7
Russian public discourse was being closed rapidly and tightly, much to the
consternation of many of the intelligentsia.8

Nicholas I would prove even more

repressive than his brother since, like him, he claimed neither to understand writers (i.e.
those who produced intellectual works) nor did he have much sympathy for them.9 This
disposition would plague the intelligentsia throughout his thirty-year reign, beginning
with the bloodletting on Senate Square in December 1825. Having been deprived of the
possibility to participate in the discussion of Russian life, the Russian intelligentsia bided
its time until political and social conditions permitted it to rejoin the debate, if only
temporarily.10

The Jewish Recruitment Ukase of 1827 and its Consequences

While the intelligentsia nursed its wounds in the aftermath of the Decembrist
Rising, Nicholas I, in 1826, created the Third Section of His Majesty's Own Chancery to
investigate all subversive activities where they could be found.11 With only the arrest of
Grisha Perrets, the thought of Jewish revolutionary activity did not seem to be a pressing
6

Anatole G. Mazour, The First Russian Revolution 1825: The Decembrist Movement, Its Origins,
Development and Significance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1937), pp. 32-5.
7
Ibid., p. 35.
8
Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p. 200.
9
Abbott Gleason, Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860’s (New York: Viking
Press, 1976), pp. 78-9.
10
Nicholas Riasanovsky, A Parting of the Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia 18011855 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 249.

144
concern.

Nevertheless, the Tsar had not forgotten his 1816 assessment when he

authorized the Second Section to codify the 1827 Recruitment Ukase. More than simply
means of ordering the Jewish community to government standards, it was believed that
the military would be the ideal school for exposing Jewish youths and young adults to
modern (i.e. Russian) education which could only help them in their future affairs.12
Curiously, the notion of education through military training had been confined
exclusively to the nobility, and clearly Nicholas was breaking new ground when he
imposed it upon an ostensibly plebeian group who had heretofore never been required to
shoulder arms.13
Personal disposition aside, Nicholas may have realized that a bad example can be
a great teacher. In this instance, the pedagogue was the Society for Israelite Christians
and its ultimate failure to bring all the Empire's Jews under control. Alexander I and the
Russian Bible Society had overestimated the effects of their propaganda. Deception was
of limited use. The Russian Empire was a well-ordered Christian state and, in Nicholas'
estimation, the Jews, along with all of his subjects, would have to know the distinction
between themselves and their governor and be bound together the strictest obedience.14
Hardened and embittered two years after the failed Decembrist Rising,15 the Tsar
was determined to teach his subjects what it meant to live under absolute authority, and
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the Jews would experience this lesson in full vigor.16 This took the form of two statute
comprising the Jewish Recruitment Ukase of 26 August 1827 but not before Nicholas
encountered delays in its promulgation and implementation.17

Apparently, Jewish

lobbyists played upon the conservative nature of key military officials to stall approval of
this design. One such figure, Admiral N.N. Mordvinov, was reportedly paid 200,000
rubles for his silence on the issue, but Nicholas would not be dissuaded.18 Eventually, the
Tsar bypassed official channels and imposed the Ukase by virtue of his prerogatives.
Beyond all doubt, Jews were now subject to direct state service, according to the
first of these two statutes. The military (i.e. army) was seen as an apt school for the
instruction of subjects and for fostering obedience to the state.19 By no means was this to
be considered an onerous burden, but an honor. Those conscripted were to understand
that their experience would ensure greater success in their respective endeavors once
military service had terminated and that their actions, with regard to the Jewish
community as a whole, would facilitate the equalization of their condition with that of
Russian society.20 Such hopes were tempered by some disquieting omissions. A period
of service was mentioned but no stipulation made as to its duration.21 Furthermore, the
promises of “greater success” and the “equalization of all conditions” were neither
elaborated upon nor given specific definition. These promises did not come with written
16
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guarantees and few Jews would put stock in the verbal assurances of the Tsar and his
officials. Left to individual and collective interpretation, the Recruitment Ukase led to an
emotional outpouring of frustration and fear in a number of communities throughout the
Pale.
Questions as to whether Jewish military service was truly voluntary or obligatory
were answered in the preamble of the second ukase. The recruitment bounty which Jews
had had to pay previously was abolished in lieu of compulsory active service in which
they would be treated the same as other citizens commensurate with their demonstrated
loyalty.22 Should there arise a need to alter Jewish obligations, action would not be taken
without prior permission from the Chief Command of Jewish Affairs, but since the
concern of the moment was to increase Jewish ranks, this was not the occasion to
entertain such notions.23 Under advisement from the Minister of Finance, the Autocrat
made a provision for some shtetlach, towns, and communities who could not meet their
allotted quota in manpower to pay a duty commensurate with their obligation, but only
under strictly defined conditions.24 Reason had to prevail in this and all other legal
circumstances and Nicholas’ jurists and ministers were committed to denying the Jews an
avenue through which they could bypass conscription.
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Quantity was a prominent factor, but Imperial legislation also foresaw abuses on
the part of community leaders in procuring their quota and, therefore, stipulated that
those males under age 12 and over 25 were not to be taken in the draft.25 To express a
dictum was one matter, to enforce it another, and despite this qualification and its
reiteration in subsequent legislation, klappers (from the Yiddish “clap,” meaning “to
take”) would violate this mandate with impunity as would unscrupulous recruitment
officers.26 That would be an omnipresent consequence of the system. In the immediate
offing, those Jews who were subject to the Ukase would experience its full weight when
paragraph 4 was implemented.

It was in this section of the Ukase where officials

choreographed every aspect of the ceremony for dispatching the recruits in a contrived
setting resembling a typical weekday morning service.
Local rabbis were made responsible for administering the loyalty oath to the
recruits in the synagogue while adhering to a carefully scripted ritual.

The Ukase

included footnotes in the bottom margin from both Torah and Babylonian Talmud which
had God “commanding” the Jews to serve the Tsar. This, together with the “Jewish cast”
of these proceedings, were designed to convince those participating that all was
theologically legitimate.27 Fragments of scriptural passages were taken out of context
and presented piecemeal in the statute in such a manner as to have Nicholas’ address to
the Jews read: “As David was once your King, so now am I. As Israel was once your
Kingdom, so now is the Empire, and as God commanded you to serve both, that
obligation stands still.” Once this had been impressed upon the draftees, each recruit had
25
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to take the oath to the Tsar without omission or variation lest he be taken without a
validation receipt.
The oath had to be taken before the Torah scrolls, save on Shabbat and the High
Holidays, in the presence of the officiating rabbi and government judicial officers. One
oddity encountered in the latter articles was that the rabbis had to lead the recruits in the
preliminary oath while the secondary had be done by the recruits themselves. To disarm
any discomfort over this secular affair which might impede processing, rabbis were
ordered to have two candles burning on either side of the scroll platform and, at the end
of the first oath, were to declare that these proceedings were not pursued for the benefit
of the kahal but for God alone.28 As if preparing for morning prayers, the draftees were
then obliged to wash their hands as prescribed under Halakhah (Jewish law) and to don
tefillin and talasim.29 Afterwards, they were taken to their places in the synagogue or
shul and read the oath first in Hebrew and then in Russian where, if unclear, rabbis could
write out the troubling word or phrase on a board or separate sheet of paper if available.
Vocalization had to come from the individual inductee alone and closure was signified by
four blasts from the synagogue shofar. As a final seal, the rabbis were compelled to
assert with all vigor that every facet of the induction ceremony was God-ordained. Any
violation or diminution on the part of miscreants would result in Divine punishment
visited upon their families and the possibility of their being cut off entirely from Jewish
26
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tradition. Retribution would not stop there. Grave were the commandments of the Lord
(the Ukase used the Hebrew term Adonoi), and the violation of even the least of them
would subject all of Israel to torment.30
Imperial authorities had anticipated the potential for desertion which was why the
Ukase promised reduced obligations for bravery under fire, although even this came with
an attached warning. Should any Jewish recruit desert and became a fugitive despite this
“grace,” his entire community would have to pay 1000 rubles for him and anyone else
from that village who followed his lead.31 At the time, assignants were worth a fraction
of their printed value which was why this fine was demanded in coin, an impossible
financial burden for many shtetlach and larger towns owing to inflation and the Empire’s
chronic specie shortage.
Apart from synagogues, only houses of study could host the induction
proceedings. The Ukase stipulated that communities had the option of presenting first
anyone delinquent in paying taxes, vagrancy, and other crimes falling under government
purview.32 Officers from the Justice Ministry were charged with ensuring that the trials
and sentencing of these so-called convicts accorded with standard jurisprudence and that
these individuals were not simply being sacrificed in haste to satisfy the community’s
quota.33 Nicholas made this point quite clear. Also, to ensure that dead souls were not
enlisted, the community was given a receipt for each consignment which was then

written the Viahavta prayer taken from the book of Leviticus obliging Jews to “bind the words of God upon
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entered into the recruitment registers which were subject to official review every three
years. Copies of these books were to be surrendered to the Imperial Chancery where they
were kept to ensure accuracy.34
Clearer in some sections than in others, the 1827 Ukase was not to be applied to
all Jews.35 Rural Jews were more likely to be called up than their urban counterparts, to
be sure, but Nicholas and the Ministry of Finance also realized that drafting all ablebodied rural Jews into the army would impair Imperial commerce. As elsewhere in
Russia, recruitment obligations were imposed selectively. Binding Jews to his person
and the Russian state through military service was imperative, but exceptions could be
made with respect to first guild merchants, Jews having Russian university diplomas,
rabbis, and teachers who had completed training and had registered with the district
authorities.36 Each of these exempted persons owed their status to the State and became
indebted to serve the same.

Anticipating that some petty traders who had accrued

sufficient wealth to qualify for first-guild membership (i.e. district merchants) might take
this occasion to press their suits, the government allowed them to do so with the
understanding that if successful in obtaining this elevation, they were still subject to
possible recruitment. If only for psychological considerations, the “rod of authority” had
to remain visible.
First-guild merchants may have been made exempt but not so their sons, an
effective means for ensuring their fathers’ good conduct. Beneficial to the state in one
respect, this provision was potentially inimical in another. Should a sizable number of

34
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merchants’ sons be drafted, the resulting loss of revenue from that quarter would
eradicate any benefit derived Jewish recruitment. In rural Jewish society, sons, save only
the most gifted Talmud-Torah scholars, succeeded their fathers in their trades.37 This
meant that Nicholas had to spare some of them in the short term for the Empire’s sake
while simultaneously engineering their gradual weaning from Judaism for the same
purpose.38 Alexander had been able to allay and manipulate Jewish anxieties with vague
assurances made conditional upon joining the Society of Israelite Christians. Nicholas,
however, did not share his brother’s millenarian inspiration and had to rely upon more
pragmatic means to affect a similar and better end. In other words, a first-guild merchant
could be led to assume that if his deportment was respectable in both his commercial and
social endeavors, the kahal or district excise agents would inform the appropriate officials
and all would go well. Obedience would be assured without having to make concessions.
Rabbis, teachers and Jews who held Russian university degrees were accorded the
same privileges and obligations as first-guild merchants. Believing that scholars would
make poor soldiers, the Tsar was moved to exempt them from the draft but not from his
grander design.39 As in the case of first-guild merchants, sons of the Jewish educated
elite were also eligible and virtually held hostage to fate and circumstance in order to
guarantee their fathers’ loyalty in submitting to the government’s directives. Of the
three, rabbis were the most valuable in realizing Nicholas’ aims and their role will be
elaborated upon in due course. As for teachers of Jewish subjects, only those who had
completed the requisite pedagogical courses and could produce official certificates
37
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attesting to this accomplishment were made exempt so long as they kept their
employment. Ancillary officials such as synagogue shammesim (sextons), members of
the chevrim kadisha (burial societies), and other functionaries and wardens who held
religious offices were all liable for conscription if they fell within the prescribed age
brackets.40 The only exit option afforded them was that they, along with other nonexempt Jews, were free to find Jewish substitutes.
Jewish university degree holders were also exempted, but considering that the
first recipient, Lev Ossipovich Mandelstamm, did not obtain his diploma until 1844, it is
a mystery as to why it was a consideration at all. Most likely the government sought to
address all conditions real and potential in an effort to affirm that it had examined Jewish
affairs completely. Urban Jews educated in other Russian institutions were not permitted
to think themselves exempt, although in truth the government had little to fear from them.
Most had already been assimilated or were well on their way towards doing so, the
veracity of which the Rabbinate had confirmed.41 Russian-educated Jews were in State
employment in one fashion or another and their overall relationship with the Empire was
comfortable in terms of satisfying their fundamental needs. Their fiscal well-being (in
comparison to their shtetl counterparts) and general apathy towards theological Judaism
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made their recruitment eligibility pro forma rather than actual, a circumstance which
separated them from their rural coreligionists.
While not prominent at the very outset of Nicholas’ reign, Jewish theological and
intellectual initiative, along with government policies, would exploit and exacerbate this
division between urban and rural Jews from the 1830’s onward. Urban Jewish priorities
in the late 1820’s, however, rarely included spiritual or theological issues or did so as
fleeting tangents. The fear of being rendered soulless would have been alien to them as
would ardent adherence to Rabbinical authority which made aggressive military
conscription among them unnecessary.
For most rural Jews, the Recruitment Ukase afforded them only one tangible
exemption which, like all of the others, few could claim.42 Those engaged in agriculture
could hope to avoid conscription if they could prove ownership of a farmstead and
success in that endeavor for twenty-five years. Unlike university degree holders, these
people actually existed, though to qualify a Jewish farmer would have had to have taken
his parcel and government loan in 1802 when Alexander I made the initial offer as part of
his Jewish improvement scheme. Such individuals were rare indeed but, in creating this
exception, the government believed that it had honored an earlier pledge.
Legalities notwithstanding, “klapping” and soul-trafficking both served and
frustrated Nicholas I’s plans. Despite the expressed prohibition of presenting underaged
males for the draft, implementation was left to local authorities and recruitment officers.43
Jewish folklore and various reminiscences from this period decried the fate of the
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kantonisti, Jewish boys between ages 8-17, many of whom had been kidnapped or taken
by various administrative means and died on the march to distant recruitment centers or
were subjected to forced baptisms.44

The severity of the barracks regimen and the

absolute severance from Jewish life, ostensibly for the whole of their 25-year enlistment
period, were bleak enough prospects for these boys.45 All the more onerous was that
service in the cantonist regiments was not deducted from their actual military
commitment as adults.46 The repetition of such irregularities in recruitment was a direct
incursion into the very fiber of Jewish communal life, and was exacerbated by
maladministration and corruption which portended disaster in the long term.47 Validation
receipts given to communities for producing underaged recruits (younger than 12 years)
became an accepted vice of the system, even though the treasury outlay for maintaining
immature draftees undergoing training would strain Imperial coffers. In the event of war
and with such recruits in the field, the Empire would have been at risk, and indeed it was
by October 1855. Added to this was the inevitable galvanizing of Jewish communal
opinion against the government which was limited in its ability to base its actions upon
the pseudo-legitimacy of Torah and Talmudic grounds. To be sure, the Jews would never
have the power to overrule much less overthrow the government, but if Judaism had to be
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reconstructed along Imperial contours, an ingress, not a barrier, was needed between the
two parties.
To the government, however, prosecution of the Ukase and its successors
amounted to a surface operation where it was hoped that the Jews of Russia would be
worn down by attrition. It mattered little to the government that its injunctions against
bribery, falsifying recruitment ledgers, and indiscriminate kidnapping were not heeded as
long as recruitment secured sufficient numbers. Moreover, Jewish religious fanaticism
and separatism were seen as obstacles to assimilation. According to Governor-General
Bibikov of Kiev, the interior of Jewish life had to be transformed, and it was in this
endeavor that military service was seen as invaluable.48
Jewish resistance to the Ukase was to be expected.

Shortly after its

implementation, there were reports of a Jewish mutiny in St. Petersburg. After emotions
died down, this demonstration turned out to be merely a mass meeting of Hasidim
praying to the Almighty for the law's revocation.49 Efforts to evade or diminish draft
obligations collectively on legal grounds had their precedents in Russian practice which
the Ukase’s authors sought to nullify.50 Despite his life-long acquaintance with military
affairs prior to 1827, the Tsar did not have the requisite experience to guide him in
mastering the most crucial aspect of this particular fray, that of discerning the reaction of
48
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anticipating
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maneuvers,

and

devising

effective

countermeasures.51 Neither the Autocrat nor his ministers had any concrete or inside
knowledge of the Jews, an ignorance which would mar their efforts.52 Nevertheless, they
tried to imagine all conceivable scenarios.

Article 48 of the Ukase, for instance,

stipulated that a Jewish recruit could have another Jew go in his place upon producing a
written testament with that individual’s signature declaring that he volunteered for this
service in good faith.

Simple and straightforward to be sure, it also invited local

corruption, since the kahals were made sole arbiters of good faith, competence, and
requisite compensation for the families of such substitutes.53 Absent from the statute
were admonitions against coercion or forging a substitute’s agreement to this 25-year
commitment.54

As long as the resultant acrimony fell to the kahal elders and not the

government, the resulting divisions in the rural Jewish community only strengthened the
latter’s hand.55 As proof of this, one need only consider subsequent articles in the Ukase.
Christians were liable for making up legitimate shortfalls in Jewish communal quotas, a
mandate which could only have intensified tensions between the two groups.
Furthermore, if it had been discovered that a recruit injured himself intentionally and was
rendered unfit for service, his family had to pay a fine sufficient to outfit a healthy
replacement and the offending community was not issued a validation receipt for the
51
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substitute.56 Without a receipt, the government did not count that soul towards the
community’s quota which meant that two had to take the place of one.

Hiding a

recruitment-eligible dodger who was found out subsequently carried with it a fine for the
abettors and again the soul was taken in the draft without receipt. Desperate to stave off
penalties for default, anyone could be “klapped.”57 Woe betide the unfortunate traveler
or peddler who did not possess the requisite papers or was divested of the same upon
arrival in a straited village and whom the kahal elders judged to be a wandering vagrant.58
Such individuals were deemed appropriate replacements under local legal provisions, a
practice which would be legitimized tacitly from the mid-1830’s onward when
recruitment authorities granted communities receipts for them.
The Recruitment Ukase was unique in the sense that active Jewish military
service had been imposed in Russia although it portended much more. Impressment,
whether legal or illicit, was tantamount to a death sentence for many individuals and a
number of smaller Jewish communities.59 Local concerns and public protests in these
communities, including attacks upon klappers, only provoked some of the more vocal
Jewish intellectuals to ridicule their provincial coreligionists, and it would be years
before even they perceived the larger consequences of the Ukase. Castigating Jews for
hysterical behavior and backward thinking was not the government's exclusive province.
56
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Town and country Jews, Hasidim and Orthodox, were more divided than ever in the late
1820’s.60 Acrimony stemming from 1798 and before had only been submerged, and the
Recruitment Ukase merely brought to the surface sentiments which had been boiling
underneath. The shtetl Jews, “die shayne yidn,” were isolated socially and intellectually
from their disdainful cosmopolitan urban counterparts. Cut off at every turn, there was
little promise of their continued separate existence, and the dissolution of the shtetl would
be the first step in disposing of Jewish consciousness in Russia.
Military service was thought to bring the Jews under tighter control while giving
them a sense that their imagined suffering would turn to benefit in the future.

In

perpetrating that design, the Tsar had the support of certain Jewish intellectuals.
Abraham ber Gottlober (1811-1899), for instance, took up the Tsar’s cause eagerly and
decried the “ignorant emotionalism” of those Jews who wailed and assumed a funerary
demeanor in the face of one of the greater mitzvahs (good deeds) which could have
befallen a Jew in Russia.61 Military service was the prime means of expressing Jewish
loyalty to the government, not to mention expanding educational and vocational
opportunities to the benefit of Empire, community and self, Gottlober asserted. In light
of all of these benefits, recruitment was hardly a threat to Jewish tradition and the death
of all things Jewish.

If anything was dying away, he contended vociferously, it was
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true evils of the Jewish condition in Russia. Expressing these views prior to the 18301831 Polish Revolt, Gottlober took comfort in the pages of his diary by pronouncing that
when cooler heads prevailed, the Tsar’s rationale would be vindicated and that the Jews
would see for themselves the benefits of his policies. Such arguments fell on deaf ears,
especially when the Polish Rising broke out.62 During that time, a number of Jews
perceived the event as a harbinger of the coming of the Messiah.63 Melancholia again
spread to all echelons of the community with Nicholas’ suppression of the Rising, which
was followed by a series of ardent addenda to the 1827 Ukase.
The Jews were left with little room to maneuver in terms of the law, giving rise to
more desperate devices. It was not unheard of for mothers accompanying their male
offspring to induction centers to plead with the examining physicians to spare their sons
by granting an exemption. Some recruits resorted to self-mutilation and starvation to
acquire genuine and feigned medical conditions which would invalidate them for service,
and though a fair number of these cases abounded, rarely did they meet with success. In
Jewish accounts, the term behola (fright) was often used to describe the emotional state
of the recruits and their friends and families which seemed to border on hysteria and led
to bizarre behavior. For example, David Tobach, a young Ukrainian Jew, not only saw
military service as his duty but as his right as an Imperial subject and was eager to do so.
Standing in queue at the induction center, he rehearsed exactly how he would conduct
himself in front of the doctors to ensure his acceptance which he feared he might forfeit.
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When his turn came, he strode up to them and declared that he was fit and anxious to
serve. The doctors were speechless. After a brief moment, one of them queried Tobach
about his state of mind and asked whether he fallen on his head recently. In response, he
reaffirmed his ability and desire to don a uniform which the authorities took as sufficient
grounds to have him declared incompetent and issued to him a blue exemption card
which, Tobach remarked later, dashed many of his hopes for happiness.64
Happiness had not eluded David Tobach entirely, and though he did not intend to
escape the draft, many did through a variety of official loopholes and a few unforeseen
ones in the 1830’s. Starting from a seemingly implacable position with few exemptions,
the government was then moved to consider other occupations and circumstances. For
instance, regular Jewish agricultural workers, in addition to farmstead holders, did not
have to register. By 1834-35, bona fide heads of households were no longer liable, a
situation which touched off another behola in the shtetlach of Belorussia and Ukraine
which did not abate for several years. Matchmakers and rabbis alike, especially in the
western borderlands, were besieged with requests for “good Jewish girls” who could be
married off quickly.

Writing at the peak of these events (1834), Yenta Bercinsky

recounted that in her village, the rabbi and matchmaker were literally stumbling over one
another. It was all that they could do to keep pace with demands for their services in the
race to spare as many young men as possible from both klappers and recruiting agents.
Yenta herself married a young Talmudist in haste who, though supposedly exempt since
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he was studying for the rabbinate, was released only after his father ransomed him from
recruitment officers for 1000 silver rubles.65
One group of Jews, however, the Crimean Karaites, were granted total immunity
from recruitment and guaranteed their properties in 1827. Given Nicholas I’s ardor and
those of his ministers in reordering the Jews, as Pavel .D. Kiselev put it,66 the Karaites
appeared to be an anomaly. Using tactics similar to those of the Karaite delegation to
Catherine II in 1795, Simcha Babovich and his compatriots convinced Tsar Nicholas and
Victor Kochubei, President of the Council of State, Vasilii Lanskoi, Minister of Internal
Affairs, Dmitri Naryshkin, Governor of Crimea, and Count Mikhail Vorontsov, Governor
of New Russia that, though Jews, they merited treatment apart from their Rabbinical
coreligionists. First of all, they were of Sadduceean descent and therefore guiltless in
promulgating the Pharisaic calumnies which resulted in Christ’s crucifixion. Just as
significant, Karaites were pre-Talmudic Jews who believed in a strict interpretation of
Torah and discounted all works outside of it, a very important theological and political
point, especially from the government’s point of view.67 Fate and a skillful treatment of
their suit favored the delegation. Babovich was soon granted his request and he returned
to the Crimea, but his departure meant only the beginning of official notice of Karaite
issues which was often efficacious to this unique community of 500-700 families.
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Rabbinical Jews’ fortunes, however, continued to decline.

Shortfalls in

recruitment quotas by the mid-1830’s meant abridgments in if not the complete
abrogation of military exemption status and other legal securities. Heightened demands
for more Jewish conscripts precipitated a commensurate rise in kahal avarice and
pettiness which resulted in landing certain “protected” individuals in the custody of
recruitment officers. Some so consigned wept, pleaded or attempted to purchase their
way out while others, who may or may not have been subject to this trade, took revenge
against those responsible in order to put an end to present and future extortion.68 A year
after their legalized release from the draft, married men, heads of households and
agricultural workers found that their exemption status was becoming more and more
tenuous.69 Stated clearly within the statute On the Passage of Jews into Settlements and
Villages, promulgated on the same day as the edict proscribing marriages to avoid
recruitment, Jews were considered Russian citizens. However, those engaged in
agricultural pursuits were free from paying taxes for ten years and, based on their tenure
in this vocation, were accorded partial to full exemption from military service.70 That
being so, M. Kirlisher, a Jewish agricultural colonist writing under an assumed name to
avoid censure, recounted a night in 1837 when his settlement was raided on the pretext of
recovering an escaped draftee.71 From his account, an impressment detachment arrived
late at night searching for the fugitive and when informed that no one had seen a stranger
milling about or seeking shelter, violence broke out. The colonists, though unarmed, put
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up such a resistance that the detachment had to move on and settle the matter in the
morning. Conspicuous by its absence during the melee but represented fully at dawn, the
local constabulary was now ready to dispense justice, a scenario which astounded
Kirlisher. Under the transparent guise of officious zeal in examining the evidence, such
as it was, the police prefect concluded that the Jews had instigated the row and arrested a
number of them on the spot. Protest would have been useless but garnish money paid to
the prefect procured the release of the suspects and the affair ended. Taking stock of the
episode, Kirlisher claimed that this was a “simple” matter and certainly not an isolated
one but, in another incident with which he was acquainted, paying off the appropriate
officials would have been futile.
About this same time, a young Jewish farm worker was arrested and charged with
possessing insufficient documentation relating to his status as a result of a clerical error.
Distraught and desperate, his mother and various Jewish officials appealed to the local
administration to free the young man and convinced them that they could vouch for his
employment. He was to be released within two days but when the time came, he was
transported to another colony five hundred versts away. No reason was given for this
action. When his mother sought justice, she was told to take up the matter in the district
courts but, in the same breath, the clerk advising her wondered what she hoped to gain. It
was true that she had the right to seek redress, but the fortunes of a Jewess in a Russian
court were not promising. Acknowledging this truism and resigned to circumstance,
there was little else she could do but to pack up her household and remaining children
and travel to the new settlement.72
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Opportunism and corruption among Russian and Jewish officials inspired some
with a sense of hopelessness while others, frustrated to the limits of endurance, sought
reprisal. In the village (shtetl) of Novoushitsa on 14 November 1836, two fishermen
from Vohkovtsi in Podolsk province pulled two corpses from a pond. Both were in
stages of advanced decomposition yet they were identified later as those of Isaac Oxman
and Shlemko Schwartzman, itinerant Jewish tradesmen who had acted as recruitment
informants for the local kahal elders and provincial authorities.73 In the course of the
ensuing investigation which resulted in the arrest of 82 Jewish suspects in the period
1836-40, it was discovered that these men were part of a sophisticated apparatus of
professional informants. In existence for some time, these men accommodated both the
parochial needs of the Jewish elders and the government’s claim to Jewish recruits,
ostensibly without the latter’s knowledge. What was most important to the investigation,
which included interrogation under torture, was how Oxman and Schwartzman were
exposed since their abettors included the Novoushitsa kahal. Eventually it was learned
that the drama unfolded when Volya Gutterman, one of the killers, discovered names
withdrawn from a “corrected” census lists so that these favored individuals could evade
recruitment. Within a short time, Oxman, Schwartzman and their entire operation, not to
mention the local politics behind it, became known to him. Since his targets moved
about as they did without a definite schedule, assassinating them posed some difficulties.
There was also the danger that such a plan would leak out and reach the intended victims.
Oxman had admitted already to regional and kahal officials that he was known among the
Jews. That they were his enemies was beyond doubt, and he implored the Novoushitsa
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kahal incessantly to grant him protection on the roads.74 His request was denied on the
grounds that an armed bodyguard accompanying an ostensibly benign itinerant tradesman
would have caused alarm and raised suspicions which could lay bare their actual
business. Furthermore, they opined, Oxman's fears were exaggerated. On the morning of
30 January 1836, however, the assassins were given their opportunity. At Novoushitsa’s
post house, Gutterman posed as a trader in desperate need of a horse to go to Kamenets.
Much to Oxman’s surprise (but not to Gutterman’s), he was heading in the same direction
and thought that this companion would serve as adequate protection for Schwartzman and
himself from assault. What transpired along the way will never be known for certain. At
some point, Schwartzman changed route and headed in the direction of Sokulets while
Oxman maintained his sojourn to Kamenets. Nonplused by this, Gutterman stayed with
his man and was rewarded when the latter decided to rest before continuing. As he lay by
a roadside tree, Gutterman smothered Oxman.
The resolution of one problem begat another. Gutterman knew that Schwartzman
could identify him if the homicide came to light and that he, too, had to be disposed of
discretely.

Ensuring that Schwartzman stayed in Sokulets (with the help of fellow

conspirators), Gutterman, posing as Oxman, then sent a letter to him three days later
requesting that he come to Novoushitsa to discuss commercial affairs with the merchants
of Vilshten. For two days, Schwartzman stayed in Novoushitsa not knowing or even
suspecting what had become of his partner. On the third, he was invited to a prayer
minyan in the bet hamidrash which he, by Jewish custom, was obliged to attend. During
prayers all was normal but upon conclusion, an argument on some obscure matter arose
biblioteka istoricheskie sudbii evreiev v rossii I USSR: Nachalo Dialoga (Moscow, 1992), p. 71.
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and Schwartzman was knocked to the ground.

As he attempted to rise, one of

Gutterman’s accomplices came from behind and strangled him.75

After waiting 24

hours, the conspirators dismembered the body and placed it in a tar barrel in the local
bath house until it could be dumped into a nearby pond.
A Jew who killed a Russian did not have to wonder about his punishment under
Imperial law, but what was the fate of a Jew who killed a coreligionist?76 After four
years of official investigation, some of the perpetrators were sent to Siberia for hard labor
including Novoushitsa’s rabbi, Michael Averbuch. Those who had knowledge of or
advocated the killings were fined in accordance with their complicity but, in the main, the
matter was resolved without draconian punishments.77

What was unique was that

Oxman’s daughters were granted an indemnity of 1200 rubles and his sons, as well as
those of his partner, were freed from all financial duties and obligations. More ominous
was the questionable evidence submitted that the Hasidim were behind these murders.
This point will be elaborated upon later but it should be noted that in the late 1830’s,
Jews who wished to maintain tradition and those who desired substantial reform both
found Hasidism to be a convenient scapegoat for deflecting government attention from
and meddling in their respective affairs.
From these events, a number of issues within the Russian Jewish community and
its relations with the government become clear. Both married men and agricultural
workers had been granted vague assurances and exemptions from recruitment. By the
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end of the 1830’s, however, not only had the vagaries proven chimeral but so too the
absolutes in light of the Tsar’s will. This uncertainty lent credence to the Marquis de
Custine’s observation that Russia’s “army of officialdom,” with each member trying to
outdo the other in executing unnecessary examinations and delays, evidenced the image
of an impotent man struggling for action.78 The same could be said for the Empire’s
dealings with its Jews, where Jewish policies were sometimes implemented by buying off
officials (i.e. paying klappers a capitation fee for each recruit they could produce).
Regardless of particulars, Jewish policies dependent upon local enforcement were largely
ineffective. In large part, this was a consequence of how the government viewed the
Jews. To the Tsar, a Jew was valued as a citizen insofar as it was convenient, and that he
was taxable, recruitable, exploitable, and employable, and invested with limited “rights”
which afforded negligible benefits.79 Despite the onerous impositions placed upon them,
the destruction of the Jews outright was an impossibility and could have marred Imperial
fortunes if it had been brought off even partially. Nicholas never entertained such a
notion.80 On the other hand, refashioning the Jews of Russia into benign subjects, useful
yet pliant and devoid of political aspirations, was proving to be more of a challenge than
the government had initially surmised. Be that as it may, the officials in charge of the
matter were still confident that progress was being made, though their measure of that
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progress appeared to be at cross purposes.81 Jewishness, in all of its manifestations,
possessed a vitality which the government understood little.

Perhaps sensing this

blindness, though never admitting to it, the Tsar and his ministers resorted to making
Jewishness and Judaism sensitive and painful issues through incessant amplification and
attention. This psychological war of attrition, it was hoped, would encourage Jews to
distance themselves from those institutions which engendered and promoted their
distinctiveness and, in time, render them secular Jews, an ethnic group with little or no
reference to active Judaism.
If the government desired to see a significant Jewish transformation in the
immediate offing, it had only itself to blame for delays. On 2 April 1833, Sergei Uvarov,
the Minister of National Enlightenment and a principal agent of Jewish reform,
proclaimed the birth of Official Nationality and its subsequent implementation in all
facets of Russian life.82 Resting upon the three pillars of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and
Nationality, the only recognizable “citizens” and institutions in the Tsar’s domain would
be those who embodied these qualities. No mention was made of the Jews on this
occasion, but there was no question as to their status for the duration of Nicholas’ reign.

The Changing World of the Shtetl

The events of Novoushitsa revealed an undercurrent in Russian Jewish
development which was gaining momentum in the mid to late 1830’s. Shtetl Jews were
81

The boundaries of the Pale of Settlement, for instance, were reconfirmed in 1835 despite Nicholas’s
intention to expand Jewish settlement in Russia by means of establishing agricultural colonies. Elaboration
upon this scheme will be forthcoming.

169
not educated in the sense that they received formal, broad-based education, though they,
like their urban and ostensibly cosmopolitan counterparts, were developing a new
awareness of their Jewishness. Conceded, the ignition point came from outside the
community as a direct result of official policy and extracommunal political initiatives, but
the actual thrust came from Jewish folk and theological traditions. Within two decades,
this parallel development would surmount shtetlach confines and become a part of the
larger transformation of Russian Jewry.
Neither passive nor helpless, shtetl Jews had a variety of methods for discovering
informants, their allies, and the consequences of their existence within the Russian Jewish
community. Originally, if a Jew wanted to inform the community about the calumnies of
its leaders, he/she, by custom, could affect a ivku ha-kri'ah, disruption of the Shabbat
service.83 The usual effect of this action was the convention of an ad hoc examination of
the supposed malefactors and determination of their guilt but, from 1827 onward, this
practice had been invoked with such frequency as to render it impotent. Circumstance
now compelled Jews to take an active role in their own defense and preservation.
Perceived social and political weakness had merely emboldened government officials to
dishonor their guarantees of Jewish integrity and encouraged Jewish opportunists to
exploit their coreligionists for monetary gain. Extending as far back as the early years of
the Inquisition, Rabbinical sources deemed such individuals perushim, cut off from the
Community of Israel, and deserving of physical death commensurate with their spiritual
one. More than mere vigilantism, there were distinct Biblical injunctions which would
have been known to shtetl Jews but not to Russian officials investigating the murder of
82

Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia 1825-1855, pp.73-4.

170
informants.84 For instance, Psalm 101:5: “Whoever slanders his neighbor in secret I shall
destroy.,” was interpreted as a tsavot (i.e. command) to punish these individuals capitally,
as well as Proverbs 30:10: “Slander is not a servant to his master.” Given these citations,
native logic concluded that these minim (heretics who had renounced Judaism in secret
while professing it openly), and meserim (those who abjured their coreligionists), were
legitimate targets since they were no longer genuine Jews.85
Novoushitsa and other Jewish communities which had had similar experiences
were too isolated to garner widespread attention or interest among the Jews of Russia.
Even so, the very records attesting to their Jewish resistance to adverse political and
quasi-legal oppression testified to their fortitude and discredited the alleged Paschal
Lamb image. Haskalah, which was just coming into its prime in the 1830’s, took no
notice of these Jews and literally forgot them, imbued with the long-standing Rabbinical
prejudice that they were beyond hope in terms of enlightenment and intellectual
intercourse.86 Despite this shunning, “die sheyne yidn,” were gradually being drawn into
the larger spheres of Russian Jewish society. and some had actually graduated to the
ranks of Haskalah by the last decade of Nicholas’ reign. Beginning in the mid to late
1830’s, the eventual confluence of “town and country,” though tortuous, was coming to
pass and would eventually chart a definite course in Russian Jewish evolution.
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Meanwhile, through natural increase, the Pale of Jewish Settlement was just
starting to bulge in terms of its ratio of population to resources.87 Underemployment by
mid-decade was on the rise, and though Nicholas I and his ministers were aware of the
problem, they were at a loss for a solution. The Pale’s boundaries were reconfirmed in
1835 and yet the Tsar wanted Jewish farmers to populate Siberia and make the region and
themselves productive. For two years, Jewish farmers were encouraged with financial
enticements to make the trek and establish themselves in the eastern wilderness, but
Count Bludov, Minister of Internal Affairs, and other high government officials were ill
at ease about the project. Peasant reaction to Jewish settlement was unpredictable, and
Bludov assumed the worst case scenario.88 To his mind and those of his allies, it made
no sense to “mend the fence” only to make an aperture in it. After two years of sustained
pressure, Nicholas finally recalled these colonists and halted the migration of their
would-be followers.89 From this episode, it was plain that the Pale, regardless of its legal
reconfirmation, was very fluid, and the boundaries which defined it could not prevent
Jewish immigration into the Russian interior. This fluidity was made all the more evident
as Nicholas continued to define and develop his Jewish policies. For instance, with the
establishment of modern Jewish schools in some of the Empire’s more important
commercial cities, Jewish residency restrictions were relaxed, and subsequent policies
and circumstances would render the Pale little more than a Jewish region rather than a
confined area of settlement.90 In any event, what has to be understood is that these odd
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affairs in 1837 would come to full fruition in the 1840’s and ‘50’s and prove
consequential well beyond Nicholas’ reign.

Frustration but not Futility: Obstacles to the Expression of the Jewish Intellectual
Voice

He may very well have been uneasy about assuming the throne in 1825 but, once
the Imperial crown settled on his brow, Nicholas I imagined himself an expert in every
field. Regarding education, he believed that people should only be taught those subjects
and to the degree which would allow them to fulfill the obligations of their stations.91 As
to whether this was a hard and fast position depended upon whether the object of
consideration happened to be Russians or Jews. Accounting for the course of Jewish
instruction during his tenure, it was peculiar that the Jews, regarded as potentially
inimical to society, were placed in a position of intellectual privilege which was denied
tens of millions of seemingly benign Russians.92 A principal reason for this paradox
could be found in Pavel Kiselev's unoriginal and increasingly time-worn assertion that
the Jews lived in a state of vagrancy and that Talmud was a retarding influence.93
Modern and diverse subjects, it was believed, was the panacea for Jewish ills, and yet the
pursuit of this design only served to make the government more uneasy. The 1830's and
'40's saw a number of proposals for Jewish education and the establishment of
government-sponsored Jewish educational institutions, but there were instances when the
initiative came from the Jews themselves rather than those of government ministers. Even
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though these progressive Jewish intellectuals pledged their talents in accord with official
sympathies, autochthonic intellectual conceptualization carried with it a sense of
autonomy which neither Nicholas nor his ministers could condone comfortably.
Where this discomfort was most keenly felt was in the field of Jewish publication.
In 1834, a group of Vilna literary figures, among whom were Ben Iakov, M.A. Ginsburg,
A. Levinsohn, and Kh. Katzenelenburg, petitioned the government for permission to
establish a journal, Minkhat Bikurim (Afternoon Portions).94 Demonstrating the purity of
their intentions, the proposed submitted to the Vilna Censor's Office included a detailed
layout of their publication which was to include a section for poetry, open letters, literary
criticism, reviews, etc. Perhaps their timing was not the best since this was the year when
the government was revising its recruitment regulations. Jewish resistance was to be
expected and did materialize but, more so than any other factor, the request that this
journal be printed in part in Hebrew condemned it.95
It was obvious that most Russian officials could not read Hebrew, did not desire
to learn, and feared the potential for subversive expression which would inevitably come
about at the expense of their linguistic ignorance. That aside, during Nicholas' reign,
there was a move to employ Jewish converts to Christianity as censors for Jewish
publications which opened up a peculiar aspect in Jewish identity formation. For the
would-be editors of Minkhat Bikurim, the man responsible for denying them permission
was Wolf Isaiahvich Tugengold whose tenure in office began in 1827 and ended in
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1864.96 Like Jacob Brafmann, Tugengold was a Jewish convert to Lutheranism with a
knowledge of Yiddish and Hebrew whose activities impeded Jewish intellectual
advancement periodically but not permanently.

As far back as the early years of

Alexander I's reign, both Jewish-Christians and Jews were employed as censors and then
fell under official suspicion. By the end of the 1820's, it was decided that of the two
groups, those who still clung to Judaism were not as trustworthy as those who had
converted and, as of 1828, non-Christian Jews were admitted to government service in
drastically-reduced numbers.97 Furthermore, what had made Tugengold so attractive to
the government was that he had been one of the pioneers of the Haskalah
(Enlightenment) movement in Galicia, was fluent in several languages, and his Lutheran
creed. All of these qualities combined with a degree from the University of Breslau made
his association with German culture complete and in accord with the educational notions
of the Tsar and his Minister for National Enlightenment, Sergei Uvarov. Like Admiral
Alexander Shishkov, Uvarov's predecessor (1825-28), Tugengold allowed very little to
be disseminated in the Empire and, in November 1836, the Jews of Russia were dealt a
profound blow when it was declared that all Jewish presses were banned. They were not
alone because, in that year and shortly thereafter, press suppression affected the Russian
intelligentsia and, like their Jewish counterparts, served to alienate them from the
government.98 Oddly enough, this crackdown only pertained to native Jewish presses and
publications but not to those published abroad such as Allgemeine Zeitung des
Judenthums. Despite some instances of official relaxation, the 1830's and '40's saw some
96
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of the most stringent censorship ever encountered in the Empire prompting some, such as
intellectual Boris Chicherin to wonder what he and his fellow luminaries were to do if
they were denied access to open air.99

Haskalah and the Russian Jewish Schools

Nicholas' government may have been oppressive but not completely suffocating.
Despite shouldering more disadvantages than their fellow Russians, Jews were still able
to rise to the occasion and determine the course of events in some instances. The Odessa
Jewish School, which was coming into full fruition in the 1830's, had actually been a
product of Russian Jewish initiative under Count Vorontsev's sponsorship in 1822.
Mendel Lefin, an early maskil (scholar) of the Mendelssohnian School (Haskalah),
brought the movement to Ukraine and Russia, and it was through his auspices and those
of his colleagues and successors that the authorities were supplied with the requisite
intellectual resources for establishing such an institution.100 From its humble origins the
Odessa School had, by 1837, one of the more modern curricula in the Empire for which it
had received the Tsar’s praise. So impressed had he been with the philosophy behind this
new form of education that Nicholas had entertained hopes that more Jewish institutions
of its kind would be established in the future.101 Haskalah had been behind the Odessa
School and had, with episodic success, tried to found additional “odessa schools” in
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Uman and other communities throughout Russia and Ukraine in the late 1820’s and early
1830’s. Resistance among some Jewish groups was unavoidable but the Tsar reasoned,
as did Isaac Ber Levinsohn (1788-1860), that Haskalah’s “spark” in Odessa would, in
time, remove all barriers to educational reforms.102 Chief among their attractions, these
schools drew foreign Jewish teachers who, given their assimilated ways, were thought
capable of hastening Jewish modernity. Riga and Vilna were given patents for such
schools in 1839 which helped attract, along with Sergei Uvarov’s invitation, Dr. Maxwell
Lilienthal.
Consequently, during the period 1837-1843, the success of the Nicholas Plan
appeared to be assured. Once more, the Karaites surfaced and so too did the Tsar’s
partially-formed ideas for their use in undermining the Rabbinate. Having received a
Karaite petition to establish a consistory in Tver, the Tsar granted it and permitted them
to settle within the Empire’s Russian heartland.103 Again, Karaite denial of Talmud’s
validity provided benefits denied Rabbinical Jews. When Russian ecclesiastical and
secular authorities attacked Judaism from a religious perspective, Talmud was the
favored target since it was safer to do so than Torah with its proximity to the Old
Testament. Karaite disregard for it was perceived as an example of modern Jewish
thinking to be held up to the Rabbinate and its traditionalist supporters. Augmenting this
disposition was the example of Bezel Stern, a Rabbinical Jew from Galicia who was
appointed director of the Odessa School and who, in 1831, devised the curriculum which
removed Talmud instruction from the plan of study. Claiming that instruction in Talmud
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was anachronistic and futile in preparing Jewish youths for the challenges of the modern
world, he assigned works by E.B. Levinsohn, S. Redgio and others whose expository
works placed Jewish life and culture within a broader context which allowed for critical
analysis and commentary.104 These arguments would resurface in the 1840’s among the
adherents of Russian Haskalah who called themselves “maskilim,” the same title Karaites
gave themselves going back as far as their Babylonian origins.105
Such a confusion of names by itself could serve the government's cause though
careful exploitation was imperative.

In the secular sphere, granting Karaite Jews

privileges and exemptions for which Rabbinical Jews dared not hope might serve as an
enticement for some to turn coat and join them. It was a reasonable assumption given the
distance imposed by tradition between “teachers” (Rabbinical intelligentsia) and
“students.” The latter existed only to support the former, giving it spiritual and some
political clout, though the debt was never acknowledged. Damaging the Rabbinical case
further was that much of its authority originated during the Babylonian Captivity (587514 B.C. E.) and was ensconced in the Babylonian Talmud. Few Jews, rural or urban,
had ever seen so much as one volume of this work which supposedly justified the
Rabbinate’s overall authority over them, peppered with occasional high-handed
treatment. Over the next three decades, pointed questions over Rabbinical legitimacy
would arise and press the Orthodox mitnagdim (opponents of Haskalah) for verification.
The stage was set for the Jews of Russia to engage in a battle between the so-called
Jewish ancients and cosmopolitans.

While not possessing a detailed knowledge of

Jewish theological affairs, the Tsar and those ministers concerned with the Jews could
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imagine it well enough to convince alienated modernists of the Tsar’s veracity in
condemning the Talmud as a false doctrine.106
The Karaite consistory was, in theory, a vehicle for manipulation far superior to
the one afforded in the aftermath of the Hasidism-Rabbinism debate. By favoring this
Jewish sect which had its own rabbinate, synagogues, almshouses, and traditions, the
government hoped to offer the Rabbinate competition with an eye towards dividing the
Jewish community. Government expectations in this regard, however, were not realized.
Russian authorities had no idea that concord between Rabbinical and Karaite Jews had
been achieved. Past disputes between the two had been adamant but now both had
reached a workable peace despite their doctrinal differences, and Karaites always referred
to Rabbinical Orthodox Jews as “our brothers.” Whether he realized that late in his reign
or not, Nicholas’ fascination with the Karaites went beyond theological issues.
Episodically, the Tsar would visit Yevpatoria, the city designated by his hand as the
Karaite capital, and would discover Rabbinical Jews living alongside Karaites, speaking
similar Tatar dialects and sharing common commercial interests.107 So adept were they
in the latter endeavor that in the early 1850’s, Nicholas allowed the Karaites to expand
their settlement and trading concerns north of the Black Sea.
Russia's non-Karaite Jewish majority were in unenviable circumstances, though
not altogether dire. Censorship notwithstanding, the Jews of Russia did enjoy a degree of
free expression in the pages of Ludwig von Phillipson’s Allgemeine Zeitung des
Judenthums.
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correspondents in Kiev, Minsk, Vilna, St. Petersburg, Odessa, and elsewhere throughout
the Empire which kept the Jewish world and world at large apprised of events there. It is
curious that the first mention of Tsar Nicholas I was of his approval for a German
translation of the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmudim and, more amazingly, his writing
the dedications to these works.108 For many Jews within and outside the Empire this was
welcome albeit strange news, but not for Isaac Levinsohn who saw this as an historic
moment.
In 1828, Levinsohn had written Te’uda be Yisrael (Desire for Israel), in which he
emphasized the study of foreign languages and German in particular since it was the
language of philosophy and critical analysis. Previously, Maimonides and Elijah ben
Solomon had each advocated such instruction, eschewing the old Rabbinic superstition
that for every word of a foreign language a Jew learned, he or she lost one Hebrew
word.109

In the proposed Riga School, the edict mandating its construction also

determined that instruction would include an amalgam of home economy, an issue
Levinsohn had advocated since the early 1830’s, in addition to Russian, German,
Hebrew, arithmetic, and geography which would have been in line with Bezel Stern’s
Odessa curriculum.110

New taxes on kosher meat were mandated in Riga to cover

construction and teachers’ salaries. In this school and subsequent Jewish institutes,
foreign teachers with appropriate credentials were hired and could teach without censure,
a liberality which contradicted the Tsar’s 1828 stance on Russian education which was to
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be practical and serviceable to the State.111 The Jews constituted a special case since
their modern education was just beginning. Limitations would be imposed later.
Submitted to the Imperial Senate on 10 May 1839, a request concerning the
establishment of a Jewish preparatory school in Riga of such a caliber that its students
could take university entrance examinations and hopefully continue their education was
duly granted.112

Municipal residence posed an obstacle.

Under the 1835 Jewish

Settlement Ukase, Jews were forbidden from residing or even being present in port cities,
especially Riga, until their ships were set to sail for overseas markets.113 Count Bludov,
and A. K. Benkendorf, Chief of the Third Department, fearing that the Tsar was being too
liberal in allowing Jews more mobility than had heretofore been accorded them, had
urged Nicholas to withdraw or place limits upon his concessions.114 Nicholas maintained
his position. At the behest of Sergei Uvarov, the Riga School was to be divided into two
classes, one primary and the other advanced, with the latter class being taught German for
the expressed purpose of reading Moses Mendelssohn’s works. German itself had been a
required language of Jewish instruction since 1804 for the purposes of studying science
and its allied fields, but to qualify it in this manner was unusual.115
One other issue regarding Jewish education was brought to the government's
attention in 1839. Isaac Ber Levinsohn, who enjoyed a modicum of respect from the
government and from Jewish intellectuals, advocated schools which would train both
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Jewish girls and boys.116 A little over two decades later, Judah Leib Gordon would also
advocate the education of girls, but it should be understood that social equity was not the
goal of this otherwise unprecedented expression of intellectual democracy. Nevertheless,
in Levinsohn's scheme, both needed instruction in religious and general subjects and,
above all else, vocational training. The Jewish community was quite diverse; everyone's
talents were different, and it was foolish to foster the belief that every child was a
potential rabbi, doctor, philosopher, and teacher.117 As for Hebrew, it was enough to
know its rudiments in order to understand the law.118
This certainly accorded with Sergei Uvarov's conception of creating an educated
europeanized Jewry. Meeting with the leaders of the Vilna maskilim, Nisan Rosenthal,
Hirsh Zvi Katzenellenbogen, and Israel Gordon, the Minister of National Enlightenment
wanted to establish a new educational program for Russia's Jews.119 Interested in their
views and providing his own, he saw the possibilities for accommodation between the
Russian Jewish intelligentsia and the government, actually going so far as to declare that
a raised finger on their part would result in the extension of the Russian hand towards
them. Cheered by this goodwill offer, the maskilim were still not sure of this man and his
motives. At times, he could be magnanimous and demanding in other circumstances.
While he was no scholar or original thinker, it was still unresolved in some Jewish minds
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whether Uvarov was devious or merely playing the role of a typical Russian
functionary.120
Regarding the censorship of Jewish books, there was little confusion as to its
influence upon Jewish society. At first light, however, it appeared to be a very peculiar
policy. That Nicholas was committed to ridding the Jews of their religious fanaticism
was well attested.121 Fast upon this claim was that of Count A.G. Stroganov's (Minister
of Internal Affairs) that every Jewish book, almost without exclusion, was imbued with
Talmud and, therefore hostile to both Christianity and society.122 Where the peculiarities
arose was in what Sergei Uvarov and the Tsar believed to be safe foreign Jewish
literature. Almost without exception, these two men were enamored of the German
Jewish intellectual tradition as presented by Haskalah. Mandatory German-language
instruction in the Riga School stemmed from their selective appreciation of Moses
Mendelssohn’s German writings and those of his immediate followers who abandoned
Judaism, became German and/or converted to Christianity.123 What both Uvarov and
Nicholas failed to recognize or eschewed as an inconvenience was that Mendelssohn’s
work and those of the Mendelssohnians differed dramatically in disposition and motives.
The father of Haskalah wrote in Hebrew and later used that language as a didactic tool for
Jews to learn German, the principle goal of his translation of the Pentateuch (the five
Mosaic books) with commentaries in that language. Rationalism rooted in classical logic,
to his mind, would free both Jews and Judaism from superstition and parochialism which
had denied them free exchange with educated Europeans and allow them to succeed in
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the larger European societies. Nonetheless, Mendelssohn stated emphatically that Jewish
cultural distinctiveness must and could be maintained within a modern context and under
no circumstance was Judaism to be sacrificed upon the altar of assimilation.124
Experience had taught Mendelssohn that moderation would allow Judaism, with
all of its richness, to remain intact in a Christian-dominated society, but that lesson was
lost on a number of his followers. As had befallen Hasidism after the Baal Shem Tov’s
passing, Haskalah (a.k.a. the Mendelssohnian movement) was cast adrift from its original
moorings. Many maskilim who had been faithful to their teacher’s tenets then assumed
an unusual dual demeanor in their writings. Hebrew, in late eighteenth-century Germany,
was still considered the language of intellectual discourse and Haskalah works tended to
express moderate to conservative principles, sentiments which were lost when they wrote
in German. Whether that language served as a release valve for pent-up frustrations or
signaled an evolutionary stage in Judaism’s development is debatable. What is beyond
dispute, however, was that German granted its employers boundless liberty in expressing
anti-traditional views as diverse as discounting the practice of swinging a dead chicken
above one’s head for the expiation of sins to a complete negation of the Talmud. Even
God fell under their scrutiny and was often presented in deistic or animistic terms.125
Stripping Judaism to the bones and finding no substance, some maskilim became atheists
while others converted to either Catholicism or Lutheranism, claiming that though these
faiths suffered from irrationality as well, the joy of the Church was preferable to the
gloom of the synagogue. Less than fifty years after his passing, philosophical amnesia
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had all but eradicated the original precepts of Mendelssohn’s school.

Even

Mendelssohn’s 1769 rejection of Johann Caspar Lavater’s proposal that he convert was
forgotten.126
Mendelssohn’s correspondence with Lavater was entirely in German, though no
Jewish student in Russia was ever made privy to it. Students in Riga, Zhitomir, Vilna,
Odessa and elsewhere in the Empire where the German model had been adopted were
exposed to carefully-crafted compendia which supported the government’s designs. What
could not be avoided was that German proficiency also permitted students and instructors
alike in the government Jewish schools to study the latest scholarship in history,
geography, philosophy and the sciences, all quite useful for modern life. Care, however,
was taken not carry Germanophilia to illogical extremes.127
Though one of the more contentious topics of Jewish journals three decades later,
Jewish languages, and Hebrew in particular, was a problem which refused to leave.
Banning publications in the language was one matter, but how was the government to
deal with certain Jewish groups for which there was no other medium of communication?
The Crimean Karaites appeared to be just such a community. Five years after granting
them their consistory, the government wanted assurances of their loyalty to the state and
comprehension of their responsibilities. Both of these matters were usually met with the
swearing of a loyalty oath in Russian. Given their relative isolation from Russian society
and even their Russian-speaking coreligionists, it was necessary to present them with an
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oath rendered in Russian, Hebrew, and Tatar expressed in Hebrew characters.128 Even
the most rigid of tsars had to bend in this instance.

The Russian Intelligentsia and its Consequences for the Jews

From 1835 onward, events proceeded apace, affording the Tsar little leisure to
assess and move decisively on certain crucial issues. Along with the Jews, Russian
educated society was undergoing its own intellectual metamorphosis which would give
rise to profound social, spiritual, intellectual, and political consequences by the middle of
the 1840’s.129 Nicholas was not adverse to such developments altogether but, as with the
Jews, he was concerned as to the course and extent of these changes and how Russia
could benefit. Talmudic instruction in the Jewish curriculum in the period 1835-1843,
for example, was one issue among many during this transitional period, and his apparent
wavering was actually indicative of his attempt to order the maelstrom of change which
was taking place around him.130 Another was the establishment, on 27 December 1840,
of the Committee for Defining Measures to Affect the Transformation of the Jews of
Russia with Count Kiselev as its head.131
Russian Jewish spiritual and intellectual developments, though significant, were
only part of the larger transformation which placed the Russian intelligentsia on a
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collision course with the government. From 1826 until 1840, the Russian intelligentsia
was, save for the Slavophile-Westernizer debate, relatively calm, but that would change
in 1840. In that year, the chief of the Moscow Gendarmerie remarked in his official
report to St. Petersburg that “something was wrong.” Though unable to state specifically
what it was or from which quarter it came, he sensed that there was a feeling of
dissatisfaction in the city which would soon reach its boiling point.132 As the chief would
discover subsequently, the Russian intelligentsia would enjoy its first burst of expression
during that decade. Nicholas would be hard pressed to rein in the educated public but by
no means was the Tsar a hard-line reactionary. Throughout the 1830’s and 1840’s, the
government spent substantial sums establishing technical institutes and, in 1842, a School
of Law in St. Petersburg.133 There was no mistaking that Russia’s continued viability in
all spheres would be determined by its educated public and bureaucracy but Nicholas,
sharing the same concerns as conservative Jews, wondered about the extent he should
accord free thinking before imposing limits. The Decembrists and their attempts to
impose European liberalism had failed yet, in 1835, the Sungorovsky Circle, which
included Alexander Herzen, tried to revive the Decembrist program.134

They were

hunted down subsequently, arrested and exiled, but this was of little comfort to the Tsar.
Nicholas’ distrust of men of ideas, the very people who had the abilities to reform his
bureaucracy, was growing daily and would continue to do so throughout his reign.135 By
the mid-1830’s and not quite a decade old, the Third Department already had several
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prominent intellectuals and intellectual literary circles under surveillance, such as the
Society of the Green Lamp which counted Alexander Pushkin as one of its members.
At the heart of this uneasiness and growing frustration between the intelligentsia
and the government, which would eventually involve the Jews, was the former’s desire to
improve Russia along Western European lines. Most students and scholars who made up
these literary-political groups such as the Society of the Green Lamp, Arzamas Circle,
Stankevich Circle and, later, the Petrashevskii Circle, had received part of their
educations abroad, mainly in Germany. Some were able to temper their passions for
Western institutions and modes which they thought superior to what existed in Russia,
but even the most contrite were frustrated.136 Owing to the Empire’s rigid social mores
and ardent legality, a number of these intellectuals believed themselves isolated from
both Tsar and society. Under the transparent guise of canvassing public opinion, a
number of these groups used their respective journals and newsletters to criticize the
Russian condition.

Strange as it may seem, Nicholas permitted criticism of the

bureaucracy with no limit imposed upon authors as to the degree of acerbity. Such
liberality came with a stringent admonition against direct or tangential criticism of the
autocracy which had always been taboo.137 At least this was so until 1836.
Nicholas, always suspicious of their activities, found that some of his fears
regarding the intelligentsia were verified when Peter Chaadaev’s “Philosophical Letter”
136

Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality, pp. 131-2. Beginning in the late 1830's and
continuing on throughout the next decade, foreigners, particularly the French, were ridiculed in the press.
Part of the reason lay in a feeling of inadequacy among some elements of Russian society. Fears that the
Russian language would be judged uncultured and ineffective abounded as well as the insistence of some
intellectuals that Russia should make every effort to distinguish itself from Europe.
137
Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p. 252. Not only was the Autocrat held out of bounds but so
too the Orthodox Church. Official Nationality notwithstanding, Nicholas insisted that any comment or

188
appeared in the journal, Teleskop. Written entirely in French, Chaadaev’s argument was
quite simple: Russia had no civilization of its own.138 Not even Vissarion Belinsky’s
1834 “Literary Musings” with its thesis that Russia had no original literature drew down
a firestorm of the magnitude which greeted Chaadaev’s work.139 Immediately, Teleskop
was closed down, its editor exiled, and Nicholas himself declared Chaadaev insane and
compelled him to submit to medical examinations lasting for several months.
Miraculously, the author was not exiled, but now the Russian intelligentsia faced its
greatest crisis.140 Divisions which had been forming since the Decembrist Rising now
separated Russia’s intellectual luminaries into Slavophiles and Westernizers, both of
whom Nicholas distrusted.141 Now it was only a matter of time before the Tsar’s attitude
towards the Russian intelligentsia would eventually carry over to the Jews and their
intellectual initiatives.
On the Jewish side, circumstances were not so dramatic but, nevertheless, about
as dire. Since Sergei Uvarov's declaration of Official Nationality on 2 April 1833 and its
supports of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality, no Jew had to question his or her
place in the new order.142 Though antedating the overall ban on Jewish publishing for
three years, official reaction to any unsupervised publishing unleashed a deluge of
denunciations of Jewish works which would continue well into the next decade.143 Most
of these charges were Jews accusing other Jews, specifically Orthodox against
criticism regarding that institution be submitted to the bishops without delay. See Zilliacus, The Russian
Revolutionary Movement, p. 19.
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Hasidim.144 It would not stop here. For the rest of Nicholas' reign and the entirety of his
successor, the charges of religious fanaticism, propaganda, and even the occasional
accusation of "danger to public morals" would find its way into the public forum,
especially after 1865. Prior to Maxwell Lilienthal's arrival, the Russian government had
no idea who or what to believe and had little time to investigate the matter in great detail.
By suppressing all Jewish publications in the Empire, officials could afford themselves
some distance until the next issue in Jewish affairs confronted them.

Maxwell Lilienthal and Russian Jewry

Revolution was not quite in the air by 1840, though all was not well. Russian
intellectual discontent and divisions, Jewish educational reforms and aspirations, and the
Tsar’s bad health all boded ill for Dr. Maxwell Lilienthal (1814-1882).145 Invited along
with Sir Moses Montefiore (1784-1885) by Sergei Uvarov to assist him and his
lieutenants in finding a solution to a heretofore insurmountable problem, Lilienthal had
little idea of what to expect.146 Firm in his convictions, however, he was a reformminded German Jew who had promised his host that he would elevate Russian Jewry
intellectually by means of Haskalah.147 This was welcome news to the Tsar and his
Minister for National Enlightenment who had come to believe that the flame which Isaac
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Levinsohn and his fellow travelers in Odessa had kindled was in danger of being
extinguished.

Haskalah in Russia was in dire need of rekindling.

Accepting the

directorship of the Riga School in 1840, Lilienthal arrived with a number of preconceived
ideas about Russia and its Jews, an ignorance which made him an ideal and pliant vehicle
in the eyes of Russian officials.

Count Uvarov tailored his briefing to augment

Lilienthal’s prejudices about the community’s backwardness, and this marred his efforts
in trying to convince his skeptical and often cynical Russian coreligionists of the benefits
offered by this new enlightenment. It was also apparent from his subsequent actions that
he did not know of Uvarov’s double game of seeming to advocate Jewish enlightenment
and promotion of Official Nationality.

Had he been privy to this intelligence, the

contradictions would not have escaped him and, undoubtedly, he would have left Russia
much sooner and with more frustration than he did.148
Principally, he was the director of the Riga School, but Lilienthal was also given
the added obligation of convincing Russian Jews, from Vilna to Odessa, that the
government’s educational program was for their benefit. This part of his mission began
in earnest in 1842. Working with the meager information Uvarov and his subordinates
permitted him, Lilienthal tried to placate his employers by doing what he thought was
their bidding, namely to ameliorate fears among various Jewish communities and prepare
them to accept a new intellectual regimen which would propel them into the modern
world. Before Jewish audiences, he spoke from his experiences with German Haskalah.
It was apparent that Lilienthal’s sincerity regarding broad intellectual, spiritual and social
148
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reforms was unquestioned, but so too his inability to vouch for the government. He had
been charged with building a bridge between the Tsar and the Jews without being given
the keystone of official intentions, the lack of which would haunt him for the duration of
his tenure in Russia.149
If this problem had escaped Lilienthal, the Vilna community elders and its other
leading members apprised him of it. It should be noted that though he had been in Russia
two years prior to this visit, Lilienthal had had no real contact with Russian Jewry.150
The surprises awaiting him and his optimism would not be pleasant. In Vilna, he began
by merely reiterating Uvarov’s views when he told those assembled that they had
misunderstood Alexander I’s motives for Jewish education and were perpetuating this
error through their reluctance to embrace Nicholas’ improvements.151 Fears arising from
government policies, he contended, were unwarranted.

Grateful for Jewish support

during the Napoleonic invasion, Lilienthal explained, Alexander had been appalled at the
squalor, disease and illiteracy which greeted him at every settlement and had resolved to
improve their station. Official disdain was directed at the Jewish condition, not the Jews
as a group. Nicholas was merely striving to realize Alexander’s vision of edifying Jewish
institutions commensurate with those for Russians with an eye towards diminishing the
disparity between the two.
Out of respect, the Vilna elders allowed their German Jewish guest to finish his
exposition and then queried him about the present Tsar’s actual intentions. Lilienthal
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could only guess at their reserve and distrust which three years later he would understand
fully.

Vilna may have lost its Gaon long ago but not its perspicacity, and having

weathered Alexander’s conniving and that of his brother, it was little wonder why the
elders accepted half-heartedly. On that score, all Lilienthal could offer was an anemic
concession that they knew the Tsar better than he, a humble stranger.152 A day later, the
scholar met with Vilna’s Stadt Maggid (City Preacher), a man convinced that Haskalah,
no matter how veritable its proponents, would lead to assimilation and apostasy. Finding
his courage once more, Lilienthal proceeded to analyze the Maggid’s concerns in detail
and was adept at exposing many of his irrational views. Gaining the field on some
points, he could not claim complete victory since it was beyond his competence to
guarantee that Haskalah would safeguard Jewish culture and religion in Russia.
Regardless, the German cosmopolitan assured the Maggid that this was not another
pseudo-Mendelssohnian design for Christian conversion but a legitimate attempt to
broaden Jewish intellectual horizons. To the latter's mind, Lilienthal’s assertions had
some merit even though the program he was advocating still left much to chance and
question.153
Vilna had not been easy and his mission would become decidedly more difficult.
Minsk had been overtly hostile and Kiev proved to be obdurate, each time making their
German guest aware of his program’s weaknesses and the resistance it generated.
Disheartened and nursing a growing resentment towards those who questioned his
program, these receptions also made him more determined to free these Jews from what
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he perceived to be their superstitions which were responsible for their fears and
stubbornness. If indeed learning to them meant only the study of Torah and Talmud in
preparation to settle a land which had yet to be reclaimed and most would never see,
studying practices which had been in abeyance for centuries, and all of this for the
indefinite coming of the Messiah, the absurdity was self-evident.154 What Lilienthal did
not appreciate was that ignorance was not the sole cause for the stiff Orthodox reaction to
his mission.

Vilna’s capitulation to Schneur Zalman was approaching its fiftieth

anniversary and the Rabbinical intelligentsia was still combating mainstream Hasidism
over doctrine, ritual, culture, and education. As if this were not enough, the Karaite issue
was a potential ill whose effects were anticipated with trepidation. Still to be deflected
were St. Petersburg’s ardent and perennial promises of fiscal enticements, expanded
employment opportunities, freedom of settlement outside the Pale, and commercial
benefits in return for Christian conversion. Given these conditions, it was understandable
that Haskalah was seen as another thinly-veiled threat to Jewish integrity.

Russian

officialdom had kept all of this from their naive German guest or at least marginalized
them. Upon reaching Odessa, the last stop, Lilienthal was given some respite. Here there
were no disapproving clamors or embarrassing questions, and his proposed reforms were
approved enthusiastically, but this should not have come as a surprise. Odessa was
southern Russia’s major center of Jewish intellectual activity which had a reputation for
being cosmopolitan in composition and demeanor. It was, after all, Russian Haskalah's
other city, and it was only natural that its Jewish inhabitants would give a German
representative of the movement a warm reception.
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Lilienthal had come to some hard realizations. He operated from pure motives in terms
of enhancing and improving upon Jewish education in Russia and had been led to believe
that the government was of the same disposition. Could he really trust his employers?
Few options were open to him in such a circumstance and the only hope that he could
entertain was that the faith he invested in Uvarov was wise.
Upon his return to Uvarov, Lilienthal possessed the demeanor of a Pharisee who
had suffered a Sadduccean rebuke.155 Barely concealing his anger, he suggested to the
Minister that all Jewish schools be placed directly under his ministry and that a rabbinical
synod be convoked to approve the government's educational reform program. Though
impossible to gauge Uvarov's mood, he did approve of this measure and set in motion
preparations of a meeting of the Rabbinical Commission in St. Petersburg which was to
be held from 6 May to 27 August 1843.156
One matter which was becoming increasingly difficult to disguise was the
inducement of Jews to convert to Christianity. Count Uvarov informed Lilienthal that
conversion was not in the Autocrat’s interests and certainly was not tied to education, a
statement which was a half-truth.157 Further blurring the appearance of government
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designs were unprompted Jewish initiatives for self-improvement through educational
reform.158 Weary of traditional Rabbinical pedantry, scholastic arrogance and deliberate
physical and psychological distancing, progressive Jews in Riga, Odessa and Kishinev
petitioned the Ministry for National Enlightenment in 1836 for Jewish secular schools
devoid of all religious instruction and committed to teaching modern subjects.159 They
were not alone. In their wake, several primary and secondary schools were constructed
throughout the major Jewish population centers and nearby villages, all modeled after the
Odessa School to varying degrees. Itsak Volozhinski, an educational reformer and close
friend of Lilienthal’s, established a number of small institutions in and around Vilna and
Minsk which broadened the Jewish educational network and acted as feeder system to the
nascent Jewish gymnasia in the two cities. So pronounced was this regeneration from
within the Jewish community that, in an unprecedented move, the erstwhile xenophobic
Dorpat University, while still closed to foreign Jews, opened its doors to native Russian
Jews who were free to study any field of their choosing. These students were informed,
however, that they were still subject to the poll tax imposed on all Jews.160

This

limitation was far from onerous and a number of Jews applied for admission.
Changes in the Jewish identity were evident but not ones which found lasting
favor with Nicholas. Jewish entrance into the Russian mainstream was not occurring at
the rate and in the numbers he desired, a shortcoming for which he castigated Uvarov
who, in turn, passed responsibility on to Lilienthal, claming that Jewish lethargy was to
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blame. Aghast but by no means silenced by this brusqueness, Lilienthal informed the
Count that if he desired the level of Jewish education and social accommodation enjoyed
in Austria and Prussia, a point which Uvarov had made ardently at the first meeting of the
Jewish Committee in 1840, then the Jews of Russia must be emancipated.161 For once,
Uvarov was left speechless.

The Fruits and Failure of Official Labor

Seldom does a straightforward design yield straightforward results.

The

government had imagined that a Russian education stressing Russian language, history
and culture would wean Jews from their traditional identity, yet this had not occurred.
Through a combination of accommodation and initiative, the Jews appeared to be shaping
up along lines that officials had not anticipated and unsure of how to govern. Even so,
official efforts to change the Jewish community had been realized to a limited degree.
Loyalty to the state, perhaps more so than any other issue, was an overarching
concern of the government in their dealings with non-Russian groups. That Vilna's Jews
had demonstrated such adherence in 1812 had not been forgotten, but there seemed to be
a question as to its duration. Was such a commodity perishable over time? By way of an
answer, at Kronstadt in 1840, 2000 Imperial Jewish sailors were interviewed about their
daily regimen and treatment. Without exception, all claimed that they were happy with
their lot, particularly since they were free to practice their faith under the direction of a
resident rabbi without hindrance or ridicule.
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intervention, the only mandatory condition required of them was that they could not use
Sabbath and High Holiday observances for seditious purposes, a restriction which the
sailors considered reasonable.162 What did the government have to fear? The rabbi, most
likely, seconded as a paid informant, and this topic which will be discussed later on in
detail.
Though only one example, it was apparent that Jewish loyalty was still in
evidence and, ostensibly, plied with a smile. What was also noteworthy was the apparent
acceptance of Jewish religious practices, an obvious instance where Jews and Russian
officials "gave and took" from one another. By no means was the government weakening
in its disposition towards the Jews or Russian society as a whole. The 1840's were the
most reactionary years of Nicholas' tenure but not to the extent that neither he nor his
ministers were blind to the benefits of guarded flexibility. Obviously, where and when
Jews and Russian officials met, there was no question as to who possessed most of the
advantages or what would come to pass if both sides remained immovable. Nevertheless,
circumstances compelled them to reach various accords, concessions which really did not
cost or impair their respective positions or programs.
Another curious aspect of Jewish-Russian relations was played out not long after
the interview with the Kronstadt sailors. A mysterious fire had broken out in the new
Jewish school near Minsk, destroying it completely and leaving the Jewish community at
a loss for what to do. Stepping into the breech voluntarily, local noblemen contributed
2000 silver rubles toward the construction of a new facility.163 The government could not
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have imagined a better exercise in public relations. A foreign newspaper (Allgemeine
Zeitung des Judenthums) had carried a glowing story about Russians helping Jews.
Perhaps, some thought, Lilienthal’s claims that the Tsar was acting for Jewish well-being
merited reconsideration. Hopeful and, to a limited degree, mitigating, such reports were
little more than a convenient shield for the regime's true intentions which, at best, allayed
Jewish fears temporarily but seldom brought lasting improvements in their wake.
Even accommodation had its limits, and if indeed the Empire was committed to
Official Nationality and particularly the promotion of Christian Orthodoxy, why were
Jewish institutions and worship still tolerated? Certainly sufficient time had passed
where, even under the guise of flexibility, Jewish theology would have been undermined
and yet it endured.164 During his visit in the late 1840's, Sir Moses Montefiore was
informed that Jewish worship in the military was fairly routine. He himself would
participate in a soldiers’ Shabbat though, he observed, the celebrants were all adult
recruits.165 Kept out the public eye, the cantonist system still existed and kahals were still
violating recruitment laws by permitting the kidnapping of children for the army and
navy. Christian conversion of cantonists had been suspended temporarily but had not
been abolished, and until Alexander II put an end to it, Jewish youths would still be at
risk.
Cantonist regiments were not presented as a means of slavery but as a step
towards Jewish self-liberation. Whether this freedom came through military service
which carried the recruit far away from those influences which were thought to blind him
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or by means of Talmud-free education, government officials were seconded by a number
of Jewish voices.166 Regarding the latter, Russian Jewish intellectuals such as Abraham
Mapu, Lev Ossipovich Mandelstam, Mendele Mokher Sforim, Judah Leib Gordon and
Moses Leib Lilienblum advocated outright anti-Talmudism when they introduced their
own projects to refashion Jewish society in Russia. By virtue of their promotion of antiTalmudist and anti-traditionalist sentiments, Jewish intellectuals afforded the Tsar time
and distance from these affairs to reassess and redirect his policies as necessary. It was
fortuitous that at Uvarov’s behest, the 1843 Rabbinical Conference convened in St.
Petersburg.

Anticipating a session where Jewish communal leaders would merely

approve government reforms, the Minister would soon learn that rigidity bore little fruit.
Prior to the Conference, in 1841, the government launched another frontal assault
on Jewish publishing which acquired some Jewish allies. When it was learned that the
authorities had banned further publication of Rabbinical works and that those extant were
to be destroyed, the Rabbi of Shilel, Chief of the town’s Bet Din, assumed the office of
“seeker-Rabbi” and enlisted the aid of “enlightened Jews” to discover and destroy all the
offending works in the community.167 Virtually a law unto himself, anyone who either
possessed the proscribed books and refused to surrender them voluntarily or impeded
confiscation would be arrested and, if of age, included in the village's recruitment quota.
Fear and opportunism most likely provided the motivation, not to mention the ongoing
struggle between Orthodox and Hasidic Jews which could not be discounted. Above all
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else, overall tensions within the Jewish community were becoming more pronounced and
the events in Shilel merely publicized an otherwise internal affair.
Every influential Jewish leader in the Empire attended the 1843 Rabbinical
Conference, the purpose of which was to reach a consensus with the government on
Jewish education.168

Among those present were Rabbi Isaac of Volozhin who

represented the Mitnagdim, R. Menachem Mendel Shneerson of Lubavich for the White
Russian Hasidim, Israel Halperin of Berdichev for the Polish Hasidim, Bezel Stern of the
Odessa School and Dr. Maxwell Lilienthal, director of the Riga School and assistant to
Count Uvarov in Jewish affairs.169

Crucial to the success of this meeting was the

classification of Jewish subjects and traditions into categories of sacred, those subject to
contemporary mutability, and those deemed antiquated.170 A Herculean labor in ideal
circumstances, reaching a consensus on such issues promised to be Sisyphean in this
inauspicious atmosphere. Despite the diversity of opinion and degrees of acrimony
among the representatives and their respective communities, some matters were resolved.
For instance, Torah study was to remain a part of the Jewish curriculum as would Hebrew
(for religious purposes only), Chaldean, Jewish geography, and other subjects essential to
Jewish viability.

Having established this, there was an added provision that those

students who did not have the aptitude for rabbinical or spiritual vocations would receive
vocational training. Regarding Talmud, despite what had been attributed to the Tsar,
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Uvarov made it clear that Nicholas did not want to impugn Talmudic credibility as a
means to convert the Jews. The Babylonian Talmud, as well as the works of the sages,
would remain sacred and, Uvarov reassured his audience, Halakhah (ritual law) would
not be altered or suspended.171
Laborious and tedious as it had been in wending his way through hostile territory,
Uvarov thought that the most difficult obstacles had been surmounted until he broached
the subject of Kabbalah. Unwittingly, he had set a match to a powder keg. No sooner
had he mentioned it than Bezel Stern condemned it as nonsense and a dangerous foray
into speculative philosophy. Immediately, the Hasidic delegates launched a vehement
attack upon Stern, claiming that Kabbalah was the key to higher levels of being, the
realization of self-perfection, and the means to affect the restoration of the world to
original purity (tikkun olam). A heated debate ensued and there was a danger that the
meeting would spin out of control. During this drama, Lilienthal made no attempt to
support the Odessa School principal in any way, perhaps because he now perceived the
goal of these proceedings with complete clarity. For his part, Uvarov saw that a physical
brawl was in the offing, and how he would explain it to the Tsar should it come to pass
was a scenario not to his liking. Asserting his authority as Minister, he declared that
Stern’s assessment was correct and that the study and practice of Kabbalah and any other
form of mysticism was to be abandoned. The issue refused to die. Raising his voice
above the tumult, Rabbi Shneerson proceeded to explain the error of such a position.
Uvarov, out of patience and surmising that he had fanned the fires in his efforts to
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extinguish them, ordered Shneerson to be quiet and take his seat. Shneerson would not
be cowed and resumed his protest which elicited from the Minister a more emphatic order
to desist or face arrest and removal. Schneerson’s mind and ears were elsewhere and he
simply, as he would claim later, did not hear that injunction nor did he realize what had
come to pass until he found himself incarcerated in a neighboring room.172 Alone and
perceiving that it was time for afternoon prayer, the Rabbi immediately began to hum a
nigun, a lyricless tune performed prior to engaging in prayer. Uvarov, having recovered
his composure and pondering Shneerson’s statements, heard the nigun as well as the
Rabbi’s eloquent chanting of the mid-afternoon psalms and he paused in his
deliberations.

Apocryphal accounts claimed that Mendel’s prayers touched the

Minister’s soul which made him reverse his previous decision. A more plausible and less
dramatic explanation may have been Israel Halperin's, (the Polish Hasidic representative),
less- impassioned presentation of Kabbalistic study which made it appear more as a
benign anachronistic addendum to Jewish ritual rather than a retardant to the State’s
intended reforms.173 Not only was Rabbi Shneerson released from confinement but, as
an added oddity, Tsar Nicholas granted to him and his children hereditary citizenship in
perpetuity. On a more dismal note, Rabbi Yitzak told a group of intimates eager to hear
of the proceedings that he perceived a wind of destruction bearing down upon the Jews
and that only prayer and mercy could come to Jewish aid.174
Confusion and little order had resulted from this congress, save now that the battle
lines between the Hasidim and Orthodox maskilim had become entrenched. In its the
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aftermath, Lilienthal, thoroughly frustrated, abandoned hope and left Russia, to be
succeeded as Uvarov’s lieutenant by Lev Ossipovich Mandelstamm (1809-1889). The
latter, upon receiving a Bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from St. Petersburg University
in 1844, had the distinction of being the first Jew to earn a degree from a Russian
university. Though committed to continuing Jewish educational reform, Mandelstamm
and his fellow travelers soon discovered that official sentiment, which had been riding
high in their favor, had taken a decided reverse. Count Pavel Kiselev, Nicholas’ Minister
of State Domains and advisor on peasant affairs, attributed continued Jewish
backwardness to their religious instruction. The cant may have been stale but not the new
catechism Kiselev proposed which would embodied re-education in religion, patriotism
and useful employment.175

Being one of Nicholas' closest confidants, Kiselev's

statements bore considerable gravity and certainly influenced the prevailing conservative
reaction.176
On 13 November 1844, Nicholas made the education of Jewish youths a special
concern which demanded immediate redress. How unfortunate, he opined, that in the
past all efforts to improve instruction among them had met with failure owing to
ignorance and resistance. Henceforth, the Jews were to be guided to productive labor and
placed upon the path of honest citizenship.177 Uvarov was now commissioned to appoint
a board of Rabbinical supervisors and Christian overseers and coordinate their activities
173
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in an effort to bring Jewish instruction up to Christian standards at the gymnasium level.
Admittedly, Jewish recruitment obligations had to be overcome before this project could
be realized and, as an obvious afterthought, a solution was found. In the case of an able
Jewish instructor or promising Jewish student being called up for military service,
demonstrated proficiency in Russian would garner a shorter service commitment and
allow them to pursue their education or professional pursuits.178
These revamped educational schemes were tied closely to the fate of existing
Jewish autonomous institutions. After insisting that kahal members take an intricate and
ponderous loyalty oath to him in 1838, Nicholas dissolved all kahals in 1844, transferring
their functions to local Russian administrations.179 On the surface, this edict seemed to
mandate an administrative reorganization of local Jewish institutions. Absent were any
references to malfeasance, an ideal pretext for dissolution. The kahals’ original raison
d’etre was to collect taxes and assume limited jurisdiction over Jewish communal affairs.
In some instances, kahal officials found that their authority overlapped with that of
district and provincial administrations. Eliminating the kahals meant the elimination of
bureaucratic duplication which accorded with the Tsar's relentless efforts to streamline
the bureaucracy.180 There was, however, one other possible explanation for this action.
Aside from physical distance, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption and outright
prevarication, the Tsar knew that some kahals were kidnapping under-aged Jewish boys,
apprehending vagrants, and waylaying itinerant travelers to meet recruitment quotas.
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Regional and district authorities had routinely turned a knowledgeable blind eye to the
traffic since it was useful to do so. In 1841 however, part of his bout of temper with
Uvarov over the perceived failure of Jewish education was that even military recruitment
was not producing the requisite quantity of Russified Jews to realize his plan. He may
not have mentioned it to the Count at that meeting but it would only be a matter of time
before he would lay the blame for this failure on the feeder institutions, the kahals being
chief among them. Moreover, questions arose about tax fraud. Soldiers and excise
officers had been sent to Jewish settlements from time to time to ensure that the proper
sums were collected and yet both could be intimidated and bribed with the end result
being, in most instances, that both the offending official and kahal leaders escaped
punishment. Geography afforded many kahals accidental autonomy in this and other
matters, and since faultless oversight and total control were impossible, the kahals had to
go.

Storm Clouds Gathering: The Russian Intelligentsia 1845-1849

From 1843 onward, Nicholas took a hard line towards the Jews, especially in
cultural and educational affairs. In part, this posture was an expression of his uneasiness
in dealing with issues with which he was not familiar but, perhaps more so, the Jewish
intelligentsia suffered as a result of the Russian intelligentsia’s activities.

Friction

between the Slavophiles and Westernizers was on the rise and both, in their own ways,
were criticizing Russian conditions very close to the throne.
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Moscow, throughout the 1840’s and ‘50’s, Timofei Granovsky, Alexander Herzen, and
Vissarion Belinsky were an intellectual force there, the dynamic representatives of the
Westernizers as opposed to the Slavophile movement personified by Stepan Shevyrev
and Mikhail Pogodin.181

Though the latter may not have enjoyed influence

commensurate with that of the former, both groups nevertheless made the University of
Moscow a center of Russian cultural life.182 Even so, Nicholas, in assessing the situation,
might very well have found credence in A.F. Ulybyshev’s remark that Russia was beset
with “two darknesses fighting one another for the genius of enlightenment.”183 As if that
did not pose problems enough, what really upset the Tsar was when Vissarion Belinsky, a
prominent member of the Stankevich Circle, declared in 1847 that Christianity in Russia
was mere superstition and not one of genuine belief.184 Attacking one of the pillars of
Official Nationality was strictly forbidden, but all the Tsar did in response was to
intensify surveillance of the Stankevich Circle.185 In that same year, authorities in Kiev
uncovered the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius, a group committed to the Ukrainian
“messianic” realization of a democratic Slavic confederation centered in Kiev. Among
those arrested and subsequently exiled were the historian Nicholas Kostomarov and poet
Taras Shevchenko, both ardent champions of romantic Ukrainian nationalism.186
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Surveillance of these intellectual circles translated into action following the
Revolutions of 1848. First, Nicholas embarked upon a censorship terror which targeted
so-called literary journals and newspapers highly critical of government policies under
the guise of reporting public opinion.187 This crackdown led to the closing of a number
of small presses and caused the dissolution of many cells associated with such groups as
the Miliutin Circle.188 While this campaign was in motion, the Tsar next put an end to
the Petrashevskii Circle, a discussion group interested in utopian socialism which had
taken up protests against Nicholas’ regime and demanded social and political reform.
Dostoevsky was among those taken into custody in the spring of 1849 when agents of the
Third Department moved in on the group.189
Nicholas, in the late 1840’s, knew only too well that this intellectual ferment
needed an outlet which the autocracy was incapable of providing owing to it very nature.
A number of these disgruntled individuals were progressive bureaucrats whose abilities
and education were never utilized fully owing to the ponderous and convoluted customs
of the Russian bureaucracy Nicholas was committed to reform. With such independent
intellectual talents straining at the bit, the Tsar and his ministers feared the long-term
consequences of such liberty to their authority and the autocratic Russian state. Efforts to
placate the Russian intelligentsia had failed, which meant that new strategies and a firmer
hand would proceed into the next decade. This change of course would also be felt
within the Jewish community.
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Official Judaism and its Critics

In the year following the dissolution of the kahals, official Jewish presses were
established in Vilna and Zhitomer under the supervision of the Director of Rabbinical
Instruction.190 Similar to the edict abolishing the kahals, this latest action was presented
as an administrative reform implemented to accommodate the growing number of Jewish
schools in the two cities. In other words, state sponsorship of Jewish publishing was
presented as a practical move. By 1845, two gymnasium-level Jewish schools had been
established as well as several primary institutions and all were in need of textbooks. This
did not provoke alarm at the time, though it should have because it provided a convenient
cover for a more ambitious project.
Earlier in 1844, the Tsar, Sergei Uvarov and the Minister for Foreign Creeds had
banned Talmud instruction in the Jewish schools and placed strict limits upon all Jewish
publications, especially those in Hebrew. Either in response to Rabbinical petitions or a
carefully-orchestrated demonstration of chimeral benevolence, the state’s Jewish
publishing scheme was enacted less than a year after the proscription of Talmud.
Superficially, the establishment of official Jewish presses could have been taken as a step
towards reinvigorating progressive Judaism. On a deeper level, however, it was a veiled
reaffirmation of autocratic manipulation. Employing a Rabbinical director as a low-level
censor was an astute maneuver.191 Should some Hebrew authors discover that this officer
189
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deemed their works inappropriate, he would be the recipient of abuse, derision, and
perhaps a firestorm or two of indignation.

Perhaps the district and regional

administrators above him would also receive the brunt of hostilities and, possibly, the
Minister for National Enlightenment himself on rare occasion. The order and placement
of these firebreaks surrounding the Tsar were stated clearly in the statute.
Associated closely with these official presses was the manipulation of Crown or
Official rabbis.

Not until three years hence would there be physical institutions

committed to producing such state officers, yet in official correspondence, statutes, and
contemporary memoirs prior to 1847-48, they were already extant.192 Fallout from the
internecine struggles within the Jewish community would invariably spread to the larger
Russian society, and those disgruntled souls who wished to avenge themselves made apt
employees in government service. Crown rabbis and Jewish censors often worked in
tandem though not always conscious of one another, and it is very possible that the
director in charge of these two presses was one of these disaffected souls. It was his duty
to make monthly reports to district and regional officials and present an annual digest to
St. Petersburg, noting which publications he approved and the reasons for those he
rejected.193
Crown rabbis were a unique facet of the Russian-Jewish experience. Codified in
1847, their origins appeared to stem from the 1827 Recruitment Ukase or, more precisely,
a failure to realize its intended design. Recall that the demand for Jewish males,
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specifically among the 12-18 age group, was an obvious attempt to starve Jewish
Orthodoxy of its future. That some recruits died while others became estranged from their
former homes and, for some, Judaism as well was to be expected, but there still Jews
committed to their faith, a rival for loyalty Nicholas could not abide. Crown rabbis,
above all else, were charged with securing Jewish loyalty by manipulating Jewish beliefs
to accord with the Russian ethos. Why some Jews became Christians while others
remained Jews was an episodic concern which the government wanted to resolve with
finality. The creation and installation of ostensibly loyal rabbis in various communities
afforded authorities an ingress not only into the religious lives of the Jews local but also
greater supervision.

It was soon known throughout much of the Russian Jewish

community that these individuals were government agents. What did matter? Many
Jews continued to suspect the so-called old Rabbinate of oppressive and often selfserving practices within the community. Cynicism combined with frustration to convince
many that more than a few of their leaders and prominent citizens were actually
parasites.194
Russian Jewry did experience changes during this period but, in the main, they
were limited to certain urban communities.

During his tenure in Russia Lilienthal

delivered his droshes (explanation of the weekly Torah portion) in German. In a similar
vein in March 1847, the New Synagogue in Odessa had a choir singing in lieu of a cantor
and many in the congregation wore European clothing.195 Did these innovations afford
Russian Jewry the free air it needed to breathe in order to survive? As later decades
would attest, the Jewish intellect was certainly vigorous, but as to whether these German
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and European innovations to its religious rituals among various congregations was the
source could not be ascertained for certain. One matter that was clear, however, was that
a form of German Reform Judaism did emerge late in the century but it did not become
widespread nor did it separate Russian Jews from Judaism.

Western Scrutiny of Russia’s Jewish Question

Intimate knowledge of Jewish affairs in the Empire may have eluded those
residing outside of its borders, but sufficient intelligence from travelers, émigrés, and
other sources had made it into the Western press and prompted external concern. In
1846, six years after his initial invitation, Sir Moses Montefiore, his wife, and a friend,
Dr. Loewe, came to Russia to appraise conditions for themselves.

Arriving in St.

Petersburg on 5 April 1846, Sir Moses wasted little time in his interview with Count
Nesselrode to seek the repeal of two edicts removing Jews to fifty versts from the
Empire’s western borders and to urge the establishment of Jewish schools. The first item,
the Foreign Minister assured his guest, was in the immediate offing but the second could
not be brought off so quickly. By no means wishing to speak for Count Uvarov with
whom Sir Moses was to meet the following day, Nesselrode claimed that Western
European Jews were the cream of the lot whereas those in Russia and Poland were the of
the basest sort.196 Sadly, he continued, the Bible had been right to describe the Jews as a
stiff-necked and hard-headed people, traits which had allowed them to survive adversity
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but at the cost of imposing upon themselves an impregnable provinciality. This would
become evident to Sir Moses in his travels.
Evidence to suggest that Nesselrode and Uvarov compared notes or read from the
same script prior to the Englishman’s arrival has yet to surface but, at the very least, the
similarity between their respective postures towards the Jews of Russia was uncanny.
Composed for the occasion, Sir Moses implored the Minister for National Enlightenment
to affect the ready amelioration of Jewish ills in terms of their education and employment
within the Russian state. The response was a near copy of the Foreign Minister’s with
the addition of Uvarov’s word of honor that Christian conversion was not in the
government’s interests. Happiness will come to the Empire’s Jews, he maintained, only
when education had prepared them for it. The Count then proceeded to inform Sir Moses
that all ills, with few exceptions, besetting the Jews of Russia could be linked to Talmud.
It was a collection of false doctrines and had been exposed as such among the learned,
but its reckless dissemination among the ignorant Jewish masses had corrupted them, and
therein lay the root of the entire problem. Base and cunning, employed in the lowest
traffic, Russian Jews had thus abandoned their faith and culture. In response, Sir Moses
contended that many learned Christians held Talmud in high esteem, but Uvarov would
not by swayed.197 Adding to Sir Moses’ incredulity, Count Uvarov then claimed that he
had to compel the Jews to study Hebrew in order to safeguard their own religion.198
Montefiore, though not possessing Lilienthal’s academic credentials, had a keener
understanding of the peculiar condition of Russian Jewry. Both men naturally held
preconceived notions about Russia and its Jews prior to their respective visits, but
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whereas Lilienthal came as the omniscient teacher, his English successor came as a
student desiring to learn.

Convinced that many Jewish fears arose from simple

ignorance, the German had been quick to dismiss uncritically Russian Jewish complaints
of government malfeasance. In contrast, the philanthropic Knight of the British Empire
listened, considered, and would draw up a report of his findings and present it to the Tsar
and the appropriate ministers. From Nesselrode’s and Uvarov’s initial remarks, it was
apparent that they regarded Montefiore as another Lilienthal, a well-intentioned foreigner
who could be led to believe most of what was told to him but could do little owing to his
non-Russian origins and ignorance of Russian Jewish ways. It was assumed that his
impact would be minimal, that the “good” he accomplished would leave with him, and
that the resulting frustration would accord flawlessly with official designs. Little did they
imagine that the Englishman’s visit would initiate others.
Naiveté was not one of Montefiore’s character traits or at least not a prominent
one. Delayed initially, Sir Moses was granted an audience with Nicholas I on 9 April in a
setting and conducted in such a manner which would not have been out of place in the
Marquis de Custine’s Letters from Russia. Conversing in French for the duration of the
interview, Sir Moses asked Nicholas to “bend an eye of merciful consideration upon my
coreligionists.” A rare smile crossed the Tsar’s face as he informed his guest, while not
really addressing his request, that there were Jews among his personal guards.199
Improve the Jewish condition?

Why would anyone desire the opposite?

Nicholas

claimed that he and his ministers had labored for the betterment of Russia’s Jews, an
essential condition which had to be achieved forthwith since they were invaluable to the
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Empire. Yes, it was true that hardships seemed to plague them, but their adherence to
separate ways and customs hindered their progress and inspired fear and superstition
among the surrounding peasantry. Official protection, given the size of the Empire, was
all but impossible. So many projects had been executed in their behalf and almost all had
failed or yielded unsatisfactory results which had cast both the Jewish community and the
government into a condition of frustration and despair. After conversing at length on
related issues, Nicholas suggested that Montefiore call on Count Pavel Kiselev, his
advisor on Jewish affairs, who could give him more information before he began his
visits to the settlements and cities.
One week later, Count Kiselev welcomed Sir Moses and proceeded to the point
without ceremony. The Jews, he claimed, were hopeless. Obdurate and unthinking, their
addiction to Talmud escaped all rationale and, even worse, that single work had spawned
a renewed wave of Orthodox Jewish fanaticism which was reversing all of the previous
reforms of the decade.

Reforming the Jews of Russia was a fantasy, Kiselev told

Montefiore. Such a mission would be in vain but, if the Englishman still wanted to do
some good despite this circumstance, there remained one option. Informing Montefiore
that Nesselrode had mentioned his complaint over removing Jewish villagers from the
western border, Kiselev suggested that Sir Moses take 10,000 of them to Palestine. Sir
Moses’ facial expression must have betrayed his thoughts, which induced Kiselev to
produce an edict with Nicholas’ signature permitting any Jew desiring to leave the
Empire to do so without encumbrance.200 Still enjoying Nicholas’ confidence, Kiselev,
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nevertheless, was fast losing his diplomatic reserve when he could barely maintain
civility towards the English Jew.
Free at last to pursue his fact-finding mission in the field with the promise that he
submit a copy of his findings to each of the ministers and the Tsar, Sir Moses and his
entourage sallied forth. He and his party made every effort to visit villagers, townsfolk,
soldiers, itinerant artisans and craftsmen to produce as complete a report as possible.
Chief among his concerns was the treatment of Jewish soldiers whom he wanted to
question about the conditions and tenure of their recruitment obligation. To appreciate
their circumstances, Sir Moses was invited to assist in a soldiers’ Shabbat service. Later,
he remarked that it had been both an honor and a relief to see that these servicemen knew
the correct order of rituals and prayers, even those for the welfare of the Tsar, which
stimulated his curiosity all the more.

Sir Moses also inquired about the trials and

tribulations of Jewish soldiers in Imperial service which had been reported via various
media in the West. In response, the servicemen apprised him of some notable changes in
their treatment which Montefiore found surprising. He had not been misinformed about
the brutality associated with the draft in the late 1820’s and early 1830’s. Some married
men were kidnapped or seized outright, leaving their wives in the status of aguna, an
abandoned woman who could not remarry until she had irrefutable proof of her
husband’s death or had obtained a get (official divorce decree) bearing his signature and
that of a recognizable bet din (rabbinical court). Now all of that had changed. Husbands
and single men who served in the guards’ regiments had twenty-year obligations whereas
non-combatants served for twenty-five, yet everyone was free to practice their faith and
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their wives and children could now live with them in the barracks.201 Impressed by this
information which he received and to which he bore witness, Sir Moses was careful not
to allow himself to swayed into making facile assumptions. He continued his sojourn in
an attempt to discern between exception and rule and gauge accurately, or at least as far
as he was able, the extent of Nicholas’ reforms.
At the end of his journeys, Sir Moses honored his commitment by making a report
of his findings to the Tsar and appropriate officials. To some of them he wrote letters
decrying their indifference to several segments of Jewish society. Still smarting from
Kiselev’s off-handed offer to repatriate 10,000 Jews to Palestine, Sir Moses suggested to
the Minister of State Domains that he remove the blinders from the Tsar’s eyes where the
Pale was concerned. Nowhere within its 17,000 square miles did its residents enjoy so
much as a hint of Nicholas’ reforms which had been lauded extensively. If the Count
desired specifics then he should know that Jewish artisans were forced to look outside of
the Pale for employment which, legally, was permitted only through conversion to
Christianity. Now was the occasion for Sir Moses to express his displeasure, an exercise
which was given full vent when the Englishman recalled that even after committing
apostasy, the Christian Jew could never advance to journeyman or master in his
vocation.202
Sir Moses Montefiore was not one to allow idealism and superficial courtesies to
blind him from realities, a lesson which would now be given to Count Sergei Uvarov. As
with Kiselev, Uvarov was reminded of his prior statements about Jewish provincialism
and how happiness would rain down upon the Jews of Russia once modern education had
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a firm footing. Maintaining an even temper, Sir Moses gave Uvarov a logical exposition
of what he had observed in the government Jewish schools and could conclude only that
in Russian, arithmetic, history and Hebrew, the students acquitted themselves admirably.
Christian teachers and their Jewish colleagues worked together amicably enough, and
considering past acrimony between the two groups, such a cooperation could heal
wounds and hopefully put an end to Jewish discrimination. This ideal setting, however,
had one imperfection. Given the growth of a modern Jewish intelligentsia which he had
witnessed and which he knew had been an ongoing process even before Nicholas’ reign,
the Jews had certainly proven themselves able to supervise their own schools rather than
defer to Christians.203
How influential were Sir Moses’ visits, reports and correspondence regarding the
Jews of Russia? When Nicholas received a copy of Montefiore's report advocating equal
rights for Jews and Christians, the Tsar responded that that would never come about as
long as he reigned.204

Autocratic obduracy had not rendered Sir Moses' mission a

complete failure, however.

Because of his travels and his political connections,

England's premier philanthropist was able to persuade Queen Victoria’s government to
establish a Jewish aid society and ancillary institutions. His crowing achievement came a
generation later with Parliament’s approval of L1,000,000 in 1881 to assist Russian
Jewish emigrants on their way to America or Palestine, an operation which also
coordinated its efforts with the Alliance Israelite Universelle under Baron de Rothschild’s
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sponsorship.205 More immediate and not to the Tsar’s liking was that the Empire’s socalled Jewish problem was accorded closer scrutiny by the Western presses and
governments, a consequence which Nicholas II would have to deal deftly after the 1903
Kishinev pogrom. For the present, Nicholas I would have to deal with another foreign
Jew who promised to resolve the Empire’s now prominent Jewish Question.
Jacob Altaris, a French Jew and close associate of Baron de Rothschild, arrived in
Russia the same year as Sir Moses but with a different intention. If Nicholas I would
authorize the repatriation of 40,000 Jewish families from Russia and Poland to Algeria
for 1,000 francs per family, Altaris claimed that he would handle all of the arrangements.
Far from building castles in the air, he had Rothschild’s backing as well as that of many
of Europe’s wealthier Jewish families in realizing this project.206 The Tsar answered him
two days later with a counter demand for 60 rubles per capita, perhaps anticipating that
this would put an end to the plan which it did. Altaris did not understand. How strange it
was to the Frenchman that the Autocrat wanted to retain a group that he considered to be
a problem, but then he was unacquainted with Nicholas’ persona. The Frenchman’s offer
was a business proposition but the Tsar saw it as a Jew dictating terms to the Autocrat of
all the Russias. He therefore had made an absurd counteroffer to save his affronted
prestige. Having no alternative, Altaris left Russia never to return and Nicholas was glad
to see him depart. Meanwhile, preparations for the Tsar’s last major blow to Russian
Rabbinism were already under way.
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Point and Counterpoint: Nicholas Facing the Jews, 1847-1855

In 1847, the Tsar announced the establishment of two Crown Rabbinical
seminaries in Vilna and Zhitomir with the dual purpose of training rabbis for religious
functions and Jewish teachers for the government schools. Despite their professional
designations as Rabbinical pedagogical institutes, both schools were accorded the status
of Russian gymnasia yet their curriculum, particularly for Rabbinical candidates, could
have rivaled the best institutions of either St. Petersburg or Moscow.207 Identical to other
Jewish schools, the proportion of Christian teachers and administrators to Jewish was in
the former’s favor though compensated with the exclusive employment of Jewish faculty
in those subjects dealing specifically with Jewish rituals, Halakhah, and the liturgical
languages.208 Balance, or at least its appearance in administering these institutes, was
crucial lest their true nature be exposed and the project killed in its nascent stage.209 For
Nicholas, it had to have time to mature. Not until 1855 would he expose his hand openly,
though he deceived himself if he believed that his motives were concealed from the
outset.
Nicholas Farmaskirten, one of the Jewish administrators assigned to the Vilna
institute, was suspected of attempting to turn the school into a de facto recruitment depot
shortly after it opened, a charge which could not be dismissed as mere slander.210
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Though never sanctioning this practice de jure, government officials, in the late 1840’s
up until 1855, made discreet inquiries to the principals and other administrators about
“volunteers” from among the rabbinical students who were suited for military service.
When such were found and presented, the institution was given a monetary remuneration.
Cosmopolitan Jews associated with the Institute, along with Vilna’s resident adherents,
were quick to deny such malfeasance and accuse Jewish conservatives of trying to
discredit reform altogether. Matters had degenerated to the point of both sides nearly
coming to blows in the streets of Vilna. By way of a partial truce, Yitzak ber Levinsohn,
one of Haskalah’s remaining visible torchbearers, managed to arbitrate a tenuous
settlement and took the liberty to chastise both sides for losing sight of what the Institute
really represented, Haskalah realized. Echoing the words of Isaac ber Levinsohn, those
who did not recognize that Haskalah was identical to authentic Jewish traditions was
ignorant and influenced by the Hasidim.211

Credited for restoring peace, his

pronouncement soon became a source of embarrassment when a recruitment shill was
discovered in the fourth rabbinical class, though the unmasking did not end there.212 It
was learned shortly thereafter that the actual bestowal of rabbinical and teaching degrees
came from the government and not from any of the Institute’s administrative personnel.
In government employ, the Institute’s principal also answered monthly to St. Petersburg.
Such an arrangement served to undermine the Institute’s credibility and all but doomed
the city’s so-called Uvarov School, a damning appellation which would remain with it
and its Zhitomer sister long after the Minister’s death in 1855.
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Responsibility for the troubles besetting the rabbinical schools did not reside with
the government exclusively. From the time the first Jewish students came to Vilna to
attend the Institute, it was apparent that Vilna itself had become a den of corruption.
Chaim Aronson, anxious to become a rabbi, had traveled to the city and received an
education that he had not expected. Seeking orientation and legal assistance to facilitate
his entrance into the Institute, he found out that the only difference between the Upper
Bet Din and the Lower was the amount of corruption and graft which was carried on in
plain view.213 His initial attempt to gain admission having failed, Aronson became an
apprentice watchmaker to earn a marginal living. He eventually came into contact with
some other would-be rabbinical students who had come to the conclusion that most
government-sponsored Jewish studies were folly.214 Even so, Aronson did not want to
give up his dream until the illegality around him became more than he could bear. In
particular, he learned that Chaim Haikil, grandson of the esteemed Rabbi Gershon of
Vilna, was a government informant whose actions had placed a number of people in the
hands of recruitment officers. When Haikil was discovered, he was bound in chains and
sent off to face the same fate to which he had condemned others, but those who saw him
off wondered why he was so complacent. Before the examining officers at the
recruitment center, Haikil produced the register of the Vilna Chevra Kadisha (Vilna
Burial Society) which had a number of “living” souls entered in its pages. He was
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released at once.215 Aronson wondered how an honest Jew could maintain his integrity in
such an environment. When he had amassed adequate resources, he left Vilna.
Similar disillusionment affected Rabbi Israel Salanter, a respected scholar to
whom the government offered the directorship of the Vilna Institute in 1848. Throughout
his career, he had served the Empire in a variety of capacities, but the prospect of
becoming one of the Tsar’s minions in Vilna was unappealing and, with all due respect,
he declined and moved to Kovno. This departure did not mean his abandonment of his
students. Indeed, it was Salanter who introduced to the Empire the Musar (ethics)
movement which would reinvigorate the Russian Jewish community.216
A complex man with a simple program, Salanter promised neither a contemporary
messiah nor to be one himself. He offered no miracles nor a “new” Torah. Furthermore,
he was not at war with the Talmud nor did he claim to be a righteous soul in whom God
had invested extraordinary wisdom and mystical power. Too much damage had been
done to Judaism’s theological and intellectual edifice at the hands of opportunists and
apostates whose guilt was commensurate with that of the Tsar’s on several levels. Before
Judaism in Russia became a body without a soul or even worse, a crypt without a corpse,
repairs had to commence at once. Chief among those labors was the restoration of
Judaism’s spiritual vitality. Salanter was convinced that Haskalah had gone too far in
stripping away seemingly useless tradition to the point of reducing Judaism to mechanical
forms without substance.217 Even Nicholas I’s strictest edict had envisioned alterations to
traditional Judaism on far less a scale than what the Maskilim had affected. All the more
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distressing was that Jewish intellectual noteworthies such as Abraham Mapu and, to a
lesser degree, the poet Judah Leib Gordon, were touting the remaining barren desolation
as a triumph over traditionalism.218 Casting aside all critical considerations, Mapu had
gone so far as to declare that all good accorded the Jews of Russia came from Haskalah
and all ill from fanatical Rabbinism. In Kherson province, M. Epstein declared that he
was overjoyed to discover that Jewish youths enrolled in the government school there
were taught contrary to Mosaic law. Freedom from archaic Rabbinism, ignorance, and
the opening of Jewish eyes to reality could only have come, Epstein wrote, through the
auspices of the blessed Tsar Nicholas I who had allowed Jews to progress.219 Salanter,
for his part, was at a loss to determine the direction of that progress.

Eschewing

emotionalism which had and would continue to plague every attempt at Jewish selfreformation, Rabbi Salanter presented his movement in the most rational and
straightforward context as being one which sought to act as a bridge between Orthodox
Jewish tradition and the demands of the modern world.220
Novel and to the point, the Musar movement was successful, but only in the long
term. Despising mainstream Hasidism and popular movements for their emotionalism,
denigration and alteration of Jewish ritual and culture, Salanter was inspired to create a
logical and humanistic reform akin to the studious nature of the Habad movement. Not
unlike Hasidism’s leaders in its early years, Salanter established himself as a teacher
who, in turn, made teachers of his students. Unlike Hasidism, however, Musar did not
fashion itself into a mass movement. Because of Musar’s insistence upon Halakhah,
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Torah, and Talmud study as a means of interpreting and rationalizing age-old tenets and
covenants within Russian and world circumstance, the mental acuity and spiritual
discipline required to build the bridge between tradition and modernity would remain
reposed in a minority. Far from being exclusive, what did reach Russian Jewry was a
new conscience derived from Halakhic and Mosaic ethics which, in their plainest form,
were understandable and applicable to mundane circumstance.

The reinvigoration

Nicholas claimed to have sparked among the Jews of Russia really did come to pass in
part owing to Musar which, like Habad Hasidism, eventually left an indelible stamp upon
the course of Jewish evolution.
Rabbi Salanter would never reside in Vilna after 1848, but this consequence did
not impair his ability to influence Jewish life there and earn a place in popular memory.
Shortly after he moved to Kovno, Vilna experienced a virulent cholera epidemic during
Yom Kippur which prompted Salanter to urge his former community to ignore the fast
and eat. The Rabbinate had refused to allow this for fear of eliciting God’s wrath by
violating the injunction to act contritely. To this fear, Salanter countered with a greater
one rooted in Halakhah, that the preservation of life in the face of death was the supreme
expression of Kadosh Hashem (Holiness of God).

According to Salanter, if the

Rabbinical authorities maintained their obduracy in the midst of this epidemic, they were
sanctioning communal suicide, an unforgivable sin for which they, the learned elders,
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would have to answer before God at Final Judgment.221 The Rabbinate was forced to
concede.
Cholera was not the end of the city’s woes. New troubles were astir in the Vilna
Rabbinical Pedagogical Institute which threatened to close it down. On 25 August 1850,
the Ministry of National Enlightenment informed the director of the Institute that a plot to
overthrow the government had just been uncovered and that Institute teachers were
among the suspected conspirators. There followed reproaches regarding the Director’s
vigilance over the dissemination of ideas among his faculty and students.222

For all of

their accusations and intimidation, neither the Third Department nor the Ministry ever
found solid evidence of the plot, although a means had been discovered for exerting
greater control. Nicholas was now confronted with a problem of his own making.
Uncharacteristically, he had removed all barriers to Jewish education in the interests of
cosmopolitanism, hoping to foster the abandonment of ingrained provincialism. In light
of this “revolutionary scare,” however, he concluded that perhaps he had gone too far.
Clearly, he had given his Jewish adversaries a potent weapon which could be turned, if
not against the autocracy as such, towards reversing his accomplishments to date.
The transparent concealment of Jewish recruitment for the army and navy from
various recruitment pools, including the government’s rabbinical seminaries, helped to
bring both armed forces up to full strength by the early 1850’s.223 Enjoying success in
one sphere meant potential failure in another as attested by the frantic letter of Alexander
N. Orlov, Director of the Vilna Institute, to the Tsar dated 10 March 1852. Enrollment in
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the Vilna Pedagogical School was steady but the Rabbinical School was in dire need of a
viable pool since the present one was almost dry. Eleven Rabbinical classes were about
to graduate which, on paper, was impressive but with very few coming behind them,
there was the possibility that that part of the Institute would face dissolution.224 The
throne was silent, perhaps knowing too well the cause of the diminution. In light of
successive events, the very outcome Orlov feared most appears to have been calculated.
On no account could the beleaguered Director know the Tsar’s mind, an unavoidable
occupational hazard.

Hoping to execute the Tsar’s presumed will with what was

available, Orlov was reluctant to petition him or the Minister of National Enlightenment
unless it was imperative. In April 1852, he asked Nicholas for both funds and materials
sufficient to meet the Institute’s needs. Six days later (24 April), he followed with a
renewed plea to establish satellite schools which would feed into the Vilna Institute since
it was virtually starving under the present system.225 Once more, the Autocrat failed to
respond.
Orlov’s experience with the Tsar revealed more than official apathy or indecision
on the latter’s part. Never losing sight of the end he intended for the Jewish condition,
Nicholas was experimenting with the means to bring it about by testing the consequences
of withdrawing the Imperial hand in one instance and applying it in another. Dissatisfied
with the results of Jewish printing limitations, bans on teaching Talmud and instituting
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so-called beneficial educational substitutions for time-worn yidishekeit, the Imperial
Senate decreed on 12 April 1851 and again on 10 October 1852 that it was unlawful for
Jewish women to shave their heads prior to marriage.226 On its own merits, it was an odd
issue over which to take the Jewish community to task. A tradition for centuries among
the Orthodox and a revered practice in mainstream Hasidism, brides were compelled to
shave their heads and wear wigs prior to going under the chuppah (bridal canopy).
Checking the lust of the other male attendants was one consideration but, traditionally,
this was done to distract the Evil Eye from casting aspersions upon the bride's true beauty
and future happiness. Official proscription of this practice had no legal precedent, but the
motive behind this latest legislation went beyond nullifying impediments to government
plans. To date, alterations actual and proposed in Jewish education and socialization
influenced the externals of Jewish life while leaving its core of rituals and esoteria
untouched. If reformation was to take place at all, it had to come from within and begin
with the abolition of rituals regardless of importance or triviality.
Nicholas may have been desperate, but his seemingly fantastic scheme could have
been brought off in the proper climate. The voices of M. Epstein and other radical
maskilim were prominent enough to be heard and heeded, and it would have been an easy
adaptation for these modernizers to include theological furniture in their zealous
prosecution of Jewish cosmopolitanism. Pre-nuptial hair divestment was a middling ritual
issue at best which, unlike earlocks, had no sanction in either Leviticus or Deuteronomy
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and certainly did not weigh heavily in routine shtetl and urban affairs.227 However, if the
autocracy could enforce its will on this point with the assistance of Jewish allies, then
other aspects of Jewish ritual would follow and the Jewish edifice would decay from
within. In the end, this too would come to naught since there was no urgent purpose for
cosmopolitan Jews to band together and act upon such peripheral issues. Besides, a far
more serious matter was brewing.

By January-February 1853, misunderstandings

between Russia and Britain over the decline of the Ottoman Empire meant that a more
aggressive Jewish reformation would have to wait.
This latest ploy to affect state-sponsored Jewish reformation had failed, but
Nicholas was not ready to concede defeat quite yet. Neither mortality nor conflict with
the Western powers prevented the Tsar from trying one last time. Occupying little more
than a quarter page in the statue book, the decree of 3 May 1855 limiting the authority of
rabbis and Jewish teachers and redefining their roles in Jewish education had the
potential of being as profound as the 1827 Recruitment Ukase. In addition to a planned
reorientation of existing instruction, accompanied by a reiteration of proscriptions and
penalties regarding suspected books, the Tsar declared that within twelve years there
would be no discernible distinction between a Crown rabbi and a Crown Jewish
teacher.228 From this date, these future state officers would be required to attend either of
the two Rabbinical Pedagogical Institutes, and only upon receiving government
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certification (i.e., obtaining their diplomas) would they be permitted to teach in the
government schools. This mandate was to be applied without exception and would be
executed in all provinces and regions.
Imagining even the short-term consequences of this innovation could not have
cheered Jewish traditionalists or even moderate Jewish reformers. What it presaged was
worse than the dissolution of one branch of the Vilna Institute. Combining the numbers
of teaching and rabbinical candidates through a redefinition of the curriculum would
certainly maintain institutional viability. However, the forced amalgamation of secular
and sacred pedagogy would create further confusion within the Jewish intellectual
community and Jewish society as a whole. Yes, rabbi meant teacher, but one who
instructed his fellow villagers and townsmen in their spiritual obligations, wrote learned
tracts and commentaries if he had the disposition and acumen, and performed the “rites of
life” (i.e. weddings, funerals, bar mitzvas, etc.) as stipulated in the 613
commandments.229 Jewish life overall, especially in the shtetlach, hinged upon everyone
knowing who they were and what God expected them to do. By denigrating rabbis to the
level of ordinary teachers, the traditional Jewish hierarchy would have been thrown into
chaos.230 More importantly, if “official rabbis” were taught from the same book as
“official teachers,” spiritual and intellectual life would be stifled. How would it appear if
one of these new rabbis was called to perform a bris milah (ritual circumcision) and had
228
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to rely upon the assistance of an old, “illegal” colleague because the Rabbinical
Pedagogical Institute had not taught him the proper prayers and procedures? By that
same token, it was conceivable that the day would come when an Institute rabbi would be
compelled to defer his ritual responsibilities to the leader of a local chevra kadisha, a
pious Jewish layman, at a burial for the same reason. If the Tsarevich’s mien accorded
with that of his father, in the future, Jews would be educated only to a level sufficient to
serve the Empire rather than the community.
Upon Nicholas’ death in 1855, the Jews of Russia greeted the news with cautious
relief and hope for amelioration. Little was known of his son, the fate of the Empire, or
their own. One fact which could not be ignored or diminished, however, was that the
Jewish community, despite its fragmented appearance, was still extant.

Forced

conversions, recruitment into the armed forces, Haskalah, Hasidism, and government
schools had each taken their toll, and though the Rabbinical leadership was in a
weakened and vulnerable state, Orthodox Judaism was not showing any signs of
immanent dilapidation.

Yet given the legacy of Nicholas’ policies inherited by his

successor, Jewish leaders and the community were steeling themselves for what was to
come.

Notes from Above Ground: Baron Horace (Naftali Herz) Guenzburg
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Not all Jewish critiques and attempts to aid Russian Jewry came from abroad. In
the 1850's, Baron Horace Guenzburg, engaged the Tsar and various ministers on what he
believed to be the most serious issues regarding his coreligionists. Education, of course,
was of considerable importance, and the nobleman, in a letter to Nicholas in 1850, could
not understand why the Jews of Russia were still waiting to receive the fruits of their
intellectual labors. Why, for instance, did not education result in equal rights with the
Tsar's other subjects?231 In addition, the Baron hoped that the government would take
measures to end Jewish residency restrictions, discard internal passports, and reform
Jewish recruitment regulations. To all of these concerns Nicholas remained silent, but
this was one Russian Jew who refused to be put off.
Of all of the aforementioned issues, Jewish recruitment was a matter Guenzburg
was determined to make Nicholas address. Writing on 15 June 1852, he recognized that
the government would not abandon the 1827 Ukase altogether but, he argued, officials
would be wise to equalize communal quotas. Some of the smaller communities were
being pressed for more conscripts than their larger neighbors, a situation which seriously
impaired their labor needs and general viability.232 Evidently this revelation fell on deaf
ears since, three years later, Guenzburg was compelled to resurrect this issue in his
correspondence with the Minister for State Domains and Minster of Internal Affairs.233
True to his remarks in the aftermath of Montefiore's visit, Nicholas would not make any
major amendments in the Jewish policies or concessions to the community while he
ruled.

231

YIVO 89/755/2.
YIVO 89/755/3
233
YIVO 89/755/5
232

232
Official rigidity gave rise to an apparent paradox. To convert all of Russia's Jews
to Christianity may have been Nicholas's dream but, had it been realized, he would have
lost a valuable fiscal asset. In early 1855, the Baron wrote the Tsar in behalf of the firstguild Jewish in the Empire's western provinces. At stake was the onerous burden of
paying 500 silver rubles per conscript, with emphasis upon "silver" specie rather than
Imperial assignants.234 Again, the throne was silent but, embroiled in the Crimean War,
Nicholas could be excused for minding more pressing affairs.

Conclusion

It would be a vain endeavor to determine winners and losers in this three-decade
contest over Jewish metamorphosis. Even so, Professor Stanislawski maintained that it
was Nicholas's object to use the military to affect their transformation into a Russified
Judeo-Christian entity. Assuming that Nicholas did not deviate from this design and if
indeed this had been his dream, it was not realized even though the last ten years of his
reign did see an appreciable rise in Jewish conversions in the military. On that criterion
alone, it would be too easy to assert that Nicholas and his government failed because,
even though Russian Jewry remained intact by 1855, it did not come through the storm
completely unchanged.
Mandatory military service did result in some conversions from Judaism though,
by the Tsar's own calculus, not to the degree that he would have desired. Education
along modern lines was another attempt to bring the Jews closer to the Russian milieu
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and, hence, modernity. Considerably more Jews were encouraged to embrace intellectual
modernity via this endeavor and its myriad satellite projects than in the military though,
at times, just who was maintaining oversight was questionable. Jewish educational
initiatives from the 1830's onward appeared to keep pace with those of the government
which, in an autocratic state, caused some officials considerable uneasiness. In part to
regain the reins definitively, Sergei Uvarov invited Maxwell Lilienthal to St. Petersburg
to reinvigorate Russian Haskalah and re-establish Jewish reformation along official
courses.
From 1840 onward, Russian officialdom made aggressive attempts to verify, if
only for its own vanity and security, its predominance in determining the future form of
Russian Jewry. The 1843 Rabbinical Convention had been a disappointment for both the
government and Jewish leaders since the investment yielded inconclusive results. Not
surprisingly, the Tsar and his ministers made the education of Jewish youths a special
concern the following year and, in 1847, institutionalized Crown rabbis.

Of all

communal figures, rabbis were seen as the corporate representations of the Jewish
intellect and conscience, therefore reformation which centered on the manipulation of
these individuals was seen as the most effective means of bring the Jews to rein. He did
not live to see the results of his handiwork which, in any event, proved a dismal failure.
The government may have had all of the key advantages but the Jews had a voice
which they used to express their ideas and criticisms. Maxwell Lilienthal expressed his
rather late in his tenure but not Sir Moses Montefiore nor, to a lesser degree, Jacob
Alteris.

Foreign Jews with considerable political influence and financial backing

certainly took an interest in the affairs of Russian Jewry but so too did some Jewish
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natives. Lazar Poliakov and his fellow industrialists would make considerable inroads in
Jewish affairs during the reigns of Alexander II and Alexander III, but Nicholas did have
the attention of Baron Guenzburg. As to the effectiveness of the Baron's correspondence,
little can be assessed since neither the Tsar nor his ministers bothered to respond.
Granted, the Crimean War would have occupied them, not to mention Nicholas's ardent
rigidity which could only have been heightened in light of Russia's floundering during the
conflict. Jewish affairs would have to be resolved, if possible, under his successor.

CHAPTER IV: A FLOWER WITH MULTI-COLORED PETALS: GROWING JEWISH
DIVERSIFICATION, 1856-1881

Introduction
Abraham Gotlober once remarked that Russia had difficulties incomparable to
those of other European nations, and few would have contested this assertion.1 Despite
the adversities of the preceding thirty years, however, the impossible had occurred. In
soil sown with salt, a stem grew and the bud of Russian Jewry's intellect and identity took
form. Though the bud had been swelling, the time had not been propitious for it to come
into bloom. Within the next twenty-five years, 1856-1881, the petals unfurled from their
tightly-knit compact and the fantastic spectacle it presented was a simultaneity of
opposites. Beautiful and grotesque, chaotic and yet possessing a semblance of order,
Jewish diversity came into full fruition at this time and guaranteed for itself a viable,
though not easy, future.
One of the more daunting challenges in analyzing the changes taking place within
Russian Jewry during the reign of Alexander II (1856-1881) is to recognize the
distinction between Jewish and Russian historical development. Until 1863 and the
January Rising in Poland, both Tsar and government were seen as sympathetic to
reforming Russia, and serf emancipation in 1861 could only have been taken as a positive
indicator of future beneficial measures.

After the suppression of the Polish revolt,

however, the once touted "Tsar-Liberator" assumed a more conservative line in his
policies and most significant reforms had come to a halt. A facile sketch to be sure, but
what needs to be realized is that the Jewish aspect of this period did not quite fit into this
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general mold. Prior to 1863, there was hope in the Jewish community that the new Tsar
would alleviate some social and legal disabilities and considerable frustration when
neither he nor the government realized these desires. During and in the years succeeding
1863, Jewish frustration was omnipresent but so too were expanded opportunities for
social and intellectual development, not to mention a deeper understanding of
themselves. As to whether Russian Jews "won" or "lost" at this time is a question of
perspective.

In terms of their intellectual growth leading to civic parity with their

Russian countrymen, this was a disappointing defeat. The ongoing struggle between the
Orthodox maskilim and Hasidim, however, kept the issue of Jewish identity alive, in the
forefront of Jewish minds, and by odd turns lent integrity to the Russian Jewish
community. It was a strange victory against dissolution but a victory nevertheless.

Can the Double-Headed Eagle Rise from the Rubble?

Defeat in the Crimean War forever altered the relationship between the Autocrat
and the governed. Gone was the myth of Gatchina where both Russian society and
military could be ordered in similar fashion. It was also apparent that the Empire, despite
its loss of prestige, was becoming more open to the West. Whether Tsar Alexander II
favored these conditions or not, he had to reach an accommodation with Russian society
which meant relaxing some of the more stringent regulations of his predecessors.2 The
Jews would invariably be influenced by official policy, but in ways which differed from
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that of the Russian population. It was indeed odd that their patriotism at the siege of
Sevastopol was renowned for the moment and then so easily allowed to slip into
oblivion.3

During this time, Jews were accorded greater liberty of movement and

settlement throughout Russia's cities and, in 1865, the Pale was abolished for artisans and
their families.4 Freer subjects meant a more viable workforce for the remaking of the
Russian Empire but concessions had to be made in order to inspire them to affect this
labor. Of their concerns, the Russian and Jewish intelligentsias had many both respective
and common, and even in the absence of the Polish Revolt, the government would have
been hard pressed to satisfy even the more vital issues. By way of self protection,
Russian officialdom fell back upon conservative reaction which only served to worsen
certain situations.5

Hope, Frustration, and Unfinished Business

Foremost in the minds of most Russian Jewish intellectuals in the years preceding
the January Rising was the state of Jewish education and the hope of receiving civic
rights equal to those of Russians. Under Nicholas I, the latter was too fantastic for
consideration, but his son was of a different mien. Even so, Jewish patience were frayed,
and, as Baron Horace de Guenzburg wondered in his letter to the Minister of National
Enlightenment of October 1858, when would the benefits of officially-sponsored Jewish
3
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education arrive?6 Furthermore, the Jewish nobleman continued, it was hoped that no
limitation of any kind be placed on religious instruction which was still considered
essential in the education of modern Jews. One other point which was raised and might
have in order to allay Russian fears over Jewish ambitions was the likelihood of
establishing more vocational schools so that those Jews not destined for the professions
could still obtain useful skills.7 No answer was forthcoming and, judging from later
correspondence, Alexander's government was slow to act.
Part of the answer for official intransigence could be found in a letter to the
Minister of Internal Affairs dated 22 February 1861. According to the correspondent,
some Jews were still under the influence of fanatical rabbis, particularly in Vilna, and that
measures were being taken to contain them.8 In his assessment of the situation, Vilna's
Governor General surmised that Jewish education and employment were in need of
sincere reforms, and only when these were in place would there be stability in the Jewish
community. Evidently, the promised reforms did not go far enough because, on 25
October, de Guenzberg wrote that despite Jewish efforts to follow the prescribed course
of instruction and obtain their degrees, legal barriers still worked to their collective
disadvantage.9 Why should a Jew try to prepare for entrance into a university? For all of
his efforts, he is met with official hostility and further obstacles which he must surmount
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and, if he happens to be in the fortunate 25%, will obtain his degree.10 Written in a spirit
of frustration and cynicism, it was also an expression of disappointment for a Tsar and an
administration for which it was hoped that the alleviation of a number of Jewish
disabilities would come to pass immediately.11
Initially, it would appear puzzling as to why the government was apparently
disinterested or, at least, marginally inclined to affect changes in Jewish education,
particularly in Vilna which was still an important Jewish intellectual center. Occupied
with more pressing affairs of state would certainly have been a plausible reason but, more
specifically, this supposed indifference could very well have been a period where
officials observed and then acted. For instance, reports that Jewish graduates could not
find employment was an echo of Lipman Gurvich's plight in 1851. A gifted graduate of
the Vilna Rabbinical Pedagogical Institute, Gurvich soon learned just how progressive his
fortunes became when his services were not in demand in the Russian milieu. He was by
no means alone.12 One could argue that the government, in this particular instance,
merely abandoned its own product, but matters did not improve when it decided to take
an active hand either. In that same year, the Director of the Vilna RPI complained to the
Vilna Education Inspector that it was impossible to teach even the rudiments of Jewish
orthodoxy to state rabbinical candidates without Hebrew instruction.13 This was at a time
when the government had banned all Jewish works save those composed in Russian.
During Alexander II's tenure, disputes over language, education, and Jewish identity
would arise more from forces within the community than without, but though not as
10
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intrusive as his predecessor, the Tsar and his government never relinquished their hold on
Jewish educational affairs entirely. A reminder of that fact came on 29 July 1859 when it
was decided that the melamedim, Jewish heder teachers, would come under direct
government authority.14
Closely related to Jewish education was Jewish military service, an issue the
government did ameliorate by abolishing the cantonist system in the late 1850's though
not releasing those youths already in the system. Calls for reform in this area would
appear in the Jewish press throughout the period.15 In its issue of October 1862, Kol
Mevaser expressed a cautious and hopeful sentiment when it reported that, according to
the Tsar’s 26 August 1856 Manifesto, the recruitment ratio of Jews to Russians would be
five per thousand and that now Jewish veterans would be eligible for various benefits.16
Furthermore, tighter regulations now mandated that those who were called up had to be
twenty-one years old and, if the head of a household, in their early thirties. In addition,
valor among Jewish soldiers would now be recognized and rewarded appropriately with
one limitation, namely, that their highest promotion would be to that of sergeant.
Conspicuous by its absence was any mention of the cantonists.17 Not surprisingly, in
spite of improved service conditions, evasions, falsification of recruitment ledgers, and
even emigration to America. Whether a Jew served or escaped, profound estrangement
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from the Jewish milieu was an omnipresent danger.18 For some Jewish conservatives, the
disgrace in these actions was not for any considerations of Russian patriotism, after all,
Jews had been part of the landscape but never the milieu.19 More profound in their minds
was that whether a Jew went off to service or fled, the Russian Jewish community
suffered for the loss.20 Communal viability was at the core of identity maintenance, but
unless the deformed legal system responsible for keeping Jews in a stigmatized status
was amended, no progress would be possible.21 Even with these ameliorating
adjustments, the prevailing notion that military service was still a panacea for ridding
communities of undesirables was still current and vigorous among Jews and Russians
alike.22 Like their intellectual coreligionists, it was only too easy for a Jew to find
himself estranged from the company of Jewish traditionalists and, after making the
required sacrifices, denied entrance into the Russian intelligentsia and general milieu.23
Educational reform was episodic and little had been gained in ameliorating Jewish
military obligations.24 In spite of all of this attention, it was as though the Jews were
invisible, made to appear only when needed or when the Jews themselves could no longer
bear the hardships of their station in silence. Regardless, it was clear to many in the
Jewish intelligentsia that if they were to remain visible, perhaps their journalistic voice
18
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needed to be amplified. In the late 1850's, permission to publish a Jewish organ on
Russian soil was impossible to obtain though not in Prussia. Taking advantage of this
situation, the Hebrew publication HaMaggid (The Preacher) was published in the city of
Lyke and transported over the Russian border. This particular journal merits mention not
because it was particularly famous or that it lasted for a time. Established in 1855, by
1856, only five issues left the press and it was shut down subsequently.25 Like most
Jewish journals, HaMaggid suffered from fiscal poverty which made its production
difficult and eventually impossible. In April 1862, Jews were permitted to establish their
own presses anywhere in the Empire provided that they operated within the 1817
censorship laws.26 This was part of Alexander II’s larger scheme of relaxing censorship
over print publications which gave rise to the commercial mass-circulation press in the
mid to late nineteenth century.27 Despite conservative government reaction, journals
such as Evreiskaia biblioteka provided an open forum which heightened Jewish cultural
and intellectual awareness which, in turn, manifested itself in various modes of political
expression such as Zionism. Known initially to a small segment of the Jewish population
resident in Belorussia and around Minsk, Zionism, by 1894, had grown appreciably as a
result of the Jewish press.28 It was also within the Jewish press that one of the more
frenetic battles among the Jews of Russia was played out, the language issue. Official
pressure on Jews to become literate and publish in Russian notwithstanding, debates over
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the intellectual efficacy of Russian, Hebrew, and Yiddish and what they portended for the
formation of Jewish identities and their future viability kept the Jews from ossifying. By
no means a glib assessment, this battle was fought on a number of fronts and levels,
challenging the Jewish intelligentsia time after time to define who was a Jew and what
constituted Judaism. On the outside looking inward, the scene would have appeared to be
one of hopeless chaos yet, when privy to an intimate understanding of the attitudes and
apprehensions which motivated the participants, one discovers a perceptible unity via
diversity which preserved Russian Jewry.

Building Russian Pyramids: Alexander’s Visions of Productive and Progressive
Russian Jews

Through professional education, the Tsar and his ministers had sought to make
the Jews valuable instruments in the Empire’s renaissance. Between 5 November 1856
and 11 January 1863, the Senate promulgated legislation which called for improved
standards in Jewish education, expanded professional opportunities and stipends for Jews
to attend Imperial universities.29

Previous directives had focused exclusively on

rabbinical training and authority while neglecting Jewish instruction at its fundamental
communal level, the heder (primary communal Hebrew school). Closer oversight had to
be implemented to ensure that Jewish youths were being prepared to serve society while
still preserving their theological and ethnic identity.30 Towards that end, on 5 November
1856, it was mandated that all melamedim (heder teachers) and rabbis register with the
29
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Jewish Teaching Committee, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and
National Enlightenment, and be examined annually on their knowledge, qualifications,
and performance.31 Rabbis had been subject to such scrutiny already and its extension to
the melamedim revealed some telling difficulties officials had in implementing Jewish
policies. Hederim had heretofore fallen outside of official purview and relied upon
communal support. Jewish government schools, by contrast, had been favored with state
financial assistance in some communities but attendance often had to be secured by
police force.32 Resistance among some Jewish parents was to be expected as was their
recourse to traditional instructors, such as melamedim, to prevent the children from
assimilating to Russian ways.33 Progressive education notwithstanding, the government
needed to reaffirm its authority in Jewish affairs, though neither the Ministry for National
Enlightenment nor the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and Foreign Creeds challenged or
insisted upon radical alterations to traditional Jewish instruction at this point. Successful
compliance was incumbent upon measured steps.
In 1861 it was decreed that Jews who held degrees in medicine, surgery, or
teaching could stand as candidates for university faculty positions.34

Nicholas had

permitted Jewish doctors to sit on regional and provincial medical boards with their
Russian colleagues and little else. Now Alexander had expanded this freedom to include
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a wider range of professionals and a new field of opportunity within the state
bureaucracy.35 Foreseeing that residency restrictions would be a problem since Jews
were still confined to the Pale, newer legislation included a clause which suspended them
in this instance. Clearly the government was marshaling its intellectual and professional
resources through the inclusion of an undervalued group, but closer observation and
expanded employment would fall short of meeting the grander design without addressing
the general social and economic state of the Jews.
Poverty, from both the Jewish and government perspective, was the single barrier
most important to Jewish advancement in general. In order to circumvent this difficulty,
a decree was enacted in January 1863 granting stipends to Jewish students to attend
institutes and universities.36 Support for this endeavor came from an annual 24,000 silver
ruble tax exacted from the Jews which was then redistributed in the form of stipends
ranging from 25 to 60 rubles per student according to need. Furthermore, impoverished
students would be given financial consideration if they demonstrated promise in their
studies.37 Teachers as well could benefit from this educational initiative, however, it was
stipulated that Russian language teachers were given priority followed by those who
taught German, Polish, and Latin. Funding priorities aside, change was immanent.
Confirming this new directive, the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, in May 1863,
opened its doors to Jews with unrestricted access to courses and lectures for 70 rubles per
annum tuition. The timing could not have been better. Overcrowded and possessing
limited resources, the Pale was suffering from a conjunction of demographic expansion
35
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and declining employment in late 1861 which led to a number of ills and widespread
discontent, not all of them related to government policies.38 Jewish discontent over
education and employment was no secret, and if some amelioration could be affected
without injury or hindrance to official reforms, so much the better.

The Other Side of Jewish Educational Reform

Undoubtedly, many Jews benefited from the government's concern over and
redistribution of funds for improvements in Jewish education. Even so, it was surprising
that this reform did not reach Vilna's Jews or, at best, offered them marginal relief. That
poverty was as much a source of frustration as some official policies cannot be denied,
but in 1863, some tempers could be contained no longer.

Kurnatovik, the Vilna

Educational Director, received a number of complaints from teachers in the various
Jewish schools complaining about insufficient funds to meet daily operating costs.39
More than mere expressions of disgruntlement tinged with sarcasm, the majority of these
missals were pathetic. A rather popular opening was: "Unhappy and poor is my position
..," followed by reports of insufficient supplies, food, unforeseen expenditures, and a host
of other concerns.40 Surpassing all others, however, was the letter of Leon Keningson, a
distraught teacher in Vilna's Second Jewish Gymnasia who did not mince words when he
claimed: "Extremely helpless is my position ... ," and concluded his litany of woes by
36
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wondering if the school itself could exist for any length of time.41 Inundated with this
correspondence, Kurnatovik probably wished that someone else would receive these tales
of frustration, fear, and despair which were beyond his power and resources to repair.
Kurnatovik was a Jew, and though it was not known if he was a praying man, in the case
of Chaim Taits, another official, one of his superiors, was made privy to the misery.
Fearless and strident in his letter to Prince Alexander Prokhorovich ShirinskiiShikhmatov, Trustee of the Vilna Educational District, Chaim Taits, a teacher in the
Second Jewish Gymnasia, made plain his case.42 In detail, he informed the Prince that he
had been an exceptional student at the Vilna Rabbinical Pedagogical Institute and had
graduated with distinction. Though the curriculum had been challenging, he bemoaned
that it had been insufficient to prepare him for what he was to expect upon graduation.
By means of his own intellectual resources, he was able to overcome these deficiencies,
but now he was confronted with another problem. Trained specifically as a Jewish
teacher for employment in a state Jewish school, Taits was grateful to find employment
immediately after graduation but now was compelled to relinquish his post because he
could not make a livelihood.43 From the Prince, there was no recorded response. Be that
as it may, Taits's situation was certainly not an isolated one and, more than likely, why
both Rabbinical Pedagogical Institutes came under increasing fire from the Jewish
community.

The Fate of the Jewish Rabbinical Pedagogical Institutes
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Reform was fickle and in Russia almost impossible to predict. Nicholas I had
envisioned, through the creation of the two institutes in Vilna and Zhitomer, a profound
remolding of Russian Jewry from the inside out. Heady ambitions for the late 1840's,
their realization would have been imperfect at best by the 1860's considering that both
institutes were literally out of synchronization with one another. In Zhitomer, German
was the language of instruction and a Germanic influence permeated the curriculum
because, its directors reasoned, without German, there was no Reform Judaism.44 The
Vilna RPI had a Russian curriculum with Russian as the language of instruction because
both state Jewish teachers and rabbis were to advocate Russian patriotism.45 Like other
Jewish institutions of the day, rare indeed was the occasion when these schools
understood financial security or security in general, but that was the least of their
worries.46 Even the Russian government had its suspicions about the students. As
unlikely as it may seem, the cradle of Jewish socialist propaganda was in the Vilna RPI,
inspired by Arkadi Finkelstein and his compatriots when they organized an "illegal"
library there. When the government found out, the group was expelled, but it was the
institute, more so than the students, who suffered the consequences.47 Was it any wonder
that neither the government nor the Jewish community trusted Crown rabbis?48
Not surprisingly, employment for Institute graduates became scarce. Faced with
the closure of the Rabbinical School attached to the Vilna Institute, its head, Rabbi
43
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Lipman Kaplan, wrote an urgent letter to the governor of Nicholaev Province on 3
January 1866 requesting a post there as a Crown Rabbi. The governor replied that no
such position was available at this time, news which made the applicant quite anxious
about his future.49 Beginning in fall 1865, correspondence between the head of the Vilna
Rabbinical Pedagogical Institute and the Ministries of National Enlightenment and
Spiritual Affairs and Foreign Creeds stated plainly that the Rabbinical school could not
attract sufficient candidates.50 Seen from its inception as a transparent attempt on the part
of the government to manipulate the essence of Russian Jewry, the school, and the
Institute as a whole, could not shed the stigma of corruption.

Memories of the

recruitment scandal which had occurred within a few years of its opening were still fresh
among Vilna's Jews. It was almost inconceivable, not to mention a shock, that official
letters had been sent to the head Rabbi requesting “volunteers” from among the
rabbinical candidates to make up recruitment shortfalls. This news had made the rounds
of most Jewish settlements in the form of fact and rumor. Credibility had been wanting
for some time and even their so-called cosmopolitan curriculum was being challenged.
Russian Jews were becoming more aware of their Jewishness and when cast into the fray
with maskilim, mainstream and Habad Hasidism, not to mention the mitnagdim, Institute
graduates could not compete with their minimalist Jewish education. Russian officials
could not been blind to these developments, and whether, in 1872, Governor General
Potopov sincerely believed that Jewish education was responsible for the rise of Nihilism
or not is a matter for conjecture. What is not questioned, however, was the convenience
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of this charge in providing him with the pretext for shutting down the rabbinical branch
of Vilna's RPI.51
Another justification of equal merit was the desire to streamline the Jewish
educational system by reducing the size and scope of the Institutes. State rabbinical
education at both facilities ended by 1873.

Despite this, their respective ancillary

pedagogical schools would remain until 1879 (Zhitomer) and 1914 (Vilna).
Subsequently, these rumps were then reorganized in order to upgrade their status to full
secondary schools which would allow their graduates to enroll in universities.52 Progress,
however, was bittersweet.53

First-rank Crown Jewish schools which had bolstered the

prestige of Jewish teachers were now dissolved, compelling their former faculties and
newly-minted pedagogues to seek employment in the broader Russian educational
system. Again, government officials apparently did not take into account the extant legal
barriers Jews would encounter by making this move.

The Hand Reaches Deeper: Official Attention to Jewish Primary Education

On 4 February 1865, de Guenzburg wrote to Judah Leib Gordon that
enlightenment had to extend to the lowest level of Jewish education. As matters stood,
Jewish primary education was not equal to its Russian counterpart.54 Within a short time,
official ministrations extended beyond the secondary schools to the primary facilities.
Until the 1860’s, Jewish primary education had been considered a local matter, but now
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concerns over curriculum and conduct required closer supervision.

Henceforth, all

melamedim were obliged to demonstrate acceptable personal conduct within and outside
their hederim in order to obtain the annual renewal of their licenses and all vestiges of
autonomy had been surrendered to the Ministry of National Enlightenment.55 From a
pragmatic position, the government wanted to ensure that Jewish education was uniform
and complied with official standards but, it should be recalled, that the Orthodox
mitnagdim called for closer scrutiny of the melamedim as early as July 1859.56
Intellectual integrity was a foremost concern, though it had stiff competition from the fear
among traditionalists that the Hasidim might exert their influence on their children at this
stratum and eventually undermine the Orthodox vision of Judaism.

Language and Identity: The Hope and Despair of Russian Jewry

Alexander II’s government was neither laissez-faire nor overly domineering
regarding the Jews, and yet Jewish initiatives were in some respects automatic. This was
possible in part because Russian officialdom afforded the community some much-needed
breathing space which allowed it liberty to assess itself and to determine its place in
Russian society. Amidst a plenitude of impulses, the most significant one driving Jewish
reform was, perhaps, the sense of belonging.57 Were the Jews a nation among nations or
should they merely assimilate to Russian mores and customs so that religion alone would
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be the only distinguishing factor?58 If only the Jewish Question rested upon such a
simple choice. Shades of meaning abounded as well as internal reforms which kept the
issue of Jewish intelligence and identity fluid and volatile. After all, Osip Rabinovich
(1817-1869) stated quite clearly that the Jews first know themselves since it was only
through self-knowledge that they would win the respect of others.59

While not a

Sisyphean quest it inspired considerable frustration which served as the engine behind the
events and circumstances of the 1860's and '70's. Though usually a negative quality, it
actually lent to the community a sense of unity through some of the tougher challenges of
these decades.
One of those challenges refused to disappear. Few other items dominated the
Jewish press, correspondence, and various meetings of Jewish religions and educational
leaders than the prolonged campaign against the Hasidism.

Long considered the

maverick theology and philosophy which the rabbinate condemned as being innovative
and inimical to theological orthodoxy, now styled itself as the embodiment of true Jewish
theology.60

In their favor, at Baron Vrangel's behest, in 1862, Jewish censorship

regulations were relaxed and provisions were made for the establishment of Jewish
presses in Vilna, Kiev, and Odessa.61 Ostensibly for the benefit of rabbinical Judaism,
the Hasidim soon took advantage of this liberality to publish their tracts which excited
fears among Jewish conservatives who thought of them as unwarranted competition, and
it was only a matter of time before the matter was put before the government. At issue
was the relative freedom from oversight that Hasidic presses enjoyed, a circumstance
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which elicited charges of religious fanaticism and sedition from the rabbinical camp. Not
knowing who or what to believe, local officials either suspended all Jewish publishing in
their districts or, as in the case of Geisel Shapiro and his brother in 1867, shut down a
specific press.62 The Shapiro brothers of Zhitomer stood out because, led by Kh. Z.
Slonimskii, Censor and Inspector of the Zhitomer Rabbinical Pedagogical Institute, the
local maskilim accused them of being the tools of the Hasidim, particularly the tsaddikim.
Under Russian law, they had a license to publish Jewish works without any further
stipulation but, charged with disseminating religious fanaticism the government became
concerned. Episodic closures of Jewish presses and the overall problems associated with
Jewish publishing stemmed from the government's inability to understand the social and
intellectual currents in Jewish society, though it made every attempt to compensate for
this deficiency by regulating language use and the substance of Jewish works.63
Though a government initiative, there were many Jewish intellectuals who
advocted universal Russian literacy.64 No aspect of Jewish life, not even religious works,
was to remain untouched.65 In January 1867, M. Epstein, the Vilna Education Inspector,
mandated that all books on Jewish subjects, particularly those concerning the Bible and
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the books of the prophets, would now be published in Russian translation.66 Abraham
Gotlober welcomed this news. For years, he had argued that a Russian translation of the
Bible would bring about Russian Jewish enlightenment, a suggestion which was resisted
in various official circles.

With some trepidation, the Holy Synod eventually

commissioned Danel Khvolson (1819-1911), a Jewish convert to Lutheranism, to
translate two-thirds of the Old Testament into Russian.67

Aside from the Bible, the

government also supported the efforts of such individuals as Yuri Tavrich, Vilna Jewish
Censor who, on 28 August 1868, ordered that all Jewish religious works be presented in
Russian to ensure that Russian literacy reached as many Jews as possible.68
Secular fields were also affected by this linguistic chauvinism.

The natural

sciences were believed to be ideal for budding Jewish scholars and, towards that end, G.
Finn published Ha Karmel in August 1865 which was devoted exclusively to those
interests and funded by the St. Petersburg Jewish Committee.69 A knowledge of Russian
and other European languages was seen as an effective counter against parochialism and
fanaticism which, it was commonly believed among many Jewish intellectuals, had
infected the masses. The supposed altruism behind these statements, however, was
obviously self-serving.70 For some progressive scholars such as Hilel Nussbaum, the
imposition of Russian literacy on all levels of Jewish society brought with it an
invaluable benefit. Yiddish was the lingua franca of the Hasidim, and if the promotion of
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Russian was manipulated carefully, those most susceptible to their influences would, in
time, be insensible to their messages.71
This brings up a curious addendum to the language issue. Obviously, Nussbaum
did not appreciate that Yiddish had a wide audience and, unlike Hebrew which was
confined to a limited intellectual elite, could gain ingress to various quarters of the Jewish
community through the development of a unique literature, humor, and satire which
would make it impossible to eradicate.72 That a similar Jewish literature developed in
Russian cannot be discounted, but the curiosity of Yiddish arose from the Russian
perception of it.73 Yiddish as a fusion language was a notion beyond their compass, and
those officials who considered it a jargon took their cues from ardent Hebraist. Overall,
the Russian government tended to view Yiddish as "Jewish German," merely a transition
language which was to lead the Jews of Russia out of darkeness and into the light of the
modern world. Its supposed affinity to German made it appealing though, as the decades
widened the gulf between Nicholas's reign and that of Alexander's, the myth of
instantaneous Jewish rebirth into a modern and respectable form was now touted with
diminished fanfare.74
Official and communal pressures to conform to the Russian ethos inevitably
influenced the Jewish press. Initially, the only printing house of any consequence was
that of the Romm Brothers in Vilna which had been established in 1799. Conservative to
a fault, their activities were limited to producing Hebrew liturgical texts, commentaries
and midrashim (exegetical works), and not once did they depart from this exclusive
71
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agenda.75

That being so, the challenges of the 1860’s and 1870’s necessitated the

establishment of newer publishing houses which produced such journals as Evreiskaia
biblioteka (Jewish Library).

Like Voskhod (Rising), its successor which began

publication in the early 1880’s, Evreiskaia biblioteka was published for Jews by Jews in
Russian and, aside from offering serial novels, poetry and historical sketches, it became a
forum for contemporary concerns and complaints regarding Imperial Jewish policies.76
Suprisingly, given some of the pointed criticisms leveled at the government, this was
accomplished with the censors’ approval.77 More narrow in scope, Kol Mevaser (The
Announcing Voice), the Yiddish weekly of the Odessa Jewish community (1861-1871),
offered its readers topics of secular and contemporary relevance along with high holiday
calendars and reports on the Jewish conditions in other nations. Though similar in format
to Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums, its principle aim was to inform Odessa Jews of
affairs which affected them immediately.
Along with Kol Mevaser (1861-1871), Di Yiddishe Folks-Blat (1881-1890) was,
perhaps, one of the more notable Yiddish newspapers but, like most, suffered from
inadequate financial support.78 Alexander Zederbaum, Kol Mevaser's editor, struggled
for three months with the government to gain approval for its establishment and the
production of its first issue in 1861. For all of his energies and efforts, however, he could
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not sustain its circulation. Ten years later, Zederbaum had to abandon it because it was
cost-ineffective in light of the newer Russain-langauge Jewish journal Den (Day).79
Rarely was silence accorded Jewish expression and exchanges of opinion in either
Yiddish, Russian, or Hebrew if only in brief runs.80 During the 1870's, Evreiskaia
biblioteka was practically the only functioning Jewish organ in the Empire.81 Meager
financial resources were an omnipresent hardship, but it was also much easier for an
editor of a Russian-language Jewish newspaper or journal on a number of counts. One
had to be nimble in negotiating the convoluted course of Russian officialdom and
legislation to win out in the end, and this was much more likely for a Russian publication
than one in either Hebrew or Yiddish. Who would sit shiva (seven days of mourning
following interrment) for either one of them, particularly the latter? To this, Abraham
Uri Kovner (1842-1909), a prominent Russian Jewish intellectual, wondered why some
Jews still quibbled over a matter which, to his mind, had a clear solution. Believing as
many German Jewish reformers that Hebrew was not the language of their parents,
Kovner went so far as to declare it merely a langauge consisting of dead letters.82
Arguing in a similar vein, Lev Levanda described the staff of Hebrew journals as being
"vaguely international" with no roots in either the German or Jewish intellectual
traditions.83 As for Hebrew being the identifying factor for Jews, this reasoning was also
flawed according to Michael Margolis. It was clear to anyone conversant in Jewish
79
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affairs, he claimed, that Jewish communities in Western Europe had already abandoned
Hebrew in favor of the languages of their respective lands. Evident as well was the fact
that linguistic assimilation did not mean the eclipse of the Jewish identity, and it would
behoove the Russian Jewish community to take notice.84

This advice did not go

unheeded. Abraham Mapu (1808-1868), a well-known Russian Jewish short-story writer
and poet, contended unhesitantly that Russian assimilation did not mean the end of the
Jewish identity.85 Playing up its part, the journal Rassvet (Dawn), made its case for
government-sponsored Jewish education and was committed to spreading the doctrines of
true religion and morality to all Jews. Also at the government's direction, this organ
championed state rabbis and teachers in an effort to accord them some credibility and
trust in the Jewish community, an endeavor which produced paltry results.86
Just as contentious as laguage was the issue of religion. Official Judaism as
purveyed by the graduates of the two rabbinical pedagogical institutes may have garnered
some followers but, in conjuction with Jewish intellectual challenges, the overall effect
upon religious orthodoxy was profound, particularly in the fashioning of "True Russians
of the Mosaic faith.”87 Rigidity on the part of traditionalists and progressives divided the
community into various factions which promoted intellectual growth but, simultaneously,
led to apathy and apostasy.

Attempting to act as a moderating voice, Moses Leib

Lilienblum (1843-1910) insisted that both sides recognize that Judaism was dynamic and
not static. Reform was not a parochial whim but a necessity and it could only come about
83
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if both sides would become more flexible in their reasoning. In fact, Judah Gordon saw
the union of reason and faith as imperative to meet the needs of the time, but flexibility
had its limits and one could only bend so far before reaching the breaking point.88 Some
avoided this controversy by assuming an apathetic attitude.

Where this was most

pervasive was among Jewish youths who, dissatisfied with their education and
interminable religious debates, placed little value in religious education and Jewish
history89 Those still interested in maintaining their traditional ties called for a more
balanced curriculum while others saw the answer to their woes, equal rights, as a goal
which could only be achieved through modern secular instruction.90

Entrenched

traditionalist considered this last proposal to be tantamount to atheism and a warning sign
that Russian Jewry was becoming lost in a maelstrom of contradictions. Buffeted from
all sides, the Jews of Russia may have thought that there was no room for a calm and
rational voice, indeed there were times when the shouting could be deafening. Despite
this, there were some, such as Simon Dubnow, saw nothing wrong with the rise of Jewish
secularism. To him, there was no abandonment of faith, merely that religion should no
longer occupy the supreme position in the Jewish national conscience.91 On the contrary,
L.I. Mandelstamm argued that religion was the key to national unity, no other
arrangement could be entertained, and A. Passover carried this position a degree further
when he stated emphatically that religion simply could not be separated from the national
character of the Jews.92
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Was there a relatively safe position for young, ambitious, and frustrated Russian
Jews trying to keep their heads above water and trying to advance their fortunes against
all odds? A. Dumashevskii's statement that an educated Jew suffered estrangement from
the Jewish community and barred admission to the Russian intelligentsia had some merit
though there would be exceptions. By 1871, a number of educated Russians viewed their
Jewish counterparts indifferently or, at worst, part of some inchoate ant-Christian
conspiracy.93 Desperate for any relief, some believed that the only course that would lead
them away from the restrictions which ensconced them in a state of ossification was
conversion to Christianity. On this score, Dubnow had reached his breaking point. He
declared that such individuals, even if they still thought of themselves as Jews and
practiced the faith in secret, were no longer Jews.94 Agnosticism, ostensibly the last
hermitage, also came under fire from both Jewish and Russian sources. The journalist
Ivan Aksakov did not mince words when he labeled those Jews who left Judaism but
refused to convert to Christianity as "moral amphibians."95

Education: All the Same, The Petals Begin to Open

Deprecating labels and slanders spurred on Jewish quest for who and what they
were by inspiring introspection. Though it would have been very easy to blame this crisis
on the government, Jewish leaders also realized that there was some merit to the
contention that Jewish intellectual parochialism was inhibiting progress. In an effort to
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resolve the problem or at least lay it open for scrutiny, the Jewish Committe of St.
Petersburg held a conference on 5 October 1869. In attendance were delegates from
Kovno, Vilna, Minsk, Grodno, and Odessa, who came to share their problems and
complaints with the assembly and anxious to arrive at some lasting remedies and reform.
From the minutes of that meeting, the delegates certainly did not lack for material.96 In
the field of spiritual reform and lending direction to Jewish education in general, Jacob
Brafman (1825-1879) and his compatriot Gur'ev, submitted items for debate which, in the
end, were deemed adversarial to Jewish interests. Being a Jewish convert to Lutheranism
did not enhance his standing with his compatriots nor did his Christian-oriented proposals
which were dismissed throughout the sessions.97 In their eyes, Brafman was not really a
Jew and, therefore, a moribund entity, but he was also seen as treacherous and cunning.
Mindful of their hostility, Brafman tried to garner sympathy by declaring at one point that
neither he nor his supporters bore any hostility towards the efforts of the Committee and
the present assembly. They stood with them and desired to assist in creating meaningful
reforms if only those assembled would trust them. In the end, no one did because, like
the Russian writer N.I. Neboisiev who also claimed to be a friend of the Jews, he had a
reputation of negotiating in bad faith.98 Other issues included a petition to Alexander II
regarding reform in the draft regulations which still favored Christians, and there was
some discussion over the possibility of developing a pure Jewish literature in Russian.
All of this was promising but, as it was recorded, many of these issues would require
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resolution at a later date and some with the grace of God and Tsar since Jews still did not
have the rights of Russian citizens.
It would be erroneous to conclude that this meeting was an exercise in futility.
Obstacles abounded but did not dampen Jewish efforts to arrive at identities which would
afford them a place in Russian society. Brafman and his "fellow Christians," as they
were identified in the minutes, did not pose much of a disruption, but this was not reason
enough to discount them. Above all else, concerns from the five larger Jewish
communities of the Empire needed a proper forum for expression, discussion,
contemplation, and, for some, resolution, and indeed this need had been met. Even the
Tsar was compelled to hear if not act in their behalf, but what must be appreciated is that
those who took an active hand in developing the collective Russian Jewish intellect were
not all men nor geriatric by the standards of the day. Indeed, in the period 1864-1877, the
demands of Jewish youths for reforms in education and religion gave purpose for the
Society for the Spreading of Enlightenment among the Jews of Russia.99 During its
tenure, the Society forged communal solidarity and many rural Jews who would not
otherwise have received any formal education did so through the Soceity's schools and
the talents of individuals such as Judah Leib Gordon, but neither the Society nor its
program had any security for further sustinence. Financial woes were never distant and
aggravated by the leadership's grandiose schemes which required commensurate revenues
which were not extant. The only potential source of profit which it possessed was its
publishing operation, but that too was mismanaged. Early on, the Society generated ill
will among some Jewish authors whose manuscripts they had rejected. It was not the
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rejections themselves which angered these authors but the Society's criteria for
publication. Not only were these not made available, but given the uneven quality of
those works which were published, the Society garnered few allies.100 Given its apparent
egoism and arrogance, as charged by its detractors, it was ironic that Society schools
were always short of textbooks.

The Education of Women: A Challenge to Tradition and the Promise of Viability
for the Community

Intellectual secularism and various shades of cosmopolitanism under the umbrella
of modernity certainly stirred Jewish passions, but the education of Jewish women
beyond the mandates of tradition excited an emotional explosion. Coming to the fore in
the mid-1860's, immediately traditionalists condenmed such proposals as dangerous.101
Once begun, there was no telling what the result might be.

To those clamors, Lev

Levanda, M. Hirschfield, and others informed the naysayers and entrenched
traditionalists that times were changing along with the needs of the Jewish community.
Were they so blind as not perceive that by educating women to degrees beyond those of
governesses and petty shopkeepers that a more economically viable and intellectual
Russia Jewry would emerge?102 Of course, even among its advocates, attitudes towards
what women should be taught and their employment was far from settled. In Tel'shi in
1872, Rabbi Khazanovich began teaching Jewish women a wide range of subjects in
order to prepare them for the entrance examinations to gymnasia and institutes.
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Impoverished students attended his lectures for free.103 Some remarked that Jewish
women made better students than men since they had escaped the ineffable intellectual
rigidity of the heder imposed upon their male counterparts. Possessing more mental
flexibility allowed them to grasp newer concepts rapidly and show greater confidence in
making inquiries and speculations. This was by no means a parochial observation.
Desiring progress within and without the community but still wedded to tradition, Rabbi
Zalkind Minor and like-minded luninaries proposed vocational education as the most
beneficial to Jewish women.104 More than gender chauvinism, this conservative tendency
was inspired by the recognition on the part of the Russian government that the Jewish
intelligentsia, and particularly the presence of Jewish students in Russian univeristies,
was on the rise.105

Incurably xenophoic, officials initiated means to limit Jewish

admissions and employment, and it was the Curator of the Odessa Educational District
who first proposed the infamous Numerus Clausus.106 Fearing that they might lose the
little that had been gained, progress was not abandoned but pursued along different
courses.
Just as prominent as Lev Levanda (1835-1888) who at one time held the post of
Learned Jew in the Vilna Governor General's office, was Judah Leib Gordon (18311892).107 Both men believed that Jewish reform was a necessity and not an evil, but
Gordon, a graduate of the Vilna Rabbinical Pedagogical Institute, was more outspoken
and engaged on the ground floor of Jewish education, so to speak, in the late nineteenth
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century.108 In 1872, he became the secretary of the Society for the Promotion of Culture
Among the Jews of Russia and St. Petersburg, an organization which advocated secular
education along with traditional Jewish instruction with an eye towards creating the
“modern” Russian Jew. Pursuing this endeavor zealously, Gordon tempered it with
humanistic understanding so as not to lend his voice to the madding din which
reverberated throughout the community. As he saw it, nothing could come of one group
accusing another of malfeasance while obfuscating or feigning amnesia regarding its own
dubious dealings. If the mitnagdim feared Hasidic exploitation of the ignorant, equal
attention should have been given to manipulation of the intelligentsia by the maskilim
which Gordon perceived to be the greater threat.109 Donning the garb of civilization
while removing the very kernel of Judaism, Gordon believed, would bring about the end
of Judaism in Russia. Tradition could not be discarded indiscriminately. Each facet had
to be weighed against contemporary conditions, its value assessed in terms of sustaining
Jewish life, culture, spirituality, and intellectual stature, and then either retained, adapted
or discarded. Gordon was concerned, moreover, that his simple and sound program was
threatened with the introduction of German Reform Judaism to the Empire in the late
1860’s.

Russian Jews were just beginning to discover themselves and realize the

possibilities of chthonic Judaism. Given the influeces of Haskalah and the Germanoriented state-sponsored Jewish education, a number of Jewish intellectuals had been
conditioned to believe that German Judaism was superior.110 The Jews of Russia needed
to have confidence in their own abilities, an observation which was easier to identify than
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remedy. If there was to be any Russian Jewish identity, it would have to be achieved
after considerable effort.
It was not uncommon for such an effort to depart from Jewish tradition, which is
what Gordon did when he decided to extend Hebrew langauge instruction to women. He
shared Levanda's belief that Jewish women needed broader intellectual exposure, though
his reasoning was decidedly different.

To Gordon, Jewish women were wives and

mothers and, in the latter capacity, were charged with instilling their sons with Jewish
traditions and morals.111 Particularly among the more affluent families, Jewish women
knew French and German, and Russian Jewish intellectuals were accustomed to reading
and speaking in a number of European languages.112 No one considered this an odd
development, in fact those who possessed this knowledge occupied a special stratum
within Jewish society, but when it came to Hebrew and the intention of teaching it to
women, hackles arose in various quarters. From Original Sin to myths regarding their
weaker constitutions, Jewish conservatives had a wealth of reasons why the extension of
this knowlege to women and girls was a mistake. Judah Gordon, however, would not
change his mind. Only too cognizant that Hebrew would never become a universal
language or, as Elieazer Perlman ben Yehuda (1858-1922) opined, one that could only be
revived in a land where Jews constituted the majority, Gordon, nevertheless, saw it as one
of Judaism's precious treasures which he did not want to disapper.113 Assisting him in
this cause were Miriam Markel-Mosessohn, one of Gordon's confidants, and Raschel
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Mironovna Khin.

Both of these women were, in Gordon's estimation, exceptional

Hebraists with much potential, though he would often catch himself if he believed that
his enthousiasm for their work overextended the bounds of propriety.

A frequent

criticism of their respective works was that it was defective in parts, a fault which was
not of their own making.114 Denied the benfits of heder and yeshiva, flawed Hebrew
would be inescapable. Though he did not belabor this point, it was apparent that Gordon
found himself in a difficult position. First of all, Hebrew instruction itself was an
exercise in rote memorization without any analysis of syntax or grammar.115

Not

surprisingly, prose and poetic creations in the language tended to be stilted and halting
rather than natural and flowing. In addition, Markel-Mosessohn's skill excelled many of
Gordon's male students, and this was not well received. Still, Gordon did not eschew his
female prodigies, especially when Rashel Klin was one of the few Jews accepted into the
ranks of the Russian intelligentsia and even played host to the philosopher Vladimir
Solov'ev.116 Proud in one respect, Judah never discounted his belief that the true purpose
in providing Jewish women with a Hebrew education was to make them enlightened
mothers. Their education was a means for preserving Jewish patrimony, and at no time
was there any serious consideration of allowing Jewish women significant freedom
within the society.117
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Intellectual freedom, real, imagined, and in its formative stages, brought with it
changes in the Jewish milieu which left some at a loss for reception. A flower of multicolored petals was coming into bloom, and though it was doing so within the currents of
a raging tempest, progressives viewed this phenomenon as a welcome consequence of
their labors. From the opposition camp, diversification was merely the antecedent to
dissolution.

To ultra-traditionalists, regardless of the tems used to describe the

relationship between some Jews and the broader Russian society, it was a heretical
courtship. The age-old superstition that for every word of a foreign language a Jew
learned he forgot a Hebrew one was still in force and now with renewed vigor since it
could be used in direct assaults upon modern Jewish journals published in Russian.119
More than adopting a foreign language as their own, the parallels between the so-called
sins of the prideful modern Russian Jews and those in the Book of Isaiah were selfevident. Already, to their minds, the state of Russian Jewry resembled the punishment
God levied upon Israel when, with a rod of iron, he had dashed them to pieces like a
potter's vessel.
“Judaism is disintegrating into two hostile camps, Hasidim and Mitnagdim, and
there appears to be no hope for resolution,” wrote E. Orshansky in 1871.120 Neither side
could claim motivational purity or altruism in their actions towards the Jewish masses in
pursuing their respective courses, though some conservative circles considered the
Hasidim to be the greater of two potential evils. By their very title, “Hasidim,” (the pious
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ones), they made themselves contentious to Jewish orthodoxy. Insult over a mere name
was not so grave as their claims to being the upholders of Jewish traditions when their
tsadikim were not rabbis and largely ignorant of Talmud and wisdom literature. In their
stead, superstition and mythology were presented as erudition and not for the
enlightenment of their followers but to support the tsadik’s otherwise untenable position.
Neither Halakahic nor Mosaic law had made provisions for this office and, considering
the potential and acutal injuries which these individuals have perpetrated, their very
existence is offensive. That these charges almost always originated with the mitnagdim
should not diminish their overall veracity even though the accusers had their own designs
to fulfill.121
Orshansky went on to claim that some of these self-styled holy men suffered from
delusions but others, out of blatant opportunism, engaged in unholy and illegal activities.
Ironically, even though some tsadikim had been exposed as frauds, legions of desperate
and unlearned individuals still flocked to them. Fine distinctions between movements
within Judaism had now become blurred. Hasidic calumnies had diminished the status of
legitimate rabbis and compromised their spiritual authority. Should this process be
allowed to continue ad infinitem, Orshansky contended that the Jews of Russia would
experience spiritual statelessness. Though his biases were inescapable, Orshansky,
nevertheless, attempted to act as an honest broker by pointing out that Hasidism would
not have grown or become as potent as it had if the Rabbinate had been more forthright
with and attentive to the Jewish masses. Blame had to be shared equally.
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Arguing in a more restrained and logical vein, Joachim Isaakovich Tarnopol
(1810-1900) an Odessa Jewish merchant, presented a more moderate view of the current
situation.122 Whether dressed in Russian garb with shiny leather boots and speaking
eloquent Russian or in dirty rags bellowing in marketplace Yiddish, the Russian Jew,
Tarnopol asserted, was a collaborative creation of Russian officialdom and the Jews
themselves.

For better or ill, change were mandated and both parties had to work

together to bring it about. Referring to Alexander II as “our humane Emperor,” Tarnopol
credited him with opening Russian universities to Jews and allowing Jewish professionals
to enter various societies, associations and teaching positions.

Pleased with these

advances, Tarnopol was not yet prepared to discard caution in favor of jubilation. He had
heard of the two rabbinical pedagogical institutes of Vilna and Zhitomer and knew only
of their purpose in graduating Crown rabbis and Jewish educators. On this subject, the
author assumed a curious position. Hoping that their education would gratify the delicate
balance of tradition and modernity, he then expressed doubts about the efficacy of their
instruction in cultivating their collective theological and intellectual dexterity.123
Uncertainties aside, Tarnopol's main plea was that the Jewish community be given the
opportunity to show Russia and the world that its continued productivity and success was
proof enough of its self-sufficiency. Once that had been recognized in official circles, the
Jews would have their political emancipation.
Realization was at hand. The Rabbinate was a wraith incapable of posing an
obstacle to progress. Gone were the days of intensive Hebrew study for all boys and men.
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Vanished, too, were Talmudic disquisitions on irrelevant esoteria pertinent to residence in
empires no longer extant. Russian authorities could not help but see that Judaism was
pliant and that Jews, particularly the more astute, had adapted already. Even ritual,
Tarnopol maintained, could be modified to reflect current experience and not diminish
the Jewish essence. The Saturday morning service, for example, would be more
meaningful to intellectual theists if some antiquated prayers were discarded and Judaism
permitted a natural rejuvenation.124 After all, since Judaism was a religion with agrarian
roots, it should have been understood that the removal of dead undergrowth was essential
if the field was to be made ready for a new crop.

Mainstream Hasids and ultra-

conservative orthodox worshippers, however, resisted even the slightest alterations.
Emotionalism, not historical necessity and reason, governed their continued obduracy.
To buttress his point, Tarnopol employed Moses Mendelssohn’s pronouncement that
Judaism was as ever-changeable as life itself.125 Change was inevitable, and Tarnopol
exhorted the Jews of Russia, particularly the intelligentsia, to recognize it as an
opportunity for self-liberation in all aspects of Jewish life and not to hide from it in fear.

Haskalah: One Current among Many

Since its introduction to Russia, it had been subdued and subordinated
episodically, but Haskalah remained a viable undercurrent in Russian Jewish intellectual
development. Adamant about the supremacy of secular over sacred learning and seeking
to rebuild Judaism along those lines, they followed a course akin to that of the Rabbinate.
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Discounting recent Jewish history and reacting against mainstream Hasidism’s
democratic appeal, Haskalah’s elitism continued to exclude women and workmen from
its ranks. Claiming that the movement’s sole interest was to groom a new Jewish
intellectual vanguard to lead the ignorant, Yiddish-speaking masses through the perils of
the modern world, the maskilim succeeded in alienating many of those they sought to
save.126 Even so, Haskalah’s growth showed no signs of waning. Throughout the 1860’s
and ‘70’s, Haskalah’s influence reached into the Empire’s more renowned yeshivas of
Volozhin and Mir which the Rabbinate could neither prevent nor counter. Baiting the
Hasidim had become de rigueur, and flushed with success and a sense of righteousness,
the maskilim adopted Hebrew as their lingua franca. Traditionalists were shocked. To
them, Hebrew used in this manner constituted a desecration of Jewish theological
tradition and Jewishness overall, especially when this language was manipulated by some
budding Jewish socialists.127

Owing to the flurry of activities engaging the Jewish

community in the middle and later decades of this century this development would be one
of many worries to ensconced traditionalists.

Contemporary Relevance Rooted in the Past: The Shades of Pfefferkorn and
Donin and the Dangers of Apostasy

Tradition competed with modernity, secularism with theocracy, and varying
shades of one cause or another occupied a nebulous middling position in the Jewish
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spectrum. One of those currents was Jewish apostasy. Though their numbers were small,
the Jewish press of the 1870’s and 80’s allowed apostates and disaffected Russian Jews to
disseminate their views to a larger reading audience than had been possible in previous
decades. Particulary pernicious was the stridency of the apostates’ position. Believing
that salvation rested with the complete eradication of Judaism as a corporeal entity, all
facets of Jewish spirituality were deemed repugnant, though their langauge was not
always direct. Educational pragmatisim often presented an alluring facade by which the
artless or gullible could be drawn in before they knew the full consequences of their new
association.

For instance, the Jewish youths of New Russia were being educated

progressively, completely eschewing the mysticism and abstactions of traditional
education.128 If all proceeded well, the time would come when these new Jews would be
on an intellectual par with their Austrian coreligionists. Promises of this sort aggravated
the extant disaffection among the larger Jewish population which provided apostates with
fertile ground. Rebuking their flawed logic, the mainstream Jewish intelligentsia
admonished those who might be tempted that an ostensibly free Jewish status bought
with the death of Judaism in order to placate Orthodox Christian provinciality and Jewish
opportunism was not freedom and that such a price must never be paid.129
More than a declatory warning would be needed if the intelligentsia hoped to
combat the apostates. With a fair knowledge of their audience, the authors and editors of
Evreiskaia biblioteka employed the age-old art of didactic storytelling in a effort to reach
those most in need of their message. Delving into Jewish history, they finally resurrected
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two of the more notorious Jewish apostates, Jacob Pfefferkorn and Nicholas Donin, as
object lessons of what could befall Jews of Russia if they were not on their guard.
Jacob Pfefferkorn, like a number of contemporary Russian Jewish apostates, was
not taken seriously at first. Desiderius Erasmus thought him to be little more than “an
ignorant butcher with a forehead of brass,”130 whose arguments were mere conjecture
without metaphysical support. True as this may have been, this initial disregard and
contempt sponsored a false sense of security which eclipsed the potential inimicability of
a malevolent, ill-educated, and determined man.

Russian Jews were particularly

vulnerable to such individuals since the Jewish intelligentsia, in the main, considered
contemporary apostates as ignorant babblers and the rest of the Jewish population was
occupied with more immediate

concerns.

This mixture of apathy, ignorance and

arrogance could only bode ill.
Considered spiritually dead by his contemporary coreligionists, Pfefferkorn was
accorded complete liberty of action.131 Taking advantage of the prevailing political
climate to serve his ends, he allied himself with the Dominicans and almost persuaded
Emperor Maximillan I to authorize the burning of all Jewish books save the Bible on the
grounds that they were anti-Christian.132 There was no conceivable reason why his
petition would be rejected. Nicholas Donin, two centuries before, had been a Jewish
apostate in Dominican service and had levied the same charge against Talmud resulting
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in the destruction of all known copies in Paris. At his instigation, the learned doctors of
the Sorbonne conducted a trial in which the Talmudic tomes were placed at the bar and
condemned for heresy and punished forthwith.

Kabbalah was also presented as

dangerous and anti-Christian since, even more than Talmud, it was far removed from
Christian experience and the likelihood of this slander being revealed was slight. Be that
as it may, as the self-appointed inquisitor of Judaism, Pfefferkorn made it known that all
volumes of these works would be the first to perish but he could not act alone. He
needed allies and not just anyone would do. It was imperative that credible scholars lend
their support to this plan. Johann Reuchlin was one of those he sought out, and by
bringing his intentions to the attention of this Christian humanist, Pfefferkorn sealed his
fate.133 It was apparent to Reuchlin that Pfefferkorn had never seen a page of any of the
works he proposed to destroy whereas he, Reuchlin, was a Judaic scholar familiar with
many of the condemned works. Through cogent argument, he exposed his adversary’s
lack of theological erudition, and the humanist further convinced the Emperor and the
Dominicans that what they were about to consign to the flames were the pillars of higher
Christian thought. Pfefferkorn's commission was revoked post haste.
Reuchlin had his own motivations though it could not be denied that the Jews had
benefited from his actions. His intervention had been a lucky stroke, but luck and
miracles could not be counted upon in all instances. Though Tsar Alexander II did not
share Empress Elizabeth I’s disposition towards Jews, Russia’s social, intellectual and
theological climate in the early 1870’s was, nevertheless, susceptible to opportunism.
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Bearing this in mind, the examples of Pfefferkorn and Donin in the pages of Evreiskaia
biblioteka served as a call to action. The Jews needed only look around them for
inspiration. Official barriers still denied them full privileges while guaranteeing them
added burdens in the form of special taxes. Coupled with this was the tacit dictum that
no Jew would ever be permitted to reach the upper social echelons. Believing themselves
trapped on all sides, a number of maskilim embraced socialism’s secular reductionist
philosophy, but the both the movement and its influence were still in its nascent stages.
Meanwhile, impatience with second-class status among Russian Jews was running high.
For those whom Haskalah had cast away and Judaism’s appeal was as welcoming as an
empty tomb, Christian conversion promised immediate relief which, for some, took
priority over the long-term consequences of such a decision.

Prelooker and Liutostanskii: Russian Jewry's Musicians of Hamlin

Neither of them demanded outright the complete destruction of Jewish works, yet
Yacov Prelooker and Ippolit Liutostanskii were apostates not to be taken lightly. What
both men may have lacked in terms of their respective Jewish theological educations,
they were well compensated in cunning and acumen when they challenged the Odessa
and Moscow Jewish communities respectively in the late 1870’s and early 1880’s. Aside
from the usual hardships and disabilities, urban Jews were particularly susceptible to
conflicts between secular knowledge and parochial mores.134 Jewish tradition placed a
premium upon knowledge and intelligence, esteeming both above the acquisition of
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material wealth, but in a narrow vein. It was de rigueur that an exceptional bar mitzvah
(a thirteen-year-old boy called to the Torah) who possessed superior talents in discussing
Torah and Talmudic issues was held up as an example to others. Be that as it may, that
individual's favor could be withdrawn with the same ease in which it was conferred if his
habits did not conform with his particular community's notion of normalcy. Shtetl Jews
tended to have little tolerance for difference. Woe betide the nebesh (unfortunate one)
who lacked the acumen or interest to pursue intellectual and theological affairs even to a
moderate degree. Aside from having to endure parental disappointment, those who did
not fit in could expect varying degrees of ridicule which subsequently alienated them
from their communities and, for some, divorced them from Judaism altogether.
Ironically, the same held true for some child prodigies in the face of inflexible communal
beliefs and standards. Growing bored with the traditional Jewish education, some read
“forbidden books” and taught themselves foreign languages.135

Such acts, when

discovered, usually resulted in ostracization from the community.

In the last three

decades of the nineteenth century, this social and intellectual rigidity would be taxed to
the limit of its strength and, in some quarters, brought asunder altogether.
Yakov Prelooker was an apostate whose sole interest was to create an
organization where Jews would be encouraged to embrace Christianity and eradicate all
prejudice which had existed between the two religions.136 His ultimate exile in England
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testified to the ill fortune of his movement.137 What had brought him to that fate did not
seem out of the ordinary until January 1882 when he published the credo of his
Brotherhood of the New Israel which earned for him the ire of Christian and Jewish
theologians alike. Prior to this, Prelooker had led a fairly quiet and unremarkable life as a
government functionary. By his own admission, his childhood was like that of most
Jewish children save that even at an early age he could not bear the ignorance and
superstitions of his parents and his grandfather, Rabbi Abraham. Feeling stifled in such
an oppressive environment, he left it in August 1877 to enter the College of Preceptors in
hopes of expanding his knowledge and finding useful employment.138 Compared to the
Crown Jewish schools of the day, the curriculum was identical save that Jewish
candidates were retained an additional year to study Hebrew, Jewish history, literature
and religion, all taught by Jewish faculty while other subjects fell to Orthodox Christians.
During the course of his studies, there were no attempts to proselytize among the Jewish
students or compulsion to perform demeaning tasks; if anything the College’s atmosphere
was tepid. Upon graduation, he was made assistant director of the Second Odessa Jewish
Government School and, shortly thereafter, his life took a decided turn.
In December 1881, Prelooker formed his Brotherhood of the New Israel and
established contacts with an allied group in Elizabethgrad, the Biblical Spiritual
Fraternity under the direction of Yakov Gordon.139 Both organizations sought to bridge
the adversities which separated Jews from Christians in Russia.

Gordon’s group

imagined that a Judeo-Russian fraternity would come about when Rabbinical Judaism
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was discarded in favor of a reformed synagogue rooted in rationalism and married to a
purified Protestant church.140 Prelooker had a more ambitious and naïve design in mind.
From his vantage, all Christian denominations could be united by means of what he
termed a “theologically benign” Judaism, shorn of all trappings which Christians found
objectionable. Crafting and honing his theology and philosophy and anxious to increase
the Brotherhood’s membership, he then printed his manifesto in the Odesski listok of 29
January 1882 with the hope that his imagined theological kettuba (wedding contract)
would be executed. What he received ultimately was a get (divorce contract) from both
communities.
Prelooker was at a loss in discerning what had gone wrong. For years, maskilim
and cosmopolitan mitnagdim had been exhorting Jews to come to the Russian bosom and
become as Russian as was humanly possible.

Various members of the Russian

intelligentsia had also called for viable solutions to the Jewish Question.141 Bearing all of
this in mind, Prelooker assumed that the day of his manifesto’s publication would be one
of triumph. It turned out to be a nightmare which lingered for several weeks. Both his
parents and grandfather expressed their conviction that he (Prelooker) would be better off
as a dead Jew than a living apostate.142

Being disowned was not the worst of it.

Following fast upon this tragedy were the vehement denunciations of the Odessa
Rabbinate which excommunicated him and threatened his supporters with the same if
they continued their associations with either him or the Brotherhood. After three weeks,
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divested of his most steadfast followers, Prelooker was left alone to confront the Jewish
community’s continued fury as well as the mounting anger of the Christian one.
Odessa’s Orthodox Christian prelates could not decide if Prelooker was offering
them a Trojan Horse or was simply a fool. The mere notion of a merger of Russian
Orthodoxy with Judaism, no matter how benign the latter may be, was repugnant. To
them, it contravened the Divine Order which, from the Orthodox Christian perspective,
was plain. The Jews had had their chance and had watched it expire on the cross; let that
be their punishment since a delayed awakening to their doctrinal errors could not mitigate
their original crime. It was a matter that went deeper than theology and ethnicity. The
historical circumstances which had forged Russian-Jewish relations and their perceptions
of one another could not be swept away on a whim, and Prelooker should have
recognized that prior to publicizing his group’s existence. Insensitive to Russian-Jewish
realities, he was also too late in acquiring an appreciative Christian audience for Jewish
apostasy. Alexander III and Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Procurator of the Holy Synod,
were now actively discouraging Jews from converting to Christianity or approaching a
station akin to it. Prelooker’s efforts were unappreciated by all save one. In the midst of
his trials, he was summoned before Colonel Katanski, head of the Odessa secret police.
At that meeting, Katanski informed him that Interior Minister Ignatiev extended his
congratulations and best wishes to the reformer and predicted a mass conversion to
Russian Orthodoxy in the near future. By this time, however, the absurdity could not
have escaped Prelooker. Accepting these impotent expressions graciously, he departed
for England soon afterwards.
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Central to this commotion was the publication of eleven precepts which defined
and governed the Brotherhood of the New Israel. Prelooker’s strident program was more
parochial, reactionary, and polemical than a rational response to the Jewish-Christian
divide. Nevertheless, he touched upon some telling points with which Russian Jewry
struggled to define itself and its role in the larger society. Prelooker denied Talmud’s
divine influence since both the Babylonian and Jerusalem talmudim were exegeses on
Torah and Halakhah which were not handed down to Moses from God. Primarily, the
two works existed merely to fill in Torah’s textual lacunae and elaborate upon esoteric
points of law, tradition, culture, and ritual. As for the Babylonian edition being evil,
Prelooker left the matter as a statement without elucidation, using it only to strike a
familiar chord among ill-educated Christians and wavering Jews as an inducement to join
his organization. In that same vein, the Brotherhood espoused that only a contemporary
rational interpretation of the Bible could serve as a source of faith and divine authority,
an obvious concession to the maskilim since this very theme permeated Moses
Mendelssohn’s Haskalah works over a century before. In his attempt to denude Judaism
of what he perceived to be its ”hubris,” Prelooker overestimated the strength of his
argument, especially when it touched upon one of Judaism’s most sacred ritual “pillars.”
Circumcision, to his mind, was to be understood spiritually and not corporally.143
For a man who had claimed to have been “initiated into the realm of Rabbinical mystery”
at age six, this was an incredible assertion. The usual course of study began with
Vaikra(Leviticus) and Devarim (Deuteronomy) and then Bereshit (Genesis) where
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Prelooker could not have overlooked God’s covenant with Abraham.144 Employing and
altering Torah, Tanya, and St. Paul’s manipulation of the circumcision mandate (Genesis
17: 9-12), he was able to arrive at his position and buttress it so as to make it appear
legitimate.

In Torah, specifically Deuteronomy 30:6 and Jeremiah 4:4, there were

references to the “circumcision of the heart,” described as removing the spiritual prepuce
(thick foreskin) from this organ in order to liberate the soul and affect its union with the
Divine. Within the original Old Testament contexts, God was concerned that the Jews
had turned from Him. This injunction was made ostensibly to remind the Community of
Israel of its divine obligations. Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi, the founder of Habad
Hasidism, carried this metaphor one step further when he opined that the prepuce
covering the hearts of men would be removed when the Messiah returned. The Divine
sparks which had been scattered when the world began would then be reunited and affect
tikkun olam (restoration of the world to perfection).145 The last piece of the puzzle which
had to be placed carefully was St. Paul’s circumvention of physical circumcision to cull
pagans into the early Christian Church. In that period, a pagan desiring to become a
Christian had to convert to Judaism as a prerequisite and undergo circumcision, a painful
and often fatal rite of passage given the attendant lack of hygiene. Mindful of this, Paul
contended that if a person underwent a “spiritual circumcision of the soul,” this alone
would be sufficient for admission to the Christian faith. Prelooker used this device
merely to play upon popular Russian misconceptions, uneasiness, and disgust for the
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practice in order to discredit it and thus remove what he perceived to be the fundamental
barrier between Christians and Jews.146
The conclusion to Prelooker’s attempted bridge and the fate of Yacov Gordon’s
Biblical Spiritual Fraternity was unusual.
blameless.

In his memoirs, he accounted himself

Slanders and intimidation which had rained down upon him and his

Brotherhood had been brought about by the manifesto’s publication in Russian which, he
insisted, made it unintelligible to many in the Odessa Jewish community. One wonders
to whom he addressed this claim since anyone knowledgeable about the Jewish situation
would have found this apology preposterous. Odessa was a major international port with
a Jewish population of 100,000 in the early 1880’s.147 Russian literacy was both essential
and widespread among the Jewish inhabitants. When he submitted his eleven points to
the local Russian paper, one wonders, given his argument, what language he expected the
printer to use. Joachim Tarnopol’s expose of a decade before asserted that Russian
literacy among the Jews was unquestioned. Also absent from Prelooker’s calculations
was that a Jewess numbered among the conspirators responsible for Alexander II’s
assassination.148 That alone was sufficient to indict the Empire’s entire community from
the Russian reactionary point of view. Neither theological union nor Jewish conversion
to Orthodoxy was palatable, and to ensure that there would be no mistaking the
government’s position on this and related matters, Alexander III declared that Jews who
had converted to Orthodoxy were still Jews and were denied full rights as citizens of the
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Empire.149 Prelooker had been cast adrift but was by no means alone. Other Jews who
had pursued similar courses found that they were unable to return to the very society they
had condemned while they remained barred from joining and participating fully in the
new Russian society. They were truly stateless.150 As for the fate of Yacov Gordon’s
group, the authorities found favor with the Biblical Spiritual Fraternity as it was
presented to them, stipulating only that all prayers and rituals be conducted in Hebrew so
that Russian raskolniki (schismatics) would be dissuaded from joining them. Like the
Brotherhood, the Fraternity was a radical group but of a contained variety. Its members
kept to themselves and did not imagine turning the Empire on its head.
For all of his faults and potential for harm, Yakov Prelooker was an amateur when
compared to Crown Rabbi Ippolit Liutostanskii. A former Pole turned Russian “patriot,”
he published a series of pamphlets which purported, through the use of footnotes and intext citations of supposedly irrefutable Jewish sources, to verify Jewish bloodlust for
Christians.151 Eager to transform his calumny into profit, the Rabbi concocted a story in
1879 that the Jews had offered him 100,000 rubles to suppress his publications,
especially those addressing the Blood Libel. He refused to do so. His public had to be
apprised of these sinister dealings. Regardless of the consequences, he had to warn as
many people as possible, particularly those willing to pay 2-3 kopecks per volume.152
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Rabbi Zalkind Minor, an eminent Russian Jewish intellectual, was alarmed at how
quickly this Rabbi’s works were disseminated among the gullible and feared that even
marginal Jews would fall under his influence. Malevolent and cunning, Liutostanskii
knew well his audience and how to craft his prose in order to incite the requisite level of
horror and indignation which whetted its appetites.

No longer employing baseless

polemics which shrieked from the pages of other pamphlets and tracts, this apostate
attempted to present his evidence in pseudo-erudite terms and buttressed his arguments
by citing so-called scholarly references designed to impress his uneducated readers.
Though of the essence, Minor bided his time and his patience was well rewarded.
Confident that he could proceed unchallenged, Liutostanskii immediately overplayed his
hand by denouncing Talmud as evil and erroneous in his 1879 work, Talmud i evrei
(Talmud and the Jews). In content, this publication was little more than a Russified
resurrection and merger of Pfefferkorn’s and Donin’s polemics with some minor
additions which its author assumed would either be accepted or pass without contest.
Zalkind Minor soon apprised him of his miscalculation and commenced his response in
earnest.
Liutostanskii’s first error appeared on the first page of his manuscript when he
altered a codicil in Polish King Boleslaw the Wise’s 1264 Jewish Toleration Edict (The
Kalisz Statute). At issue was the proscription against kidnapping Jewish children for
conversion purposes which was a capital offense. This section, as well as the entire
Edict, was written in Polish, Latin and Russian, a point which Minor emphasized in
appraising Liutostanskii’s scholarship. The whole of the Rabbi’s entire thesis rested upon
a single sentence fragment, “krast detei evreev” (to steal children of the Jews), which had
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been altered in Liutostanskii’s work to read, “krast detei evreami” (to steal children by
[means of] the Jews). In the original statement, the Jews were victims; Liutostanski's
alteration of noun case transformed them into victimizers. Acknowledging tacitly
Liutostanskii’s skill at linguistic manipulation, Minor then emphasized his opponent’s
apparent illiteracy in Polish with relish.

Mockingly, Minor castigated him for not

checking his interpretation against the Latin and Russian editions. If Liutostanskii had
been acquainted marginally with those languages, this error might have been excusable,
but the Rabbi was not in a pardonable position. The Kalisz Statute was also written in
Polish, and a man who had been educated in Poland should not have mistaken the Polish
genitive for the instrumental.153
Minor's devotion to this error covered several pages which, taken on their own
merits, resembled an exercise in puerile hairsplitting but, in relation to Liutostanskii's
work as a whole, this was a calculated tactic. Contemptuous of him and his motives,
Rabbi Minor also realized that Liutostanskii was one of the more sophisticated Russian
Jewish apostates in print. His alteration of legitimate information taken from legitimate
sources and presented in a manner resembling a learned treatise could not be exposed and
disproven easily. On the cusp of the 1880’s, Russian Jewry was in a tenuous position.
Beleaguered, confused and uncritical Jews, in addition to their Christian counterparts,
were ideal consumers of such literature. It was imperative, therefore, that Minor and his
colleagues acquaint themselves with apostate literature, analyze their content and
reasoning and then tailor their responses in a manner intelligible to the average reader.
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Above all else, they had to ensure that their responses would not be viewed as mere
additions to the very upswell they hoped to quell.
Linguisitic grounds had not posed insurmountable obstacles and in terms of
theology, Minor had even difficulty in dealing with Liutostanskii who condemned
himself with every step. Well-versed in Torah and Talmud, Rabbi Minor was certain that
his opponent had never read a single page of the latter.154

Interspersed among

Liutostanskii’s discourses, Minor recognized several undocumented borrowings from
other polemical pieces and that some sources were outright fabrications. An example of
the latter was the Rabbi’s claim that Rabbi Uchazim (a corruption of Etz Hayyim--Tree of
Life) had uncovered a secret code in Jewish daily and Sabbath prayers which indicated
that Jews prayed for the Messiah’s coming along near-identical Christian lines. Minor
questioned this claim on a number of points. A cursory examination of the contemporary
Jewish siddur (daily and Sabbath prayerbook) and maksor (High Holiday prayerbook)
with their plain Hebrew texts could not be translated or interpreted to credit such an
assertion.155 Following from this statement, Liutostanskii then claimed that Jews had
been hostile to Christians and Christian practices from time immemorial.

Citing

Deuteronomy 20:16, he uncovered what he deemed to be the basis for Judaism’s antiChristian bias which was still viable and constituted a threat to Russia’s commonweal.
Admonishing his readers to consider the context from which the verse was taken, that is,
Deuteronomy 20:10-17, Minor proceeded to lay bare Liutostanskii’s fallacy. First of all,
God’s injunction to the Israelites to kill aliens in their midst had been in force only in
wartime against their pagan neighbors. All adult males were to be killed to prevent the
154
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Israelites from abandoning their nascent monotheism to embrace again “their gods which
had caused you to sin in times past.”156 Christians did not exist when this mandate was
made, but since Liutostanskii interpreted this to mean all foreigners (i.e. non-Jews), his
Torah (notions of Jewish doctrinal orthodoxy) and historical literacy now came under
attack. Before the Israelites became Israelites (those who wrestle with God), they were
Chaldeans, Akkadians, Moabites, Amorites, and Canaanites, all of whom had been
polytheists. Struggling to survive as a distinct people, they had to separate themselves
from the larger societies from which they came, hence this sanguinary injunction which,
as Minor noted, was never carried out.
Towards the end of Talmud i evrei, even its author had become aware of gaps and
ill-constructed premises in the work and attempted to remedy them through references to
imaginary Jewish theological texts. Even so, he somehow deluded himself into thinking
that he had reached the zenith of his thesis when he declared that Jesus was a viable
factor in Judaism. Should skeptics question this assertion, Liutostanskii insisted that one
need only look to the Talmudic tractate “Etz Hayyim” and discover for oneself the works
of the “Christian Rabbi.” This tractate was part of a supposedly cloistered third Talmud
which the Rabbinate kept under lock and key for fear that its contents would bring an end
to its authority.157 On his merit as a Crown rabbi, Liutostanskii claimed that he had been
permitted access to this work and became guilt-ridden. While he and his colleagues had
benefited from this secret, the Rabbi’s conscience compelled him to reveal the truth to the
Jews of Russia.
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Discarding this declaration, Minor now gave full rein to his acerbic acumen and
consternation.

Admittedly, Liutostankii's work left him confused. It was simply

incomprehensible as to why the author, who had decried Talmudic tractates all along for
their textual contradictions, so often turned to them for support. That the Babylonian and
Jerusalem talmudim presented contrasting viewpoints was an obvious revelation to any
learned Jew. If Liutostanskii had been the scholar that he had claimed to be, he would
have known that Talmudic discourse rested upon countervailing interpretations which
had kept Jewish intellectual life viable for centuries. Often the obvious was invisible, a
defect which carried with it profound consequeces which Minor hoped that he had
mitigated through his analysis and exposure of this pseudo-intellectual fraud. Had the
obvious now shed it obscurity and been made plain? The Jews of Russia were compelled
to exercise caution if there was to be any future for Judaism in Russia.
Wariness and skepticism were most effective when its practioners knew the
dimensions and character of the challenges before them. At a time and in a land where
little was what it appeared to be, Russian Jewish apostasy was also an enigma because it
was often more than a simple divorce from Judaism. Ardent apostates occupied one end
of the spectrum while their traditional opponents secured the other and their respective
sentiments were beyond question. In between them lay this quasi-nebulous array of
"Jews of a sort" who either eschewed or limited their active religious participation while
still retaining a cultural or intellectual tie. Moses Lieb Lilienblum (1843-1910), for
example, was such a man.

As a child, he showed promise as a scholar but his

perspicacity and curiosity led him to grief. Growing up in the village of Marshalov
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(Ukraine), he followed the usual course of childhood instruction but, finding the standard
Hebrew fare staid, he collected secular literature in various languages. By undisclosed
means, he was found out and the local rabbi raised such a furor and roused the
community to such an extent that he had to leave. Lilienblum never forgot that incident,
especially since the final assault upon him came from the local Hasidim who tried to
poison him.158 Not discarding Jewish theology outright, he enjoyed little more than a
tangential relationship with it afterwards, preferring to invest his Jewishness in secular
education with the goal of forming a secular Knesset Israel. As a consequence of
personal experience and general observation, religion for Lilienblum and other moderate
maskilim had been a divisive element among the Jews rather than a cohesive force. It
needed to be given its rightful place within the framework of contemporary circumstance.
Socialism, with its emphasis upon actual collective work for collective commonwealth,
seemed to be a viable solution to a number of Jewish ills.159 Certainly there would be a
division of labor as such a system developed, but everyone would have to be skilled in
some endeavor. No one who was able-bodied would be permitted to benefit from the
labor of others unless he himself labored with them. Regarding education, Lilienblum
advised Jewish parents to shield their children from speculative philosophy by teaching
them a trade.160 By no means an appeal to parochialism, this was a heartfelt exhortation
to the Jews of Russia to deal with immediate issues before addressing abstractions.
Accomplishing higher goals was imperative but so too was it for the Jews to establish a
corporal and spiritual identity, a state of being which would put an end to their stateless
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existence. As Dubnow pointed out, spiritually and culturally strong nations perserved
their identities even under profound political subordination, and Lilienblum concurred.161
Though his identity with Judaism as a religious faith had been diminished, embracing it
as an ethnic community gave him greater latitude of action and would come into full
fruition with the Zionist movement.

Rank Opportunist: The Case of Jacob Brafman

Neither progress nor regression within the Jewish community could ever be given
definite definitions owing to myriad conceptions and consequences associated with these
notions. Though blatantly self-serving, Ippolit Liutostanskii saw himself as a Jewish
reformer attempting to rid Russian Jewry of its ills. Likewise, Jacob Brafman labored
under this delusion, and though he lacked Liutostankii's virulence, his potential for
delaying Jewish initiative and compromising reform could not be overlooked or
dismissed. Given his performance at the 1869 assembly of the St. Petersburg Jewish
Committee, he was a known quantity among Russian Jewry's spiritual and intellectual
leaders. Their intelligence was increased when Brafman publishing Kniga kagala in
Vilna in 1869, and though he did not live to see its reissue in St. Petersburg twelve years
later, the fact that various government officials, including the Tsar, saw merit in this
work. Among Jewish intellectuals, it was ridiculed and a frequent complaint was that
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Brafman could never seem to find Ibid and Ibidem which was rather unfortunate since the
whole of his work rested upon these two primary sources.162
For a man deserving such ridicule, it is remarkable that so little was known of
him. As a young man, he converted to Lutheranism to avoid conscription and became a
Hebrew teacher in the Minsk Spiritual Seminary with the added responsibility of
overseeing the institution’s acquisitions of Hebrew and Polish Jewish texts. It was a
secure and uninspiring post which, ostensibly, gave him a reasonable livlihood which
brings up the question of why he wrote the Book of the Kahal. Presumably, he had had
no profound contest with any Jewish faction which would have touched upon his life
directly. Brafman's name does not appear among those in the midst of the traditionalistmodernist struggles, so an ovbious motive hardly presents itself.

Government

preferrment for promotion, given his post, would have been in keeping with his selfpromoting nature but considering that Brafman had ensconsed himself in a relatively safe
position from the Jewish maelstrom, why would he have written a contentious book?
Truth be known, he was determined to settle accounts, and the only outstanding debt to
his pride which required the peculier satisfaction he desired originated from the frigid
alienation he suffered during the St. Petersburg assembly. If Kniga kagala had been
merely a protracted invective against the Jewish community, it would have been little
better than Talmud i evrei. With its complex network of ideas, history, and contemporary
commentary, Brafman also criticized Russian officials while still attempting to forge a
bridge of understanding between Russians and Jews.
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Meticulous in establishing his thesis, Brafman began his work with a lenghty
account of Jewish history up to the present, detailing legalistic intricacies and their
bearing upon Jewish historical and cultural development. Owing to the degree of detail,
this was primarily for the benefit of a non-Jewish audience. After having satisfied
himself with this background, Brafman then argued that the true divide between Jew and
Russian lay not so much in theology but in the calumnies of the kahals.163 He pointed out
that Polish monarchs had created them as revenue factors and accorded them limited
autonomy in communal affairs as long as there were no conflicts with or compromise of
royal authority. On paper this arrangement appeared ideal but, on the advent of the
partitions, kahal abuses had become blatant and Russian authorities merely absorbed this
corruption along with Polish territory. Expediency once more led to autocratic blindness,
according to Brafman, since the tsars valued the kahals solely as tax collectors and trade
regulators. Their officers were given a free hand in communal affairs, a mistake which
was realized when revenue returns from some communities varied radically from year to
year and eventually led to the dissolution of the kahals in1844.164 When this occurred,
Brafman had hoped that the Jewish community had learned its lesson about integrity over
guile. He was disappointed. Filling the void was a new Jewish administrative body, the
asifr (asifah) which the author claimed was even more corrupt and skilled at deception
than its predecessor.165

163

Jacob Brafman, Kniga kagala (St. Petersburg, 1881), p. 88.
Ibid., p. 103, 109.
165
Ibid., p. 90. This is the most esoteric reference in the entire work. According to Israel Cohen, the
Asifah was, as Brafman described, an exclusive and influential group which was made up of kahal elders
and held near-absolute authority. Where Brafman errs is in thinking that this body took the place of the
kahals after the 1844 dissolution, ignoring the fact that the Asifah could not stand alone. See Israel Cohen,
Vilna (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1944), pp. 118-120.
164

294
At the core of Brafman’s concerns was what he perceived to be the ill-defined
place of the kahals within the socio-political structure of the Empire. Limited autonomy
via the kahals as a temporary step towards emancipation was a cynical device, he opined.
For example, the government established three-year limits on communal rabbis in order
to avoid official corruption yet neglected to either define or limit their authority as chief
judges of their respective Bet Dinim (communal rabbinical courts) which fell under kahal
purview. Akin to the office of Gaon, these rabbis soon found that impartiality and justice
to be romantic fictions while placating those who administered their salaries became a
full-time occupation.166

Some Jewish communities were literally divided against

themselves owing to this circumstance. Russian literacy, another imposition, was billed
as the liberating grace from superstition and mysticism and yet for those who acquired it,
the government offered little in the way of employment outside of the shtetlach or
integration into the larger society. If embracing Jews in a free forum caused uneasiness,
there would be little risk in following Napoleon I’s example in France by establishing a
commensurate category of True Russians of the Mosaic faith.167 Brafman was at a loss to
understand why the government was reluctant to affect this transition. Traditionalists
would not have to fear assimilation and Russian reactionaries could find little fault in
such a designation, but official action was slow in coming. Devoting considerable
attention to Jewish education was admirable, Brafman conceded, but to train Jews for
occupations and positions which would not be there for them after completing their
instruction was the height of futility. The Society for the Spreading of Enlightenment
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among the Jews, Brafman contended, had a noble mission before it.

By 1880, it

numbered 340 men and had cells in Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, Yekaterinoslav, Vilna,
Minsk, and Kazan which all enjoyed minimal success overall in the face of staunch
suspicion from the Jews themselves. Past government designs and bad-faith negotiations
had made many Jews suspicious of any attempt to improve Jewish education. Accused of
being apostates determined to absorb Judaism into the Russian milieu, Society agents had
to reassure potential members that russification neither eradicated nor diminished
Talmudic morals while believing it themselves.168 To lend credence to their promises,
their schools, most notably the one in Mariampol (in Russian Poland), taught Russian,
German and geography along with Jewish history, Hebrew, and religion with the result
being that these cosmopolitan schools inculcated their students with a greater awareness
of their Jewishness than any heder or yeshiva. Satisfied with this condition, Brafman
concluded his lengthy survey of the Jewish condition by expressing wonder as to why
mitnagdim and maskilim were fretting about the demise of their respective designs as a
result of the other’s slanders and manipulation. Judaism had to change. Even Baron
Lionel de Rothschild’s L’Alliance Israelite Universelle, whose foray into this dispute
made it all the more ludicrous, could not prevent the obvious transformation of the
Russian Jewish condition. Whatever Russian Jewry became would have to be accepted
as a fait accompli. Despite being an apostate himself, Brafman’s pronouncements on this
subject were neither malicious nor contemptuous. Relating to the significance of the bris
(rite of circumcision) and marriage rites, he actually referred to them as “our most holy
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events,” which testified to the convenience rather than the conviction of his
conversion.169

The Polish Revolt and its Aftermath:The Mosaic of Official Jewish Identity

Brafman was not the first to exploit conditions for personal benefit but, that aside,
Kniga kagala did emphasize the frustrated hope among the Jews of Russia for civic
parity. Around the time of its second printing in 1881, Russian Jews were still hoping for
what Jews in other lands possessed and should have been accorded to their Russian
coreligionists had not adversity interceded.170 No other event proved so decisive in
deciding the destiny of Russian Jewry than the Polish Revolt of 1863-64. Russian
liberals rallied behind the Tsar in a spirit of chauvinism.171 In such an atmosphere,
paranoia permeated all strata of society. Any mention of “separatism”, “nationalism” or
“particularism” coming from a non-Russian community, no matter how slight, fell under
the scrutiny of the Interior Minister.172 Besides the Poles, the Ukrainians were becoming
a source of uneasiness in the immediate aftermath of the Revolt but, when overt
hostilities ceased, all non-Russian nationalities would become suspect. Reform had to
come to the Empire, but the intent had been to spare the autocracy.173 In this endeavor,
Alexander II was alone without any means to guide his course. His two predecessors had
recognized the potential for a reform crisis, but each had managed to put it off. Domestic
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and foreign affairs had not accorded the present Tsar that luxury. The Poles had been
offered the restoration of those liberties which Nicholas I had abrogated in 1831, but the
Reds had insisted upon an independent Poland and nothing less.174 Polish unrest and the
subsequent Rising of 22 January 1863 could not have come at a worse time. Education,
heretofore seen as the key to Russia’s modernity, was now considered suspect. Owing to
the lack of clearly defined rights and safeguards on academic freedom and the authority
of professors and administrators, student riots broke out at the universities of Kazan,
Moscow and St. Petersburg. These events, coupled with mysterious fires in the capital,
all but compelled the Tsar to reconsider his actions.175 Already, the limitations on
university admissions had been repealed on 23 November 1855 and the curriculum made
more comprehensive.

The education students were receiving made them able

competitors with their European counterparts while alienating them from the autocratic
state. Exacerbating the problem was that in the period 1858-63, Russia had had three
successive education ministers, none of whom had attended university.176 This matter
was laid bare when the Russian intelligentsia accepted and became entrenched in the
philosophy of German Idealism and its emphasis upon critical investigation and
intuition.177
Giving birth to an intellectual elite capable of transforming Russia into a
respected European power required significant institutional restructuring.
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expectations of the nobility in the aftermath of serf emancipation, the intelligentsia’s
demands for direct political participation was only a matter of time. Nicholas I had
outlawed discussions of political issues in 1845 and sought to keep the governed at bay.
Alexander II, however, realized that if Russia was to progress, the intellectual elite would
have to be given a voice, perhaps a hand in political affairs, but only to a limited
degree.178 The Basic Principles, proposed in 1862 and implemented fully throughout the
Empire by the middle of 1865, was Alexander’s attempt to achieve social and political
concord with an increasingly changing Russia.

Universities were granted greater

freedoms than they had had heretofore, and there was moderate easing of the censorship
statutes but, lest there be any mistake, this liberality was sharply curtailed in political
affairs. When a group of landowners sought an audience with the Tsar in 1864 to
negotiate the extent of their participation in politics, Alexander agreed to meet with them
unofficially. When they had his audience, the Tsar then made it clear that political reform
was his prerogative alone and that no social class had the right to interfere.179 To prevent
future misunderstandings, the Basic Principles directed the Minister of Internal Affairs to
banish persons deemed politically dangerous or suspicious, and thus was born the
Russian legal institution of administrative exile which would outlive the Empire. Despite
this development, the Basic Principles provided a foundation for Alexander’s reform
initiatives, including the introduction of public trials as a guarantee of openness in legal
procedures. Unified rule of law in the Russian Empire, a feat beyond Catherine II’s
177
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abilities, was a viable hope for Alexander II.180 Regardless of his disposition towards
reform, Alexander could not prevent the upswell of revolutionary fervor among Russian
intellectuals and their Jewish counterparts.181 European influences were flowing into
Russia daily, and Europe’s perceived advantages only made Russia’s deficiencies all the
more stark. Attempts on the part of A.V. Golovnin (Acting Minister of Education) and P.
Valuev (Minister of the Interior) to arrive at a censorship arrangement suitable to both the
government and journalists proved daunting. Ivan Turgenev termed those intellectuals
“nihilists” who sought to cast aside everything in the belief that destruction was a creative
force, and condemned them for the ills which would invariably follow. Conservative
intellectuals, ministers, and newspaper editors were duly concerned by the revolutionary
ferment of the post-emancipation era, but none more so than the Tsar himself. That
Alexander was preoccupied with his prerogatives and what would become of them was
self-evident, but this was not his concern alone. The massive and unwieldy Russian
bureaucracy, through obduracy, fear, and stupidity on some levels, was fighting for its
very life.182 Beset with a society “straining at the bit” and a government incapable of
accommodating its aspirations, the Tsar had one of the more unenviable positions in
Europe. In an effort to improve Russia’s image abroad and encourage interest, preferably
commercial, in the Empire, the newspaper Le Nord was established in Belgium in 1855 to
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acquaint Europeans with the “reality” of Russia and dispel falsehood.183 The Europeans
remained unconvinced and their general thoughts and perceptions towards Russia were
hostile, especially towards those autocratic precepts which Alexander II swore to uphold
at his coronation. Russia’s integrity could not be sacrificed on any account, but the Tsar
had only a small coterie of advisors to guide him and Russia towards modernity, a
problematic situation in its own right.184
The Jews of Russia were neither lost nor forgotten amidst the ferment of the Great
Reforms. Polish rebels, suspected and actual, were punished in droves, an ominous move
which the Jews interpreted as a harbinger of matters to come since their Polish
coreligionists were represented in the rebel camp.185 It would have mattered little if only
one Jew had taken part since his punishment alone would not have spared Jewish
communities on both sides of the border from official and unofficial recrimination. Being
the Empire’s most visible non-Russian community, any involvement would have excited
fears in government circles because, like that of the Poles, the Jewish condition was a
product of decades of oppression.

From being an unwanted nationality, they had

graduated to the status of potential fifth column. Prior to 1863, discussion over Jewish
emancipation had been broached along with various implementation schemes, but now all
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was for naught.186 The Polish Revolt had taken its toll on the Tsar’s prestige, and
retribution was point of personal and dynastic honor.187
Alexander II’s response was to impose a new set of special taxes on the Jews. So
proficient and regular was he in implementing these excises that the Yiddish novelist
Mendele Mokher Sforim declared that death may indeed be the end of most men but
taxes would certainly be the end of the Jew.188 Official admonishments to engage in
productive pursuits and educational opportunities followed in the wake of fiscal
obligations. However, no sooner would the Jews be directed or encouraged to take
advantage of openings in various professions or university and technical schools then,
just as swiftly, they were held back by such legal obstacles as the numerus clausus in
university admissions and an ever-narrowing employment sphere.189 Earlier generations
had greeted these contradictions with relative silence, but a newly-emerging Jewish
intelligentsia began to make its voice heard. Honoring St. Petersburg’s injunction to
apply their imposed Russian literacy and fluency in other foreign languages to good
purpose, many vented their frustrations and ideas in Jewish journals and newsletters
which gave them a public venue to express their views on a wide range of issues. Few
hesitated to decry their plight and criticize official Jewish policies, an exercise which was
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given almost free vent considering the abandonment of pre-publication censorship.190
Even so, many of these works, even some of the less virulent articles, were subject to
subsequent bans or alterations.191
Could a mutually-beneficial consensus between the government and the Jews be
reached? This was the overarching concern of Joachim Tarnopol who praised Alexander
II for his progressive programs and apologized for his bureaucratic shortcomings, yet
expressed his dismay over wasted Jewish potential when denied the opportunity of full
expression in gainful employment.192 No one contested the changes in Russia which had
come about in this era, but some attitudes and actions differed little from what had been
given in the previous reign. Various officials maintained that provisions had been made
to provide ample educational and employment opportunities, but many of these
palliatives were transparent, and no other group understood this more keenly than Jewish
farmers.

At the behest of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1863-64, official

investigations of Jewish agricultural colonies were undertaken in Bessarabia, Minsk and
Yekaterinoslav to assess their productivity. Without exception, the reports claimed that
the land contours and soil were extremely poor which made any worthwhile agronomic
endeavor impossible to pursue in these areas. Similar investigations were carried out in
other Jewish colonies throughout the decade and were published in Materiali dla
geographii i statistiki rossii (Materials for Geography and Statistics of Russia) in 1871.
By its own admission, the government had allotted to these settlements substandard land
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and yet the colonists, expecting financial relief or land improvements, were faulted. In
spite of the evidence before them, officials stated that Jewish farmers brought about their
own failures owing to their addiction to Judaism.193

State officials contended that

fertilizer and seed from government stocks had been made available to the colonists as
well as low-interest loans for land purchases, more than sufficient resources for
cultivation. By arguing in this vein throughout this discourse, the Ministry revealed its
intentions. It was of little consequence if Jewish agricultural settlements were situated in
peripheral locales known to have nitrate-deficient soil. Instead, documented Jewish
failures in this endeavor provided prima facie evidence to support the contention that
Judaism was an anti-agrarian religion.194 At best, Alexander II may have heard of these
developments in passing but it is unlikely that he perceived the broader implications.
Propaganda value notwithstanding, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its provincial and
regional officials engaged the Jews in a cynical game rigged to favor the designers at the
expense of its unwilling players. Before the Ministry investigators set out for their
designated regions, higher officials had guessed beforehand what their agents would find.
The reason for this was that as far back as 1817 with the first Society of Israelite
Christians’ agricultural settlements, this same ruse had drawn in the Jews. In the mid1830’s, Nicholas I had advocated Jewish agronomy to another generation as a means of
social advancement, and a new set of players were rooked in the same fashion. Since
there was no perceivable way to turn these failures into monetary windfalls, their value
192
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rested in inculcating among rural Jews with a sense of inferiority and perpetuating that
image in the popular Russian imagination. Direct bureaucratic assistance was well
disguised.

If viable land had been apportioned to Jewish colonists and they had

succeeded, the stereotypes would have lost potency and the Jews accorded psychological
emancipation from their ill-favored status.
After examining the survey reports, the Ministry of the Internal Affairs surmised
that it would be futile to teach Jews how to farm. Jewish writers wasted no time in
exposing the presumed anti-agrarian nature of Judaism as a feeble libel. Abraham, the
first Jew, was a farmer and so too were generations thereafter.195 In addition, the Jewish
calendar was a lunar one centered around the seasons and Sukkhot, the Festival of the
Ingathering, could be nothing else than an agrarian celebration. However, it was assumed
that despite these indisputable facts, government agents would not retract what they had
advanced. The Russian public, Jews and non-Jews alike, were the target audience.
Informing them of these affairs in an effort to influence public opinion and forestall
adverse government actions sustained the Jewish stigma which could be used to official
advantage. Jewish survival was at the heart of nineteenth-century Jewish journalism,
particularly when the Ministry of Internal Affairs finally admitted that it had suppressed
the truth behind the Blood Libel.
Acts of mob violence touched off on the slim pretext of a Christian kidnapping and
ritual murder were often matters of life and death which the Ministry downplayed as
localized disturbances.

As early as 1871-72, a fact-finding mission similar to that
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constituted to examine Jewish agricultural productivity conducted investigations into the
Blood Libel. Those involved concluded that the notion was impossible given Jewish
theological mores, ethics, and practical science.196

Seven years elapsed before the

Ministry published its assessments of Jewish agronomy while those on the Blood Libel
were withheld and popular superstition allowed to gather strength. Since 1821, Russia
had experienced episodic pogroms sparked by the Blood Libel, but those from the 1870’s
onward were extremely virulent, culminating finally in the famous 1913 Beilis Trial.197
Bureaucratic slowness and disinterest played no small role in delaying official
discounting of this myth, though calculated inefficiency and low cunning had their worth.
Like the mythical anti-agrarian Jewish religious fanatic, the specter of the bloodlusting
anti-Christian Jew could be manipulated to control public perceptions and keep the Jews
as the eternal outsiders. The Blood Libel was permitted to stand because it checked
Jewish social, intellectual, economic and professional advancement and added to their
stigmatized status. The image of Jewish inundation of Russian life and the anticipated
vengeful persecution of their former oppressors weighed heavily upon more than a few
anti-Semitic consciences.198
For all of its advantages, the Blood Libel was becoming one of Russia’s graver
curses in the century’s last three decades.
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engulfed Western Europe and had made inroads in Poland and Russia had the reciprocal
effect of laying bare their respective social iniquities. Russia would certainly not be
exempt from exposure if only because the Rothschilds, Baron de Hirsch and other philoSemites were determined not to allow it to hide behind a wall of secrecy. Eliciting acute
international criticism were the two Kishinev pogroms of 1881 and 1903, the latter the
result of a rumor of ritual murder. Claiming that the size of the official bureaucracy and
its countless ex-officio civilian assistants made prevention and the administration of
justice virtually impossible may have been a credible excuse, though the international
community disregarded it.199

Following this with protestations of innocence in either

orchestrating or condoning these riots may very well have been plausible, but for an
Empire striving for the respect and dignity of a world power these apologies injured its
chances of obtaining this status. Other nations would look askance at an Empire so large
and mighty whose government could not enforce domestic order. Foreign observations
and judgments were blunt and Nicholas II, along with his two predecessors, knew this
and noted it accordingly. Pogroms were no longer internal matters and half measures
towards discovering and punishing their participants were now unacceptable. As a
consequence, the Odessa regional police inspector ordered the arrest of some 200
suspected pogromists in the aftermath of the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, but only at the
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urging of the resident American military attaché. The fate of the incarcerated was not
reported but, they were set at liberty after a brief imprisonment.200
It is difficult to state precisely whether Russia, especially in the late nineteenth
century, suffered from what Theodore Mommsen termed Judenfurcht (Jewish terror) or
its beleaguered officials were merely at a loss for what to make of the Jews.201 No doubt
some did nurse apprehensions though few sought the Devil under their respective
bedsheets. Alexander II and Alexander III thought of the Jews from time to time but
neither’s policies towards them demonstrated extraordinary or even moderate
Judeophobia.202 Matters seemed to be taking on a life of their own. Accounting for this,
several facets of the Russian Jewish condition may not have been dictated from above
though responsibility for them still lay within proximity to the throne.

Jewish Journalistic Self-Defense and Concern Over the Russian Identity

With official reaction running high in the aftermath of the Polish Revolt, social
and literary Judeophobia was not only widespread but actually respectable.203 Should
anyone be so ill-advised as to assume that Jewish silence meant agreement, Osip
Rabinovich ensured that no such misconstruance could be made. To those who referred
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to Jews as Moshkas, Ioshkas, and espoused a host of slanders and libels, Rabinovich
responded that for the Jews to respond to each and every one of these insults was
unworthy of them.204

Attempts on the part of Russian Jews to present themselves

honestly were usually distorted in the Russian press, a consequence which led to the
establishment of a number of Jewish journals in the 1860’s and ‘70’s. Devoted to Jewish
concerns within the broader spectrum of Russian life, newspapers such as Den: organ
russkikh evreev (Day: Organ of the Russian Jews) and Vestnik russkikh evreev (Russian
Herald of the Jews) advocated a rapprochement between Jews and Russians. Legal
reform was the first step and had actually begun prior to the Polish Revolt after which it
became a moribund issue. Even so, what both Den and Vestnik wanted their Russian
compatriots to understand was that Jews wanted to participate in all facts of Russian life
while still retaining the religion of the forefathers.205 Official attempts to diminish
Jewish religious attachment by means of the Jewish government schools had been
misguided, according to the Jewish contributors of these journals. If Russian educators
had been commissioned to teach Russian as an augmentary component of, not a
substitution for, Jewish studies, the Russian-Jewish rapprochement would now be a
reality. As matters stood by 1871, there was still a glimmer of hope that Russians and
Jews could come together as distinct peoples, it was a distant one. Both sides had much
to accomplish before such a project bore fruit.
Associated with the Jewish Question was Russian officialdom’s attempts to
preserve the Imperial state against the influence of resident non-Russians.206
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Russification was not desirable by the 1870’s, not that it had ever been a crucial
consideration in Alexander II’s plans. In the eyes of Russian officialdom, the peasant,
because of his ignorance of foreign ideas, was considered to be the ideal standard-bearer
of Russian national culture who was well suited to implant it wherever he settled. He
was thought to be incorruptible. Reality, however, dictated otherwise. In the late 1870’s,
it came to the attention of the government that a number of these so-called incorruptible
emissaries of Russian civilization had “gone native” in Siberia.207 Perplexity was the first
official response. It was unthinkable to the government that a born and bred Russians,
members of a great civilization, could be degraded by voluntarily assuming the culture
and religious practices of their erstwhile lesser neighbors.

Indeed, this was an

embarassment to Russian prestige but, finally, an official explanation was offered. This
ethnic degeneration was the fault of the Russian colonists who tended to be of the “lowest
type,” barely aware of their Russianness and, therefore, the most susceptible to
compromise.208

Given the physical distances, the state of transportation, and the

hopelessness of reconverting these individuals to Russian mores, the Russian government
eventually ignored them and attended to more pressing matters of state.

Evreiskaia biblioteka: A Jewish Perspective
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By the latter part of the century it was realized that the Jewish popular press had
the potential to act as a mediator between the Jewish community and the government.209
Dialogue was essential if reform within in the Jewish sphere was to enjoy any success,
and with the liberalization of press restrictions in the mid-1860's, the Jews were among
the beneficiaries.

As early as 1858, Alexander II opined that the heavily-censored

Russian press impeded social reform. Society had to be more open, a calculated risk
which would launch Russia into the modern age, and during the period 1862-65, Russia’s
first boulevard press emerged.210 Jewish presses were included and permitted to exist
anywhere within Russia provided that they, like their Russian counterparts, observed the
standing censorship regulations. Well inured to such proscriptions, it did not take long
for both Russian and Jewish editors and writers to develop strategies which allowed them
self-expression while circumventing the more onerous prohibitions.211

Of equal

consequence were the demands of subscribers who, by the 1870’s, were determining the
content and orientations of their periodicals. Direct criticism of the Tsar was still
forbidden, but an investigative report on local corruption would certainly be appreciated
in St. Petersburg and spark official action.212
Making its debut in 1871, Evreiskaia biblioteka was both a journal and a
newspaper. Claiming to be a literary-historical journal, this particular publication
embraced a wide spectrum of ideas, commentaries, editorials, and even extensive book
reviews. Serial novels, such as Lev Levanda’s Goriachee vremia (Hot or Turbulent
Times) and stories like M. Brandshteter’s Mordkhe kizovich, were examples of an
209

Weinberg, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 60-61.
McReynolds, The News Under Russia's Old Regime, pp. 23-4, 52.
211
Weinberg, Between Tradition and Modernity, p. 61.
210

311
emergent new Jewish literature which this publication showcased in the hope of ensuring
Jewish viability. Its more mudane function was to provide an outlet for local or special
interest articles, opinions, and complaints against government policies, Jewish
parochialism, or any issue touching upon Jewish life in Russia or abroad. By assuming
this dual demeanor, Evreiskaia biblioteka served a variety of interests among Russia’s
various Jewish groups though, for most of its life, the Jewish intelligentsia made up the
bulk of its contributors. Nevertheless, during its ten-year run (1871-1881), it informed
the Jews of Russia, promoted intellectual development, provided an officially-sanctioned
forum for grievances, and most importantly, an audible “voice” which was heard with
greater attention in official circles as the nineteenth century entered its final decades.
A general description of Evreiskaia biblioteka’s submissions could be summed up
in the title of Lev Levanda’s novel. The 1870’s were indeed turbulent times for Russians
and Jews alike though, with regard to the latter, the contest over identity had changed.
Gone were the external assaults upon Judaism; now a new problem from within had come
about which concerned Lev Gordon (Judah Leib).213

A moderate Jewish reformer,

Gordon and his associates had labored to preserve Judaism while bringing it in line with
modern circumstance. This project had always been a frustrating one, particularly in
Russia during Nicholas’ regin where obstacles abounded without end.

Now under

Alexander II, the atmosphere was not so severe but the question of Jewish identities had
taken on another dimension. In the German rabbinical academies and Jewish schools,
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Hebrew instruction was being abandoned.214 Given the Russian Jewish association with
German scholarship, Gordon feared the worst. Though perceptible gains had been made
in some quarters regarding the formation of distinctive Russian Jewish identities, the
Russian Jewish intelligentsia tended to follow the German example. A new Jewish
literature written in contemporary languages and reflective of modern Jewish experiences
was indeed needed, according to Gordon, but not at the expense of literacy in Hebrew.215
Hebrew was the key to understanding and preserving Jewish history and culture. If it
were abandoned, then those two pillars of Jewish identity would be lost as well. Russian
Jews, however, by maintaining Hebrew literacy while developing a new literature made
accessible in Russian and other modern languages via translation, could revitalize Jewish
intellectual life. Quite possibly, such works would appeal to a non-Jewish audience and
mitigate the misconceptions surrounding the Jewish community. Quite possibly if such a
rapport could be established with the larger Russian community some good could be
derived. By no means a solitary and ephemeral crusade, Alexander Harkavy, another
Russian Jewish intellectual, would advocate a similar program a decade later.
Hope amidst adversity was a predominant theme in the articles published in
Evreiskaia biblioteka. In 1873, V.V. Stasova remarked that there was hope of Jewish
acceptance, or at least toleration, in European circles owing to a renewed artistic interest
in Jewish life and culture.216 For the first time since the medieval period, Jews once more
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were being depicted without hostility, at least on canvas in Paris.217 Throughout Europe,
but particularly in France, Stasova claimed that Jewish images were being rethought and
cast in a new light. This change in demeanor, however, should not come as a surprise. To
Stasova’s mind, France had always been the first among the European nations to embark
upon socially progressive ventures which would soon be taken up by her neighbors.
What Stasova hoped to gain from his article was twofold.

First of all, he

broadened the horizons of his readers by informing them of significant developments
affecting Jewish interests outside of Russia and Germany. More to the point, he offered
hope. The political rights of non-Russians were meager with no immediate promise of
expansion, let alone equality, with Russian citizens who themselves had few rights
comparable with those of a growing number of their Western and Central European
counterparts. Even so, Alexander was anxious to modernize Russia and make it an equal
partner among the European Great Powers and, in pursuit of that goal, Russian society
had become more open. Jewish journals and periodicals were certainly progressive
within the Russian milieu and, with the passage of time, it was quite possible that the
Jews of Russia might still stand to gain some important concessions. Since the flow of
modernity tended to migrate from west to east, its arrival in Russia was not out of the
question, just simply a matter of time. Such was Stasova’s perception in any case.
Current intellectual and political issues were quite important but so too were some
lingering unresolved issues from within the Jewish community. Writing in response to an
earlier letter to the editor and offering an explanation for the failure of Haskalah in Minsk
province, Lev Levanda attempted to present the Jewish side of one of the more
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controversial aspects of Russia’s Jewish Question. Specifically, M. Margolis, another
contributor, had criticized the Jews of Minsk province for their rejection of Max
Lilienthal when he attempted to win them over to Haskalah. Levanda thought that this
condemnation was too severe and unjustified.218 In his rebuttal, Levanda maintained that
too often Russian officials and some Jewish progressives assessed blame without
considering circumstance.

It should be remembered, Levanda admonished, that

Lilienthal’s arrival was unexpected. At first, he puzzled the Jews with whom he came
into contact. When he announced his Haskalah program, he exicted fears among his
listeners, fears which could have been mitigated if only he had been willing to listen to
Jewish community leaders and had considered their views.219 Taken by surprise and
confronted with a program which was beyond both their experience and comprehension,
Lilienthal’s mission was doomed to fail. Haskalah for the Jews of Minsk province,
Levanda contended, was too progressive a scheme to be implemented, much less
maintained, given the community’s intellectual resources. Once these deficiencies had
been taken into account, it was plain that these Jews should not be judged so harshly.
Education and intellectual advancement were key concerns among the Jewish
intelligentsia and especially to Evreiskaia biblioteka's contributors. Frequently, their
pieces expressed requests for equal civil rights. Ia. Rosenfeld stated the matter plainly
when he claimed that if sensible Russian society would unite with the Jews, expanded
and equal rights for the latter would be forthcoming.220

All too often, legislative

decisions were influenced by public opinion which had always opposed this demand.
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What was the point of all Jewish labors and hopes, he inquired, if these rights could not
be achieved? Why are Jewish detractors unable to see that such a reform would not
benefit the Jews exclusively? By expanding Jewish legal and political rights, Rosenfeld
claimed that state economic and social interests would also be served.221
An active voice was Russian Jewry’s only hope to affect substantial social and
political gains and Jewish journalism held the key.222 The golden age of Jewish literature
had arrived, declared Ben Iosef, and amidst the variety and diversity of publications, the
Jewish voice had never enjoyed such freedom. Attitudes within the Jewish community
were changing. Fifteen, even ten years ago, conservatives believed that Jewish literature
written in languages other than Hebrew would lead to impiety, but this had not occurred.
Jews were still God-fearing (bogoboriaznenny).223 Even Hebrew had been enlisted in
secular service. As early as 1854, the Jewish newspaper, Ha Maggid, was published for
Russian Jews who were so eager for news that they read it in their synagogues during
prayer hours.224 At that time, the Crimean War was of particular interest. The founder
of this publication, Zilbermann, wanted to educate the Jews of Russia, especially the
young, but was concerned about imparting too much of the truth about the larger world to
his readers. Since then, times have changed, observed Ben Iosef, and now the Jews of
Russia could take full advantage of the literary openness which was before them.
Indeed, Jewish journalism and the voice it expressed had made great strides
during Alexander II’s reign though, even with relaxed censorship regulations, it had not
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been an easy sojourn. Ben Iosef’s article struck a positive tone, but even he could not
have forgotten the bitter journalistic contest which had arisen from the 1861-62 SionOsnova Controversy.225 Perhaps Ukrainians had only one word for “Jew,” (zhid), but
Jewish progressives feared that that same word, orthographically identical to the Russian
slur, and other epithets would find their way into the Russian press. In the face of a fairly
active Jewish parallel, however, their influence would be challenged and certainly not
accepted in silence.

Comparisons with the Polish Jewish Experience

Russian Jews shared with their Polish coreligionists the same government but not
entirely the same circumstance.

The situation of Polish Jewry was so changeable,

particularly after the suppression of the Revolt, that it would have defeated a gambler’s
odds. Russian efforts to foment divisions between Jews and Poles and overt hostility
towards any attempts between Poles and Jews to achieve rapproachment, made Jewish
life there all but untenable.226 Even so, the Jewish Question was the most-discussed issue
in Polish journalism.227 Venerated as the acceptable “little Jews” in one instance and
then vilified as an “alien group with no attachment to Polish culture” in another, Polish
Jews often did not know where to turn or how to react to the sea of philo- and anti-
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Semitic polemics which all but consumed them.228

In their efforts to stabilize the

turbulence, they found an odd ally in adverse political events. One favorite accusation of
Polish anti-Semites was that Jews were anti-patriotic and disrespectful towards Polish
Catholic institutions and traditions. This claim lost credibility temporarily in April 1861,
when Rabbi Ber Meisels of Bransk was arrested and then expelled from the country for
closing local synagogues in protest over Russian desecration of Warsaw’s Catholic
churches.229 The Polish press also noted that during the 8 April demonstration Michael
Landy, a young Warsaw yeshiva student, grabbed a cross-capped staff from a fallen
priest whom the Cossacks had gunned down and continued to march on in his place. A
few steps later he too would fall dead.230 Such heroism could not be discounted, and
when these stories circulated throughout the country, they instigated a temporary philoSemitic outpouring.231
The year 1861 saw a flurry of activity on the part of Polish reformers trying to
forge a national political entity while, at least as far as the moderates were concerned,
placating their Russian overlords. Working ardently towards realizing Polish autonomy
within the bounds of the 1832 Organic Statute, defusing radical revolutionary furor, and
even advocating full emancipation and legal equality for Jews was Count Alexander
Wielopolski.232 One of his early champions and a notable figure among the Whites

228

Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p. 370. Particularly puzzling was the presence of positive Jewish
images in a number of Polish works in the period 1865-1880 amidst recurrent accusations of Jewish
“betrayal” as the cause for the failure of the January Rising. Opalski and Bartal, Poles and Jews, pp. 42-3.
229
Hoffman, Shtetl, p. 121.
230
Cyprian Norwid, “Polish Jews” (1861) Stranger in Our Midst, p. 89. See also Opalski and Bartal, Poles
and Jews, p. 46.
231
Since the goal of the Polish press was to inspire patriotism, it was only natural to include “good Jews,”
acting in behalf of Polish interests. Once adversity set in, however, the Jew would revert to alien status.
See Hertz, The Jews in Polish Culture, p. 209.
232
Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.372.

318
(moderates) was Leopold Kronenburg, a Jew who had converted to Catholicism to avoid
personal adversity in the preceding decade.233 Despite apparently substantial support,
Wielopolski soon discovered that his was a thankless task.

Through insisting that

nationalist demands be cast aside and that full cooperation with the Russian government
was the only way Poland could ameliorate Russian rule, he ended up alienating large
sections of the moderate camp. Count Andrzej Zamoyski, for example, whose group was
linked to the Agricultural Society and had initially supported Wielopolski’s scheme,
eventually succumbed to the Warsaw Reds (revolutionary radicals). Soon others joined
the radical ranks out of political pressure. Time was of the essence. For the young army
officers, landowners, and university students who comprised the radical camp,
Wielopolski was moving too slowly and was too subservient to the Russians, especially
since the Count would not even consider the notion of a fully independent Poland.
Alexander II’s expressed approval of Wielopolski’s proposals did little to ingratiate him
with those who styled themselves as selfless Polish patriots, and when the Polish Catholic
Church cast its lot with the radicals at the end of 1861, Wielopolski had to concede the
field.234 The Uprising of 1863-64 was the consequence of the failure to steer a moderate
reformist course.
In 1866, novelist Josef Kraszewski (1812-1887), reflecting upon the Warsaw
demonstration and the January Rising (1863), wrote a fictionalized account of two
friends, Iwas, a Christian, and Jacob, a Jew, discussing the status and perception of the
latter’s coreligionists in Poland. Iwas queried as to whether his friend thought himself
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more of an Israelite than a Pole, considering that he did not adopt Polish customs, dress,
or participate in political activities.

Jacob responded that the Jews owed Poland a

substantial debt for taking them in and shielding them from medieval Crusaders and the
Inquisition; since he had lived all of his life in the country, he thought himself as much a
Pole as an Israelite.235 Rabbi Meisels had reasoned similarly, claiming to be part of
Polish landscape. Iwas’s observations of Jewish non-assimilation and a reluctance to
enter politics were accurate but as Jacob pointed out, these shortcomings were as much a
consequence of Christian proscriptions as they were Jewish parochialism.236 Given the
current influx of influences from Western Europe, however, Jewish political participation
would soon take off.
Polish elites, by virtue of an autonomous educational system before 1863, had
attempted to bring about Jewish assimilation through the imposition of a cosmopolitan
curriculum and had achieved results similar to those of the Russians. Jewish society in
Poland now consisted of several groups and dispositions scattered throughout the
country, and it was apparent that the Jew of late nineteenth-century Poland was not what
he once was. Owing to his Jewish, European and humanistic education (Jewish women
were excluded from this milieu), the modern Polish Jew had more choices and
opportunities before him but, as Kraszewski’s Jacob opined, such freedom was perilous.
Jewish traditions had, for the heedless, been replaced by Polish ones or sacrificed on the
altar of reason which rendered them soulless entities in possession of a dead
the “established” Polish Christian. As one Polish Jewish patriot remarked, “I love Poland but not
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modernity.237

For Jacob, this was a dreary prospect but one which had not become

universal. Presenting himself as one of a select minority, Jacob asserted that he was
neither a spiritual ghost nor a fanatic, superstitious traditionalist. He was a cosmopolitan
Jew who respected Jewish traditions within the context of contemporary life. As such, he
posed no threat to Polish mores or anyone else’s.238
Could not most Poles understand that Jews were their patriotic brethren? Having
been active in the January Rising and sharing defeat’s hardships with their Christian
countrymen, the latter repaid Polish Jewish patriots by joining the Russians in
denouncing them as spies and opportunists, casting them adrift without any support.239
A Jew and the devil were children of the same mother, according to a Polish proverb
which was gaining currency at this time.240 Such fickleness made continued coexistence
doubtful when the maintenance of that centuries-old symbiosis was essential if Poland
wished to remain a cultural nation of any stature.241 Old habits had deep roots and those
of the Poles were well entrenched. Jewish status before and after the Polish Rising
served as an object lesson for Russia and Russian Jewry if they were astute enough to
grasp it.242

The parallels were there.

Poland was undergoing a similar dual

metamorphosis and sought identical means in resolving its Jewish Question, differing
only in that these processes were more prominent than in the Empire. With Poland being
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brought under even closer scrutiny after 1863, St. Petersburg could ill afford to ignore the
Polish mirror of its own Jewish affairs.
In a climate of uncertainty, the liberal novelist and journalist, Boleslaw Prus
decided to write in 1875 what he hoped would be recognized as a well-reasoned response
to the Jewish presence in Poland. True, the focus of his “Chronicles” was on the Jews of
Poland, but if “Russia” were substituted for “Poland,” his article would have been
relevant still. “Reason must prevail over the anti-Semite,” he wrote. To advocate the
immediate expatriation of the Jews from Poland was akin to divesting the human body of
its arteries and expecting it to continue living.243 Since the tenth century, Prus contended,
Jews had been living in Poland and though they were still a distinct people, their long
relationship with Polish society had made them an essential part of the country’s organic
whole. Prus made it clear that he was neither a philo- nor anti-Semite but merely one
who sought to distribute equally credit and blame among Poles and Jews. Some believed
that Jews held the monopoly on filth and laziness but should one venture into Warsaw’s
slums, Prus maintained, it would be clear that poor Christians suffered from the same
afflictions. Every popular misconception about the Jews could be applied to Christians.
As far as ignorance, intolerance, arrogance, and prejudice were concerned, both
communities possessed them in equal measure.
The Jews were in need of reform, Prus agreed, but their present defects were as
much of Europe’s making as their own.244 Spain, France, England, Italy and Germany
each gave testament to Jewish fortitude under extreme duress, but it was in Poland where
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they found rest, established institutions, and prospered for several centuries. Since the
beginning of the Diaspora, Poland was as close as the Jews had come to having a
fatherland. They had labored for many of its causes and these deeds had not gone
unnoticed. The Castellan of Lukow had once declared that Jews were Polish citizens and
useful ones at that. Though hardly a recommendation for sainthood, it was a genuine
rebuke to those individuals who found Jewish criminality, real and imagined, more
distasteful than the Christian variety.

Such reasoning, Prus admonished, should be

examined carefully. Since the fifteenth century, Polish Jews had been compelled to act
contrary to human nature. After all, it was the height of perversion to insist that they
labor on Poland’s behalf when its fruits were not assured them. Furthermore, to expect
them to act with civility towards those who spat in their faces and to conduct themselves
honestly when most honest employment was denied them was a cruel joke. Perhaps the
most preposterous aspect was the belief that Jews should assume a dignified bearing
while fettered about the neck and kiss the hands of those responsible for placing them in
this condition.245 Good and evil were not the exclusive provinces of one group and it was
true that the Jews had their respective representatives of both as did all other nations.
Before concluding his “Chronicles,” Prus expressed his opinion on the Talmud
and the belief that this work was at the root of the Jewish condition. He found it puzzling
how otherwise intelligent Christians could assume that books defined a people’s
character. Those who subscribed to such oddly fascinating theories possessed a fatal
blind spot in their reasoning.
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apology and refutation, Prus asked, then why had the Christian Bible and Patristic works,
judged as good books ostensibly under the same criteria, failed to move Christians
towards more honorable endeavors and extend charity to those outside of their faith?246
Enough stones had been cast in both directions and further discourse on good and evil
and the merits and shortcomings of Jews and Poles were futile in light of the most
pressing issue to date, Poland’s future. If the nation wanted a true solution to ChristianJewish relations, it could be summed up in “brotherhood.”247 Throughout the country
there were ills enough to be addressed without infighting and their resolution could only
come about through a united effort which was certainly not beyond Polish capabilities.

Russians in Search of Russianness

In their quest for identity, the Jews were not alone. From 1856 until the end of
the century, the Jews of Russia would have to contend with the Russian quest for
Russianness which carried with it its own frustration and despair. Defining Russianness
in terms of the Russian Orthodox Church, long regarded as the institutional keystone of
Russian national identity, now needed augmentation.

Karamzin’s dictum that in

becoming citizens of the world, Russians ceased to be Russian was gaining currency
among many Russian intellectuals.248 Much of traditional Russia had passed away with
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the Crimean War but not the Slavophile-Westernizer debate which now took on a
particular urgency in terms of establishing t he Russian identity.249 The humiliating
defeat at the hands of England and France, nations which had heretofore sent men of
letters, engineers, artists and architects to Russia, seemed to verify the Slavophile
sentiment that Russia had grown weak owing to its dependence upon the West. Debate
over the West’s perceptions of Slavs, Russians and civilization itself animated Russian
and Jewish discussions alike, raising questions about the former’s supposed superiority
and the latter’s ostensible backwardness.250
Unmistakably, Russia had incorporated some European cultural and artistic
elements into its own edifice. By the time Alexander II ascended the throne, an astute
Russian would have noted significant European influences in the nation’s architecture,
social structure, educational system, and even in Russian vocabulary. Discomfort among
the Slavophiles was to be expected. To their minds, Russian reformation had to come
from within and along strict Russo-Slavic lines.251 Dostoevsky, Pushkin, Gogol and
Turgenev each played upon this theme, a tenuous balancing act between Russian tradition
and European progressivism, in order to illustrate the various benefits and evils Russians
encountered in their search for a tangible Russian identity. As part of this milieu and
contending with these same issues within their own ranks, the Jews could sympathize
249
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with the Russians but, being resident “foreigners” and perceived as a potential threat to
all things Russian, they were kept at a distance.252

What the Tsar Did Not Know

Whether they lived in Poland or Russia, Jewish visibility was forever blurred in
the eyes of officialdom. Following from the January Rising, Alexander did not see the
Jews in his own right but relied upon his ministers to inform him of their activities. The
Jews became the responsibility of the government’s bureaucrats.

Bureaucrats and

bureaucracies are composed of personalities, from the lowliest clerk to ministry heads, a
fact which should not be underrated. Nikolai Gogol’s Dead Souls examined the gulf
between appearance and reality which was extant in the Russian bureaucracy with fair
acuity.253

Despite its strict on-paper pyramid of power, almost everyone had some

province of authority and those who had not yet attained that coveted position made up
for the deficiency with guile. Few functionaries would have been neutral on the Jewish
Question or, depending upon their rank, reluctant to implement their designs in
policymaking if the opportunity was afforded them.254 August von Kotzebue, Governor
of Odessa, for example, was angry with the city’s Jews for their pro-French posture
during the Franco-Prussian War and instigated a three-day pogrom at Easter in 1871.255
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Without hard evidence, the Governor claimed that he knew the Jews to be kramolniki
(plotters), anti-patriotic and forever scheming against Imperial rule.

The time for

retribution had come.256 No one was in a position to stop him. A local project pursued
without Alexander’s authority, Kotzebue was assured immunity from prosecution since
such an action would draw into question the authoritative integrity of Imperial
administration. This was the fundamental irony of the autocracy when even the Tsar was
as much a captive of this system of government as he was lord over it.
The visibility problem was a mutual one. Some officials were known to the Jews
but, in general, their collective fate was subject to a legion of invisible faces. For a few,
that was cause enough to convert to Orthodox Christianity or eschew theology altogether
and become as “Russian” as was permitted by law and custom even though little was
gained from the transformation. Often conditions worsened when certain state officials
resigned, retired, or were dismissed and their replacements were of a differing
disposition. Jewish status was tenuous even in the best of circumstances and dire in the
extreme during transition periods. The longer the reign the greater the turnover of
officials, and with the ascension of a new Tsar, communal anxiety, frustration and tumult
reached their apex. Alexander II reigned twenty-five years, his successor only thirteen,
but their combined thirty-eight years were sufficient to alter the course of Russian Jewish
development in such a manner that there could never be a return to the “old ways.”

Conclusion
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The flower of Russian Jewry's intellect and identity came into bloom in the midst
of a gale of hardships. Some problems, poverty and parochialism, refused to abate and
yet very few were willing to surrender to fate. At no time was the Jewish condition in
Russia ideal nor was it enshrouded in impenetrable gloom, particularly during Alexander
II's twenty-five-year tenure. If only as a consequence of circumstance, the Russian
government accorded the Jews two general benefits at this time; the 1863 educational
stipends and press liberties two years later. Of these two boons, the latter was the greater
because it allowed grievances pertaining to Jewish education, culture, identity, and
religion to be expressed beyond the small circles of intellectual elites. From a purely
pragmatic vantage, this relative liberty of expression released a considerable amount of
tension that had been welling up for decades but even more so, thoughts could now be
put into print and then translated into action.
The October 1869 meeting of the St. Petersburg Jewish Committee was one such
translation. Its accomplishments may have been subject to debate, yet it cannot be denied
that those delegates from five of the larger Jewish communities in Russia brought to the
fore concerns which were shared by all. Details of this assembly were limited, but what
came from this meeting was a determination to create a Jewish educational environment
sensible to the demands of both modernity and tradition. Jacob Brafman's proposal of a
Christian marriage to Jewish reforms was rejected, but even his performance yielded
benefits in the struggle against apostasy.
Liberties seldom come without consequences, and the same censorship
relaxations which allowed Lev Levanda and Abraham Mapu to espouse their views on
and contributions to the Jewish identity also permitted apostates the same exercise. That
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Russian was the mandated lingua franca posed no obstacle to Rabbi Ippolit Liutostanskii
and Jacob Brafman who made ready use of it in their respective publications. Combining
cunning with market sense, Liutostanskii was able to disseminate his invectives against
Jewish theology through a series of three-kopeck pamphlets. He had the potential to
reach a wide audience which was why Rabbi Zalkind Minor had to act quickly and
resourcefully in his counter to his opponent's pseudo-erudition.
Jacob Brafman, in contrast, published a book. Presumably, he garnered far fewer
readers than Liutostanskii but, unlike the latter, his work caught the Tsar's attention and
won his approval. Certainly possessing the potential for inimicability, Brafman's Kniga
kagala lacked the virulence of Liutostanskii's Talmud i evrei because the author was
arguing from a secured position. Employed in the Minsk Seminary, life may have been
boring but seldom disquieting and he was able to maintain a livelihood. No doubt his ego
had been bruised at the St. Petersburg assembly, and surmising that members of the
Rabbincal Committee might have allegiances to the clandestine and corrupt Asifra, he
would have had adequate inspiration to publish his work.
Apostates aside, the Russian-language Jewish press initiated a glasnost (openness)
in Jewish society which would allow the intelligentsia to explore all facets of just who
and what they were as Jews. Judah Leib Gordon called for a new Jewish literature; a call
which Ben Iosef claimed had been answered by the end of the decade. Perhaps the most
important development to emerge from the Jewish press was the encouragement it gave
Jewish writers to produce books, poems, and short stories. As Ben Iosef remarked, this
(the late 1870’s and early 1880’s) was the golden age of Jewish literature; the Jewish
voice was not only being expressed, it was on display for all to see. This was a major and
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permanent accomplishment.

It also contained another benefit which would prove

consequential in the years ahead.
Intellectual expression, coupled with Alexander’s rejection of Russification for
non-Russians, afforded the Jews the opportunity to engage in introspection. In a sea of
criticism regarding government policies, demands for civil rights, and intercommunal
squabbles, the Jews of Russia began to appreciate the fact that though they were “a
Jewish community,” often defined by the term evrei or the more derisive zhidy, they were
also a pluralistic society. Wrangling over definitions of Jewish identity had become a
time-worn and futile exercise.

Now it was time to explore the possibilities and

dimensions of identity in order to establish a varied Jewish sense of self which could
withstand the tests of time and circumstance.

CHAPTER V: WILTED AND FADED BUT NOT DIVESTED OF ITS STEM:
JEWISH SELF-EXAMINATION AND ACTIONS IN A DARK AND COLD
CLIMATE, 1881-1894
Introduction
In the immediate aftermath of Tsar Alexander II's assassination on 1 March 1881,
Russians and Jews were filled with sadness and synagogues and churches to capacity, all
praying for a time of peace.1 God had turned deaf. Despite Jewish entreaties to the Tsar
of Heaven and the Tsar of Earth (Alexander III) for justice and social tranquility, 1881-82
saw myriad pogroms which all but divested the Jews of any hope of communion with
Russian society. As for the Jewish identity in its many forms, this would continue, and
the Jewish cultural mien would be strenghtened if only because many Russian Jews could
not leave the country which had hosted them and their ancestors for ten centuries.2 In
spite of this, these years and their successors did see substantial emigration to both
Palestine and the United States where the seeds of Russian Jewry germinated anew on
ostensibly fertile soil but not for the benefit of those left behind.
Among those unable to leave, there was the sense that they were caged pariahs,
unwanted, unloved, and with no place to go. Some capitulated to these pressures in a
variety of way while others embarked upon the endeavor of “bridge building” between
Jewish tradition and modernity and, by extension, between themselves and Russian
society. Haim Zhitlowski, Ahad ha-Am, and Simon Dubnow, to name a few, believed
that contemporary Judaism was capable of changing with the times while preserving its
fundamental structure.

Even the Christian philosopher Vladimir Solov’ev saw the

salvation of Russian Jewry in bridge building, though, as he conceived of it, Judaism
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would eventually adopt Christian theology and ethics. This, Solov’ev opined, would end
their suffering. The facility of this position would be borne out by subsequent events and
the fact that Russian Jewry would not have survived to this point without its resilient
spirit. Being able to adapt to cirsumstance was a common thread in Jewish history, but
now Russian Jewish leaders had to preserve their gains which were in danger of eclipse
in light of the Zionists' call for aliya (emigration to Palestine) and the idealism
surrounding life in the United States.
While it is true that the first Jewish settlement in Palestine, Rehovot, was a colony
of Russian Jews, Zionism in Russia was a multi-dimensional movement.3 Fragmented
into various factions with each espousing its own particular version of Jewish identity, a
number of Zionists also associated themselves with the rising socialist movement. Of
course, non-Zionist Jewish socialist groups emerged as well, and both movements
afforded those Jews who could not emigrate the prospect of political and social
participation. Without losing their distinctiveness and becoming more at ease with their
Jewishness, many Jewish workers and intellectuals tried to become part of the Russian
landscape, but that was one bridge which would never be open to them completely.
There were, however, a few isolated exceptions. In the Don-Dnepr Basin, for instance, a
clear, albeit tenuous, comraderie developed between some groups of Jewish and Russian
workers which was somewhat beneficial in reducing the barriers which had separated
them, though tensions always remained below the surface. Nevertheless, the imagined
community of Russian Jewry was gaining substance in the political milieu. Political
2
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awareness and nationalist impulses led to the realization and the possibility of placement
or belonging within the Russian context, but after having won the battle for shaping their
own identity, the second battle for political status would be fraught with disappointments
and meagre gains during Nicholas II’s reign.
These pains were not suffered in silence. Western philanthopists such as the
Rothschilds and Baron Maurice de Hirsch each presented their projects for Jewish reform
to the Russian government in the belief that officials would see the benefit of assisting
rather than hindering the Jewish community. Specifically, Baron de Hirsch wanted to
acquaint his Russian coreligionists with the arts and works of refined culture and invest
them with a taste and zeal for making themselves, in time, purveyors of civilization.
Towards that end, he pledged 60,000 rubles.4

Abundant wealth coupled with a

commensurate degree of generosity, his efforts were not appreciated in official circles
and even thwarted. If his education designs were to come to naught, he contemplated
including Russian Jews in his Argentinian colonization operation which had already
transplanted a number of Jews from unfavorable circumstances to reasonable prosperity
in South America. Like Jacob Alteris before him, unfortunately, this too met with
official obfuscation and, by the 1890's, de Hirsch concluded that he could do no more.
Repression and emigration notwithstanding, the Jews still had their voices in the
mass circulation press though the titles were changing. For instance, taking Evreiskaia
Biblioteka’s place was Voskhod (Rising) with a run which extended well into Nicholas
II’s reign. Like its predecessor, it too would serve as an outlet for intellectual and social
3
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expression as did several Jewish journals in Russian Poland. For its part, Polish Jewish
journalism in the previous decade espoused, however briefly, some of the benefits to be
derived from assimilation.5 Controversy naturally ensued, but what was brought into
sharper focus on both sides of the border was that even within the assimilationist milieu,
Jews were taking more active roles in determining who they were and in defining their
particular places in society.
Was Russian Jewry coming to an end or was it at the threshold of a new
beginning? Conservatives could not see beyond the former and progressives lived in
hope of the latter. Some could not tell if the Jews of Russia were experiencing chaos or
progress. Fragmentation of Russian Jewish opinion reflecting communal diversity was
now more noticable owing to the presence of Jewish journals which broadened
participation in this ongoing discourse.6 Difference, moreover, did not necessarily imply
communal disintegration even though Simon Dubnow could not be dissuaded from this
position completely.7 Perhaps the best metaphor for the times was Scholem Aleichem’s
fiddler on the roof because almost every thought and institution which had defined
Russian Jewry was in a precarious balance. It was enough to negotiate the weight
between tradition and modernity and then assume the added burden of contending with
the mercurial mien of Russian society. Was it any wonder that most Russian Jews and
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Russian Jewry as a whole did all that they could to “scratch out a pleasant, simple tune
without breaking their necks?” Nonetheless, at the end of Alexander III’s reign in 1894,
the fiddler was still playing.

Climatic Changes: The Immediate and Long-Term Consequences for the Jews

Alexander II’s regin began on a note of optimism for the Jews and ended in
tragedy.

On the day of his assassination, the much-celebrated "Tsar-Liberator" had

intended to give his subjects a limited form of representative government, a plan which
Alexander III scrapped as one of his first acts.8 Prior to 1881, the general disposition
among Jewish intellectuals was one of guarded hope. Despite omnipresent restrictions, it
appeared to the Jews of Russia that they were establishing themselves as a viable
component of Russia’s modernization, a sentiment bolstered by Alexander II’s fairly
progressive Jewish policies. Fortune, like every facet of Jewish life in Russia, was
fragile. When the Tsar was assassinated, it was reported that Heisse Helfman, a Jewess,
was among the conspirators, and that intelligence unleashed the tensions, fears, and
prejudices which had been largely pent up during the previous decades of Alexander II’s
reign.

In an instant, the tenuous peace between Russians and Jews exploded into

violence.
Alexander III condemned the pogroms and, on 11 May 1881, received a
delegation of prominent Russian Jews to inform them of his displeasure and that he
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regarded all of his subjects equally.9 That the Jews were singled out for this violence was
most unfortunate because they were little more than a weak pretext for these
disturbances. Governor Bil'basov of Poltava assumed the same attitude of incensed
inaction and Count Ignatiev, Minister of the Interior, was actually castigated at session of
the Council of Ministers for his ineptitude in dealing with, if not passive support for, the
pogromchiky.10 Others questioned the cavalier treatment of this grave and widespread
problem. No mere temporary affair, the events of 1881-2 were an expression of a deeplyseated hatred and fear of Jews whose roots emanated from the very core of Russian
society and the world had to be apprised of it.11 This latter position did not want for
credibility. Jewish property losses in the south were staggering but just as alarming was
the apathy of local police and troops in quelling the riots and in their subseqent
prosecution of the rioters and Jews.12

This in itself was an education. Jewish identity

formation in Russia had been ongoing with little indication of how it influenced their
image in Russian eyes until the aftermath of the pogroms. Part of the blame rested with
the inadequacies of Russian law.

Proscriptions and penalties which defined the

relationship between the government and the governed abounded but not one described
disturbances between groups within society itself.13

Lacking any tangible guidance,

police and military authorities local were left to devise boards of inquiry and trials along
their own lines which, obviously, led to inadequate compensation for the victims and
outright miscarriages.
9
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submit detailed catalogues of what had been destroyed or stolen and account for every
kopeck of remuneration. Furthermore, it was incumbent upon the injured parties to not
only produce the malefactors responsible to ad hoc tribunals in corpore but to present
irrefutable evidence that the suspects were the actual perpetrators.14 Not surprisingly,
little was accomplished in terms of restitution, and the Jews had had little time to recover
their composure before they were subject to further indignities.
On 3 May 1882, the May Laws came into effect. Among its proscriptions, Jews
could not move freely from one town to another and, even more onerous, could not
conduct business on Sundays or Christian holidays.15 It did not stop there. From 1882
until 1901, educated Jews found that employment in those fields which had heretofore
given them some status and hope for better treatment had been severely curtailed. During
this period, Jewish admission to the bar was suspended for fifteen years and the Imperial
army set a quota of 5% on Jewish doctors. In some of the more remote townlets, Jews
were denied the vote in local elections and, taken together with other omnipresent
restrictions, Jewish frustration was at its peak.16 "We have lived too long in hope of our
rights which have now been cruelly dashed.," wrote one journal subscriber while another,
demanding the release of the Jews from the government's "imposed indignities," blamed
the Jewish intelligentsia for its failure to fulfill its role as guardian of the community.17
Indeed, this last pronouncement, despite its impassioned nature, was truer to the mark
than its author intended.

14
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A Challenge to Theological Integrity

In the midst of their evolution, the Jews of Russia often found themselves facing
revived aspects of their past. As had been true of some Jewish communities in the
immediate aftermath of the Khmelnytsky risings, a number of southern Russian
communities found themselves without any theological bearings and desperate for any
promise order and security. Their coreligionists, 226 years before (1656), had embraced
the Sabbatean movement with devastating consequences and, in 1882, New Times
offered similar wares and portended the same end.

Already, the Spiritual Biblical

Brotherhood, which had preceded New Times, had caused some concern among Jewish
intellectuals because of its proposed reform of Jewish religious practices and theological
outlook. Subsequently, according to some Jews who had either left the Brotherhood or
had some association with it, it was a systematic perversion of Judaism which extended
down to its fundamental principles.18 Given the Jewish experience in Russia, especially
with apostates and opportunists, this was a serious problem which had been seen before
and for which there were remedies. Now, however, a new wrinkle had been added.
Targeting the Jews living around Elizavetgrad who were largely ignorant of Jewish
history and culture, the Brotherhood was able to spread among them easily, but New
Times was much more sinister because it made ready capital of the demoralization
arising from the 1881-82 pogroms. Unencumbered among individuals who could not
offer them any tangible resistance, the movement's leadership proceeded to interpret the
16
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Old Testament in a narrow and literal vein. Talmud was considered superfluous and
dangerous and therefore banned, as was sacred music from its services, and
anthropomorphic art owing to the Biblical proscription regarding graven images.19 At the
core of New Times's perniciousness was its exploitation of the ignorance surrounding
Torah and the Old Testament. The latter was a product of Christian translations and
editing of the Mosaic penteteuch (five books) over the centuries but, in Russia, this work
was expanded in the Russian Orthodox octateuch (eight books) with an additional
purpose. In this work, its translators, editors, and compilers made every attempt to prove
that Christ was present and a significant force in Jewish theology well in advance of the
immaculate conception. By telescoping the Old Testament into the New Testament,
those Jews who were ill-acquainted with their own traditions, not to mention being
frightened and desperate, were ripe for Christian conversion.20 Such shameless cunning
was not without historical precident, a fact which was recognized by some Jewish
observers who considered New Times's tactics worthy of the Hellenization efforts of
Antiochus Epiphanes.21 Regardless, what had to be appreciated and addressed was that
reform from within the community was everyone's business and there was no paucity as
to the areas in need of competent ministration.
Once more, education became a central issue among the Jews of Russia.
Shortcomings in terms of instruction were found on every level and for reasons other than
mere poverty.
18

The melamedim, for instance, had been a mainstay of the Jewish

Ibid., n. 35. (7 October 1884), p.3.
Ibid.
20
Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus, trans. Simon Franklin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1991), pp. xxxii, 10. Metropolitan Illarion saw the Old Testament as a prefiguration of the New. In 1050,
he delivered "A Sermon Concerning the Laws of Moses and the Grace of Jesus Christ" in which he
promised full clerical sanction to those Jewish apostates who could convert Jews to Christianity.
19

339
experience because they were the first academic authorities with whom Jewish boys met
on their rigorous course of study. Few would have contested their historical role in
molding Jewish minds and, by extension, the custodians of intellectual communal
integrity, but times had changed. To remove them would have been a loss to Jewish
culture, but their services had become obsolete and Jewish youths needed scholars who
would prepare them for the challenges of a world in transition.22
By no means was intellectual modernity to be construed as an excuse for cultural
amnesia and abandonment. Talmud and Torah were still the pillars of strength that they
had always been and their study could not be ignored. Even among ardent progessives,
Talmud was seen as a liberating work and not one of enslavement. Though a closed
canon since the sixth century C.E., it compelled its students in every age to reason
flexibly and to consider all possible sides of an issue before rendering a pronouncement.
One in possession of such skills could never really be a slave to another. A keen
understanding of its subtlties and intricate forensics revealed the means by which it
forged Jewish life and permeated all of its facets, and this was maintenance of the highest
order.23 In the eyes of those who saw it as a collection of time-worn and irrelevant
precepts, ignorance and obduracy were in full vigor since Talmud was as much a part of
the Jewish present as it was of the past.
Talmud had withstood adversities well in advance of those experienced in Russia,
but how would the rabbinate fare? Since the 1798 Hasidic coup in Vilna, calls for
rabbinical reform had echoed throughout every major Jewish shtetl, town, and city
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quarter in Russia. By the early and mid-1880's, thoughts of Palestinian emigration all but
eclipsed this issue, much to the consternation of those committed to fortifying the local
Jewish community. Palestine, it was argued, was a distant dream which would require of
those determine to make aliya a spirit of complete sacrifice. More immediate was the
reformation of the Rabbinate.24 In some respects it was a circular issue in the Jewish
press which often returned to the general concern over Jewish education, the rabbinate
being one of the more critical areas in need of improvement. Credibility, more so than
any other factor, was in dire want. Not widely reported in the Jewish press were stories
of rabbis and congregations engaged in dubious activies which eventually led to official
prosecution.25 Though not as potent as they once were, Crown rabbis lingered on, and
more than a few found themselves engaged in other occupations in order to gain a living.
One of them, Solomon Rabinovich, who wrote under the name Scholem Aleichem,
dedicated himself to the development of Yiddish literature.

Exceptions aside, the

rabbinical question was one of those concerns which did not become any more virulent
with time but also never saw complete resolution.

Vladimir Solov’ev: A Would-be Purveyor of Jewish Reform

Theological and philosophical reform were not a Jewish monopoly. Unsolicited,
Vladimir Solov’ev, a devout Orthodox Christian and philosopher, lent his talents to this
endeavor as a means of bridging the gulf which separated Jews and Russians. So many
errors had marred Christian-Jewish relations and, consequently, those between Russians
24
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and their resident Jews, but redemption was possible. Jews were not be viewed as an
isolated entity but rather seen as a component of the Christian ethos; the Jewish Question
was really a Christian one.26 Casting scorn and ridicule on Jewish law, long the favorite
activity of theological polemicists, was futile since Jewish and Christian law and ethics
were essentially the same, the latter being a revision and more relevant edition of the
former. Mindful that his critics might lay a charge of heresy against him, Solov'ev was
quick to point out that the Jews suffered from arrested development which led to their
subsequent failure in establishing a completely ethical society. No Christian, however,
was permitted comfort in this revelation because, he admonished, they too were morally
culpable.27 On the issue of Christ and the Jews' repudiation of him, Solov'ev offered
what he believed to be a rational explanation.

Before the Messiah’s coming, he

conjectured, God invested the Jews with a materialistic bent in order for them to develop
a sense of nationalism which would allow them to recognize and appreciate the
Redeemer when he appeared in their midst.

Either the investment had proven too

profound to uproot or God had miscalculated the end of his means since it led to a
complete denial of Jesus’ divinity and ultimate execution. Such “boneheadedness,” as
the author termed it, was simultaneously the Jews’ greatest asset and curse in that it kept
Knesset Israel intact while leading to its spiritual degradation.28 As dire as their situation
appeared, however, Solov’ev maintained that the Jews were not lost. The blood of Christ
was the blood of redemption shed for all, including those who had rejected him, but this
sacrifice was only the next to last step in a process towards spiritual perfection.
25
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Recognizing Christ as the son of God was the true end of this theological odyssey, and
the Jews had yet to reach this point. What had to be revealed and ardently impressed
upon the Jews was that their theology was not so much erroneous as it was archaic and
incomplete, ills which could be rectified at once if Judaism could be bridged and married
to Christianity.29

Solov’ev was convinced that Jews had an obsessive concern for

Christians and could not account for their reluctance to convert but, truth be known, no
such interest was borne out to any significant degree in the nineteenth century.
The marriage of Judaism to Christianity was Solov'ev's all-consuming passion
which few others shared. Beginning his research in 1875 and publishing the results in
1889, he was convinced that Jewish mysticism, specifically the first three sephirot
(emanations) of the ten in Kabbalah (mystical revelation), were exact representations of
the Christian Holy Trinity.30 Taking linguistic license and picking those aspects of
Jewish mysticism which suited him, Solov’ev, in effect, created an ecumenical church
which he supported with German rational philosophy. He took the first three Kabbalistic
emanations, the ein sof (infinity, the infinite one), hokhma (wisdom) and binah
(understanding), and equated them with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. To butress his
assertion, Solov’ev claimed that the Hebrew rosh (head) was a reference to Adonoi (Lord,
God), and since the ein sof was always placed at the top of the representational
Kabbalistic keter (crown), this was undeniable proof that Jews possessed the same
conception of God as Christians.31 Several problems arose from this interpretation, the
27
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most profound being that God was never referred to as “rosh” in either Torah, Talmud or
in the major Kabbalistic works. As for his rendering of ein sof into the Greek sophia and,
by inference, “holy wisdom” in the Christian context, he took a considerable linguistic
leap.

A considerable effort, Solov’ev, nevertheless, failed to make the connection

between Jewish mysticism and the Trinity but this did not daunt him. Confronted with
evidence to the contrary, he would not accept the existence of two distinct religions
where his reasoning mandated that there should be only one.
Vladimir Solov’ev, among all of the bridge builders, was the most unusual though
hardly an innovator. In analyzing his 1884 essay and other works, his theological and
intellectual demeanor appear identical to those of Western European Christian
intellectuals of the late Renaissance. Like them, Solov’ev valued Judaism as a pedestal
for Christianity and had a guarded respect for Jewish beliefs and rituals while opining
that many had lost their original meanings over the centuries and were retained only
through Jewish stubbornness. Though he would have liked to have welcomed Jews into
the Christian fold, Solov’ev did not intend an ambush similar to that of John Caspar
Lavater whose proffered polemical hand to Moses Mendelssohn in 1769-70 became an
arresting grip intent upon pulling the so-called infidel into the bosom of Christianity.
Solov’ev’s welcome was a firm offer and not a belligerent command to the Jews,
formulated through the astute crafting and strategic deployment of theosophical forensics.
He succeeded in making some discernible inroads. It is quite plausible that if German
and Polish Jewry influenced Russian Jewry, Western Christianity had acted similarly in
certain spheres of Russian Orthodoxy, though the reception would have been a slow and

344
reserved one.32 Despite xenophobic reservations among Russian Orthodox Christians,
Solov’ev illustrated the Empire’s growing receptivity to Western influences in many
fields. Theology may have been a restricted one but, as Solov’ev and his fellow travelers
illustrated and as Pobedonostsev feared, rationalism and speculative reasoning had
entered the Russian mind and what would become of Church and State relations was an
ominous unknown.33

Jewish Bridge Builders and Their Prospects

In their midst, the Jews had their own Vladimir Solov'ev in the person of Osip
Mandelstam. Writing in the early twentieth century, he interpreted Judaism as more of a
way of thinking rather than a formal religion.34 Freed from formalism's rigid confines,
Mandelstam carried his thesis one step further when he claimed that his unique human
consciousness embraced all human nature which made Torah and Christ, Judaism and
Christianity, and the Patriarchs and Disciples all complementary components in the
ongoing dialogue between God and humankind.35 Undoubtedly, Solov'ev would have
seen the bridge Mandelstam offered and praised it guardedly because he had not created
it himself and it did not accord precisely with his own vision of bringing the Jews to
32
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Christianity. Unity would have been welcome but only in a communion which assured
Christian primacy and not, as Mandelstam conceived, universal equity.
It would not be an inconsiderable logical leap to claim that Osip Mandelstam's
theology and philosophy was inspired by the battles over Jewish religious integrity in the
late nineteenth century. With no discernible gains or losses, victors or vanquished, these
clashes were becoming tiresome for both participants and observers. Conservatives
believed that Russian Jews were being pulled in too many directions, and the time for
religious argument had passed. Now more than ever, the social and material needs of the
community must be addressed before all others.36 To this plea, Moses Lilienblum would
not have been insensible but he had his own design and would not be distracted from it.
Socialism, as he saw it, was the universal secular engine for constructing a tangible
Jewish identity and making Jews and Judaism a productive and beneficial partner in
Russian, European, and eventually global affairs. The only obstacle before him was
Judaism’s theological identity which had cloistered the Jewish community for many
centuries and had, in his assessment, retarded its development. Securing Jewish political
dignity and autonomy was the next step in Russian Jewry evolution but one which would
require the community to search beyond its boundaries for substantial allies. Russian
society had been approached prior to 1881 with the results ranging from a mere slap on
the wrists to homicide. Pogroms and mutual fears cast long shadows impervious to
dispersion, and the lesson learned under these conditions which most impressed
Lilienblum was the necessity to create a secular division of Judaism. Theology would
not be discarded but, as Dubnow suggested, no longer made a principle impulse of Jewish

36

Russkii evrei, n. 19. (7 May 1882), p. 697.

346
nation building. Kept to a minimum, the primary labor would be to construct a pragmatic
foundation for the Jewish national identity which, in itself, would prove an all-consuming
mission. Mundane issues, not abstractions, had to be addressed immediately if Russian
Jewry was to remain viable. As for the Russians, Lilienblum’s hope of assistance from
that quarter was shattered in the 1881-82 pogroms.37 Allies had to come from beyond
Russia’s frontiers while efforts from within had to continue without abatement.

Yiddish and Zionist Movements: Plaintive Hopes of Modernity

Hope was becoming a diet of starvation, and it was only too apparent that Jewish
liberation from St. Petersburg was beyond contemplation. Tarnopol had written that Jews
were strong enough to determine their own course, a sentiment which Sir Moses
Montefiore had emphasized in his reports to Nicholas I and his ministers. Now it was up
to the Jews themselves to forge their own identities and to fashion their own liberation.
Officially, reform was slow in coming. Jewish patience was diminishing and, by the late
1880’s, was all but exhausted. Incapable of waiting any longer for official action, Leo
Pinsker, a Russian Jewish doctor from Odessa, exhorted his coreligionists to seek
emancipation from within rather than expect it from without.38 This task, like many
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others, would not be an easy one. For too long the Jews had been without a fatherland, a
physical geopolitical center from which they could form a cohesive society and establish
distinct intellectual and cultural institutions which would permit them to stand as an
independent entity.39 Poland had been an apt host centuries ago but even when Jews
were tolerated, Pinsker pointed out, they were mere interlopers in a land which they could
never call their own. A Jewish national identity was neither a dream nor an idle wish but
a necessity whose development had been impeded owing to extracommunal hostility.
Looking at Russia, Pinsker contended that that Jews had resided there for centuries but as
resident foreigners who were despised because they were not autochthonous. No one was
really to blame for this and certainly not the Russians since this was a natural, human
reaction towards those different from themselves. This obvious revelation did not solve
the problem.

Judaism’s generally nebulous condition in the Empire was an

insurmountable barrier to continued Jewish viability. Being neither native nor true aliens
owing to the duration of their habitation, Jews had been reduced to rootless wanderers,
beggars devoid of all dignity, forced to plead for charity. Making the matter all the more
bleak, Pinsker opined that emigration would be impossible if this grave circumstance
were reported around the world since no nation would welcome such an impoverished
people.40

Working his angst up to maximum pitch, he concluded his didactic essay by

claiming that the Russian Jew would never find true peace until a Jewish nation became a
reality.
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Leo Pinsker was a sober, intelligent, but an uncharismatic figure in the evolution
of Russian Jewish identities. The Jews of Russia needed a dynamic leader whose vision
spanned beyond the shtetl and Russia’s borders; a leader who could realize a rational
program for Jewish reform and carry it out. Stepping into that role reluctantly was
another Odessa Jew, Asher Ginzberg, later known as Ahad ha’Am (One of the People),
and his secret Zionist society, B’nai Moshe (Children of Moses).41

One of the

consequences of the events of 1881-82 and their residual effects was the inauguration of
Russian Zionism, and though Theodore Herzel would eventually eclipse Ginzberg and his
organization, there is no disputing that he was one of the key figures in Russian Jewry's
rejuvenation.42 Everyone involved in the Zionist movement had an idea of what Zionism
was and what it should become, but Russian Jews, like Russian Slavophiles and
Westernizers, could not arrive at a concrete agenda or workable process to realize their
respective visions. Some even wondered if it would solve Russia's Jewish crisis because
Palestinian emigration was still in its formative stages and deficient in most means of
support.43 Granted, there was some backing from Sir Nathaniel de Rothschild and other
prominent Western European Jews, but the translation of funds to the Palestinian colonies
and the skills required of the colonists once there still prosed problems.44 Skills and
education were in short supply, a deficit which afflicted all strata of the Zionist ranks and
B'nai Moshe as well. Among those members who comprised the inner circles reposed the
attributes for success. To a man, they were sophisticated, European-educated, quasi41
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secularized Odessa Jews who, by circumstance, were confronted with a situation in part
of their own making. Anyone of them might have made a successful go at Palestinian
settlement but they were few in number and not inclined to do so. Outside of their cabal,
there were the more numerous rank-in-file members who were traditionally-educated,
deeply pious, and somewhat suspicious of their leadership's motivations.

Ginzberg

himself had to tread lightly in his dealings with them since he was no longer a practicing
Jew but deeply attached to Judaism all the same and could not conceive of being anything
else.45
Divisions abounded and were particularly acute in the upper echelons. From the
formal initiation of B’nai Moshe in 1889 until its dissolution in 1898, Ginzberg was
engaged in a protracted dispute with Moses Leib Lilienblum over the direction and
priorities of Jewish nationalism. Ginzberg believed that cultural nationalism, that is, the
restoration of Jewish mores, customs, education, and religion to a moderate degree,
should take precedence over all other considerations in preparation for Russian Jewry’s
aliya.46 Lilienblum insisted that nationalist efforts be concentrated in socioeconomic
reform in Palestine exclusively.

Eventually, their dispute reached its apex when

Lilienblum accused Ginzberg of not addressing the impoverished condition of Eastern
European Jewry, a charge to which Ginzberg responded bluntly by claiming that Jewish
nationalism was neither suited to nor interested in solving such problems.47 Disputes and
divisions never healed and were actually exacerbated by Ahad ha-Am’s practice of telling
the leadership, and his favorites in particular, more of the “truth” than what he permitted
45
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to be disseminated among the rank and file. He justified this practice by claiming that
this method of dissemination protected the long-term goals of B’nai Moshe and its
renovation of the Jewish identity from the majority’s emotionalism and rash behavior in
coming to terms with the dilemmas of Jewish identity.48 Not once did he suspect that the
threat of dissolution would come from above rather than below. Equating emotionalism
with ignorance, he had failed to recognize that defect within his inner circle which would
eventually cost him his organization.
Despite the many difficulties he had to confront, Asher Ginzberg could seek
solace in B’nai Moshe’s single success, the establishment of the very first self-supporting
agricultural colony in Palestine, Rehovot.49 In this one instance, Russian Jews were the
pioneers, not the followers, and their example would lead other Jews to settle there.50
Volunteers in Russia to go to Palestine were plenty; the financial resources to send them
were meager. As a Zionist, he and his fellow travellers had encouraged others to settle
there without first-hand knowledge themselves. Curious but also concerned about the
accuracy of his information regarding the success of Jewish settlements there, Ginzberg
traveled to Palestine in 1891-92 and, unwittingly, condemned himself and B’nai Moshe
in the process.
His agent in Palestine had been Joshua Eisenstadt (also known as “Barzilai”) with
whom he had been associated since 1887. From that time, Eisenstadt had given Ahad ha-

46

Simon Dubnow took issue with this design. Owing to the difficulties involved and the limited benefits
from settling there, Dubnow claimed that the United States offered greater opportunities. Weinberg,
Between Tradition and Modernity, p. 154.
47
Zipperstein, Elusive Prophet, p. 47.
48
Marietti, "Signs of Life,"p. 39.
49
Ibid., p. 108. To Ginzberg, Rehovot and the other colonies in Palestine were the signs of life of the
Jewish nation.
50
Zipperstein, Elusive Prophet, p. 54.

351
Am an idealistic impression of Palestine which the latter had trusted sight unseen. Upon
reaching Palestine, the illusion was dashed against reality.51 First of all, the arable land
that potential settlers had been told was plentiful was actually at a premium. Coupled
with this, Arab land agents and merchants were not above exploiting the ignorance of
newly-arrived colonists and, perhaps most disturbing to Ginzberg, Jewish settlers were
treating Arabs with contempt. Further exacerbating tensions was Baron Edmund de
Rothschild whose philantropy Ginzberg found to be manipulative and demanding, not to
mention that he actually rivaled the Arabs in controlling Palestinian settlement.52 Had
there been any positive inidications, no matter how slim, he could have reached a happier
conclusion, but that was not to be. Nothing that he saw boded well and under these
circumstances, a large-scale aliya now seemed impossible.

Returning to Odessa,

Ginzberg decided to present the stark realities of Palestinian settlement to his followers
and urge them to establish the means for Jewish nationhood for a time when Palestinian
settlement would be more favorable.53
Disenchantment with Palestine was only the beginning of Ginzberg’s woes.
Contrite and sincere, he presented his findings to the entire membership but it fell upon
deaf ears. Suspecting that he was not telling all that he knew, some of the more desperate
to leave Russia surmised that their leader’s findings were a ruse to keep Palestinian
settlement limited to a favored few. To this charge, he responded that the Palestinian
colonies were all but completely dependent upon outside philantropy.54

The more

desperate refused to hear him, and when he realized that he could not stem the onrushing
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tide, Ginzberg then informed those who were determined to make the trek that they had
to act in a spirit of complete self-sacrifice.55 Any other attitude would be unrealistic. Not
that he had acted dishonestly, but his decision to be completely forthright with all
members of B’nai Moshe came too late. By 1898 B’nai Moshe had disbanded though its
philosophy of self-determination in forging Jewish identities remained.56
Land was a key component to national identity in the minds of some which
spurred Russian Jewish aliya but, tied closely with this notion, was language. In general,
the two were equally important but, in light of the Jewish condition, language was
believed to hold the greater value since it was in immedate communal possession
whereas Palestine was governed by others. The creation of a Judeo-Palestinian society
was far beyond the means of most Russian Jews but not so the creation of a high Yiddish
culture.57 For Haim Zhitlowski, Yiddish was a bridge capable of binding together the
Jewish community, specifically the worker and the intellectual.58

It would be very

simple. A Yiddish program, properly implemented, would allow for the creation of a
collective Jewish consciousness with little effort. and the raw materials were at hand.
Despite the stigma attached to Yiddish as a so-called shtetl jargon, a number of left-wing
Jewish intellectuals claimed that indeed a Yiddish culture held more promise in
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promoting Jewish progressivism than an irrelevant and dying religion.59 Hebrew was still
considered the intellectual language of the Jews but Yiddish, owing to its linguistic
informality, had to potential for reaching a much larger audience.60 In the spirit of the
times, Zhitlowski sought to put into practice what he espoused.
In the period 1883-87, he attempted to develope a scientific scheme for Jewish
national survival. As an initial step, he had discarded what he termed the “narrow
nationalism” which had infected much of the Jewish community and contributed to its
mental parochialism.

Hoping to lead by example, he joined the Russian Narodnik

movement as a “nationalist Jew,” finding a common cause with Russian progressives
who advocated greater social and political rights. For a time, believed that he had
discovered the common ground where the two could meet and act for mutual benefit but,
in the end, this was not to be. They may have spoken the same language, espoused
similar beliefs in terms of social reform, and even shared their hopes and frustrations, but
no confidence, no matter how intimate, could change the fact that a Jew was a Jew and a
Russian a Russian. It mattered not how well Zhitlowski presented himself, he was
incapable of reversing the tide of Russian Judeophobia which had gripped the nation for
much of the 1880's and '90's.61

He and his coreligionists were the others, forever

condemned to be on the outside looking in and, owing to official peculiarities,
occasionally the receipiants of illogical and cruel policies. For example, in the early
1880's, the government offered stipends to Jews who wished to attend the Medical
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Surgical Academy and the Military Medical Academy but no relief from the virulent and
pervasive anti-Jewish propaganda in circulation at that time.62 Many Jews simply wanted
to belong in Russian society as Jews without hindrances, but the quest for that belonging,
that acceptance, was a fast-fading bloom.

Nevertheless, perseverence had to be

maintained and perhaps the forces of attrition might yield some small ingresses.

Another Attempt at Jewish Educational Reform: The Efforts of Baron Maurice de
Hirsch
If the Jews of Russia were to become useful citizens of a grand empire, it was
imperative that they be educated in such a manner as to affect their ready and easy
assimilation of Russian mores.63 Such was the design of French Jewish philantropist
Maurice de Hirsch who, from 1881 to 1890, made every attempt to establish a network of
well-funded progressive Jewish schools which would allow his Russian coreligionists to
embark upon useful occupations. Assisting him in this design before his untimely death
in 1886 was one of the Poliakov brothers who had made their fortune in Russia's railroad
industry. That aside, it was Poliakov who had solicited de Hirsch for this design in 1881
because of his concern for Jewish affairs in Russia and his financial resources. Once the
two men had agreed upon general principles, they were then directed by Count F.
Danilov, the St. Petersburg Minister of Public Instruction, to submit their proposals in
accordance with Russian governmental procedure. There was some cause for optimism
when Danilov notified de Hirsch that Tsar Alexander III was pleased with the general
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prinicples and was inclined to approve a more detailed rendering of them.64 On 1 June
1881, the Baron received welcome news that the organizing committee for his project had
been approved with Lazar Poliakov as president.65 The next step was to establish the
governing regulations for what would become the Baron Maurice de Hirsch Foundation
and its schools.
At some time during these negotiations, Horace de Guenzburg wrote de Hirsch
with a friendly admonishment that projects in Russia must start small and their backers
reserved in what they asked of the government.66

From the nature of de Hirsch's

correspondence, he took this advice to heart when he informed Danilov that he wanted to
act within the full compass of Russian law. By July 1881, de Hirsch had presented the
Minister with a lengthy document detailing, among other issues, the establishment of the
Foundation, limitations on annual fiscal outlays from his account in the Bank of France, a
request for shorter military obligations, and the assurance that all instruction would be
conducted in Russian.67

For his part, Tsar Alexander did shorten the recruitment

obligations of the students and promised that the government, along with de Hirsch's
appointed agents local, would ensure that expenses did not exceed 100,000 francs per
annum.

As for overall approval of this project, that would have to wait until 13

November 1887 but, in the meantime, the Baron could put into place his network to
ensure smooth operations once the Foundation was running at full potential.
For a time, the Foundation met with no substantial obstacles. Baron de Hirsch
was able to ensconce Le Marquis d'Alsace and Mr. Leonce Lebmann as his agents in St.
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Petersburg who gave him monthly reports as to the progress the Foundation was making
in Russian Jewish education. In addition to his desire to make the Jews useful to Russian
society, de Hirsch also impressed upon his agents and Russian officials that he was
determined to free them from the moral and material degredation in which they now
found themselves but not without compensation. By affecting this liberation, de Hirsch
made it clear that he desired Russian officialdom to reciprocate by according the Jews a
measure of benevolence under the law.68 It was a simple request expressed more as a
wish than a command, yet it may very well have been the instigator of the trouble to
come.
In January 1889, Leonce Lebmann informed Baron de Hirsch that negotiations
with the government regarding the principles and operations of his Foundation were
floundering. Amazed and perterbed, de Hirsch wrote to Danilov for an explanation of
what had come to pass. Had he fogotten that just as the Marquis and Lebmann were
obliged to keep him informed so too was Danilov?69 Why was the Russian government
withdrawing its approval from key articles of the Foundation's constitution? In his
possession, the Baron argued, he had a copy of that document bearing the Tsar's signature
and seal. Did this mean nothing? More distressing were the official counter proposals.
For instance, in Article 5 paragraph 7, Russian officials now demanded the right to
exclude Foundation members from deliberations regardless of pretext.

This was

insufferable. Making no effort to hide his anger, de Hirsch wrote that the only guarantee
that was sure to be honored was that of official delays if not outright stonewalling. What
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was even more galling was the complete rejection of Article 6 which pertained to the
successors of de Hirsch and the Foundation's principle officers because, once again, the
government had found no fault in this arrangement previously. Should Danilov require
proof of this, the Baron informed him that he had retained the Minister's letters to him
which had confirmed official approbation.70
That his pride and honor had been bruised by this reversal of fortune was evident
but it did not cloud the Baron's judgment or his capacity for innovation. He had to
delegate authority. In the conclusion of his missal, de Hirsch proposed to establish a
committee composed of the Grand Rabbi of France and Paris, along with the presidents
and vice presidents of the Jewish Consistory of Paris, Paris Committee of Jewish
Benevolence, and the Paris Jewish School of Trades to determine the succession of
officers. Previously, this had been de Hirsch's sole prerogative. Believing that he had
satisfied official amendments to Article 6, he then turned his attention to Article 9
paragraph 2 where he reaffirmed his edcuational commitment with the addendum that his
pedagogues would elevate Jewish morals along with their intellectual life.71 Engaged as
he was, de Hirsch could not leave Paris at that moment and had to rely upon the Marquis
and Lebmann to execute his wishes to the best of their abilities. Did he dare hope that the
crisis had been met?
Less than a month later, de Hirsch received his answer. From St. Petersburg on 1
February 1889, Leonce Lebmann wrote his employer to ask about de Hirsch's actual
control over his Foundation.72 Affairs were still sluggish, officials remained obdurate
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and vague and, from his persepctive, Lebmann could only conclude that the Baron's
partners in this endeavor shared neither his frankness nor his ardency of commitment.
Obfuscations may have been part and parcel of the Russian government's mode of
operation, but for a man who had pledged 50,000,000 francs towards a design of
unprecedented importance, the darkness of ignorance was not an acceptable working
environment. On 16 May 1889, Baron de Hirsch wrote to Konstantin Pobedonotsev,
Procurator of the Holy Synod, to express his dissatisfaction over the use of his funds.73
As stated clearly in the first article, those funds were dedicated to Jewish education
exclusively.

Where was the money going?

The financial disbursements from the

Foundation's fund in the Bank of France were legally binding and could not be altered
without considerable effort and the Baron could see no benefit from such an action. It
was clear to him that he could not realize his goals, initial or final, if the Russian
government persisted in its present course. Apparently, the Procurator thought little of
the Baron's concerns since he did not bother to reply.
On that same date, Maurice de Hirsch informed Count Danilov that he was
willing to make some additional amendments to the Foundation's constitution though he
considered these alterations grave.74 Had he not insisted that Danilov inform him of the
legalities involved? If indeed he, de Hirsch, had been misdirected, why would Poliakov
have allowed this since, after all, he had relied upon that man's guidance? Giving full
vent to his frustration, de Hirsch still wondered why the government, which had had no
reservations about his Foundation and its program in 1887, now all but condemned it.
The curriculum for the Foundation schools had not deviated from its initial proposal nor
73
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had it advocated any other goal than the assimilation of Russian Jewry. When Poliakov
had approached him 1881, he had made plain this desire of the government and since no
Russian official had informed him to the contrary, de Hirsch though that his designs were
in accord with official sentiments.75 Being a man of affairs and expecting negotiations to
be conducted in good faith, by 1890, de Hirsch had lost his ardor and taste for Russia.
Though he would continue to fund some Jewish institutions in Greater Russia, such as the
St. Petersburg Jewish Orphanage, he had all but given up on the Jews of Russia. Even his
successful Jewish colonization scheme in Argentina only saw the arrival of a few Russian
Jews since, as Jacob Alteris discovered before him, getting Jews out of Russia in large
groups was virtually impossible.76 Once more, Russian Jews had to rely upon their own
intellectual resources and expect little in the way of amelioration.

Caged by Design: Alexander III, Tsar of all of the Russias

It could not have escaped the Jewish imagination that Russia was ostensibly a
prison without visible bars and walls, but what may have been overlooked was that its
warden was also an inmate. Alexander III was as much a prisoner of the Russian state as
he was head of it. His inability to prevent the pogroms of 1881-82 from breaking out and
his dalliance in sequestering them was evident, but then again the means which would
have allowed him to do so were not readily available.77 Be that as it may, these events
74
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left Alexander III in a dark mood.78 The Jewish Question had been a matter that he
would have liked to have kept indoors but efforts to do so had proven futile. One reason
for this was the government’s ongoing appeals to Western European creditors for
financial assistance to bring the Empire up to modern standards which, as matters stood,
were still quite distant. Added to this, serf emancipation, a decidedly progressive step,
earned for the government the opprobrium of both estate owners and former serfs who
were unable to adapt readily to the new economic conditions and faced an uncertain
future.79 Further aggravating Alexander’s initiatives was the State Council, a body for
which the Tsar had a particular dislike since, from his perspective, it was forever
challenging his prerogatives.80 Meanwhile, Jewish journalists continued to press their
demands for Jewish civil rights and no amount of anti-Jewish rhetoric from the Russian
press could squelch it.81 A de facto moratorium on the issue had been in place since 1863
and would have remained so indefinitely had not the Empire fallen on hard times.
Alexander III needed money. Russia was in dire need of Western European investment,
especially from England, Germany and France whose prominent Jewish bankers and
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financiers were well informed of the treatment accorded their coreligionists in Russia.82
On one occasion in particular, the Tsar had to avert a potential divestment scenario from
coming about when his Finance Minister, Nikolai Bunge claimed in an official
memorandum that he was determined to expose the evils of Judaism through exposure of
their commercial interests. Count Nikolai Ignati’ev, the Minister of Internal Affairs, sent
a similar notice to the Tsar asserting that he had proof of Jewish control over the banks,
bar, stock market, the press, and other areas of public life and that his countermeasures
awaited His Majesty’s approval.

Much to their mutual consternation, the Tsar

sequestered their presumed revelations for fear that Baron Edmund de Rothschild, who
was purchasing a substantial number of Russian state bonds at the time, would cancel his
transaction.83 In an attempt to resolve Russia’s Jewish Question, Alexander III ordered
the Pahlen Commission to study the Jews of Russia from all conceivable vantages and to
submit recommendations. Dissatisfied with its findings and suggestions, especially that
of granting Jewish emancipation over a course of years, he dissolved the Commission and
made the Jewish Question part of Nicholas II’s complex inheritance.

Voskhod: The Hope of a New Day
Efforts to refashion, revitalize, reconstitute, and reform Judaism in Russia never
diminished nor, for that matter, did its new voice. Taking up the mission of Evreiskaia
biblioteka was Voskhod (1881-1899) which was similar to its predecessor in content
82
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though it was decidedly more strident. Jewish self-examination was still practiced but so
too was the drive on the part of some contributors to place the Jewish community and all
of its distinctive characteristics within the broader Russian milieu. Even in the darkest
hours, the need for belonging never diminished. Neither Voskhod’s editor, A.E. Landau,
nor its commentators, poets, short story writers, and the occasional philosopher imagined
that centuries of distrust between Russians and Jews would be eradicated overnight. The
primary concern of all of those associated with the journal was to heighten awareness of
the Russian Jewish condition among both Jews and Russian alike which was why, like its
predecessor, Voskhod was published in Russian.
In his poem, Russkomu evreiiu, Ia. Steinberg offered a unique allegory of the
Jewish condition. The Jew was “an aggrieved stepchild,” put to bed hungry and plagued
by nighmares. Darkness offered no protection since the threatening voices still assailed
the Russian Jew as he groaned in vain, but now both the night and these ghosts were
receeding. Already, day was nearing. Hope was not forlorn.84 On a rare note of
optimism, Steinberg envisioned a Russia which was indeed transforming in terms of its
social, political and intellectual complexion and believed that many Jews sought to be a
part of these changes. His hopes were shared by others but, as could be expected, such
optimism was invariably countered by pessimism or, at least, a studied sobriety.
The Jewish Question in Russia, according to M. Margolis, would become most
pointed when Jews achieved a degree of political self-consciousness.85
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Question tended to originate within the Jewish community itself and then extended to the
country in which Jews lived. Comparing Russian Jews with their Western European
counterparts, the author pointed out that often the Jewish Question was lost amid a host
of pressing issues. It was therefore incumbent upon the Jews themselves to keep it
viable.

Various obstacles had to be negotiated with great care, specifically social

prejudice and legal proscriptions, which was an arduous but not impossible task. Even
so, the more people have tried to resolve the Jewish Question, the more entangled it has
become. In Russia, Margolis continued, a causuist approach had been taken in attempts
to resolve this dilemma without any true understanding of its nature.86 It was imperative
to first discover how the Jewish Question was established and under what conditions.
Once that has been accomplished, it was important that in the political milieu Jews not
demand the same rights as Christians.87

If the Jews of Russia really desired true

emancipation, Margolis surmised, the German and American Jewish communities were
apt models. Quoting Bruno Baer, Margolis claimed that the Jews of Germany redefined
themselves in terms of human science, freeing themselves completely from religious
constraints which had retarded their political development. In short, they subordinated
their religious identity for political ends.88 America, which had no state religion, was an
even better model since Jews could ostensibly enter into politics without difficulty.
Summing up his essay, Margolis concluded that the formation of a completely political
society free of religion would solve the Jewish Question.89
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Moving from the political to the literary field, another contributor, known only as
Mevakker, claimed that Jewish literature had to expand its horizons in a modern language
or else face extinction.90 What was needed was a new Jewish literature written in modern
Hebrew.91 Russians and Jews alike were at present not aware of the vast store of Jewish
literarture since it was ensconsed in ancient Hebrew.92 It concerned Mevakker that Jews
had to read their own work in translation rather than in the original, a consequence he
hoped would be removed with the advent of a new form of literacy. More than simply
creating a new Hebrew language out of the older one, Jewish authors had to modernize
the Jews themselves by placing them in contemporary circumstances. This would be no
mean feat; in fact it would require several stages to make the endeavor a reality.93 Barely
in its infancy, this project already had its detractors who called for the death of Hebrew in
all forms since, they claimed, it was an anachronism. To this challenge, Mevakker would
not deign to respond because, for him, the continuance of Jewish life and spirit was
rooted in the development of a truly Jewish language.
Associated closely with linguistic identity was historical literacy, a call which was
taken up by Alexander Harkavy and his associates under government auspices.

A

member of the Society for the Spreading of Enlightenment among the Jews of Russia,
Harkavy published a paper in 1894 detailing his efforts and those of his associates to
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amass sufficient documentation for the publication of a Jewish historical journal.94 That
much of the documentation was inaccessible made the project all but impossible, but the
Society’s members, Harkavy declared, had not given up. Lithuanian archives were more
accessible, and already it was hoped that the publication of these documents in a
collection, Russko-evreiskaia arkhiva, would be possible. It was to be a monumental
work. Using three typesets, Cyrillic, Roman script (not block), and Hebrew, every aspect
of Jewish history in Russia was to be considered, from tenth-century Karaite manuscripts
up to the present. So that no detail would be missed, Baltic German Jews were to be
included along with their Lithuanian, Polish and Russian coreligionists.95 Furthermore, a
Slavic-Jewish names directory of towns and individuals was to be included to give
balance to the work’s overall scholarship.

In that vein, perhaps one of the more

progressive proposals was to gather letters, pamplets, diaries and personal reflections of
non-Jews living in proximity to the Jewish communities in hopes of discerning the
origins and nature of their relationships. It was believed that by according non-Jews a
comparable voice in this Jewish work, a truly balanced and comprehensive history could
be published in Russia.
Jewish identities and self-determination were growing appreciably at this time,
and with the community’s increasing participation in various fields, particularly in the
political sphere, it would attract Russian allies.96 While true Russian advocates of Jewish
causes were not to be turned away, the author publishing under the pseudonym of
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Kriticus, in his critique of the late Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov, admonished Jews to be
wary. At issue was the third volume of Aksakov’s collected articles which pertained to
the Slavophile’s writings on Polish and Jewish questions.97 Prior to 1862, the author
pointed out, Aksakov was an actual supporter of the Jews. Citing his journalistic work in
the late 1850’s, specifically when he wrote a series on Jewish commerce in the southern
provinces, the Jews were described as being industrious and prosperous. Early in the
next decade, however, Aksakov had a change of heart.
The issue responsible for this change from advocate to adversary had been the
question of Jewish legal and civil rights. Serf emancipation in 1861 and the granting of
civil rights to the Jews of Russian Poland in 1862 weighed heavily in Aksakov’s
considerations, especially when the Jews of Russia demanded for themselves what their
coreligionists across the border had been granted. When it was decreed that Jews could
be employed in all government branches, Aksakov reached his breaking point. Sounding
the tocsin, Aksakov wondered if the office of Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod fell
under this new order.98 Limitations had to be imposed. Jews were hostile towards
Christianity and Russia was a Christian state, he claimed. Once he reached the apex of
his argument, Aksakov claimed that Russians had never been hostile towards the Jews
and were prepared to grant them autonomy and even the freedom to settle anywhere in
Russia. That alone should be sufficient, Aksakov added. Jews had to understand that
Russians were not willing to grant them equal rights and full emancipation. Further
debate over this issue would prove fruitless.
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In presenting this piece, Kriticus was not writing out of frustration but rather
offering a cautionary missal to Jewish progressives to maintain their self-restraint.99
Change in the Jewish condition was both noticeable and expanding into various fields by
the late 1880’s, but with it came uncertainty, chief of which was the possibility of losing
what had been gained thus far. Amidst this omnipresent trepidation, however, there were
promising signs. As the century neared its end, Russian-Jewish cooperation, primarily in
labor politics, was more prominent than it had been previously but also more tenuous.

Pragmatic Bridges and Mutual Cooperation

In the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, many bridges had been built to
modernity with episodic results. Zhitlowski envisioned a Yiddish culture capable of
maintaining tradition while adapting to contemporary conditions. In that same vein,
Harkavy and Dubnow labored to invest the community with Jewish historical literacy so
that Jews would not forget their origins and become lost in the maelstrom of assimilation.
Even Ahad ha-Am’s version of rebuilding Judaism was a dualistic attempt to resurrect a
form of Biblical Judaism capable of creating a modern Jewish state in Palestine. On a
more mundane level, however, the Jews of Russia needed to address issues closer to
home.
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The Pale was becoming more overcrowded and resources, which had never been
plentiful, became all the more dear. With the 1881-82 pogroms fresh in their memories
and sporadic anti-Jewish disturbances throughout the southern and western regions of the
Empire, Jews of all walks of life had little choice but to bow to circumstance and seek
their fates in the larger Russian society. Some turned to such trades as prostitution
which, given the rise of industry and the formation of new towns, supplied services which
were in great demand.100 Still others found employment in the Baku oil fields, private
banking, and since the 1880’s and ‘90’s was Russia’s age of railroads and mining, a
select few made substantial financial gains in those industries. Lazar Solomonovich
Poliakov, for instance, leader of the Moscow kupechestvo and a Jew, financed both the
Moscow-Odessa line and, in 1892, initial construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.101
By the end of the century, there was hardly an area of entrepreneurial activity where Jews
were successfully excluded. Jews could be found in the Siberian gold mines, the Volga
and Amur fisheries and in the shipping lanes on the Dnepr, not to mention the southern
Russian coal mines and factories.102 From Russia’s economic transformation, the Jewish
identity in Russia experienced another change in its complexion. A distinct Jewish
working class with its particular interests was taking shape as was a Jewish bourgeoisie
which the Russian government found useful in pursuing its industrialization schemes. In
different ways, both developments accorded Jews a place within Russian society while
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leaving its permanence uncertain.103 More than just a logical outcome of events, a
number of Jewish workers came to realize that they and their Russian counterparts had
shared interests. Granted, a similar phenomenon had taken place in the 1870’s, but its
revival in the late 1880’s and 1890’s offered some Jews a faint hope that communion
between Jewish and Russian workers was still possible. Each side had its own peculiar
needs but, in terms of establishing a politically free-standing entity, their overall
objectives were nearly identical. This was particularly true in Ukraine owing to the
industrial concentration there which made it a virtual hodgepodge of nationalities.104 The
most profound changes in the Jewish condition during these decades of transition resulted
from the rapidly increasing number of Jewish workers who would acquire their own
voice both within and beyond the Jewish community.

Jewish Socialism: An Addendum to the Identity Issue

For the Jewish majority, employment proscriptions still hindered progress and, in
certain regions, these impositions were so rigorous that some Jewish women had to
become prostitutes in order to survive.105 As for the overall Russian revolutionary
movement, Jewish adherents who had not deserted the cause in the aftermath of the
pogroms hoped that Populist claims of waning anti-Jewish violence and rising anti103
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Tsarist agitation bore some truth.106 In terms of employment, little had changed since the
1870’s. The textile mills concentrated in Belorussia and Lithuania still employed the
greatest number of Jewish workers along with cigarette and match factories.107 Of the
two groups, the latter comprised the only true Jewish proletariat prior to the late 1880’s.
By itself, this situation was not unusual until one realizes the target audience for preBundist Jewish socialism which originated in these regions.
The Bund of 1897 grew out of various Jewish socialist circles. While it is true
that these groups were Jewish in terms of their leadership and rank-in-file, their goals
were geared to producing educated Jewish socialists who would then present socialism to
Russian factory workers.

In this regard, the results were negligible.

Why Jewish

socialist intellectuals embarked on these missions prior to 1890 can be explained by the
simple fact that Russia’s factory workers were Russian almost to a man. Furthermore,
the concepts of class struggle and bourgeois exploitation had greater currency among
Russian laborers than Jewish ones. Jewish workers were certainly capable of striking and
work slow-downs but, considering that in most instances Jewish employers were little
better off than their employees, gains were minimal. Often the victory of Jewish workers
was mainly the satisfaction that they could act collectively regardless of the meagre
concessions they gained from their actions.108 Jewish socialist intellectuals did not doubt
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that Jewish workers possessed the requisite socialist impulses, but until more were
employed in the larger labor market, their impact on the socialist revolution would be
minimal.
Factories and mechanization may have freed some Jews from traditional
occupations, though the majority still found themselves on the outside of Russia’s
industrial revolution.109 Often Jewish applicants for factory positions were passed over in
favor of Christians, even by Jewish factory owners, because the latter tended to possess
the essential technical skills to ensure efficient production. That few technical schools
were open to Jews was an obvious handicap, but more profound was the state of Russian
industry itself which worked against both Jews and Christians alike.
Mining, metallurgy, and railroads were major pursuits of the government which
funded their respective developments with substantial foreign aid. Even so, large-scale
industrial projects were initially unattractive to members of Russia’s wealthy elite.
Inflation following the Crimean War and the decline of the ruble’s value made them
conservative in terms of their investments. Government securities with a guaranteed
annual return of six percent were far more lucrative than a long-term investment with an
uncertain promise of returns.110

This made credit to potential industrialists all but

unobtainable. Compounding the problem was the legal obligation on the part of the
industrialist to support his workforce regardless of the profitability of the venture, not to
mention the monetary exactions from the workers themselves for such necessities as
questionably-potable water, bad food and poor lodgings. If a factory owner wanted to
109
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give his operation the promise of longevity, he would turn to foreign banks for loans, but
even then his troubles were not over. Competing with him for foreign credits was the
government itself. About the only industry which brought in substantial returns, at least
by Russian standards, was textiles, and even that success did little to improve Jewish
factory employment.111
Aside from the reluctance of Russian factory owners to employ Jews, potential
Jewish workers had to contend with a more immediate problem when confronting their
coreligionists. Jewish factories were smaller than Russian ones and, therefore, required
smaller workforces.

The dearth of industrial skills notwithstanding, the potential

problems which could arise from Jewish employees made them unattractive to Jewish
employers. First of all, Jewish workers would expect to be excused for Rosh Hashana
and Yom Kippur which, alone, resulting in a ten-day work hiatus. In addition, fast days,
the Ninth of Av, Purim, not to mention events such as brises, funerals, and weddings,
would all conspire to mar productivity.

Even more profound was the employer’s

obligation to perform some function at a life-cycle event when asked to do so. It would
have been perfectly natural for an employee to ask his boss to accept the Elijah chair at
his son’s bris or, if older, to stand in attendance at the child’s bar mitzvah. Since,
ostensibly, both employers and employees attended the same synagogues and were part
of the same community, the authoritative distance between boss and worker was
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blurred.112

By the early 1890’s, however, this “communal intimacy”was changing

dramatically.
The khevrat, artisan associations to which both Jewish artisans and masters
belonged, began to disintegrate.113 In large part, this was due to Jewish workers who
wanted to form distinct associations among themselves to discuss issues of concern
beyond the watchful eyes of their employers.

Owing to ongoing Jewish identity

diversification, this development was merely another instance where a traditional social
institution was being replaced by another which, ostensibly, was more flexible in terms of
working with newer concepts and daring to experiment with new and “foreign” ideas.
More to the point, it was a demonstration of the spirit of self-determination which was
spreading to the wider Jewish population. From mere rhetoric, the demand for charting
one’s own course was translating into action. To Jewish traditionalists, modern Russian
Jews of the 1890’s were going off in all directions without a coherent program. Then
again, these were the same people who feared that the abandonment of any traditional
notions meant complete assimilation.

Because of the ties that bound Jews to their

community, some simply could not free themselves from this confinement, much of
which was of their own making.
Outside of the Jewish community, Jews had to contend with the inexhaustible
supply of Russian prejudices. One in particular which tended to frustrate Jewish
employment was the belief that Jews would not work on Saturday. Those Jews who
hoped to compete in a Christian-dominated society discarded this traditional proscription.
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Even so, some potential employers began to perceive the Sabbath as evidence of Jewish
revolutionary potential out of some misguided notion that Jews met among themselves in
secret on that day. The potential, however, proved to be real enough. According to
Okhrana records from the period 1884-90, there were 579 known active Jewish
revolutionaries among the 4307 revolutionaries in their files who were considered among
the most radical.114 Consequently, though Jewish employment might be possible, it was
never easy.115
Some Jewish intellectuals saw the betrayal of the Jewish community coming from
all sides and from within. If the Jewish community was to emerge from this maelstrom
intact, a new guiding philosophy had to be found and implemented at once. One blessing
which Alexander III had bestowed upon Russia’s Jews, if only unconsciously, was that
he did not keep them forever in his sight. He neither attempted to russify the Jews nor to
envelope them within the garment of the Russian Orthodox Church, a circumstance
which permitted Jewish intellectuals an opportunity to step back and assess the Jewish
condition and propose solutions.

Socialism, an ideology which was gaining wide

currency among Belorussian and Lithuanian Jews in the 1880’s and ‘90’s, held more
promise than any other option at the time. Before it could be presented to the Jewish
community, however, the community, specifically the Jewish worker, had to be educated
in order to appreciate it and realize that the achievement of its ends would be a long-term
process. In other words, a segment of the Jewish intelligensia intended to present the
socialist program in line with a Jewish nationalist identity. Haim Zhitlowski had
Press), p. 18
113
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advocated such a program for years with Yiddish being the vehicle of liberation for the
Jewish proletariat from their bourgeois coreligionists. Along with him, John Mill saw
great potential in fitting Jewish nationalism into a socialist framework, and Karl Kautsky,
whom the Russian Social Democrats held in high esteem, claimed that a correct answer
to the national question was essential if the class struggle of the proletariat was to yield
substantial dividends.116 Global liberation from exploitation to which Russian Jewish
hopes were pinned was the ultimate goal, but it had to be acted upon immediately;
otherwise this ideal would be little more than a mere abstraction.
Other voices took up the call for Jewish liberation. Vilna, the center of Jewish
intellectual life for centuries, became the home of Jewish socialism. On 1 May 1892, a
group of Jewish socialist intellectuals who were active in organizing Jewish workers,
gave a series of didactic addresses to their audience in an effort to convince them that
revolutionary change was inevitable.117 Avram Maizel, a jeweller, was the first to speak.
Progress, he stated, was in the immediate offing. Jewish Russian subjects had taken
destiny into their own hands in a variety of ways with the most important being the
rejection of traditional Jewish holidays.118 Tradition had been a retarding influence upon
the Jewish mind; now that holidays and religious practices had been discarded, Jews
could now embrace an international movement whose “holidays” would last for an
eternity.

More than mere acknowledgement of historical inevitability, the socialist

movement demanded action. As an immediate goal, Maizel urged his audience to press
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the government for a constitution which would allow specifically workers’ concerns to be
presented to the government. Ultimately, however, Jewish workers had to demand that
political liberty lead to civil equality. Such developments had already taken place in
Western Europe, and there was no reason why it could not be realized in Russia.119
Arguing in a similar vein, Reuben Gershovsky desired a complete break with
Jewish tradition, contending that the quest to maintain distinctiveness alienated the
community from all other societies and was at the root of Jewish adversity. Now was the
time to combine with others into a socialist international whole. Though some of the
other speakers agreed with him, Gershovsky’s mandate met with considerable opposition
from another speaker, Shmuel Gozhansky. The Jews, he opined, had fought too hard for
their distinctive identity to cast it away for any cause. Why should socialism demand that
they do so? Other groups within the movement retained their distinctive characteristics
without marring the overall international mission; Jews were no different. Within the
context of liberation, the specific needs of the Jewish community needed to be addressed
and in no way would they impede the progress of revolution.120
Of the two positions, Gozhansky’s prevailed in the end with the formation of the
Jewish Bund in 1897. A socialist union of Jews working for the benefit of Jewish
workers, it was certainly not an institution designed to meet short-term goals; a belief
which was impressed upon its membership.121

Furthermore, even though Arkady

Kremer, the “father of the Bund,” and his fellow proto-Bundists were influenced by
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Haskalah and saw it as the means by which the Jewish community could adapt to modern
life, the Bund never perceived itself as a brain trust but as a mass movement. Like the
Russian Populists, Bundists believed that socialism would regenerate Russian society
and, towards that end, education was the key which would guarantee its success.
Concerning Jewish identity, the Bund demonstrated that socialism did not run
counter to traditional Judaism. Granted, most Bundists minimalized their adherence to
the Jewish faith, but even they saw that the liberation socialism would bring, at least in
theory, would allow Jewish identities to flourish. Just as important was that the Jews of
Russia were now open to the international network of socialist organizations which
existed in France, Germany, Switzerland, and elsewhere. The international window for
which the Jewish intelligentsia had been striving now had the promise of being realized.

Coal and Railroads: The Pillars of Imperial Russia

If we retreat from the projected future to economic reality, there was some hope
for those Jews who were young, able and desperate for employment.

Making the trip

south, those who arrived at the coal mines of the Donbass-Dnepr bend found that their
wages would be sufficient to sustain their families.122

Employment for a Jew either in

the mines or the steel mills was fairly easy. At least in the beginning, the development of
southern Russia appeared to promise the Jews greater opportunities and prosperity than
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had heretofore been accorded them. With the coming of railroads and the opening of new
mines and factories came the establishment of schools, hospitals and utilities which
eventually created a number of small municipalities. Often, Jews worked in proximity to
Russians and Ukrainians, a condition which always held the prospect for violence, and
indeed there were incidents. Nevertheless, the condition of Jewish workers tended to
improve and progress made in terms of relative acceptance by their co-workers. As could
be expected, disputes between workers and factory owners abounded, not to mention
those which erupted between skilled and unskilled workers. In the latter instances, the
skilled workers tended to side with the Jews who, eventually, were regarded for their
educated and urbanized demeanors.123

Furthermore, as a tenuous trust developed

between Jews and Russians in this region, the Jews formed the intellectual leadership in
such groups as the Social Democrats. Within its ranks, Russians and Jews, along with a
number of Ukrainians, realized their common cause which diminished the barriers
separating these groups to a limited degree, and yet they could be raised again at the
slightest provocation. Not blind to history, the Jewish socialist intelligentsia rationalized
that some movement in labor relations was better than ossification, and the Jews needed
these Christian workers as allies. Like their Polish coreligionists, the Jews of Russia
were seeking ingress into Russian politics in the hope that their status could be improved
and their identity gains safeguarded. In order to affect this, they needed the support of
non-Jews in creating mass political movements capable of bringing this about.124
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Particularly after 1895, Jewish organizers intensified their efforts in promoting this
design.
Though not a Jew himself, Alexander I. Fenin (1866-1945) spent much of his
adult life as a mining engineer in southern Russia and had a number of Jewish colleagues.
From his perspective, the young Russians who toiled side by side with the Jews and
Ukrainians thought it their mission to take an active part in restructuring Russian
economic and industrial life.125

Honor associated with labor, coupled with a

psychological need to forge an original Russian nationalism, made up the atmosphere of
the mines during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Given the relatively low
educational level among the miners, unique notions about labor and industry developed.
For instance, with the rapid expansion of railroads in Russia, some miners came to
believe that an engineer was somehow a “money grubber” whose labor, in comparison to
theirs, did not justify his wages.126 Fenin excused such conceptions on the grounds that
these peasants had little understanding of the changes occuring around them which were
indeed momentous. Both railroads and coal, vital to Russia’s growing industrial base,
were indebted to foreign banks as well as native ones, some of which were Jewishowned.127 With the quantities of coal, iron ore and flux being mined and the vast
distances between the mines and factories, a well-developed rail network was essential.
Even so, the success of the Russian infrastructure at this time rested upon the mining
communities which nurtured it.
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A close friend of Fenin’s and fellow mining engineer was Leo G. Rabinovich.
Rabinovich was a Jew and, like Fenin, spent as much time in the mine shaft as he did
topside. Though engineers ranked above the men they directed, there developed a bond
between them, a comraderie which recognized few differences, including religion and
ethnicity on occasion. Fenin recounted the day that Rabinovich earned his men’s lasting
respect. Often disputes over the practice of giving miners part of their pay and sending
the remainder to their families led to short-term strikes. In and of themselves, these
temporary work stoppages amounted to little but, as Fenin pointed out, the resolution of
the dispute lay in the ritual of settlement. On this particular occasion in the early 1890’s,
Rabinovich was in the process of negotiating a settlement with the strike leader when the
latter blew the smoke from his cigarette into his face. Without hesitation, Rabinovich
snatched the cigarette from the miner’s mouth and threw it to the ground. That action
soon settled the strike and Rabinovich earned the respect of all present.128 As an odd
corollary to this incident, the peasants of Chutino, who had always been on good terms
with the miners and Leo Rebinovich, appointed him chairman of the building committee
for their new Orthodox church. In their minds, no one else was more suited for the
position and, after all, he was a friend to everyone. Granted, this was a rare exception to
the rule and yet, amidst the anti-Jewish violence and passions simmering just below the
surface, communion between Jews and Christians was at least possible, even if it were
unlikely to become a widespread phenomenon.
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In isolated instances, goodwill between Russians and Jews prevailed, but as the
Russian government became more adamant in building an efficient rail system and
incurred greater debt to Jewish financiers in the process, amity would become a scarce
commodity. Perhaps Finance Minister Sergei Witte (1892-1903), more so than any other
figure in Alexander III’s administration, understood the precarious nature of the economy
and attempted, through his own ingenuity and negotiating with Baron de Rothschild, to
build a viable rail infrastructure. To his credit, he made the Southwestern Railway, which
had been operating at a loss, one of the more profitable lines in the Empire through the
imposition of freight tariffs and offering loans on grain in transit to potential shippers.129
Within a short time, he was able to increase revenue to nearly double the value of assets.
Because of this miraculous feat, Ivan Vyshnegradskii, Witte’s predecessor as Finance
Minister (1886-1891), called upon him to establish an official Railroad Department in
1889.

Working through the Baranov Commission, Witte imposed a unified freight

schedule over the Empire’s entire rail network and, by 1890, had all but placed every rail
line under government control. To be sure, all appeared to be secure on the surface, but
even Witte’s talents could not overcome some of the more fundamental problems. First
of all, cost overruns in construction and maintenance were endemic.130 Reluctant to part
with any of its gold reserves, the government imposed bare budgets upon contractors and
engineers which resulted in an inefficient and, in parts, dangerous railroad system. Since
native financial capital on a par with that possessed by Lazar Poliakov and Jan Bloch was

129

Theodore von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York: Atheneum Press,
1969), p. 47.
130
Ibid., p. 233.

382
scarce, Witte had little choice but to seek funds from the most prominent of Russia’s
foreign creditors, the Baron de Rothschild.
Purchasing Russian state bonds was only part of the Baron’s interest in the
Empire.

Railroads in Russia, given its vast mineral resources, was an investment

opportunity which could not be bypassed. Specifically, de Rothschild saw considerable
potential in the Baku oilfields. Kerosene had a ready market in Europe and Russia could
offer a steady supply. Initially, there was the logistical problem of transporting the
kerosene from the fields to market; one which de Rothschild resolved by advancing loans
to Russian refiners for the purchase of tanker cars.131 Despite his wealth, he did not act
alone. Foreign investment in Russia’s railroads accounted for fifty percent of the outlay,
a condition which came about through Witte’s creation of joint-stock banks in which
accounts to industrial clients were secured by stock shares. Even so, for all of his careful
economic planning, he could not forstall the eventual disaster of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad. Everything from cost overruns to shoddy and delayed construction was laid at
his feet and, eventually, brought about his downfall as Finance Minister.

Poliakov,

Bloch and de Rothschild were three very wealthy Jewish financiers which Witte, by all
rights, enlisted to save the very “veins” of Russia’s nascent industrial modernization, and
yet even in this positive light, circumstances conspired to rob them of a positive image in
Russian eyes.

The Persistence of “Otherness”: The Jews in Russian Eyes
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What were Russian Jews to think?

In one instance, they were ripe for

Russification and in another, held at arm's length.132 The Poliakov brothers had supplied
Russia with its "veins of iron" and yet their educational partnership with de Hirsch and
the Foundation garnered little official support.

Even the much-celebrated and

Rothschild-backed Alliance Israelite Universelle was seen as a weak weapon in the battle
against Russian anti-Semitism.133 Perhaps the most perplexing was the government's
own investigation of the Blood Libel in which officials confirmed its impossibility and
yet Pavolacki Krushevan, the formulator of the infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion,
could claim that he had discovered how Jews made wine without grapes and be
believed.134 Old superstitions died hard if they died out at all, and regarding Jewish
images in Russian eyes, few notions would have wanted for immortality.
Popular attitudes ranged from admiration to disparagement with room enough
even for disinterest. It was indisputable that Jews were considered different in every
conceivable respect. For instance, their supposedly remarkable resistance to various
diseases was rationalized as a genetic and environmental adaptation to their squalid living
conditions. During the 1880-82 scarlet fever epidemic, it was pointed out that the Jewish
mortality rate was much lower than that among the Christians.135 To the simple observer,
there was no other plausible explanation. Continued contact with the Russian population
131
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and proximate residence, some opined, would impair this immunity and, as proof, it was
mentioned that in the 1884-5 Podolsk smallpox epidemic both Jewish and Christian
populations living in close proximity to one another suffered at a ratio nearing 1:1.
Superior constitutions or not, one area where Jews were inferior to other groups,
according to L.S. Minor, was in their neurological makeup. In his essay on the subject he
observed that Jews suffered from chronic hysteria and that this trait was most acute in
adult males.136 Proof was in observation. In the marketplace, they stood apart from
others waving their hands and posturing in uncontrolled emotional outbursts in
incomprehensible gibberish, clearly these were outward manifestations of a nervous
disorder, but Jews were a queer lot prone to pathological inconsistency. Alcoholism
among the Jews should have been more prominent since it was a consequence of weakwilledness and yet it was not at all pervasive among the Jewish population. Minor had to
admit that after he had conducted a long-term study of Russians and Jews, a higher
proportion of the former suffered from alcoholism than the latter, all but invalidating his
thesis of Jews being endemic neurotics. Reluctant to abandon his initial supposition, he
could not deny his research findings, a quandary with which he struggled for several
pages. Finally, unable to resolve the issue one way or the other, he concluded his
disquisition on a neutral note.

Greener Pastures Over There: The Myth and Reality of Jewish Life in America
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There had to be a place in the world where Jews were not subject to stringent
scrutiny for the sole purpose of exposing their imagined inadequacies. Palestine may
have been alluring to some but America seemed more appealing. Resources there were
thought to be plentiful as well as land, and opportunities for social and intellectual
advancement were believed to be limitless. Alas, many could not make the trip but, for
others, emigration to der goldener land was possible though, like with Rehovot, some
pioneers had to lead the way. Though not every Russian Jewish emigrant who landed at
Castle Rock, New Jersey or Ellis Island was a Talmud scholar, the Hebrew-langauge
press, more so than its Russian and Yiddish counterparts, reported on conditions in the
United States and what Jews could expect. First of all, Hebrew literacy in Russia and
Eastern Europe was not widespread, and considering that yearly subscription to such
publications as Ha Meliz and Ha Zefirah were between five and six kopecks, few could
afford them.137 An explanation for this limited appeal was that the Jews who would
eventually travel and settle in America would need an intellectual elite to lead them and,
prior to their arrival, address and hopefully remedy any major difficulties. A number of
the Hebrew-literate intelligentsia had the financial means to make the trip and, ostensibly,
the linguistic skills beyond Hebrew to make inroads in the extant Jewish community
there. Even among them, optimism was forever in bloom and, consequently, ripe for
defoliation.
Established American Jews greeted the new immigrants tepidly at best and, as
reported in Ha Zefirah, insisted that they give up all of their cultural characteristics as
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soon as possible.138

This same publication also reported that in Chicago, German-

American member of B'nai B'rith refused to grant a charter to Polish and Russian Jews
desirous of establishing their own lodge because, from their perspective, these Jews were
unfit for membership in the Brotherhood.139 Even in America, old attitudes were still in
evidence though, in time, they would either disappear or become benign. What shocked
newly-arrived Russian Jews more so than harsh treatment at the hands of other Jews were
the curious innovations in Jewish rituals and customs which exceeded their imaginations.
On 1 August 1882, Ha Meliz reported that it was not uncommon for ritual
slaughterers in America to wear earrings, be clean shaven, cut their earlocks and, most
surprising, men and women were seen sitting together during Shabbat services. Some
Jewish men had even had the audacity, as in Cincinnati, to pray without skull caps.140
Confusing matters further was the notion of American Reform Judaism which most
Russians found perplexing.

Had the matter remained so, experience might have

unravelled the mystery but, in 1879, two events occured which caused long-standing
ripples in the Jewish psyche. Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise, the founder of Hebrew Union
College in Cincinnati, according to Ha Zefirah, not only permitted his daughter to marry
a Christian but also blessed the union.141 Conservative sensibilites barely had time to
receive this when it was learned that a bowl of boiled shrimp had been served at the
reception of HUC's inaugural commencement.142 Had the observation of Ahad ha-Am
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come to pass? Ginzburg had once wondered if it was possible within Reform Judaism to
be Jewish and not Jewish simultaneously.143 Ha Zefirah went even further by claiming
that Rabbi Wise was worse than Pharaoh, and that from all appearances, the Jewish
identity in America was in greater peril than it was in Russia. Even so, the country could
not be discounted completely because Jewish hopes were far from extinction. In the
United States, there was still promise of a Jewish future; the soil was ripe for germination
and renewal and, in 1887, these sentiments were verified with the establishment in New
York of the Jewish Theological Seminary.
There was no disputing the conservative natures of these publications and yet, in
their peculier compositions, each made allowances for change.

Conceded, worship

without skull caps and the serving of treyf at a Jewish function would never be condoned,
yet both publications advocated Judaic and secular studies for American Jewry.
America's promise of a Jewish future was more secure and immediate than Palestine's in
the 1880's and '90's. Of course, modernity has some disquieting aspects but without them
Judaism could not flourish. If the Jews had learned any lessons from history it was that
the times were ever-changing, and if Jews and Judaism were viable and organic, they too
had to redefine themselves in every age and this one was no different than any other, past
or future.

Jewish Identity in Russian Poland
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If the fortunes of Russian Jewry at home and in America had appeared odd and
uncertain at times, the condition of Polish Jewry in the last two decades of the nineteenth
century took some unusual turns of its own. Though they had been given their civil
rights in 1862, the Jews of Poland had gained little from that advantage by the 1880’s and
‘90’s. Every gain had been a struggle. In 1861-62 and again in 1863, there had been a
sense of fraternity between Poles and Jews; a relationship which, after 1864, had cooled
considerably.144

Largely responsible for this frigid estrangement was the incessant

interference of Russian officialdom. Though a Polish-Jewish reconcilliation appeared
unlikely, it was, nevertheless, a possibility which prompted the Russians to go to
considerable lengths in promoting friction between the two communities.145 Antipathy
was omnipresent, but Polish-Jewish relations never reached a state of complete
ossification, particularly with the coming of mass politics in the 1880’s. Ethnicity, more
so than any other, became a key issue in Russian Poland which prompted some Jews to
become Poles of a sort by converting to Catholicism and adopting Polish ways and
surnames. Those who elected to do so, however, constituted a negligible minority. More
significantly, Warsaw, the heart of Polish politics, had a sizable population of what
Jewish and Polish proponents of assimilation termed “Poles of the Mosaic faith.”146 In
the pages of Israelita, a Jewish assimilationist weekly, Dr. Ludwik Nathanson espoused
the importance of Polish identity, but he had joined a battle he could not win. First of all,
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with the influx of Jews into Warsaw from Lithuania, the definition of “Jew” became quite
diverse as the decade progressed.

Also, Jews desiring to assimilate Polish ways

encountered stiff opposition by the leaders of the Endecja who, like Roman Dmowski,
claimed that assimilated Jews could not share the Polish consciousness and, therefore,
could never be considered Poles.147 Compounding the problem, religion alone was not a
sufficient determinant and language, a crucial component in identity formation, also
proved unreliable.148 At this time, Warsaw’s inhabitants spoke and were literate in
Russian, Polish, Yiddish, German and Hebrew.149 Jewish particularism became even
more obscured with the coming of Russian-speaking Litvaks and their particular Jewish
culture. The Warsaw assimilationists were at a loss as to where to turn. Not only was the
importance of being Jewish consequently amplified; so too was the confusion over what
constituted Jewish life and culture. Warsaw was a magnet for Jews coming from various
parts of the Empire who brought with them other modes of Jewish life apart from
traditionalist and assimilationist ones. More identifying options were made available, and
this diversity had the potential of preserving Polish Jewry just as it had done so for the
Jews of Russia, but the politically-minded assimilationists anticipated the worst. In their
minds, a coherent and unified identity was imperative if the Jews were to enter politics
and, ostensibly, improve their collective and individual lots in life. Be that as it may, it
was becoming evident even to the most ardent supporters of a single Jewish identity that
such a notion was a fantasy. Diversified Jewry in the political sphere soon gave rise to a
diverse Jewish press.
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As with politics, the language of publication did not always distinguish the Jewish
press from its Polish counterpart in the 1880’s.150 Some Polish-language journals were
clearly published for Jewish consumption. In time, however, with the adoption and
promotion of Yiddish, a distinct Jewish popular press was established as well.151 By the
1890’s Yiddish had actually been accorded a measure of respectability in most Jewish
circles.152 Its strongest association was with the socialist movement because it bound
together Jews of all intellectual, social and political backgrounds. Warsaw was indeed a
polyglot city and its Jewish community equally so, yet Yiddish was the Jewish lingua
franca which, not surprising, contributed to the preservation and maintenace of an
imagined community amid diversification. Mass politics used Yiddish to promote its
aims, a recognition of the increasingly important cultural role of Yiddish as the language
of diaspora nationalism.

Conclusion

By 1894, had Russian Jews won or lost? The answer depends upon how one
values their gains against unrequited desires.

For their labors, they had made

considerable progress initially in education and employment and had proven themselves
intellectually capable in a number of fields prior to having almost all of that taken from
them in the wake of the 1881-82 pogroms. While cleaning up the physical debris left
behind, the Jewish intelligentsia had to perform the same service regarding the remnant
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psychological rubble by facing the challenges posed by apostates and opportunists who,
under the guise of reform, were sowing dissension. That situation was met and
conquered, but it became apparent that if the Russian Jewish community was to enjoy
guaranteed viability it would have to build bridges to the outside world, an endeavor
which would take substantial energy, sagacity, and trust.
One of the first notable endeavors of this sort came from Vladimir Solov'ev. A
devout Orthodox Christian, he appeared to sympathize with the plight of Russian Jewry,
though this sentiment carried with it an ulterior motive. Quite simply, he surmised,
Russian Jews suffered as they did because their faith was not in keeping with the times
nor had it been since the birth of Christianity.

If only they would cast off their

boneheadedness and recognize the similarities between their tenets and the
deuteronomical Christian ones and make the logical step by joining the Christian faith.
Careful not to assume an imperative tone, Solov'ev was offering his hand to any Jew who
would take it.
Wishing to realize Jewish assimilation to Russian society, Baron Maurice de
Hirsch actually thought that he was honoring the wishes of both his coreligionists and the
Russian government.

More than a business proposition, the Maurice de Hirsch

Foundation and its schools were to provide Russian Jews with vocational skills which
would make them employable in Russian society. Considering that Tsar Alexander III
had given him his approval in November 1887, the Baron did not imagine that serious
difficulties would arise as long as he acted within Russian law. For a variety of reasons,
his Foundation suddenly lost official favor and no clear reasons were forthcoming as to
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why this had come to pass. At a loss for what to do, de Hirsch eventually dissolved the
Foundation and admitted defeat.
As inauspicious as conditions were for Russian Jewry, relatively few sought
Christian conversion as a remedy. Most bridge builders, such as Haim Zhitlowski and
Simon Dubnow, sought an accommodation with the larger Russian society as a distinct
community. It was hoped that this could be realized on a number of levels. Zhitlowski's
advocacy of Yiddish, for instance, had the potential for being an intellectual tie with
binding power, drawing together Jews from all strata, especially Jewish workers who
were starting to take interest in the rising socialist movement. Along with Moses Leib
Lilienblum, Zhitlowski saw in socialism Judaism's secular salvation. By placing religion
in the background, the Jews of Russia would have been freer in their associations with
Russian socialists, sharing similar frustrations and aspirations, and hopefully achieving
tangible civic rights. Despite episodic instances of communion in southern Russia and
other industrial regions, however, centuries-old superstitions, antagonisms, and distrust
made the lasting realization of this dream an impossibility.
Self-help was a notion so embedded in the Jewish experience that it could very
well have served as its synonym. Zionism, especially in the last two decades of the
nineteenth century, was just such a movement and appeared to be one of the more
intelligent courses for Russian Jewry. Perhaps Palestine was an arid wilderness but it
was also a land without pogroms, prejudice, and a place where a Jew could be a Jew
without restriction. A facile representation to be sure, Russian Zionists nevertheless, and
Ahad ha-Am in particular prior to 1892, envisioned the Jewish homeland as being little
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different from this idealized sketch. Such visions originated from the frustration and
desperation surrounding them, and it mattered not if one lacked actual verification of
conditions there; it had to be better than what they now experienced. Added to this was
the wish and the promise of the Passover feast known to every Jew: "Next year in
Jerusalem, next year in the Holy Land." Emotions alone inspired a desire to make aliya,
and if this was to be so, Asher Ginzburg wanted to ensure that he was not sending his
coreligionists to a land in which life would be untenable. When he discovered just that
and shared this knowledge with all members of B'nai Moshe, he may have saved some
lives but lost his organization.
If Palestine was not yet ready for a mass aliya, the United States appeared to be
more receptive. As Ha Zephirah and Ha Meliz reported, however, the reception was not
always an amicable one and the social conditions in America were unlike any that
Russian Jews would have experienced in their lives. Synagogues without balconies and
sanctuaries without partitions allowed husbands and wives to sit together, a strange
innovation which was not always to the tastes of Russian Jewish visitors or newly-arrived
immigrants. Furthermore, Jewish men without beards or earlocks, the serving of treyf at
Jewish functions and, perhaps more horrific, the possibility of marriages with Christians,
made it appear as if the Jewish world was being turned upside down. Even so, both
publications still maintained, with some reservation, that for the time being America
provided the most stable environment for Russian Jews until Palestine was capable of
receiving Jewish immigrants.
For Russian Jews who could not make the trip to America or Palestine
immediately owing to financial resources or other affairs, Poland served as a temporary
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residence. Though Jews in Russian Poland had actually received rights in 1862, they had
derived few benefits. As an added burden, Russian authorities made every effort to
prevent any meaningful collaboration from developing between the two groups but, as
had been true in Russia, there were isolated instances of cooperation which, at the very
least, maintained a social balance with few major violent outbreaks.
At the end of this thirteen-year period, Russian Jews had little to cheer them save
that their fundamental goal of communal integrity had been secured if only in a
fragmentary form. Had they acquired rights commensurate with those of Russians, they
would have had the added protection of Russian law, but that was not to be. Later on,
those Jews who stayed behind would find their niches not only in the Jewish Bund but
also within the Bolshevik ranks and the Jewish Section of the Communist Party until
Stalin decided that they constituted a threat. Even emigration was an identity-preserving
measure though, on first glance, it might not appear so. Though the Russian Jewish
community lost their intellects and talents when they left the Empire, these emigrants,
whether they settled in Rehovot or elsewhere in Palestine or the United States,
transplanted Russian Jewry in places where it could bloom anew and propagate. Now
some would argue that upon leaving Russia, these Jews ceased to have any identity which
would incorporate Russia or Russian in any way since, after all, it was a convenient
locative designation more than a cultural one. In response to this position, it should be
pointed out that there had been a Jewish presence in Russia for ten centuries and the
"battle" for Jewish distinctiveness in Russia did not preclude the absorption of elements
from the numerically dominant and often hostile culture. These elements made up part of
the baggage that the immigrants would carry with them.

Certainly, citizenship
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documents would identify these individuals as Palestinians and Americans to which they
might add the designation "Jew," but what of it? Though historical amnesia might have
erased much of the cultural lucidity invested in their ancestors, there was no denying that
succeeding generations provided Russian Jewry with a viable continuum both in Russia
and abroad.

CONCLUSION
Among some Russian Jews and Slavophiles, there was a shared illusion of an
original and homogenous version of their respective communities to which they believed
that they were destined to return and all would be right with the world. If indeed some
Jews still adhered to that notion in 1894, it paled when confronted with the reality of
multiple identities. Still, there was some comfort to be derived from the realization that
though there was no one impeccable definition of the Russian Jewish community, it was
a community all the same. Even the “imagined community” was more than an historical
myth; it was and had always been a state of mind and the inspiration for the Jewish
community to adapt to ever-changing circumstances in its attempt to return to a more
pristine state.
As a natural addendum to community, a number of Russian Jews preceeded to
broaden their respective outlooks in embracing the grander notion of nation and
nationality. According to Theodore Weeks, Russian authorities never arrived at a precise
definition of “nation” in late Imperial Russia; an obstacle which Benedict Anderson’s
conception of nation as an imagined political community which is inherently limited and
sovereign seems to circumvent. Applied to Imperial Russia, “limited” meant that the
community was distinct from the larger Russian society, and this was certainly true of the
Jews. In that same vein, “sovereign” implied a degree of self-determination which the
Jews possessed in creating their multiple identites.

Despite the concerns of Simon

Dubnow and some traditionalists that this fragmentation was the death knell of Russian
Jewry, the community showed no signs of imminent collapse and actually weathered
several storms throughout the nineteenth century.
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In analyzing the metamorphosis of the Russian Jewish identity in the nineteenth
century, it was necessary to begin with a mental fiction. The myth of Jewish wholeness
and its subsequent shattering during the 1648 Khmelnytsky Rising illustrated not only the
physical dispersal of the Eastern European Jewish community but also the beginning of
its intellectual quest for restoration. Amidst their ruined homes, Jewish survivors also
suffered the loss of their intellectual confidence, and this vulnerability made them
receptive to the messages of Shabbetai Zevi and Jacob Frank. Each of them promised to
produce a pure form of Judaism which would stand all contest and their followers,
desperate for guidance and stability, followed them and, eventually, became
disillusioned. Hasidism, as formulated by Israel ben Eliazer, the Baal Shem Tov, was
actually a sincere attempt to present Judaism to and the investment of a Jewish identity in
those Jews who did not have the benefit of formal Jewish education or the means to
acquire it.

Of these three movements, it held the greatest promise of preserving

communal integrity, and its success made it the target of Rabbinical Judaism which
recognized no other version of the faith aside from its own.
Profound concerns within the Jewish community, Tsar Alexander I (1801-1825)
was only intersted in transforming them into a Russified (i.e. loyal) Jewry given their
numbers and their settlement along the Empire’s vulnerable western frontier. Determined
to make the Jews “modern people,” the Tsar and his officials enacted legislation and
established programs which allowed them to integrate into Russian society and become
assets to the state while keeping them at a distance. Aside from the practical and military
benefits to the Empire in the face of Napoleon’s invasion, there was little else he could do
with 800,000 Ashkenazim which his grandmother, Catherine the Great, had laid at the
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Imperial doorstep. Motivated by millenarian zeal inspired by Madame de Krudener and
Reverand Empaytaz, Alexander believed that it was his mission to expose the Jews to the
glories of Christianity.

In 1817, the Society for Israelite Christians was created

specifically for the realization of that purpose promising the Jews of Russia that their
quality of life would improve substantially from what it had been previously should they
join. In response to these legislative entreaties, the Jews of Russia were largely skeptical,
and given the chronic maladministation of Jewish affairs in the early 1820’s, few
entrusted their futures to the Tsar.
Mysticism and delusions of Divine Providence were replaced subsequently by the
brutal practicality of Nicholas I (1825-1855). It was during his tenure that the Jews of
Russia developed their sense of self-reliance and resilience which would carry them
through subsequent decades. The challeges to Jewish identity and integrity were not long
in coming.

Beginning in 1827 with the Jewish Recruitment Ukase and continuing

through to 1831 and the suppression of the Polish Revolt, Nicholas and his ministers took
an active hand in attempting to refashion the Jews of Russia into Russians with a Jewish
accent. Though not an immediate presence in all official actions concerning the Jews,
Nicholas's character, nevertheless, determined the temper and tone of their treatment. He
was a man who, in one respect, expected to be obeyed without question or resistance. In
the military, this was standard and the Tsar saw little difference between the barracks and
Russian society. Even so, his rigidity was not immune to restrained laxity, and as the
1830’s progressed, changes within the Jewish community encouraged Nicholas to relent
gradually. For their part, Jewish intellectuals learned to adapt to the contours of Russian
government and were able to enter into a “blind partnership” which not only resulted in
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safeguarding the Jewish community against complete assimilation but also inaugurated
one of the more unusual developments in Russian history.
Jewish initiatives in educational reform first caught Nicholas I’s attention in the
mid-1830’s. The curriculum of the Odessa School, which had actually been established
in the early 1820’s, emphasized modern subjects over traditional Torah and Talmud
studies with an eye towards preparing Jews for the modern world. Not only did Nicholas
approve of this curriculum but made ready provision for the establishment of several
Jewish schools designed on the Odessa model. With equal ardor, he endorsed a German
translation of the Talmud and advocated the teaching of German as a modern and
scientific language. All of this progress, however, did not eradicate Nicholas's suspicious
propensities, and his reservations and anxieties began to show in the late 1830’s and
continued throughout the next decade.
Perhaps the most pressing issue was one which concerned not only the Jews but
the nature of Russian society as a whole.

Order and discipline were essential to

autocratic viability, but if Russian society was to remain viable, it had to be allowed to
breathe.

It was clear that certain liberties had to be accorded the governed, Jews

included, but the question remained as to how these liberties could be reconciled with
autocratic power. Furthermore, with the coming of Dr. Maxwell Lilienthal in 1840,
Russia’s Jewish affairs were placed on the international stage for all to see. That the
Jews themselves appeared to be directing their own reform was both heartening and
disconcerting because there was the potential danger that the autocracy would find itself
chasing after Jewish initiatives in an effort to regulate them. To head off such a scenario,
Sergei Uvarov was authorized in 1843 to convene a rabbinical conference in St.
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Petersburg in order to discover just what was on the minds of the Empire’s Jewish leaders
and how their designs could be brought in line with the government’s Jewish policies.
The results of this meeting made Nicholas more determined to bring the Jews under
control.
If he thought that the influence of Jewish modernists would diminish the Jewish
identity in Russia, Nicholas was soon disappointed and resorted to desperate measures.
Particularly in the last three years of his reign, proscriptions against various rituals, such
as brides shaving their heads prior to going under the wedding canopy and the blending
together of Crown rabbis and Crown Jewish teachers, were both fantastic and futile. Of
the two, the last would have had a profound impact on the Jews of Russia if the Tsar’s
death had not prevented its implementation. Nevertheless, Russian Jewry endured.
During the tenure of Alexander II (1856-1881), Jewish expression and frustration
were both running at fever pitch. Given his demeanor, the new Tsar was believed to be
more liberal than his predecessors and Jews even dared to think that their emancipation
was in the immediate offing. Prior to the Polish Revolt (1863-4), Alexander remarked
that the Russian press had to be more open, Jewish recruitment obligations were
ameliorated, and the serfs were finally emancipated. All of these were taken as positive
indicators of reforms to come, but after the suppression of the January Rising, Russian
officialdom became more conservative and reserved in terms of granting liberties.
Despite this, Jews were given educational stipends and press liberties equal to
those of Russian editors and journalists. Through this medium, the Jews of Russia were
able to engage in self-examination, criticism, and intellectual discourse in front of a wide
audience. Such issues as education, rabbinical reform, and employment were freely aired
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and, in some instances, garnered official attention and improvement. Primarily, the press
was perhaps the best anti-revolutionary policy devised by the government. By allowing a
fair degree of expression within clearly deliniated legal boundaries, concerns, anxieties,
frustrations, and even humor, satire, and creative impulses had an outlet which reduced
tensions and gave officials insights as to what the governed were thinking. Granted, this
last "benefit" was an area which tested Jewish and Russian editors' creativity in
manipulating government censors, and the authorities probably suspected as much.
Liberty of the press also meant that apostates could present their programs to the
Jewish reading public. Both Jacob Brafman and Rabbi Ippolit Lieutostanskii made ready
use of this medium for their parochial benefit but so too did their opponents. What
resulted was that the battle for Jewish identity and integrity which had been confined
mostly to intellectual circles was now aired for all to see and, if inclined, to join. It
cannot be denied that the Jewish public was well informed about the dangers of apostates
and their pseudo-Jewish reform movements but, inundated to the point of saturation,
apathy was inevitable. Some wondered what all of this energy had to show for its
expenditure.

Had the Jewish condition improved?

Was there indeed a future?

Unbeknownst to most Russian Jews, Tsar Alexander II had implemented a design for
limited representative government on the morning of 1 March 1881; a measure which
would die with him a few hours later on a snow-covered boulevard in St. Petersburg.
Several years after the assassination, few would have remembered the name of
Heisse Helfman, the only Jew among the conspirators, who perished in a basement cell in
the Peter and Paul Fortress. Even so, the presence of one Jew was pretext enough to
incite the pogroms which Alexander III (1881-1894) condemned but did little to quell.
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Perhaps there was some truth to the statement he gave a Jewish delegation shortly after
the violence began that Jews were merely an excuse for the disorders. Certainly no philoSemite himself, he often found himself acting as a de facto defender of Russian Jews
because he literally could not afford to do otherwise. Russia’s industrialization was
bankrolled by politically-influential European lenders, many of whom were Jews, a fact
which escaped some of his subordinates. Nikolai Bunge’s supposed revelation of a
Jewish financial plot to take over the Russian government, sporadic pogroms, and the illtimed 1891 expulsion of Jews from Moscow which denied Russia much-needed funds for
famine relief were some of the many pressures with which the Tsar had to contend. In
addition to the Jews local, philantropists such as Baron Lionel de Rothschild and Baron
Maurice de Hirsch were attempting to ameliorate the plight of their Russian
coreligionists. Given his disposition, Alexander probably wondered about the extent of
his authority, and it would not have been unusual for him to discount his arrangement
with de Hirsch over that fundamental concern. By the early 1890's, Jews were present in
every major industrial endeavor despite omnipresent discrimination and not only as
workers but also managers, owners, and lenders.
Neither proximity nor segregation succeeded in eradicating centuries-old
prejudices and instances of violence between Jews and Russians.

Even so, Jewish

persistence eventually contributed to the evolution of Jewish identities on Russian soil.
By 1894, Jewishness had not been reduced to an accent or, as Simon Dubnow had once
feared, been absorbed into the larger Russian society and culture. It had developed
several forms, all equally valid, viable, and distinctly Jewish.

Though emigration
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reduced their physical numbers in Russia, the proliferation of Russian Jewry in Palestine
and the United States guaranteed its viability.
The struggle to maintain Jewish identities had been won but a political foothold
was still wanting. With Jewish emigration swelling during Nicholas II’s reign, a
meaningful political concession which might have stemmed the tide appeared unlikely.
For those remaining in Russia, even the establishment of Jewish sections in the larger
Russian socialist parties did little to advance specific Jewish political aspirations. Some
politically active Jews saw that their eventual placement in the Russian milieu would
probably come about under a predominantly Russian socialist banner and not a Jewish
one. Regardless, what had to be recognized was that the Jewish identities which had
been brought about by various means were themselves a means to achieving the end of a
politically recognized “nation” within a multinational state.
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